A. K. YOG, J. Heard Sri Yatindra Sinha, Advocate on behalf of the tenant-petitioner and Sri Pankaj Naqvi, Advocate on behalf of the landlord-respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 5 (being the widow and sons of original deceased- landlord Jagdish Saran Agarwal ). The parties have already exchanged rejoinder and counter-affidavits. Conse quently, this writ petition is being heard and decided finally at the admission stage. 2. The accommodation in question is admittedly governed by provisions of Sec tion 21 of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 (called the Act ). The accommodation in question is the first floor of 12, Zulfiqar-ganj (Shyamganj), Bareilly, of which, ad mittedly, the petitioner was tenant. The ground floor accommodation was in the tenancy of one Satya Prakash. 3. Jagdish Saran Agarwal, landlord, who was employed in the Excise Depart ment, U. P. Government, filed an applica tion, initially both under Sections 21 (1) (a) and 21 (1-A) of the Act. The landlord claimed that his need was bonafide. He was to suffer more hardship than the tenant if his release application was rejected. The landlord further claimed eviction of the tenant on the ground that he retired from Government service on 30th June, 1984 and had to live at Bareilly in a tenanted accommodation, hence the case was covered under the aforesaid Section 21 (1-A) of the Act. The release application filed by the landlord was registered as P. A. Case No. 107 of 1984. It appears that the landlord also filed an application for release against another tenant on the ground floor of the accommodation of the premises and it was registered as P. A. Case No. l08ofl984. 4. The petitioner has filed a copy of judgment and order dated 10-4-1988 passed by the Vlth Additional District Judge, Bareilly (Annexure-XII to the peti tion) which shows that the release applica tion against Satya Prakash was allowed. Rent Control Appeal No. 27 of 1988 filed by tenant (Satya Prakash) was allowed by means of the aforementioned judgment and order dated April 10,1998. Rent Control Appeal No. 27 of 1988 filed by tenant (Satya Prakash) was allowed by means of the aforementioned judgment and order dated April 10,1998. Sri Pankaj Naqvi, Advocate, learned counsel for the contesting respondent informs that a writ petition was filed by the landlord in this Court and the same is pending disposal and the facts of the case culminating in the present proceedings are also it might have been stated that the Prescribed Authority allowed the release application (P. A. Case No. 107 of 1984) vide judgment and order dated February 2,1993 (Annexure- VI of the petition ). The Prescribed Authority decided the case in favour of the landlord both under Section 21 (1) (a) and Section 21 (1-A) of the Act. The tenant being ag grieved filed Rent Control Appeal No. 31 of 1993 a copy of the memorandum of appeal is Annexure-VII to the petition. During the pendency of the appeal Jagdish Saran Agarwal, landlord died and his real representatives were substituted. The tenant also incorporated Para 11-A in the memorandum of appeal contending that sons and daughter of the deceased Jagdish Saran Agarwal (landlord) had no need of the accommodation in question as they were already living in their own built houses. The memorandum of appeal clear ly indicates that the main thrust of appeal is to the effect that the case of landlord, in the fact of the instant case, did not fall under Section 21 (1-A) of the Act because of the landlord possessed another accom modation. The tenant, does not assail find ing of the appellate Court regarding an cestral property of the landlord. 5. Commissioners report, paper No. 61-Ga (Annexure-VIII of the petition), shows that the said Commissioner Report contains description of (house No. 291, Mohalla Gangapur, Bareilly ). The said Advocate Commissioner vide report dated January 10, 1986 (with reference to ap plication No. 40-B of para 5 (III) of the Advocate Commissioner) found that the house built of old bricks had fallen an roof and terrace were supported on beams, floor was Kachcha, no plaster was there on the walls and in the sketch map at place C of the room a there is a door. The Com missioner concluded that the house was old one and in dilapidated condition. 6. Another Commissioner Report was obtained on 24-7-1987 (Annexure IX to the petition ). The Com missioner concluded that the house was old one and in dilapidated condition. 6. Another Commissioner Report was obtained on 24-7-1987 (Annexure IX to the petition ). The said report indicates that the petitioners counsel showed un willingness to the map prepared in respect to the accommodation in Mohalla Gan gapur (Annexure-5 to the writ paper books ). During pendency of the appeal, a Commissioner was again appointed and he submitted report dated 23-10-2000 (Annexure- XI to the petition ). The Com missioner submitted report regarding the houses which were in possession of two sons of the landlord, namely, Uttam Prakash and Rakesh Kumar, who were living with their own families separately and recorded that the information was gathered from Smt. Manju Agarwal wife of Uttam Prakash and Smt. Niru Agarwal wife of Rakesh Kumar Agarwal (daughter-in-law of the landlord ). This Commissioner Report indicates that two houses at Patel Nagar were in possession of the two sons of the landlord who had their own families and were living separately. In respect of the other accommodation, situate at Mohalla Madhowadi, Nai Basti (Annexure-XI to the peti tion), the Advocate Commissioner found that Smt. Gayatri Devi wife of Late Jagdish Saran Agarwal (landlord) was found in possession. 7. During pendency of the appeal, the deceased-landlord restricted his release application under Section 21 (1-A) of the Act. Learned Appellate Court found that Smt. Gayatri Devi wife of Jagdish Saram Agarwal had purchased open piece of land (140 Sq. Yd.), from Hulasi and Gauri Shankar vide sale deed dated 6- 3-1960 and 24th July, 1961 regarding Madhowadi ac commodation (282 Sq. Yd. ). It is observed that after constructing the house thereon Uttam Kumar Agarwal and Rakesh Kumar (sons of deceased- landlord Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 in the writ peti tion) were in possession. It was also held that the other two sons, Sushil Kumar and Manoj Kumar, Respondent Nos. 4 and 5, were living in another house along with their mother, Smt. Gayatri Devi built in recent past. Lower Appellate Court ob served that there was no difference in the circumstances of the case, which at the time of filing of prevailed while the appeal was pending. 8. 4 and 5, were living in another house along with their mother, Smt. Gayatri Devi built in recent past. Lower Appellate Court ob served that there was no difference in the circumstances of the case, which at the time of filing of prevailed while the appeal was pending. 8. The Lower Appellate Court con sidered contention of both the sides and dismissed the appeal holding that the provision of Section 21 (1) has been squarely applied to the fact of the case. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner seeks to challenge the judgment and order of Lower Appellate Court on the following grounds :-accommodation in question was used for commercial pur poses whereas the release of the said ac commodation were sought by the landlord for his personal residential need. 10. Finding recorded by Court below show that the building in question was meant to be used as residential and it was not built as commercial building and hence it cannot be said to be commercial building. Even otherwise the Court below dealt with this respect and held that the release application of the landlord was maintainable. 11. The next submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the landlord was in possession of the room (10 x 10 feet) on the ground floor of the premises whereas accommodation in ques tion exists on second floor. According to the tenant, apart from one room there was latrine and common courtyard. The landlord, how ever, denied existence of latrine and court- yard. According to the tenant the ancestral house at Gangapur was also available. 12. The question whether one room accommodation on the ground floor in the premises in question and the other in the ancestral property actually existed and/or were adequate and suitable, is a question of fact. 13. The Court below had considered the evidence and came to the conclusion that these premises could not be said to be alternative of suitable/adequate accom modation for the landlord. The Court below came to the conclusion that they were in possession of above sons of landlord-who had their families and living therein. 14. Learned counsel I6r the petitioner submitted that the landlords had sufficient accommodation with them and hence provisions of Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act were not applicable to the fact of the instant case. 15. The Court below came to the conclusion that they were in possession of above sons of landlord-who had their families and living therein. 14. Learned counsel I6r the petitioner submitted that the landlords had sufficient accommodation with them and hence provisions of Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act were not applicable to the fact of the instant case. 15. The petitioner, as mentioned above, also referred to the P. A. Case No. 108 of 1994 (Jagdish Saran v. Satya Prakash ). The judgment passed in the aforesaid case in appeal is under challenge in writ petition before this Court. It has no relevance for deciding the case. So far as ancestral property and at Mohalla Madhobari are concerned, two Courts below have recorded concurrent findings of fact and it is not open for this Court, in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, Con stitution of India, to reappraise evidence and interfere with the judgments of the Courts below. 16. Moreover, I do not find any error apparent on the face of record and come to a conclusion and record own finding. 17. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, submitted and placed reliance on the decision in the case of Katyan Rai Saxena v. IInd Additional District Judge, Bulandshahr and others, 1982 (8) ALR 205. Para 13 of the said judgment reads: "in our opinion Section 21 (1-A) was enacted for providing an immediate shelter to a landlord who is left without any accommodation in consequence of having to vacate upon cessa tion of his employment a public building. The legislature appears to have made this provision to meet the exigency arising out of the landlord being confronted with the serious problem of finding an accommodation for his residence after being deprived of the use of public building which was allotted to him in consequence of his employment. So that the landlord might rehabilitate himself without going through the rigorous and time consuming process envisaged under Section 21 (1) the legislature thought that such a landlord might be relieved of the obliga tion of having to establish that he bona fide requires the accommodation belonging to him or that as between him and his tenant, he would suffer greater hardship. It appears that in a contingency covered by Section 21 (1-A) the legislature presumed that the need of the landlord would be genuine and that his require ment must necessarily take precedence over house of the tenant. " 18. Applying the ratio adopted by a Division Bench in Kafyan Rai Saxenas case (supra), the Courts below committed no error in finding out whether the accommodations, pointed out by the tenant in the instant case were actually available, adequate and suitable. The mere fact that the landlord possesses same accommoda tion, irrespective of its condition (i. e. , whether it is habitable or not, and what is its extent) is not enough to reject the release application under Section 21 (1) of the Act. 19. The language employed in Sec tion 21 (1 -A) mandates that the Prescribed Authority shall, on the application of a landlord in that behalf, order the eviction of a tenant from any building at any time under tenancy, if it is satisfied that the" landlord of such building was in occupa tion of a public building for residential purpose, which he had to vacate on ac count of the cessation of his employment. 20. The ratio adopted in the case of Kalyan Rai Saxena is only to the effect that Section 21 (1 -A) will not be available to the landlord, even if he has to vacate on ac count of cessation of employment if he possesses an alternative residential ac commodation. In turn it makes it clear that such alternative accommodation must be an accommodation, which may be suitable and adequate. 21. To right conferred under Section 21 (1-A) to the landlord who is suffering because of cessation of his employment contemplated in that section, is a substan tive right created by statute and such a right should be enforced by the authorities, under the Act as it existed on the date of deciding release application. It could not be taken away by subsequent event as otherwise the averment now to delay release proceeding so as to create situation for the landlord to make arrangement for expanding need and settled grown up sons and daughters. Cessation of employment for any reason, whatsoever, does not visit an employee sufferance of his own accom modation or sufferance on various ac counts. 22. Cessation of employment for any reason, whatsoever, does not visit an employee sufferance of his own accom modation or sufferance on various ac counts. 22. In result, I find no manifest error apparent on the face of record, the writ petition lacks merit and is, accordingly, dismissed. 23. Learned counsel for the petitioner at this stage submitted that he e allowed to vacate the premises. He states that he has instructions from his client. He submits that the petitioner shall give undertaking before the concerned Prescribed Authority for peacefully vacat ing and handing over the vacant posses sion provided that he is granted six months time. Learned counsel for the contesting respondent has no objection to the same provided the petitioner fulfils requisite conditions and gives an under taking for compliance of the same. Conse quently, I direct that the petitioner to retain possession of the accommodation in question-subject to the strict com pliance of the following:- (1) The tenant-petitioner files before concerned Prescribed Authority on or before 15th March, 2001 an application along with his affidavit giving an uncondi tional undertaking to comply with all the conditions mentioned hereinafter. (2) Petitioner-tenant shall not be evicted from the accommodation in his tenancy for four months i. e. , up to 31st July, 2001. Tenant-petitioner, his repre sentative/assignee etc. claiming through her or otherwise, If any, shall vacate without objection and peacefully deliver vacant possession of the accommodation in question on or before 31st July 2001 to the landlord or landlords nominee/repre sentative (if any, appointed and intimated by the landlord) by giving prior advance notice and notifying to the landlord by Registered A. D. post (on his last known address or as may be disclosed in advance by the landlord in writing before the con cerned Prescribed Authority), time and date on which landlord is to take posses sion from the tenant. (3) Petitioner shall on or before 15th March, 2001 deposit entire amount due towards rent etc. up to date i. e. , entire arrears of the past, if any, as well as the rent of the period ending on the 31st July, 2001. (4) Petitioner and everyone claiming under him undertake not to change or damage or transfer/alienate/assign in any manner, the accommodation in question. up to date i. e. , entire arrears of the past, if any, as well as the rent of the period ending on the 31st July, 2001. (4) Petitioner and everyone claiming under him undertake not to change or damage or transfer/alienate/assign in any manner, the accommodation in question. (5) In case tenant-petitioner fails to comply with any of the conditions/or direc tions contained in this order, "landlord shall be entitled to evict the tenant-petitioner forthwith from the accom modation in question by seeking police force through concerned prescribed authority. (6) If there is violation of the under taking of any one or more of the conditions contained in this order, the defaulting party shall pay Rs. 25000/- (Rupees Twenty five thousand only) as damages to the other party besides rendering himself li able to be prosecuted for committing gros sest contempt of the Court. Petition dismissed. .