JUDGMENT Bhaskar Bhattacharya, J. These three second appeals are at the instance of the plaintiff of Title Suit No. 409 of 1978 who is the defendant of Title Suit No. 408 of 1978 and are directed against the judgment and decrees dated February 1, 1994 passed by the learned Judge, Small Causes Court, Sealdah in Title Appeal Nos. 2 of 1992, 3 of 1992 and 10 of 1992 heard analogously thereby modifying the judgement and decrees passed by the learned Judge. 2. The appellant herein filed Title Suit No. 409 of 1978 in the Second Court of learned Munsif, Sealdah for declaration that he is a thika tenant in respect of the suit property and for permanent injunction restraining the respondents from disturbing his possession in the suit property. The respondents on the other hand who were defendants in Title Suit No. 409 of 1978 had filed a suit being Title Suit No. 408 of 1978 against the plaintiff of Title Suit No. 409 of 1978 thereby praying for declaration of their right, title and interest over the self-same property, for recovery of possession and also mandatory injunction for demolition of the structure constructed over the suit property. 3. The case made out by the appellant in his Title Suit No. 409 of 1978 was that he was inducted as thika tenant in respect of the suit property by the predecessor-in-interest of the present respondents some time in the year 1930 and by virtue of such right he had constructed structure over the property. According to the appellant, the respondents after acquiring title to the property by virtue of their deeds of purchase were trying to dispossess the appellant from the suit property. 4. The defence taken by the respondents on the other hand was that the appellant was a rank trespasser, who trespassed in the property in the year 1971 and raised certain unauthorised structure over the property and as such was not entitled to the relief claimed. In the suit filed by the respondents herein being Title Suit No. 408 of 1978 they have prayed for recovery of possession on the self-same allegation. 5. Since the subject matter of both the suits was same and the points involved therein were identical, both the suits were heard analogously. 6. In the suit filed by the respondents herein being Title Suit No. 408 of 1978 they have prayed for recovery of possession on the self-same allegation. 5. Since the subject matter of both the suits was same and the points involved therein were identical, both the suits were heard analogously. 6. The learned trial Judge by the judgment and decree dated September 30, 1991 dismissed the suit filed by the appellant with a finding that the appellant had failed to prove the case made out in the plaint. So far the other suit being Title Suit No. 408 of 1978 is concerned, the learned trial Judge decreed the same in part. The said court found that the respondents had proved right, title and interest in the property. However, the learned trial Judge was of the view that although the appellant could not prove the plea of thika tenancy but from the materials on record it was evident that he was a tenant governed under the Transfer of Property Act and as such in the absence of any notice under section 106 of such Act the respondents could not pray for recovery of possession of the property. Therefore, the prayers for recovery of possession and mandatory injunction were refused. 7. Being dissatisfied with the dismissal of Title Suit No. 409 of 1978 and part decree granted in Title Suit No. 408 of 1978, the appellant herein preferred two appeals being Title Appeal Nos. 2 of 1992 and 3 of 1992 respectively. On the other hand, the respondents being dissatisfied with the refusal of decree for recovery of possession and mandatory injunction preferred an appeal being Title Appeal No. 10 of 1992 before the learned first appellate court below. All the three appeals were heard analogously and as mentioned earlier, by the judgment and decrees impugned in these three appeals, the learned first appellate court below has dismissed Title Appeal Nos. 2 of 1992 and 3 of 1992 filed by the appellant and allowed Title Appeal No. 10 of 1992 preferred by the respondents. In substance, the learned first appellate court below has dismissed Title Suit No. 409 of 1978 and has decreed Title Suit No. 408 of 1978 in full. 8. Being dissatisfied, the appellant has preferred these three second appeals. 9. Mr. In substance, the learned first appellate court below has dismissed Title Suit No. 409 of 1978 and has decreed Title Suit No. 408 of 1978 in full. 8. Being dissatisfied, the appellant has preferred these three second appeals. 9. Mr. Roychowdhury, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has at the very outset contended that the respondents having pleaded that the dispossession occurred in the year 1971 whereas the appellant's possession in the property from at least 1960 having been established, the learned courts below ought to have held that the suit is barred by limitation. 10. In my view, the respondents having prayed for recovery of possession on the basis of title and such title having been established, the prayer for recovery of possession cannot be barred by limitation even if the appellant is found to be in possession for more than 12 years prior to the institution of the suit inasmuch as the appellant did not dispute the title of the respondents or their predecessors-in-interest in the property. According to Article 65 of the Limitation Act, time runs against the plaintiff not from the date of dispossession but from the time when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse. Thus, I find no substance in the aforesaid contention of Mr. Roychowdhury. 11. Mr. Roychowdhury next contends that the learned court of appeal below ought to have relied upon the entry in the register of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation and held that the appellant was a thika tenant in respect of the suit premises. 12. It appears from the judgment of the learned first appellate court that the said court gave detailed reasons why it disbelieved the case of tenancy. First, the appeal court pointed out that not a single rent receipt could be produced by the appellant. 13. Secondly, in the plaint rate of rent was mentioned as Rs. 15/- whereas in evidence the same was described as Rs. 10/-. Even the appellant in cross-examination further stated that 'khajna' was not fixed. In view of such inconsistent pieces for evidence as regards the rate of rent and above all the case of the appellant that the alleged payments were made without any receipt, led the court of appeal below to disbelieve the case of thika tenancy pleaded by the appellant. 14. In view of such inconsistent pieces for evidence as regards the rate of rent and above all the case of the appellant that the alleged payments were made without any receipt, led the court of appeal below to disbelieve the case of thika tenancy pleaded by the appellant. 14. Such finding are basically findings of fact based on appreciation of evidence on record and as such this court sitting in a second appeal cannot re-appreciate the evidence on record. 15. It is now well settled that an entry in the municipal register cannot create title. Such entry is merely a piece of evidence of possession. Therefore, by virtue of such entry, the appellant cannot claim thika tenancy when he has failed to prove payment of rent or even rate of rent. 16. Thus, the finding of the learned court of appeal below that the appellant failed to prove tenancy of any nature whatsoever is quite reasonable on the basis of materials on record and I find no reason to disturb such finding. 17. Mr. Roychowdhury lastly contended that the learned courts below erred in law in not considering the case of the appellant of acquisition of thika tenancy right by adverse possession. 18. To appreciate the aforesaid contention of Mr. Roychowdhury, it will be profitable to refer to the definition of thika tenant' as it stood at the time of institution of these proceedings vide section 2 (5) of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949: "Thika tenant" means any person who holds, whether under a written lease or otherwise, land under another' person, and is or but for a special contract would- be liable to pay rent, as a monthly or at any other periodical rate, for that land to that another person and has erected or acquired by purchase or gift any structure on such land for a residential, manufacturing or business purpose and includes the successor in interest of such person, but does not include- a) Who holds such land under another person in perpetuity ; or b) Who holds such land under another person under a registered lease, in which duration of the lease is expressly stated to be for a period of not less than twelve years; or c) Who holds such land under that another person and uses or occupies such land as Khatal;" 19. From the above definition it is clear that a thika tenancy right presupposes existence of an agreement between a thika tenant and the landlord and is created on consideration of payment of rent. 20. Thus, in the absence of any such agreement or even payment and acceptance of rent, such relationship cannot be conceived of. A litigant, unless proves existence of such agreement or implied agreement by acceptance of rent by landlord cannot assert the right of thika tenancy by adverse possession by merely showing his possession and act of construction over the disputed land for more than 12 years. This court is quite alive to the position of law that there may be adverse possession of a limited interest in the property as well as of full title as owner. For instance, if a tenant encroaches the surrounding lands of the landlord and asserts those as part of his tenancy and notwithstanding such open assertion, the landlord does not file any suit for recovery of possession of those adjoining lands, the tenant acquires tenancy right over excess lands by adverse possession thereby adding those lands to his existing tenancy and after the expiry of 12 years, the landlord will be precluded from filing a suit for recovery of the excess land by treating the tenant as trespasser. In such a case, the tenant however is under obligation to return possession of those excess lands at the time of surrender of tenancy. Similarly, a tenant may encroach the land adjoining his tenancy but owned by a third person and thus acquire tenancy right over such excess land and on termination of his tenancy, title to such excess lands will vest in his landlord. In other words, the tenant holds adversely against the third party on behalf of his landlord and during the continuance of his tenancy if a suit is filed by the third party for recovery of possession by treating him as trespasser, the tenant can successfully defend the action on the ground that he was in adverse possession for more than 12 years as tenant and that such adverse possession was for the ultimate benefit of his landlord. There are reported cases indicating that a tenant of a particular type of tenancy can acquire a tenancy of a different type by adverse possession. 21. There are reported cases indicating that a tenant of a particular type of tenancy can acquire a tenancy of a different type by adverse possession. 21. But in my view, a rank trespasser who has failed to prove either any contract with landlord whatsoever or payment of any rent to such landlord, cannot claim a thika tenancy right by adverse possession and a suit filed by the owner of the land for recovery of possession from such trespasser is not barred even if the trespasser is in possession for more than 12 years when such trespasser does not dispute the title of the landlord. The suit being based on title and the appellant not having disputed the title of the respondents in the suit property, the suit filed by the respondents for eviction of the appellant was not barred by Article 65 of the Limitation Act. 22. Thus I find no substance even in the last contention of Mr. Roychowdhury. 23. All the points taken by Mr. Roychowdhury having failed, I find no substance in these appeals and those are dismissed accordingly. 24. No costs. Appeals dismissed.