Patni Top Development Authority v. Special Tribunal, J&K
2001-09-06
T.S.DOABIA
body2001
DigiLaw.ai
1. "Justice delayed is Justice denied." "Justice hurried is justice hurried. In this case above concepts have been mixed up. This is a case of "Justice delayed is justice hurried". 2. Facts are as under:- Placing reliance on Section 13 (4) of the Town Planning Act (hereinafter referred to the Act), the Jammu and Kashmir Special Tribunal has accepted the Appeal preferred by respondent-Kuljeet Rai, Harjeet Rai and Manjeet Rai. The fact that in aforesaid Act, it is mentioned that the appeal preferred before the Tribunal has to be decided within 10 days and in case that appeal was not so decided, then the appeal has necessarily to be accepted. The Tribunal without going into the merits of the controversy and placing explicit reliance on Section 13 (4) of the Act, allowed the appeal. The appeal was preferred against an order/notice issued by the Patnitop Development Authority calling upon the respondents to demolish construction raised on KhasraNo. 2117/1729/983 of Village Sanasar, District Doda. The relevant provision which has been relied by the Tribunal is Section 13 (4) of the Act referred to above. For facility of reference this is being reproduced below:- "Any person aggrieved by the order of prescribed authority directing the person to demolish, alter or pull down the building or part thereof under sub-clause (3), may prefer an appeal to the Minister or the authority appointed by him in this behalf within 10 days after the date of aforesaid order of the prescribed authority. The memorandum of appeal need not be accompanied by a copy of order appealed against; provided that the Minister or the authority appointed by him in this behalf shall decide the appeal within 10 days from the date the appeal is filed, failing with it shall be presumed that the appeal has been accepted; Provide further that the Minister or the authority appointed by him in this behalf may either or after the filing of the appeal, compound the offence and accept by way of compensation such sum as he or it may deem reasonable subject to such Rules, regulations and orders as may be prescribed. Where an offence has been compounded no further action shall be taken against the aggrieved person in respect of the offence so compounded. The sum so accepted shall be recoverable as arrears of land revenue." 3.
Where an offence has been compounded no further action shall be taken against the aggrieved person in respect of the offence so compounded. The sum so accepted shall be recoverable as arrears of land revenue." 3. The learned counsel appearing for the parties submits that the intention of the Legislature in framing the aforementioned provision was to impress upon the authorities to decide the matter with speed and expeditiously. The purpose of this provision is not to throttle the judicial process. It is stated that if such inference is to be drawn then the very purpose of the Statute would be defeated and unscrupulous litigant would see to it that an appeal preferred under the Act is not decided within the period of 10 days and the result envisaged by sub-section would ensue. 4. After having heard learned counsel for the parties I am of the opinion that if the interpretation which has been placed by the Tribunal is to be taken note of then this would rule out the possibility of applying judicial mind to a lis coming before it. All that the party preferring the appeal is to wait and let the Tribunal also to wait for period of 10 days to expire. This would lead to automatic acceptance of appeal. If the manner in which the Statute has been interpreted is to be accepted as the only way of interpreting the Statute then this would lead to unreasonable results, i.e. acceptance of appeal without application of mind. This is never the intention of an Act of legislature. The presumption is that a Statute is valid. The further presumption is that a Statute has been enacted with a view to advance cause of justice and to ensure that a situation which is legal comes into existence. The manner in which the Statute has been interpreted by the Tribunal would lead to unreasonable results and the provisions would have to be declared ultravires. However, without taking this extreme view and applying the principle of "reading down the provision", the provision in question is held to be directory and not mandatory. It is held that the purpose of this Statute is not to rule out absolutely applicability of judicial mind. Where the conduct exhibits total disregard it may be possible for Tribunal to invoke the penal provision. This can be done in the rarest of the rare case.
It is held that the purpose of this Statute is not to rule out absolutely applicability of judicial mind. Where the conduct exhibits total disregard it may be possible for Tribunal to invoke the penal provision. This can be done in the rarest of the rare case. Reasons for this would have to be given. This is not be done as a routine. Such was not the situation in this case. Therefore, the acceptance of appeal on mere reasoning that the appeal was not decided within a period of ten days is a reasoning which cannot be accepted. Even otherwise, the appeal was preferred on 05-11 -1997. It was decided after a lapse of four months. The penal provision referred to above could have been made applicable immediately after on the expiry of ten days. As this was not made applicable, therefore, the presumption would be that the Tribunal was not keen to resort to this provision and the consequences envisaged by the penal provision were not to be made applicable at a later stage. Once the period of ten days is over and once the penal provision are not made applicable then there was no justification to invoke these provisions. Any other interpretation shall make mockery of judicial system which presupposes that a lis would be decided after due process and by giving a reasoned judgment. I am accordingly of the view:- (i) That the provision in question is not mandatory; (ii) That if the provision is to be interpreted as mandatory then it would lead to arbitrary results in as much as judicial sanctity would be conferred on an illegal Act merely on the happening of event that the appeal was not decided within a period of ten days. Such a situation can be avoided by following the principle of reading down the provision. This purpose can be achieved by treating the provision as directory. (iii) That in any case the provision having not been invoked for almost four months, power if any, under this Section could not be invoked after four months. Having failed to exercise this option immediately after the expiry often days, this option could not be exercised by the Tribunal. 5. This petition is accordingly allowed. The matter is sent to the Tribunal who would decide the matter on merits. The parties to appear before the Tribunal on 03-10-2001.