JUDGMENT Bhaskar Bhattacharya, J. This second appeal is at the instance of a tenant/defendant in a suit for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement and is directed against the judgment and decree dated January 30, 1993 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, 1st Court, Barasat in Title Appeal No.178 of 1987 thereby affirming those dated July 15, 1987 passed by the learned Munsif, 2nd Court, Barasat in Title Suit No.119 of 1978. 2. The landlords filed the aforesaid suit for eviction of the present petitioner on the grounds of default in payment of rent and reasonable requirement. 3. So far the ground of reasonable requirement is concerned, the case of the plaintiffs was that they required the tenanted property for their own use and occupation as there were 29 members in their family and 14 rooms were in their khas possession. 4. The aforesaid suit was contested by the present appellant by filing written statement thereby denying the material allegations made in the plaint. 5. So far the ground of default is concerned, the learned trial Judge gave protection to the present appellant under section 17(4) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act as the appellant complied with the provision contained in section 17(2) thereof. 6. The learned trial Judge however on consideration of the materials on record held that the plaintiffs reasonably required the suit premises for their own use and occupation and thus decreed the suit only on the ground of reasonable requirement. 7. Being dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Judge the defendant preferred an appeal before the learned first appellate court below and by the judgment and decree impugned herein the said court has affirmed those passed by the learned trial Judge. Being dissatisfied, the defendant has preferred the instant second appeal. 8. After hearing Mr. Bhattacharya appearing in support of this appeal and Mr. Being dissatisfied, the defendant has preferred the instant second appeal. 8. After hearing Mr. Bhattacharya appearing in support of this appeal and Mr. Roychowdhury appearing on behalf of the respondents and after going through the materials on record I find that both the courts below on consideration of the materials on record rightly held that the plaintiffs reasonably required the suit premises for their own use and occupation in view of number of members of the family of the plaintiffs and the accommodation available to them, the findings recorded by the learned courts below are quite reasonable and I do not find any reason to disturb the aforesaid concurrent findings of fact. 9. Mr. Bhattacharya, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant however has raised a substantial question of law in this second appeal. 10. According to Mr. Bhattacharya, in the Court of Appeal below his client filed an application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure for taking into consideration as additional evidence a rent receipt issued by one of the respondents during the pendency of the appeal before the learned first appellate court below. According to Mr. Bhattacharya, the said respondent by accepting rent from the appellant created a fresh tenancy in respect of the selfsame room and as such in view of creation of such tenancy, the decree passed by the learned trial Judge should be set aside as one of the plaintiffs was not willing to take the benefit of the decree. There is no dispute that a written objection was filed against such application and it was contended in the said written objection that the said rent receipt was obtained by the appellant by practising fraud upon one of the respondents and as such the same should not be taken into consideration. 11. The learned first appellate court below however did not enter into the question whether such rent receipt was really given out of free will but was of the opinion that such question cannot be adjudicated in the said appeal and if really such receipt was granted, it is for the appellant to file separate suit for declaration of such new tenancy. 12. Mr. Bhattacharya submits that the learned court of appeal below refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in him by law by not entering into such question. Mr. 12. Mr. Bhattacharya submits that the learned court of appeal below refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in him by law by not entering into such question. Mr. Bhattacharya further submits that if the case of new tenancy advanced by the appellant is accepted, in such a case this decree should be set aside and such question should be adjudicated in this proceeding itself. 13. Mr. Roychowdhury, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent has however submitted that even if it is accepted for the shake of argument that one of the landlords has issued such receipt, it will have no effect upon the existing decree which has already been passed and as such the learned court of appeal below rightly refused to go into such question. 14. Therefore, the only question that now arises for determination in this second appeal is whether one of the landlords after the passing of a decree for eviction can by creating a new tenancy in favour of the tenant in respect of selfsame property upset a decree passed by the learned court below and whether an appellate court hearing an appeal against such decree can investigate such fact. 15. In my view, if four persons claiming to be joint landlords file a suit for eviction of their tenant and if such a suit culminates in a decree, such joint and indivisible decree in favour of four persons can be set aside either on an application for review by the tenant under Order 47 of the Code or by way of an appeal under Order 41 of the Code on merit; even in such an appeal, the appellate court can set aside the decree otherwise than on merit if all the decree holders agree to withdraw the suit in which the decree impugned was passed or if it is established that the entire interest of the decree holders in the suit property has vested in the judgment -debtor by operation of law or by act of the parties including all the decree holders. In other words, an appellate court can consider whether there is merger of interest of all the decree holders in the suit property with the judgment debtors. 16. In other words, an appellate court can consider whether there is merger of interest of all the decree holders in the suit property with the judgment debtors. 16. But if the judgment -debtor in such an appeal alleges creation of fresh tenancy even by all the decree holders and such fact is disputed by the decree holders and the deoree holders do not apply for withdrawal of the suit in which decree has been passed, the appellate court is not competent to adjudicate such disputed question; because the appellate court's duty is only to see whether the decree impugned is in accordance with law and whether the decree holders' interest has entirely merged with that of judgment debtor in the suit property. It may not be out of place to mention here that Order 22 Rules 1, 3, 4 and 10 of the Code authorise the court to adjudicate the question whether on the death of a party or in view of devolution of interest other than death during the pendency of the proceeding the right to sue survives or not and the provision contained Order 22 Rule 11 authorises an appellate court to take into consideration such fact even in an appeal. 17. Thus, if a disputed question of fresh tenancy even by all the decree holders is alleged by a tenant/judgment debtor and the decree holders do not agree to withdraw the suit inspite of such allegation, the remedy of the judgment debtor lies by raising such dispute in execution case by filling application under section 47 of the code allegation satisfaction of the decree by creation of new tenancy. Therefore, the learned first appellate court below right did not enter into the question whether any rent receipt was voluntarily issued by one of the respondent. 18. Thus, I am of the view that the question whether the rent receipt was voluntarily given or whether any right could be created by one of the respondents in favor of the appellant need not be answered by this court and it is for the executing court to answer such question if raised. 19. Thus, there is no necessity of remanding the matter back to the court below to decide the aforesaid question. 20. Thus, all the point taken by Mr. Bhattacharya having failed, I find no merit in this appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed. Appeal dismissed.