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2001 DIGILAW 1811 (RAJ)

Banwari Lal v. Shiv Dayal

2001-11-20

ARUN MADAN

body2001
JUDGMENT 1. - This revision petition arises out of the order dated 4.1.2000 passed by the learned ADJ No.2 Sikar in CMA No. 115/98 whereby he allowed the appeal of the respondent and the petitioners were directed to undergo the sentence of one month each for committing civil contempt of the order of learned Munsiff & Judicial Magistrate (First Class) Danta Ramgarh (Sikar) dated 3.11.1989 and quashed and set-aside the order dated 5.2.1996 of the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Div.) Danta Ramgarh whereby, he rejected the application of the respondent bearing CMA No. 51/92 for punishment of disobedience. 2. The facts which are relevant for deciding this revision petition briefly stated are that in a suit for specific performance and permanent injunction filed by the respondent plaintiff, the trial Court vide its impugned order dated 3.11.1989 decreed suit against petitioner No.1 Banwari Lal, as under:- HINDI MATTER 357458 3. Feeling aggrieved by the order of the trial Court dated 3.11.1989, the petitioner-defendant No.1 filed an appeal bearing No.36/90 before the ADJ Sikar who vide its order dated 8.12.1995 while allowing the appeal No. 36/90 preferred by the petitioners, dismissed the respondent-plaintiff's suit No. 86/1987. It is averred in the petition that SB Civil Second Appeal No. 16/96 filed by the respondent against the order of the appellate Court dated 8.12.1995 is pending adjudication before this Court. 4. It is significant to mention herein that during the pendency of the suit preferred by the respondent, on an application which was filed by petitioner No.1 under Order 41 Rule 5 Civil Procedure Code, the learned appellate Court had stayed the operation and execution of the trial Court's order dated 3.11.1989 vide its order dated 11.12.1989 which remained in force upto the decision of the appeal i.e. on 8.12.1995 passed by ADJ Sikar when the suit of the respondent had itself been dismissed. 5. Pending decision of first appeal notwithstanding the stay in favour of the petitioners, petitioner No.1 executed a registered sale deed of the land in dispute alongwith other adjacent disputed land which had been given in the meantime distinct and separate numbers in the settlement operation in favour of vendee i.e. petitioner Nos. 2 to 4 on 18.8.1992. 6. On 30.11.1992 the respondent filed contempt application before the trial Court contending therein that by execution of the sale deed dated 18.8.1992 the petitioner No.1 as well as petitioner Nos. 2 to 4 on 18.8.1992. 6. On 30.11.1992 the respondent filed contempt application before the trial Court contending therein that by execution of the sale deed dated 18.8.1992 the petitioner No.1 as well as petitioner Nos. 2 to 4 (vendees) have committed wilful disobedience of the judgment & decree of the trial Court dated 3.11.1989. The application was contested by the petitioners though admitting the fact of executing the registered sale deed dated 18.8.1992 but denied the disobedience or having committed civil contempt of trial Court's order dated 3.11.1989. 7. The trial Court after recording the evidence of the parties, rejected the said contempt application of the respondent vide order dated 5.2.1996 holding that there was no allegation against the petitioners that any interference or obstruction was made by them in the use or possession of the land pertaining to respondent Shivdayal hence, no disobedience or contempt of the decree was made out particularly when the impugned order dated 3.11.1989 had already been set-aside in appeal by the appellate Court vide its order dated 8.12.1995. 8. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the trial Court dated 5.2.1996, the respondent preferred an appeal before the leaned ADJ No. 2 Sikar who vide its order dated 4.1.2000 allowed the appeal of the respondent holding the petitioners guilty for committing contempt of trial Court's order dated 3.11.1989 and the petitioners were awarded imprisonment for one month each in civil jail for the alleged disobedience. Hence, this revision petition. 9. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length, examined their rival claims and contentions as well as the legal position at issue. 10. Mr. B.L. Mandhana, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has vehemently contended at the bar that the impugned order of the appellate Court dated 4.1.2000 reversing the order of the trial Court dated 5.2.1996 is grossly illegal, arbitrary, unjust, irrational and suffers from the jurisdictional error. He has further contended that if the impugned order is allowed to stand, it would cause irreparable injury to the petitioners. 11. It is pertinent to mention herein that the aforesaid impugned order of the appellate Court dated 4.1.2000 was in operation and effect till 7.2.2000 when the petition was admitted staying the operation and effect of the impugned order dated 4.1.2000. 12. Mr. 11. It is pertinent to mention herein that the aforesaid impugned order of the appellate Court dated 4.1.2000 was in operation and effect till 7.2.2000 when the petition was admitted staying the operation and effect of the impugned order dated 4.1.2000. 12. Mr. Mandhana further contended that so far as the execution of the sale deed of the disputed land in question, during the pendency of the litigation between the parties is concerned, its execution has not been prohibited by the decree. Hence, in the circumstances, the execution of the sale deed does not amount to disobedience or contempt of the decree. It was further contended by the learned counsel that the impugned order is misconceived, baseless, erroneous and perverse inasmuch as, the learned appellate Court had failed to appreciate an important aspect of the matter that the operation and execution of the decree in a suit for permanent injunction had itself been stayed and hence it could not be said or inferred that the alleged sale deed dated 18.8.1992 was made in violation of the decree as the same was not even in force and in operation at the relevant time. Mr. Mandhana contended in this regard that since there was no decree passed against the judgment-debtor i.e. petitioner No.1 and vendee i.e. petitioner Nos. 2 to 4, the impugned order punishing them for disobedience/contempt of the decree is totally without jurisdiction and preposterous. Alternatively, it has been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners that after passing of the decree what at all remained to be done was the execution thereof. At the most, if the respondents were at all aggrieved, the proper course which he could have been advised of was to proceed in the matter as regards the execution of the decree but not to file a contempt petition. Instead of filing the execution proceedings which he did not, rather preferred contempt application. As there was no stay order in existence restraining the petitioners from executing the sale deed and only the principles of lis-pendence applies; as such it was open to the decree holder (petitioners) to have executed the sale deed in favour of the vendee-petitioner Nos. 2 to 4. 13. Mr. As there was no stay order in existence restraining the petitioners from executing the sale deed and only the principles of lis-pendence applies; as such it was open to the decree holder (petitioners) to have executed the sale deed in favour of the vendee-petitioner Nos. 2 to 4. 13. Mr. R.K. Agrawal, learned counsel for the respondent has controverted the aforesaid contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners and stated that the petitioners have rightly been sentenced to undergo the imprisonment vide the impugned-order in question as there was a clear disobedience of the order dated 3.11.1989 since it was in force and operation when the sale deed dated 18.8.1992 was executed between the parties to transaction. In support of his aforesaid contentions, counsel for the respondent placed reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court in (1) Tyabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and anr. Vs. Hind Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd. AIR 1997 SC 1240 and (2) Kaulashwari Devi (Smt.) and anr. Vs. Nawal Kishore and anr. 1995 Suppl.(1) SCC 141 . 14. In Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla (supra), the Apex Court on the point of contempt observed that interim order of injunction passed in suit was flouted and disobeyed by the defendants. However, the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, even then defendants can be punished for violation of said interim orders. 15. I have perused the ratio of the aforesaid decisions and in utmost regard, I have no hesitation in saying that the facts of the above decisions are not attracted to the instant case and its ratio is distinguishable inasmuch as, in the instant case the injunction/interim order was not in existence of which the disobedience is alleged to have been committed by the defendants (petitioners). 16. In Kaulashwari Devi (Smt.) (supra), the case of the plaintiff before the Apex Court was that the first defendant executed an agreement of sale on 10.9.1969, whereunder he agreed to sell the suit property for a consideration of Rs. 9500. A sum of Rs. 5000 was paid by way of earnest money. The balance was to be paid and the sale deed registered on or before 31.10.1969. Plaintiff's case was that though he called upon the first defendant to execute the sale deed, he did not. He said, he even purchased requisite stamps and was ready with the balance consideration. A sum of Rs. 5000 was paid by way of earnest money. The balance was to be paid and the sale deed registered on or before 31.10.1969. Plaintiff's case was that though he called upon the first defendant to execute the sale deed, he did not. He said, he even purchased requisite stamps and was ready with the balance consideration. The first defendant avoided to execute the sale deed whereupon he issued a notice on 26.12.1969 and filed the suit soon thereafter. The first defendant contested the suit. She complained that the plaintiff played fraud upon her. According to her, some other land was to be sold and she was paid only Rs. 1000. She denied the execution of the agreement of sale sought to be enforced by the plaintiff.The Apex Court observed as under:- "Once it is held that the plaintiff did pay the amount and obtain the sale deed within the period prescribed by the trial court, the main ground upon which the High Court had dismissed his suit becomes untenable. Regarding the absence of averment in the plaint that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, we must say we are not satisfied with the reasoning of the High Court, apart from the fact that the said finding is a halting one. It is evident from the pleadings qua the facts of the case that the plaintiff was anxious at all points of time and was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract". 17. The ratio of the aforesaid decision is not attracted to the instant case as w.e.f. 11.12.1989 when the suit of the plaintiff respondent for specific performance and permanent injunction was stayed upto 8.12.1995 when the original suit came to be dismissed, the very issue was not there. 18. In rebuttal to the above argument of the learned counsel for the respondent, Mr. Mandhana stated that be that as it may, if the petitioners have committed any contempt or disobedience of the order of the subordinate court, it is only the High Court which is empowered to punish the contemner for disobedience. In support of his argument, learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance upon the provisions of Sections 10 & 11 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. 19. In support of his argument, learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance upon the provisions of Sections 10 & 11 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. 19. In order to appreciate the contentions of the either party, I would like to mention the provisions of Sections 10 & 11 of the Contempt of Courts Act which reads as under:- "10. Power of High Court to punish contempts of subordinate Courts.-Every High Court shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority, in accordance with the same procedure and practice, in respect of contempts of Courts subordinate to it as it has and exercises in respect of contempts of itself: Provided that no High Court shall take cognizance of a contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a Court subordinate to it where such contempt is an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code. 11. Power of High Court to try offences committed or offenders found outside jurisdiction.- A High Court shall have jurisdiction to inquire into or try a contempt of itself or of any Court subordinate to it, whether the contempt is alleged to have been committed within or outside the local limits of its jurisdiction, and whether the person alleged to be guilty of contempt is within or outside such limits." 20. From the above, it is clear that in respect of contempt of any order passed by the subordinate courts, it is only the High Court that can take action against condemners since the power to punish is vested with the High Court alone except in cases covered by Section 228 of the Indian Penal Code and Order 39 Rule 2A of the Code of Civil Procedure which stipulate, as under:- "228. Intentional insult or interruption to public servant sitting in judicial proceeding.-Whoever intentionally offers any insult or causes any interruption to any public servant, while such public servant is sitting in any stage of a judicial proceeding, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both". "2-A. Consequence of disobedience or breach of injunction.-(1) In the case of disobedience of any injunction granted or other order made under Rule 1 or Rule 2 or breach of any of the terms on which the injunction was granted or the order made, of the Court granting the injunction or making the order, or any Court to which the suit or proceeding is transferred, may order the property of the person guilty of such disobedience or breach to be attached, and may also order such person to be detained in the civil prison for a term not exceeding three months, unless in the meantime the Court directs his release". 21. From the language of the above proviso to Section 228, it is further dear that the jurisdiction of the High Court would nevertheless be effected on the ground that same facts are required to be investigated either by civil or criminal courts. The law is also well settled that although the High Court has got power and jurisdiction to punish for contempt, such power and jurisdiction will be used by it very sparingly with great care and caution, unless its exercise is absolutely necessary for the proper administration of law and justice. 22. The law is also well settled that the law of contempt is conceived in the public interest where in a case the corporate veil is being blatantly used as a cloak to wilfully disobey the orders of the Court, public interest requires that the corporate veil must be lifted to find out the person who disobeyed the order of the Court. 23. 23. Now, the questions which are relevant for consideration of this Court are that:- (1) as to whether there was any injunction order or bar affecting sale of property in question and who can be made accountable for contempt ?; (2) whether the petitioners could be held guilty of any disobedience or contempt since the plaintiff had himself admitted the factum of sale and that there was no decree prohibiting from transferring, alienation or disposing of the property in question (3) whether the appellate Court was justified in drawing up the contempt proceedings against the petitioners and sentencing them to undergo civil imprisonment for a period of 30 days on the assumption that they had committed disobedience particularly when no injunction order was in existence of which the alleged disobedience could be said to have been committed ? 24. Be that as it may assuming that the petitioners have committed any breach of the order of the trial Court; at the most, the only remedy which the plaintiff could have availed of was to file a contempt petition before the High Court as per the provisions of Sections 10 & 11 of the Contempt of Courts Act rather than preferring the contempt application before the appellate Court; which in my view was not permissible in the eyes of law. 25. Though, according to the provisions of Section 11 of the Contempt of Courts Act, the High Court cannot interfere or take cognizance in such matters in which a contempt is alleged to have been committed in respect of a Court subordinate to it where such contempt is an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code. But, this is also not the position here as the petitioner had not committed any contempt muchless criminal contempt for which he has been punished. 26. Be that as it may, if any criminal contempt is alleged to have been committed there should have been cogent reasons or circumstances explained on record before they could be punished for alleged disobedience of the Court's order. 27. My aforesaid observations are fortified from the judgment of the Apex Court in (3) S. Abdul Karim Vs. 26. Be that as it may, if any criminal contempt is alleged to have been committed there should have been cogent reasons or circumstances explained on record before they could be punished for alleged disobedience of the Court's order. 27. My aforesaid observations are fortified from the judgment of the Apex Court in (3) S. Abdul Karim Vs. M.K. Prakash AIR 1976 SC 859 , where the Apex Court reversed the order of the Kerala High Court in facts observing therein as follows:- "(1) that the reply given by the Magistrate was sufficient to dispel the suspicion that in making the order, in regard to the delivery of the timber to R-1 he was actuated by a motive to impede or obstruct or defeat the course of justice. (2) that in making the wrong order regarding delivery of the timber, the Magistrate was not actuated by any improper motive or deliberate design to thwart, impede, obstruct or interfere with the course of justice or to circumvent or defeat the proceedings in revision pending before the High Court. (3) that since the Magistrate had at the most committed only a technical contempt of High Court, in absence of any mens rea penal action was not called for". 28. From the perusal of the aforesaid decision of the Apex Court, it is clear that the power and jurisdiction of the High Court in contempt matters is restricted only to those cases where the criminal contempt of the order of subordinate court calling for violation of any of the provisions of the Indian Penal Code having been committed by the contemner meaning thereby that the High Court can only interfere in such matters in which the alleged criminal contempt has been committed; which is not the position in the instant case. 29. The appellate Court thus, in my view, has not at all looked into this salient aspect of the matter that on the date of execution of the sale deed i.e. on 18.8.1992 between petitioner No.1 and petitioner Nos. 2 to 4, the impugned order dated 3.11.1989 which was decided against the petitioners was subsequently stayed in favour of the petitioners vide order of the trial Court dated 11.12.1989 and ultimately the appeal bearing No. 36/90 preferred by the petitioners in the original suit came to be allowed while suit preferred by the respondent bearing No. 86/1987 was dismissed on 8.12.1995. 30. 30. Hence, it is abundantly dear that on date of execution of sale deed dated 18.8.92, no injunction order restraining the petitioners from alienating, transferring or disposing of the property in question was in existence, therefore, no question for disobedience of the order dated 3.11.1989 had arisen. 31. It is further significant to mention that the execution of the sale deed dated 18.8.1992 which was executed in between the petitioners and the respondent-plaintiff was with regard to the land bearing Khasra No. 475/539 khatedari rights of which stood vested with the petitioner No.1 whereas, the land bearing Khasra No. 474 was in the khatedari of the respondent. Before execution of the aforesaid sale deed though the petitioner No.1 agreed to sell 10 biswa of land of Khasra No. 475/539 to the respondent but when the respondent had not deposited the sale consideration, the sale deed between the petitioner No.1 and the respondent could not be executed. Later on, petitioner No.1 disposed of the said part of the land of Khasra No. 475/539 to petitioner Nos. 2 to 4 upon failure of execution of earlier sale deed between petitioner No.1 and the respondent. Hence, it is clear that the respondent was never either before the sale of the land in dispute or after sale of the land in possession of the said land. When the respondent was never in possession of the disputed land and khatedari rights of which were already vested with the petitioner No.1, it was open to the petitioner No.1 to have executed the sale deed in anybody's favour; particularly when no injunction order was there prohibiting the petitioners from doing so. 32. Hence, it was not open to the respondent to take the plea of having the petitioners interfered in the possession of the land in dispute and the question with regard to the petitioners having committed any breach of the order dated 3.11.1989 would also not arise. 33. 32. Hence, it was not open to the respondent to take the plea of having the petitioners interfered in the possession of the land in dispute and the question with regard to the petitioners having committed any breach of the order dated 3.11.1989 would also not arise. 33. The trial Court's order dated 3.11.1989 was only to the effect that the petitioners shall not interfere in the use and occupation of the land pertaining to the respondent i.e. Khasra No.474; in which the petitioners never interfered and he executed the sale deed of his own land bearing Khasra No. 475/539 khatedari rights of which were already vested with the petitioners, in my view, the injunction order dated 3.11.1989 was not applicable to the petitioners, as the injunction order was confined only to Khasra No. 474 belonging to respondent and not Khasra No. 475/539 belonging to petitioner No.1. Hence, the petitioner No.1 had rightly complied with the order dated 3.11.1989 by not interfering in the use and occupation of the land bearing Khasra No. 474 which belongs to the respondent. 34. It is thus dear from above that the petitioners had not at all disobeyed the order of the trial Court dated 3.11.1989. 35. Thus, the appellate Court in my considered view has committed material irregularity when it passed the impugned order dated 4.1.2000 mechanically without appreciating the above facts on merit. 36. The appellate Court while passing the impugned order dated 4.1.2000 has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla & Anr. Vs. Hind Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd. DNJ 1997(2) 236 , wherein the Apex Court observed as under:- "Interim orders passed by Civil Court, whether can be flouted on the ground that Court has no jurisdiction to deal with suit, merely objection to jurisdiction would not bar Court from passing interim order and the party cannot disobey interim order, pending decision on jurisdictional power". 37. The Ratio of the aforesaid decision is not attracted to the instant case as the question of challenging the jurisdiction of the court passing interim order would not arise in the instant case. 38. 37. The Ratio of the aforesaid decision is not attracted to the instant case as the question of challenging the jurisdiction of the court passing interim order would not arise in the instant case. 38. In my view, the trial Court in its order dated 5.2.1996 while rejecting the respondent's application for contempt and acquitting the petitioners from the charge of committing contempt has rightly relied upon the ratio of the decision of the Allahabad High Court in (4) Sheo Kumar Saxena Vs. Zila Sahkari Vikas Sangh, Gonda AIR 1983 Allahabad 180 , wherein the Allahabad High Court held as under:- "Consequence of disobedience of injunction after vacation of temporary injunction, it cannot be enforced or executed. Hence, punitive action for its breach cannot also be taken after its vacation". 39. From the above, it is thus further clear that on the date of execution of the sale deed 18.8.92, the impugned order dated 3.11.1989 was already stayed by the order dated 11.12.1989, thus in absence of existence of any injunction order, it cannot be inferred or presumed that the petitioners have committed disobedience of the order of the court concerned. Thus, the appellate Court has grossly overlooked this salient aspect of the matter that when no injunction order restraining the petitioners from doing certain thing was in existence at the time of execution of the sale deed of the disputed land in question, as to how the petitioners can be said to have disobeyed any order when the said order was not in existence and in such circumstances, the question of disobedience or contempt would not arise. 40. Prima-facie, I am of the considered view that the trial Court was within its right and jurisdiction in having passed the order dated 5.2.1996 by decreeing the plaintiff suit in respect of khasra No. 475/539 regarding the land measuring 12 bighas and 15 biswas out of which, the land measuring 10 biswas which appurtenant land on the Eastern side of forming part of Khasra No. 474, which was in favour of the plaintiff. 41. 41. It is thus dear from above discussion that since there was no stay order preventing the petitioners against alienation, sale or transfer the land in question at the relevant point of time except that the petitioner shall not cause any interference regarding the use, occupation and possession of the land by the decree holder, this aspect of the matter having been grossly overlooked by the appellate Court who allowed the appeal by reversing the well reasoned order of the trial Court dated 5.2.1996, deserves to be quashed and set-aside being not sustainable. 42. It is further pertinent to mention herein that the findings recorded by the trial Court more particularly in para 12 of the order dated 5.2.1996 that on the basis of the evidence led by the parties, it is well established that petitioner No.1 had subsequent to the judgment dated 3.11.89 on 18.8.1992 had executed the sale deed in favour of petitioner Nos. 2 to 4 as regards the land measuring 10 biswas forming part of Khasra Nos. 920 and the sale deed was duly registered and that the applicant respondent Shivdayal had not rendered any evidence to the effect that as to whether he had at all handed over possession of the land in question to petitioner Nos.2 to 4 but the fact which has been established on the record is that the land was undisputably sold to them and that the proceedings regarding the land bearing Khasra No.474 (old) forming part of Khasra No. 920 (new) were also pending between the parties. The most significant aspect of the matter which the trial Court has taken note of was that whether the petitioner has committed any violation of the order or disobedience of the order passed decreeing the suit for permanent injunction, no such evidence had ever been led on the record by the respondent. 43. The most significant aspect of the matter which the trial Court has taken note of was that whether the petitioner has committed any violation of the order or disobedience of the order passed decreeing the suit for permanent injunction, no such evidence had ever been led on the record by the respondent. 43. So far as the registration of sale deed of the disputed land is concerned, the trial Court has observed that since the operation and effect of the earlier judgment dated 3.11.1989 has firstly been stayed vide order dated 11.12.1989 and later on the said order has been set-aside by the appellate Court vide order dated 8.12.1995, hence it cannot be inferred or said that the decree has any worth in execution and was ever in operation and effect and as such, the petitioner could not be held guilty of having committed any wilful disobedience of the decree or order in absence of any injunction order against them. 44. The trial Court while passing the impugned order has further placed reliance upon the ratio of the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Sheo Kumar Saxena Vs. Zila Sahkari Vikas Sangh, Gonda AIR 1983 Allahabad 180 wherein the Allahabad High Court also placed reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court in (5) State of Bihar Vs. Rani Sonabati Kumari AIR 1961 SC 221 , wherein the Apex Court observed, as under:- "Though undoubtedly proceedings under Order 39, R.2(3) Civil Procedure Code have a punitive aspect as is evident from the condemner being liable to be ordered to be detained in civil prison, they are in substance designed to effect the enforcement of or to execute the order. This is clearly brought out by their identity with the procedure prescribed by Order 21, Rule 32 of the Civil Procedure Code for the execution of a decree for a permanent injunction. No doubt the State Government not being a natural person could not be ordered to be detained in civil prison, on the analogy of Corporations for which special provision is made in Order 39, Rule 5 , but beyond that, both when a decree for a permanent injunction is executed and when an order of temporary injunction is enforced the liability of the State Government to be proceeded against appears to be clear". 45. 45. Hence, the trial Court in my view has rightly observed that the petitioner could not be held guilty of any contempt muchless wilful disobedience of the stay order. On the other hand, the appellate Court while reversing the said order had failed to take into consideration the aforesaid salient aspect of the matter and in my view the finding recorded by the appellate Court are factually incorrect since there was no stay order in respect of alienating, transfer or disposal of the land in question against the petitioners and the stay was limited only to the extent that the petitioners were restrained from raising any interference in use or occupation by the non-petitioners. 46. My aforesaid views are fortified from the judgment of Gujarat High Court in (6) Gohel Parbhatbhai Nathabhai Vs. Pandya Arwind kumar Ambalal AIR 1987 Gujarat 160 at page 166 , observed as under:- "Normally, once when the temporary injunctions are granted they would be continued till the disposal of the suits and, therefore, such temporary injunctions have the span of life till the suits are disposed of and, therefore, the period of detention is prescribed at three months. The express language of R.2-A of O.XXXIX if read in proper context it would make it clear that it is only in respect of temporary injunction which is granted either R.1 or R.2, and if breach thereof is committed then the consequence would follow as mentioned in R.2-A. Therefore, the argument that it would also include permanent injunction granted at the time of passing the decree is totally misconceived. Therefore, that argument cannot be accepted". 47. The ratio of the aforesaid decision is attracted to the facts of the instant case as in the instant case since there was no suit pending adjudication in which injunction order has only been passed, rather the suit was finally decided on 5.2.1996 against which the plaintiff could not have preferred contempt application before the Appellate Court; more particularly when there was no specific order directing either party to the proceedings restraining them from doing certain acts, hence, there was no occasion for the petitioners to have committed disobedience of the order of the trial Court in absence or existence of such order restraining them from sale, transfer or alienating the land in dispute.As a result of aforesaid discussion, the revision petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 4.1.2000 passed by ADJ No.2 Sikar in CMA No. 115/98 against which this revision has been preferred is quashed and set-aside and the order 5.2.1996 of the Civil Judge (Sr. Div.) Danta Ramgarh passed in Civil Misc. Application No. 51/92 is restored. There will be no order as to costs.Revision allowed. *******