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2001 DIGILAW 1897 (RAJ)

Murti Mandir v. Ram Charan

2001-12-06

H.S.PUNIA, RASHMI PRIYADARSHINI

body2001
PRIYADARSHINI, Member –This is an appeal filed u/Sec. 224 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (In short ``the Act) against the judgment and decree of Revenue Appellate Authority, Alwar dated 26.6.93, whereby the first appeal preferred by the respondent No.1 to 3 was accepted and the judgment and decree of the trial court dated 8.10.90 were set-aside. (2). The brief facts, necessary for decision of this appeal, are that a revenue suit for declaration of khatedari rights and permanent injunction was filed by the Villagers on behalf of appellants No. 1 & 2 with the averment that the plaintiffs are khatedar tenants of agriculture land bearing Khasra No. 231, 232, 235 to 241, 469, 507, 508 and 509 measuring 41.13 bighas situated in the precinct of Village Rampura Patan and this land was given as muafi to both the temples and it was khudkast land of the plaintiffs-appellants. The defendants- respondents No.1 to 3 were pujaris of both the idols and they were managing the worship and cultivation of the suit land of the deities, and also the suit land was in possession of the Pujaris on behalf of the deities. It was further stated that the defendants took undue advantage of their position and got the suit land recorded in their own names in collusion with the officials of the revenue department and they have started misuse of the income from the said agriculture land to their personal advantage. The villagers are worshipping both the idols and religious feelings of the villagers have been hurt by the action of the defendants. Therefore, it had become necessary to bring the suit. It was also stated that the management of worship to the deities will not be possible if the defendants transferred the land to other persons. The plaintiffs approached the defendants but they have refused to get the entries corrected in the revenue records. It was, therefore, prayed that the appellants-plaintiffs No. 1 & 2 be declared khatedar tenants of the suit land and also prayed for permanent injunction against the defendants-respondents No. 1 to 3. (3). The plaintiffs approached the defendants but they have refused to get the entries corrected in the revenue records. It was, therefore, prayed that the appellants-plaintiffs No. 1 & 2 be declared khatedar tenants of the suit land and also prayed for permanent injunction against the defendants-respondents No. 1 to 3. (3). The defendants-respondents opposed the suit by way of written statement and contended that the suit land was not khudkast land of the plaintiffs-appellants and it was submitted that the defendants No.1 to 3 were khatedar tenants of the suit land from the time of their ancestors and the defendants got the suit land by way of inheritance. It was further stated that one- third share in the suit land was sold by defendant Charan Das and father of defendant Bhuvaneshwar Das to defendant No. 2 Ramswaroop by way of registered sale deed on 15.6.67. Later on the suit land was partitioned between the defendants and they are in separate possession of their share. The defendant No.2 Ramswaroop is not pujari of the temple, although defendants No.1 & 3 have admitted that they and their ancestors were pujaris of the plaintiff-appellants temples, but the suit land was never a muafi land and it had no concern whatsoever with the plaintiffs (Temples). The defendants were never in possession of the land as Pujaris of the temples, but they were khatedar tenants of the suit land. (4). On the pleadings of the parties the learned trial court framed eight issues and after recording evidence of the parties and affording them an opportunity of hearing, the suit filed by the appellant-plaintiffs was decreed and the deities were declared as khatedar tenants of the disputed lad. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial court, Respondents No.1 to 3 filed first appeal before Revenue Appellate Authority, Alwar which was accepted by the impugned judgment dated 26.6.93 and the judgment and decree of the trial court was set-aside on three grounds holding that old and new khasra numbers are not consistent, that the entries were not changed during the settlement operation, but names of the pujaris were recorded in the revenue records in Smt. 2018 and that the villagers are not competent to bring the suit on behalf of the deities. Hence this second appeal before the Board of Revenue. (5). Hence this second appeal before the Board of Revenue. (5). We have heard both the parties and perused the impugned judgment and the record of the trial Court. (6). The learned counsel for the appellants has argued that any devotee/worshipper can bring a suit for the deitys land. The deity is a perpetual minor and the pujaris appointed to manage the affairs of the deities had acted against the interest of the deity and in collusion with the officials of the revenue department, got the entries made in the revenue record in their favour. In these circumstances, the devotees filed a suit for correction of the entries and declaration of khatedari rights in favour of the deities. Any person can bring a suit for protection of the interest of the deities. Therefore, the villagers had locus standi to file the suit. In support of this argument he has placed reliance on Khumma vs. Mandir Parshavnathji (1), and Parmanand vs. Tehsildar Behrod (2). The next contention of the learned counsel of the appellants is that the defendants did not dispute the comparison of old and new khasra numbers and the learned first appellate court has developed a new case which was not set up by the defendants-respondents. However, the appellants-plaintiffs filed comparison table, Exhibit-2, and the defendants-respondents have also filed the same comparison table as Exhibit-A-2, which shows that there is no inconsistency in comparison of old and new khasra numbers. Therefore, the finding recorded on this count by the first appellate court is perverse. It is further contended that entries made in favour of Pujaris before settlement operation without order of the competent court can be corrected at any time. The suit land belonged to the deities initially and the plaintiffs produced Jamabandi of Smt. 2001, 2009 and 2013-16, which proved that the deities were khatedar of the disputed land, but the entries in the names of Pujaris occurred first time in Jamabandi Smt. 2018-21. The land in dispute belongs to the deities and deity is perpetual minor. Thus land, being in the name of perpetual minor, cannot be transferred to any other person and no khatedari rights could have accrued to any tenant or pujari. Therefore, the first appellate court has adopted a wrong approach and has recorded perverse findings. The land in dispute belongs to the deities and deity is perpetual minor. Thus land, being in the name of perpetual minor, cannot be transferred to any other person and no khatedari rights could have accrued to any tenant or pujari. Therefore, the first appellate court has adopted a wrong approach and has recorded perverse findings. In support of these arguments reliance has been placed on Durga Lal vs. Shanicharji Maharaj (3), Rampratap vs. Board of Revenue (4) and Jamna Lal vs. Board of Revenue (5). (7). As against this, the learned counsel for the respondents No.1 to 3 has contended that the appellants- plaintiffs failed to prove that the suit land was handed over to the temples by the villagers. Hence, they have failed to prove the very foundation of the case. It is further contended that Jamabandi of Smt. 2001 and 2009 contained the names of respondents-defendants. But these entries were changed during the year Smt. 2013-16 without any basis and this mistake was corrected during the year Smt. 2018. It is also submitted that Jamabandi Smt. 2013-16, Exhibit-3, is pertaining to only 21.11 bighas, whereas the trial court decreed the whole suit for 41.18 bighas. It was notproved that who appointed the defendants as pujaris of the temples or the land in dispute was muafi land of the idols. It is further contended that the villagers were not authorised to bring the suit on behalf of the deities because no management committee authorised them to file the suit in the court. (8). We have given our most anxious consideration to the arguments put by the learned counsel for both the parties. In this case following two issues arise for decision of this court :Public Prosecutor (1) Whether the villagers/devotees/worshippers of the idols can bring a suit on behalf of the deity for declaration of khatedari rights pertaining to the land in dispute? (2) Whether the land in dispute belongs to the deities who are perpetual minors and whether khatedari rights can accrue to pujaris in such lands? Point No. 1 First of all we have considered the question of locus standi to file the suit on behalf of the deities by the villagers/devotees. (2) Whether the land in dispute belongs to the deities who are perpetual minors and whether khatedari rights can accrue to pujaris in such lands? Point No. 1 First of all we have considered the question of locus standi to file the suit on behalf of the deities by the villagers/devotees. It is clear that nine persons of Village Rampura Patan, where both the temples are situated, filed the suit before the learned trial court for declaration of khatedari rights in favour of the deities and permanent injunction. It can be said that the villagers/devotees have come before the trial court in order to protect the interest of the deities. It was alleged that the Pujaris of the temples got the entries recorded in their names in collusion with the officials of revenue department then it can be said that the Pujaris had not acted fairly or failed to protect the interest of the idols. On this point case of Khumma vs. Mandir Parshavnathji may be referred here in which this point was also considered. After considering the various case law it has been observed that there are consistent rulings of the Board of Revenue treating the deity as a perpetual minor and juristic person. The idols are always considered to be perpetual minors in the eye of law and as they cannot bring suits themselves somebody has to bring suit on their behalf. When such suits are brought, it is as much necessary for a court of law to see that the interests of the idol are protected just as in the case of suits by or on behalf of the minors. It was also observed that Order 32 of CPC lays down procedure by which the interest of the minors can be safeguarded and on this analogy a solitary principle can be applied by the courts of law to suits, by or on behalf of idols. In the case of Parmanand vs. Tehsildar, Behrod, the disputed land belonged to deity and the name of Bhanidas was entered in revenue record as Pujari of the temple. After resumption of the Jagir, the land was somehow got entered in the khatedari of Bhanidas, who transferred it to Parmanand. Under these circumstances, Tehsildar Behrod filed a suit praying that the sale deed may be declared null and void and the plaintiff be declared khatedar of the disputed land. After resumption of the Jagir, the land was somehow got entered in the khatedari of Bhanidas, who transferred it to Parmanand. Under these circumstances, Tehsildar Behrod filed a suit praying that the sale deed may be declared null and void and the plaintiff be declared khatedar of the disputed land. In these facts and circumstances of the case, it was held that the Tehsildar, Behrod cannot file a suit and it is deity which can file a suit through a next frient. (9). Looking to the above legal position, a perusal of the plaint shows that the suit has been filed by deities through nine persons of the same village where both the temples are situated and it can be said that the suit has been filed by the deities, through next friend. The deities/idols being perpetual minors cannot bring the suit themselves and somebody has to bring the suit on their and the villagers/devotees of the said temples have come forward to safeguard the interest of the minors. It is also apparent that there is allegation against Pujaris of these temples that they have wrongly been got entered as khatedar of the disputed land in collusion with the officials of revenue department and in these circumstances no other person can be said to be a best persons to act as a next friend of the minors other than the devotees/villagers of the Village Rampura Patan. The learned first appellate court has given a finding on this point in perfunctory manner which cannot be upheld and we hold that the devotees/villagers of the Village Rampura Patan are competent to act as next friend of the plaintiffs-deities, looking to the facts and circumstances of the case because the pujaris of the said temples have acted against the interest of the idols and failed to safeguard the interest of the minors. Point No. 2 (10). The learned trial court had considered the evidence adduced by both the parties and came to the conclusion that the land in dispute belongs to the plaintiffs-deities and defendants were custodian of the disputed land on behalf of the idols. Now, point for the consideration is whether the disputed land belongs to the deities or idols and further that khatedari rights cannot accrue in such lands. The learned first appellate court has held that the entries of khasra numbers in comparison table are not consistent. Now, point for the consideration is whether the disputed land belongs to the deities or idols and further that khatedari rights cannot accrue in such lands. The learned first appellate court has held that the entries of khasra numbers in comparison table are not consistent. It was also observed that the settlement operation took place in Smt. 2028 whereas the defendants names were entered in the revenue records in Smt. 2021. The learned first appellate court has failed to examine the revenue record in proper perspective. We have carefully examined the revenue record produced before the learned trial court and it is revealed that Jamabandi Smt. 2013-16, Exhibit-3, shows both the deities as khatedars of the land bearing khasra No. 194 to 199, 200, 367, 368, 369 to 371 and the names of Narain Das and Banvari Das shown as pujaris in equal shares. Jamabandi Smt. 2001, Ex.4 and Jamabandi Smt. 2009, Exhibit-5, are pertaining to other khasra Nos. 236, 193, 228, 364 and 234 in which the names of Narain Das and others have been entered but the remarks column contains an entry to this effect : It shows that the land in dispute belongs to plaintiffs-deities and the names of Narain Das and Banvari Das were shown as pujaris in equal shares, therefore, it can be safely held that the disputed land belongs to the deities/idols. The defendants- respondents produced Jamabandi Smt. 2018-21, Ex.A-1, in which khatauni No. 42, 34 and 44 have been mentioned showing separate khasra numbers and dispute arose from these entries. Both the parties produced comparison table, Ex.2 and Ex.A-2, and careful examination of both these comparison tables reveals that the disputed land is same and there is no inconsistency in the comparison tables. Old Khasra No. 367 min, 368, 369 and 371 have been clubbed together and one new khasra No. 507 has been given. Similarly, Old Khasra Nos. 198 and 199 were clubbed together and new khasra No. 240 has been given. This cannot be treated as an inconsistency or discrepancy in the revenue record. Therefore, the finding of the first appellate court with regard to the comparison table is perverse and the first appellate court did not examine the comparison table in its true sense. 198 and 199 were clubbed together and new khasra No. 240 has been given. This cannot be treated as an inconsistency or discrepancy in the revenue record. Therefore, the finding of the first appellate court with regard to the comparison table is perverse and the first appellate court did not examine the comparison table in its true sense. It is admitted position that one-third share of the disputed land was sold to respondent No.2 by respondent No.1 & 3 and thereafter partition took place between the respondents and the separate khatauni was prepared during Smt. 2041 which are Ex.A-5, Ex.A-6 and Ex.A-7. But these are subsequent entries of the revenue record. It is well proved that the disputed land belongs to the idols. (11). The question of accrual of khatedari rights in the lands belonging to deities was considered in the case of Rampratap vs. Board of Revenue in which it was also argued that the land belonging to idol were muafi land and they were resumed after coming into force of Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagir Act and the rights of the idols/temples were extinguished, but this argument was found to be without force and it was held that the land held by Idols/temples was khudkast land and the idols, being perpetual minor, cannot be expected to cultivate the land personally. It was held in case of Nathu and others vs. Board of Revenue (6), that since the deity of temple is a perpetual minor, the land shall remain khudkast, even though it may be cultivated through anyone. In the present case defendant-respondents No.1 & 3 were pujaris of the temples and they were looking after the cultivation of the land belonging to the Idols. Therefore, it may be deemed that the disputed land was khudkast land of the idols. In case of Jamna Lal vs. Board of Revenue, the land was muafi land in the name of Mandir Shri Murliji and names of pujaris were also entered in the revenue record. The petitioners were sub-tenants of muafi land which stood resumed with effect from 1.7.63 and in that case khatedari rights were claimed u/S. 19 of the Act. In that case it was held that nobody has any right to claim possession, title or interest over the land which stood vested with the State government by operation of law. The petitioners were sub-tenants of muafi land which stood resumed with effect from 1.7.63 and in that case khatedari rights were claimed u/S. 19 of the Act. In that case it was held that nobody has any right to claim possession, title or interest over the land which stood vested with the State government by operation of law. Although, the defendants-respondents have not claimed their rights as sub-tenants of the muafi land and it does not appear that the land belonging to the plaintiff idols was resumed under the Resumption of Jagir Act. (12). The Larger Bench of the Board of Revenue in case of Durga Lal vs. Shanicharji Maharaj also considered the acquisition of khatedari rights under the Tenancy Act in respect of lands acquired or held for a public purpose or for a work for public utility. It was held that the property endowed to, and held by a deity or an idol can be considered to be held for public purposes and it was observed that the true beneficiary of religious endowment are not the idols but the worshippers and that the purpose of endowment is maintenance of that worship for the benefit of the worshippers. While giving an answer to the reference made to the Larger Bench it was held that a Hindu deity or idol is minor for the purpose of Section 46(1)(A) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act and the land held in muafi by a deity, even if they are cultivated by a person who is neither pujari or manager nor a member of such pujari or managers family nor hired labour or servant are included in the definition of ``land cultivated personally. In the last it was opined that acquisition of khatedari rights in the lands held by idols and deities is barred by the provisions of Section 16(VI) of the Act because such lands are held for public purposes. In the last it was opined that acquisition of khatedari rights in the lands held by idols and deities is barred by the provisions of Section 16(VI) of the Act because such lands are held for public purposes. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case and legal position discussed above it may be held that the disputed land belongs to the plaintiffs-idols and the idols are perpetual minors in view of the provisions of Section 46 of the Act and if the land belonging to deity is managed by a pujari or is given to any person for cultivation, the said cultivator is only sub-tenant as contemplated by Section 46 of the Act and no khatedari rights could accrue in such lands in favour of either pujari or any person who had cultivated such lands as sub-tenant. It is also well settled that the deity is perpetual minor and the land recorded in the name of idol cannot be transferred and no khatedari rights could have accrued to the transferee. Therefore, the sale of land to respondent No.2 is null-and-void. In view of this finding, judgment passed by the first appellate court is perverse and deserves to be quashed. (13). In the result, this second appeal is accepted and the judgment and decree passed by Revenue Appellate Authority, Alwar dated 26.6.93 are hereby set-aside and the judgment and decree of the trial court dated 8.10.90 are hereby restored. (14). Pronounced in the open court.