Judgment :- In all the writ petitions, have challenged the respective impugned orders passed by the 1s, placing, under suspension. Since the issues involved are one, the same, all the writ petitions are dealt with together by a common order. The petitioner in W.P. No. 18507 of 2000 was working as Traffic Manager in the 1st respondent Port Trust when he was placed under suspension by the impugned order of the 1st respondent. The petitioner in W.P. No. 18511 of 2000 was working as Chief Mechanical Engineer in the 1st respondent Port Trust when he was placed under suspension by the impugned order of the 1st respondent and the petitioner in W.P. No. 18512 of 2000 was working as Financial Adviser and Chief Accounts Officer in the 1st respondent Port Trust when he was placed under suspension by the impugned order of the 1st respondent. The issues raised and the reliefs sought for in all the three writ petitions are one and the same and therefore the averments made in W.P. No. 18507 of 2000 are dealt with as follows :- It is the case of the petitioners that in accordance with the decision taken by the Export Promotion meet held in Madras Port Trust on 27-5-94 by the Cabinet Secretary, Government of India, to encourage berth reservation scheme implemented as is being done in Bombay and as directed by the Joint Secretary, Ministry of Surface Transport, a note was prepared for the said purpose by the Marketing Manager of the 1st respondent Port Trust on 4-7-94. The said note was approved by the Traffic Manager, Chief Mechanical Engineer and Financial Adviser and Chief Accounts Officer namely the petitioner in the writ petitions as well as by the Chairman of Chennai Port Trust on 14-7-94. Based upon the said note, a communication was sent to the Joint Secretary, Ministry of Surface Transport seeking clearance for implementation of berth reservation scheme after the approval of the then Board in B.R. No. 74 dated 27-7-94. Pursuant to the said note was approved, a tender advertisement was also made in all leading newspapers on 21-9-94 mentioning the terms and conditions for private participation in the container terminal at Bharathi Dock (200 MTS berth length). In response to the said tender advertisement, five shipping lines submitted their tender. Pursuant to the said note was approved, a tender advertisement was also made in all leading newspapers on 21-9-94 mentioning the terms and conditions for private participation in the container terminal at Bharathi Dock (200 MTS berth length). In response to the said tender advertisement, five shipping lines submitted their tender. However, three shipping lines agreed for the minimum guaranteed throughout per annum namely M/s. Bengal Tinger Line, M/s. Pacific International Lines and M/s. X-Press Contained Lines. On the basis of the tender, a comparative statement was prepared containing the offer of shipping lines. While M/s. Bengal Tinger Line and X-Press Container Lines submitted their proposal in line with the guidelines as per the advertisement, M/s. Pacific International Lines submitted their conditional offer that 24 hours carting should be permitted by the Port Trust for them. Based upon the proposals, an internal discussion was held on 26-10-94 on the various aspect of the offers received in which the Traffic Manager, Financial Adviser and Chief Accounts Officer, Chief Mechanical Engineer, Deputy Chief Traffic Manager, Deputy Manager (Legal) and the Convenor, Manager (M & S) participated. It was decided in the said meeting to ask the shipping line to submit their firm proposals on or before 14-11-94. Pursuant to the above, four shipping lines respondent namely M/s. Pacific International Lines, M/s. X-Press Contained Lines, M/s. Shreyas Shipping Lines and M/s. Bengal Tinger Lines. The evaluation committee consisting of all the petitioners evaluated the four offers and recommended the offer of M/s. Bengal Tinger Lines for allotment of 200 MTS berth length in C.T.B.I. (North) as their offer was the highestWhile calling the tenders to submit their revised proposals, discussions we also held with the tenderers on 10-11-94 and 11-11-94 based on their original offer. During the internal discussions, the evaluation committee deliberated the possibilities of allotting 200 MTS berth length in West Quay 1 and 2 and C.T.B. 1 (North) without port equipments. Since only M/s. X-Press Container Lines informed their willingness to operate West Quay 1 and 2 without port equipments and also offered a guaranteed throughput of 50000 T.U.E.s per annum, the same was recommended by the evaluation committee for consideration and approval by the 1st respondent initially and by the Board later on. The 1st respondent placed the recommendations of the evaluation committee before the Board. The 1st respondent placed the recommendations of the evaluation committee before the Board. On receipt of the said recommendations, the Board in turn constituted a sub-committee consisting of few trustees of the Board of highest integrity. The said sub-committee went into the details of the proposal and based on the sub-committee's recommendation the Board approved the entrustment of work to M/s. Bengal Tinger Lines in respect of C.T.B. 1 (North) and to M/s. X-Press Container Lines in respect of West Quay 1 and 2. The said decision of the Board was intimated to the Ministry which was approved by the 2nd respondent and the work was allotted to the respective shipping lines and the work were also completed. On 21-3-96, the Central Bureau of Investigation registered a case under R.C. 15(A)/96 against the Chairman, Chennai Port Trust Shri M. Kalaivanan and M/s. X-Press Contained Lines under Section 120B read with 420 IPC, Section 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. After investigation, charge sheet was filed before the Special Judge, CBI Cases, Chennai on 2-11-99 against seven persons viz., (1) Shri M. Kalaivanan, Acting Chairman, Chennai Port Trust, (2) Shri K. Dhikpathy, Traffic Manager, Chennai Port Trust, (3) Shri V. S. Ranganathan, Chief Mechanical Engineer, Chennai Port Trust, (4) Shri S. Muthusrinivasan, Financial Adviser and Chief Accounts Officer, Chennai Port Trust, (5) Shri K. C. Raman, Senior Vice President, M/s. Pat-Volk Limited, Chennai, (6) Shri S. B. Rao, Regional Representative, M/s. X-Press Container Lines, Chennai and (7) M/s. X-Press Container Limited, Chennai represented by Shri S. B. Rao which was taken on file in C.C. No. 16 of 1999The first accused in the said criminal case namely Shri M. Kalaivanan was placed under suspension in connection with this case and another case on 23-9-96. He challenged the order of suspension before the Central Administrative Tribunal and the same was rejected. However, the High Court in W.P. No. 1382 of 1998 by order dated 17-3-99 set aside the order of suspension. When the first accused was suspended on 23-9-96, the 1st respondent did not consider as necessary to place the petitioners namely accused 2 to 4 in the said case under suspension. However, the High Court in W.P. No. 1382 of 1998 by order dated 17-3-99 set aside the order of suspension. When the first accused was suspended on 23-9-96, the 1st respondent did not consider as necessary to place the petitioners namely accused 2 to 4 in the said case under suspension. However, by the impugned order dated 24-10-2000 the petitioners were placed under suspension by the 1st respondent by virtue of the power conferred under Regulation 7(1)(b) and (c) of the Madras Port Trust Employees (Classification, Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1988 hereinafter called as "The Regulations". The above orders of suspension are the subject matter in these writ petitions. Mr. N. R. Chandran, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners would raise the following contentions. Firstly, the learned Senior Counsel would contend that inasmuch as the petitioners and Mr. M. Kalaivanan, Acting Chairman, Chennai Port Trust at the relevant period were implicated in a criminal case in C.C. No. 16 of 1999, even as early as on 2-11-99 when the charge-sheet was filed, the 1st respondent has resorted to pass the impugned orders of suspension only against these petitioners and that too only on 24-10-2000. Therefore, the order of the 1st respondent in placing the petitioners under suspension cannot be sustained on the ground that selective suspension of placing some of the officers involved in the case and leaving other officers without there being an order of suspension against them. Such orders of selective suspension is bad. In support of the said submission, the learned Senior Counsel relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in, " 2000 (1) ATJ 734 : (K. Sukhendar Reddy v. State of A.P.)" Secondly, the learned Senior Counsel would contend that in this case, the Authority to place the petitioners under suspension is the appointing Authority. In so far as the petitioners are concerned, they are the employees covered under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 24 of Major Port Trust Act, 1963. In that event the petitioners cannot be placed under suspension without the approval of the 2nd respondent. In so far as the petitioners are concerned, they are the employees covered under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 24 of Major Port Trust Act, 1963. In that event the petitioners cannot be placed under suspension without the approval of the 2nd respondent. In the present case, the order of suspension has been made at the directions of the 2nd respondent itself without there being any recommendation by the Board and the statutory Authority acting on the instruction of higher Authorities is bad inasmuch as the appointing Authority has not applied his mind and recommended the suspension of the petitioners to the 2nd respondent. For the said purpose, the learned Senior Counsel would rely upon a judgment of this Court reported in, "1963 76 Mad LW 76 (V. V. Shunmugha Nadar and Brothers v. The Joint Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, Madras)"and the judgment of the Apex Court reported in" (Anirudhsinhji Karansinhji Jadeja v. State of Gujarat)" The learned Senior Counsel would further rely upon a Division Bench Judgment of this Court reported in, "1994 Writ LR 84 (Jawahar College Staff Association, 180-A, Block-6, Neyveli by its Secretary v. The Secretary, Jawahar Science College, Block 14, Neyveli-3)"to stress the difference between the word" approval"and" permission". According to the learned Senior Counsel" approval" holds good until disapproved. In other case, it does not become effective until "permission" is granted. Therefore, the learned Senior Counsel would contend that the approval granted by the 2nd respondent cannot be held to be valid so long as there is no proposal mooted out by the 1st respondentThirdly, the learned Senior Counsel would contend that the impugned orders of suspension made by the 1st respondent in exercise of the powers conferred under Regulation 7(1)(b) and (c) of the Regulations cannot co-exist inasmuch the powers conferred on the 1st respondent to place the officers under suspension. Regulations 7(1)(b) relates to, "if were any disciplinary proceedings against the officer is contemplated or is pending". Regulations 7(1)(b) relates to, "if were any disciplinary proceedings against the officer is contemplated or is pending". On the other hand, the said power conferred on the 1st respondent to place an officer under suspension under Regulation 7(1)(c) relates to "where a case against an officer in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation or trial" The learned Senior Counsel would contend that admittedly the orders of suspension relying upon both Regulation 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(c) cannot co-exist and therefore the orders of suspension are liable to be set aside. Finally, the learned Senior Counsel would contend that there is no rule in the Port Trust to continue the order of suspension after the retirement of the employee who was placed under suspension as contained under Rule 56 of the Fundamental Rules applicable to the Government servants. The petitioner in W.P. No. 18507 and the petitioner in W.P. No. 18512 of 2000 are already retired and therefore the continuance of suspension is bad. In this connection, the learned Senior Counsel would rely upon a judgment of this Court reported in 1997 Writ LR 120 (N. M. Somasundaram v. The Director General of Police, Government Estate Madras) and the judgment of the Apex Court reported in (The State of West Bengal v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi). Per contra, Mr. A. L. Somayaji, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the 1st respondent would contend that the petitioners were the members of the tender committee constituted to evaluate the tenders. Only on their recommendations the Board accepted the proposals and the same was forwarded to the 2nd respondent for approval. Even though a criminal case was registered against the petitioners as well as the then Acting Chairman who was implicated as the 1st accused, the Acting Chairman was alone suspended as early as on 23-9-96 and there was no decision taken by the Board. The said order of suspension was taken invoking Rule 3(3) of All India Service (Discipline and Service) Rules, 1969. However, the said order of suspension was set aside by a Division Bench of this Court in W.P. No. 1382 of 1998 in order dated 17-3-99 (reported in 2000 Lab IC 490). The Authority competent to place the 1st accused namely the Acting Chairman under suspension vests with the 2nd respondent since he being an IAS officer. However, the said order of suspension was set aside by a Division Bench of this Court in W.P. No. 1382 of 1998 in order dated 17-3-99 (reported in 2000 Lab IC 490). The Authority competent to place the 1st accused namely the Acting Chairman under suspension vests with the 2nd respondent since he being an IAS officer. The 1st respondent has no say in the order of suspension insofar as the 1st accused is concerned. However, the Board did not resort to place the petitioners who were also implicated in the criminal case to place under suspension at that time. However, when the charge-sheet was filed on 2-11-99, the matter was considered by the Port Trust on 14-11-99 and the proposal was forwarded to the 2nd respondent for placing the officers under suspension. The said proposal was considered by the 2nd respondent and the Joint Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Surface Transport in his letter dated 20-4-2000 informed the 1st respondent Port Trust that, "it has been decided in consultation with the CBI not to place the petitioners under suspension as the main accused has been reinstated into service" . However, when the 2nd respondent reconsidered the question of placing the petitioners under suspension on re-examination and on reconsideration, decided that the petitioners be placed under suspension forthwith in terms of Regulation 7(1)(c) read with Regulation 7(2) and proviso thereto of the Regulations. The said decision was communicated in the letter dated 6-10-2000 to the 1st respondent with further direction to take action in terms of seeking approval of the 2nd respondent under proviso to Regulation 7(2) of the Regulations. Accordingly, on 10-10-2000 the 1st respondent requested the approval of the 2nd respondent to place the petitioners under suspension under Regulation 7(2) of the Regulations. In response to the said request by the orders dated 20-10-2000 was passed and the same was communicated by letter dated 19-10-2000. However, the 1st respondent in his letter dated 20-10-2000 sought for a revised draft order for placing the officers under suspension and also the approval under Regulation 7(2) of the RegulationsBy order dated 20-10-2000 while withdrawing the earlier letter dated 19-10-2000, the Joint Secretary and Chief Vigilance Officer, Ministry of Surface Transport, Government of India communicated the approval of the 2nd respondent to place the officers under suspension enclosing a draft suspension order. Based upon the draft suspension order, the impugned orders of suspension dated 24-10-2000 were issued to the respective petitioners by the 1st respondent. The learned Senior Counsel for the 1st respondent based upon the above factual position would submit that the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners that the impugned orders of suspension are hit by the principles of selective suspension is not correct. Admittedly, in the charge-sheet only seven persons were implicated. Out of the seven persons, the 1st accused was then Acting Chairman, an IAS officer. He was placed under suspension on 23-9-96 even before the charge-sheet was filed on 2-11-99 invoking Rule 3(3) of All India Service (Discipline and Service) Rules, 1969. However, the said order of suspension was set aside by a Division Bench of this Court. Out of the remaining six accused, all the three petitioners who were cited as accused 2 to 4 were alone the officers of the 1st respondent Port Trust. The remaining three accused are the Senior Vice President of Pat-Volk Limited, Chennai, Regional Representative of M/s. X-Press Container Lines, Chennai and M/s. X-Press Container Lines, Chennai represented by Mr. S. B. Rao namely the sixth accused. They are all not the officers of the Port Trust and therefore there is no question of placing these three persons under suspension at the instance of the 1st respondent since the three petitioners are alone the officers of the 1st respondent Port Trust, all the three petitioners were placed under suspension. Therefore, on the facts of this case the principles of selective suspension is not applicableInsofar as the second contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, the learned Senior Counsel for the 1st respondent would contend that the competent authority to place the petitioners under suspension is the 2nd respondent. Therefore, the impugned orders placing the petitioners under suspension passed by the 1st respondent on the directions of the 2nd respondent cannot be in any way said to be in violation of any of the Regulations. Insofar as the third contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, the learned Senior Counsel for the 1st respondent would contend that the orders of suspension were made in exercise of powers under Regulation 7(1)(b) and (c) of the Regulations. Insofar as the third contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, the learned Senior Counsel for the 1st respondent would contend that the orders of suspension were made in exercise of powers under Regulation 7(1)(b) and (c) of the Regulations. Admittedly, the criminal cases are pending trial against the petitioners in C.C. No. 16 of 1999 before the Special Judge, CBI Cases, Chennai and the disciplinary proceedings are also contemplated against the petitioners. In that view of the matter, placing the petitioners under suspension in exercising the powers cannot in any way be said that they are not co-existent and therefore the learned Senior Counsel submitted that the said contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners is also liable to be rejected. Insofar as the last contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, the learned Senior Counsel for the 1st respondent would contend that in the writ petitions, the impugned orders of suspension has been challenged only on the above grounds and whether to continue the suspension after the retirement in the absence of any rule for the said purpose cannot be considered and consequently the same cannot be a ground for setting aside the orders of suspension issued pursuant to the directions of the competent authority. Therefore, for all the above reasons, the learned Senior Counsel submitted that the writ petitions are liable to be rejectedMr. N. Kannadasan, learned standing counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent contended that inasmuch as the 2nd respondent is the competent authority to accord approval for placing the petitioners under suspension by virtue of the proviso to Regulation 7 of the Regulations, there is no illegality in directing the 1st respondent to place the petitioners under suspension in view of the fact that all the petitioners had been implicated in a criminal case and charge-sheet has also been filed against them. Further, the learned standing counsel contended that factually the 1st respondent sent his proposal for approval of the 2nd respondent for placing the petitioners under suspension in letter dated 10-10-2000. Only on the basis of the said proposal, the direction was issued by the 2nd respondent in the letter dated 20-10-2000. Therefore, the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners that the 1st respondent has acted only on the directions of the 2nd respondent is not correct. Only on the basis of the said proposal, the direction was issued by the 2nd respondent in the letter dated 20-10-2000. Therefore, the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners that the 1st respondent has acted only on the directions of the 2nd respondent is not correct. Therefore, the learned standing counsel for the 2nd respondent submitted that the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners in challenging the impugned orders of suspension are liable to be rejected. Coming to the first contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, it is to be noted that in the charge-sheet filed on 2-11-99 before the Special Court, CBI Cases, Chennai, seven accused were implicated. Out of the seven accused, only 1 to 4 are the officers of the 1st respondent Port Trust. Admittedly, the 1st respondent who being an IAS officer was placed under suspension by competent authority by virtue of the powers conferred under Rule 3(3) of the All India Service (Discipline and Service) Rules, 1969. However, the said order of suspension was set aside by the Division Bench of this Court. By the impugned orders of suspension, all the remaining three officers have been placed under suspension. Therefore, it cannot be called as selective suspension as contended by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners when factually all the three petitioners who were the members of the evaluation committee and on whose recommendations only the proposal were approved by the Chairman and the Board have been placed under suspension only after charge-sheet was filed against them on 2-11-99. Therefore, the judgment relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners reported in 2000 (1) ATJ 734 : holding that the selective suspension is bad is not applicable to the facts of the present case. Accordingly, I reject the said submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitionersInsofar as the second submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, it is to be seen that the competent authority to place the officers under suspension is the 2nd respondent. For convenience, Regulations 5 and 7 of the Regulations are extracted as follows :- "5. Accordingly, I reject the said submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitionersInsofar as the second submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, it is to be seen that the competent authority to place the officers under suspension is the 2nd respondent. For convenience, Regulations 5 and 7 of the Regulations are extracted as follows :- "5. Appointing Authority (1) The power to make appointments to Class I posts other than those covered by Clause (a) of sub-section (i) of Section 24 of the Act shall be exercised by the Chairman (2) The power to make appointments to Class II posts shall be exercised by the Deputy Chairman (3) The power to make appointments to Classes III and IV posts shall be exercised by the Head of the Department concerned." 7. Suspension (1) An employee may be placed under suspension (a) Where in the opinion of the Chairman, he has engaged himself in activities prejudicial to the interest of the security of the State; or (b) Where a disciplinary proceeding against him is contemplated or is pending; or (c) Where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation or trial (2) The order of suspension shall be made (a) in the case of an employee referred to in Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 24 of the Act by the Chairman; and (b) in the case of any other employee by the appointing authority Provided that no such order relating to an employee referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 24 of the Act shall have effect until it is approved by the Central Government. "A reading of the said Regulations would clearly indicate that the Chairman of the Port Trust is the appointing authority insofar as the Class I posts other than those covered by clause (a) of sub-section (i) of Section 24 of the Act. Admittedly, even as per the averments made in the affidavits filed in support of the writ petitions, the petitioners are the employees covered under clause (a) of sub-section (i) of Section 24 of Major Port Trusts Act, 1963. Insofar as the officers governed under clause (a) of sub-section (i) of Section 24 they can be placed under suspension by the Chairman as per proviso to Regulation 2. Insofar as the officers governed under clause (a) of sub-section (i) of Section 24 they can be placed under suspension by the Chairman as per proviso to Regulation 2. However, such orders of suspension shall have the effect only after the approval by the 2nd respondent. Therefore, the competent authority to either approve or refuse to approve any order of suspension is the 2nd respondent. The grievance of the petitioners are that when such power has not been exercised by the 1st respondent in recommending their case for suspension, the 2nd respondent cannot suo motu direct the 1st respondent to place the petitioners under suspension. This contention of the petitioners has no legs to stand inasmuch as the 2nd respondent is the competent authority to approve the order of suspension. Of course, in an earlier occasion the 2nd respondent had decided not to place the petitioners under suspension in view of the fact that the 1st accused in the case namely the Acting Chairman who was placed under suspension was reinstated by virtue of the orders of the Court. That does not mean that the competent authority cannot reconsider the said decision and decide to place the petitioners under suspension. It is well settled principle in law that an authority who has the power to take a decision, has equally the power to review the said decision also. The competent authority has after reconsidering the matter and in view of the fact that the petitioners who were the members of the evaluation committee were alone responsible for the recommendations and especially they were also been implicated in the criminal case by CBI, have taken a decision to place the petitioners under suspension. In my considered view, the 2nd respondent is empowered to reconsider its own decision when the 2nd respondent is of the opinion that the petitioners shall be placed under suspension in view of the pendency of criminal case against them and such action cannot be in any way said to be bad in the eye of law. The judgments relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners to support his submission that the authority competent to place the petitioners under suspension namely the Chairman cannot act on the instruction of the higher authorities. The judgments relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners to support his submission that the authority competent to place the petitioners under suspension namely the Chairman cannot act on the instruction of the higher authorities. In the judgments reported in 1963 76 Mad LW 76 it has been held that the decision of judicial or quasi judicial authority given under the direction of, or after consultation with, some other person even if that person be a superior authority, will be invalid as being in violation of the rules of natural justice. That was a case when the quasi-judicial authority was deciding an appeal, passed orders on the instruction of the higher authority. Therefore, the Court came to the conclusion that such an order was bad. Similarly, in the judgment reported in the Apex Court had an occasion to consider a case where the exercise of the powers by the competent authority under directions are in compliance with the instruction of some other person or authority amounts to failure to exercise the discretion altogether. That was also a case of the exercise of power by a statutory authority vested with jurisdiction passed orders on the instruction of the higher authority. In the judgment relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners reported in 1994 Writ LR 84, a Division Bench of this Court considered the scope of statute No. 27 of Chapter XXVI of the Laws of the University of Madras. According to the said statute". appointments to the teaching staff of a college shall be made only after the Principal has been given an opportunity of expressing his views. All appointments shall be reported to the Syndicate which shall satisfy itself that they meet the requirement of the University." While considering the said statute, the Division Bench held that the appointments made by a private college will become effective as per the terms contained in the order of appointment, and in the event of those appointments are not approved by the Syndicate or University, they cease to be effective from the date of they are disapproved. The Division Bench came to the conclusion, all that the statute requires is that the appointments made shall be reported to the Syndicate and there is no question of prior approval before the appointments are made. The Division Bench came to the conclusion, all that the statute requires is that the appointments made shall be reported to the Syndicate and there is no question of prior approval before the appointments are made. However, in the present case, the orders of suspension can be passed by the 1st respondent but the same will not become effective until it is approved by the 2nd respondent. Therefore, unless there is an approval by the 2nd respondent, there cannot be a valid order of suspension. In that context, the powers of the Syndicate to satisfy itself as to the appointments by virtue of statute 27 of Chapter XXVI of the Laws of the University of Madras cannot be in any way equated with the powers of the 2nd respondent under proviso to Regulation 7. Therefore, the ratio laid down in the Division Bench judgment reported in 1994 Writ LR 84 is not applicable with the facts of the case and I do not agree with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners. In the present case, admittedly the approval of the orders of suspension shall be made by the Central Government namely the 2nd respondent. Therefore, the 2nd respondent cannot be in any way considered as an authority without any say in the matter since the orders of suspension will not be given effect to until the same is approved by the 2nd respondent. Further, from the files produced by the 1st respondent, it is seen that the 1st respondent on 10-10-2000 has addressed to the 2nd respondent seeking for approval of the 2nd respondent as required under Regulations. Based upon the said requisition only, the 2nd respondent in the letter dated 19-10-2000 approved the said proposal to suspend the petitioners. However, the said letter was withdrawn on 20-10-2000 and a revised letter was sent by the 2nd respondent to the 1st respondent approving the suspension of the petitioners enclosing copy of the draft suspension order. Based upon the said requisition only, the 2nd respondent in the letter dated 19-10-2000 approved the said proposal to suspend the petitioners. However, the said letter was withdrawn on 20-10-2000 and a revised letter was sent by the 2nd respondent to the 1st respondent approving the suspension of the petitioners enclosing copy of the draft suspension order. However, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners would contend that the said letter dated 10-10-2000 cannot be in any way considered as a proposal for suspension of the petitioners inasmuch as the said proposal has been mooted out by the 1st respondent after the communication of the 2nd respondent dated 6-10-2000 directing the 1st respondent to take action to seek approval of the 2nd respondent under proviso to Regulation 7(2) of the Regulations. Therefore, the learned Senior Counsel would contend that the authority competent to exercise the power of placing the petitioners under suspension cannot act on the directions of the 2nd respondent without independently applying his mind. It is true that by letter dated 6-10-2000 the 2nd respondent has directed the 1st respondent to seek approval under proviso to Regulation 7(2) of the Regulation for placing the petitioners under suspension. The said direction was considered by the 1st respondent and thereafter only a proposal has been mooted out by the 1st respondent in letter dated 10-10-2000. Merely because the proposal has been mooted out by the 1st respondent to place the petitioners under suspension on the directions of the approving authority in its letter dated 6-10-2000, the subsequent approval granted by the 2nd respondent for placing the petitioners under suspension cannot be held to be invalid. Therefore, I do not find any illegality in the 1st respondent in passing the impugned orders of suspension against the petitioners on the directions of the 2nd respondent who is the competent authority to approve any orders of suspension that may be passed by the 1st respondent. Therefore, the judgment relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners are not applicable to the facts of the present case. Accordingly, I do not find any merit in the said submissionsThe last submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners is that the two petitioners in W.P. Nos. 18507 and 18512 of 2000, suspension orders issued in respect of them cannot continue in view of their retirement. Accordingly, I do not find any merit in the said submissionsThe last submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners is that the two petitioners in W.P. Nos. 18507 and 18512 of 2000, suspension orders issued in respect of them cannot continue in view of their retirement. In my considered view those matters are not the subject-matter in the writ petitions and the said submission would fall outside the scope of orders of suspension challenged in the impugned orders. Therefore, I do not find any merit in the said submission also. Accordingly, I hold that the impugned orders of suspension are valid and cannot be set aside on the ground of selective suspension as alleged by the petitioners and there is no inconsistency in the impugned orders of suspension when the orders refer to both Regulation 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(c) of the regulations and the impugned orders passed by the 1st respondent at the directions of the 2nd respondent cannot be also held to be bad on the ground that the 1st respondent had acted on the directions of the 2nd respondent. For the foregoing findings, I am unable to accept all the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners and accordingly I reject the same. In view of my above findings, I do not find any grounds to interfere with the orders of suspension as there are no merits in the writ petitions. Accordingly, all the writ petitions are dismissed. No costs. Consequently, W.M.P. Nos. 26775, 26779 and 26780 of 2000 are also dismissed.