ORDER Hari Nath Tilhari, J.—By this petition, the Petitioner has challenged the order impugned dated 24th of June, 1999, passed by the 1st Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore, in Appeal No. 410 of 1984, Electric Power Devices Co. Canara Mutual Building v. Senior Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India, whereby, the 1st Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore, has dismissed the Petitioner's appeal from the order dated 15.12.1984, passed by Estate Officer in case No. 1 of 1984. 2. The facts of the case in the nutshell are; that: On proceedings being taken under Sections 4 and 5, of Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, against the Petitioner from the premises in question situated at 2nd floor of Canara Mutual Buildings, at No. 4, Residency Road, Bangalore, on the ground that the petitioner's lease has been terminated or determined vide notice of termination dated 11.1.1983, and as, the Petitioner before this Court did not comply with the notice, so, the proceedings, as his continuing in possession after termination of tenancy was unauthorised one. Notice of the petition, which was moved by the Divisional Manager of LIC, was issued and served on the present Petitioner, who was Respondent before the Estate Officer. The present Petitioner filed his reply before the Estate Officer and raised the following pleas. That the Respondent, before the Estate Officer, has been in possession of the premises, as a tenant since 1955, and he cannot be deemed to be an unauthorised occupant. That the present petition is barred by res judicata, since earlier petition had been dismissed, vide order dated 29.3.1982, and no appeal had been preferred, therefrom. That the area occupied is 464 square ft. in Second Floor, and there is no bona fide requirement of the space by Life Insurance Corporation of India, when an area of approximately three times were let out to post office on the ground floor, and it was stated in defence that, it speaks about the mala fide intention of LIC. The present Petitioner, who was Respondent before the Estate Officer, also took the plea, that, he will be subject to great hardship, if he is evicted therefrom. 3. The Estate Officer framed the following points for determination: 1. Whether the Respondent before it is in unauthorised occupation of the public premises in question. 2. The present Petitioner, who was Respondent before the Estate Officer, also took the plea, that, he will be subject to great hardship, if he is evicted therefrom. 3. The Estate Officer framed the following points for determination: 1. Whether the Respondent before it is in unauthorised occupation of the public premises in question. 2. Whether the present action taken to evict Respondent as bonafide and the premises is required for self-occupation by LIC of India for expansion of its Branch Office, as contended by LIC? 3. Whether the present action initiated against the Respondent (that is, Respondent before the Estate Officer), is barred by principles of res judicata as contended by the Respondent? 4. To what reliefs, if any? On consideration of the material on record, the Estate Officer, held that, it is not a disputed question, that, premises in question is public premises within the meaning of Public Premises Act, so, the position was that, it was an admitted position, that, the premises in question has been a public premises within the framework of public Premises of Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants' Act. He further found, that, tenancy had been terminated validly, and as the premises in question is a public premises in terms of the Act, so the Respondent (present Petitioner) was held to be in unauthorised occupation of the premises, since after, determination of tenancy. It further held, that the Respondent before the Estate Officer, that is, present Writ Petitioner did not make out and could not make out a case, that the action of the LIC, was mala fide. It also held, that, previous action was, on account of default in payment of rent, so, that decision will not, operate as, res judicata. 4. On appeal being preferred by the present Petitioner, the learned Appellate Court, held that, there is no dispute, that, the premises is a public premises and by a valid notice, a tenancy has been validly terminated, the Appellate Court opined, in the same manner, as the Estate Officer and held, that the appellant before it had become an unauthorised occupant and he was liable to be evicted and there was no other question to be considered. 5. 5. Feeling aggrieved from the Appellate's order by which the Appellate Court has affirmed the order of the Estate Officer, the Respondent before the Estate Officer, that is, the Appellant before the City Civil Judge has come up in this Court by this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. I have heard Sri R. Sudarshan, learned Counsel for the Petitioner and Sri M.L. Vishweshwaraiah, learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 1. 6. An attempt had been made to contend, that, the learned 1st Additional Civil Judge was not competent to decide the appeal, but, no base for the same had been made in the petition, under the Public Premises Act, Section 9 provides as under: that is, Section 9(1) of the Public Premises Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants' Act, 1971: 9(1) - An appeal shall lie from every order of the Estate Officer made in respect of any public premises under Section 5, or 5(b) or Section 5(c) or Section 7 to an Appellate Officer, who shall be the District Judge of the District Court, in which public premises is situate or such other Judicial Officer in the District of not less than 10 years standing, as the District Judge may designate in this behalf. Sub-section (6) of Section 9, provides and reads, as under: For the purposes of this section, a Presidency Town shall be deemed to be a District Court and the Chief Judge or the Principal Judge of the City Civil Court therein shall be deemed to be District Judge of the District Court. 7. Section 3 of the Karnataka Civil Courts' Act, gives three categories of Civil Courts subordinate to High Court, namely, 1) District Court, 2) Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division and (3) Court of Civil Judge, Junior Division. Section 4, provides for establishment of a District Court, but it appears, that, vide Sections 4 and 5, were omitted by Act 8 of 1978, and they were deemed to have been with the prospective effect. Section 12 of the Karnataka Civil Courts' Act provides, that, the District Court existing immediately prior to the appointed day, shall be deemed to be District Court's established under the Act, unless reconstituted in accordance with the Civil Courts' Act and District Court has been declared to be the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction with the local limits of the jurisdiction. In the year 1979, the legislature passed an Act known as Bangalore City Civil Courts' Act, Section 3 of the Act provides for establishment of a City Civil Court in the City of Bangalore, and Sub-section (2) of Section 3, provides that, the City Civil Court shall consist of Principal City Civil Judge and a number of other City Civil Judges Court, as the Government may in consultation of the High Court appoint. Sub-section (3), declares, that, notwithstanding anything contained in any law, the City Civil Court shall be deemed to be the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in the City of Bangalore. Section 5(2) of the Bangalore City Civil Court Act, 1979, provides that, the Principal City Civil Judge may subject to any general special order of the High Court from time to time, make arrangements or such arrangements, as he thinks fit for distribution of business by the City Civil Court amongst the Judges thereof. The Principal Judge of the City Civil Court enjoy he position and status of the Principal District Judge. 8. Under Section 9 of the Public Premises Act, the appeal can be entertained, Heard and disposed of either by the Principal City Civil Judge, who enjoy the position of the District Judge or it may be disposed of by an other Judicial Officer in the District, as designated by him, and he also, satisfies the condition of 10 years standing. 9. In the present case, Petitioner has not made out a case. The assertion has not been made in the petition on affidavit, that Sri Muzzamil the Judge, who presided the Appellate Court did not have the necessary qualification of 10 years' standing, as a Judicial Officer, nor it was alleged, that he was not designated, for hearing the appeal. That ordinary presumption of law, as per Section 114(E) of Evidence, i.e. that all judicial and official acts have been regularly performed, will prevail. In this view of the matter and in absence of necessary assertions being made out in the Writ Petition, the contention advanced by the Petitioner's Counsel that the Additional City Civil Judge, has no jurisdiction to hear the appeal is without substance and has to be rejected. 10. In this view of the matter and in absence of necessary assertions being made out in the Writ Petition, the contention advanced by the Petitioner's Counsel that the Additional City Civil Judge, has no jurisdiction to hear the appeal is without substance and has to be rejected. 10. Learned Counsel further contended, that the Estate Authority or the Appellate Authority did not grant him time to produce additional evidence to show the mala fide intention of the Insurance Company in taking proceedings under Section 5, and tried to contend that unless bona fide requirement, was there with the present Respondent-Insurance Company and unless they prove, that they required for the building for their own use bona fide, the proceedings of eviction could not be initiated. In my opinion, this contention of Petitioners' Counsel is also without substance and has to be and that is, hereby rejected for the following reason: The proceedings were taken under Section 5 of the Act, which provides for eviction of unauthorised occupants from the public premises. Who is an unauthorised occupant and what expression unauthorised occupation, means, have been defined under Section 2 of the Public Premises Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants Act. That Section 2 reads; in this Act: Unless context otherwise requires an unauthorised occupant in relation to any public premises means, the occupation by any person of the public premises without authority for such occupation, and includes the continuance in occupation of any person of the public premises, after the authority; Whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer order under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever. What is material to be seen is: Whether in case of a person, who had been tenant and put in occupation of the premises under a transfer; when that transfer or lease etc., has expired or has been determined. What is material to be seen is: Whether in case of a person, who had been tenant and put in occupation of the premises under a transfer; when that transfer or lease etc., has expired or has been determined. If the lease has been determined validly and thereafter if, a person continues in occupation without consent of the owner or lessor or authority, then such occupation is to be deemed to be an unauthorised occupation, and Section 5, requires two things to be established, one i.e. the premises in question is a public premises, and the other, is that, the Defendant in the case alleged to be in occupation of the building happens to be an unauthorised occupant or the person is in unauthorised occupation of the public premises. If the two conditions are established, then in that case, authority is entitled to pass order directing said person to vacate the premises, which is in his occupation, within the time fixed or within 15 days of publication. If that, person fails, the coercive methods for evicting him may also be taken. No other consideration is required to be taken, arguments of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner appears, to proceed on the basis of some principles of Rent Control Law, that, either there could be ground mentioned in Section 21 or bona fide requirements, but this Act, that is Public Premises Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants Act, does not conceive of such situation or requirement for passing the order of eviction. 11. As mentioned earlier, it has to be established that the premises in question is a public premises and then in those cases the, Special law enacted by the Central Parliament or even by the State if enacted, would prevail over the general law to avoid any conflict. In this view of the matter, the Public Premises Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants Act did not require nor does it provide for bonafide need etc. being established an essential condition or considerations before eviction order can be passed, and as the law requires in proceeding for eviction of tenant from premises governed by the Rent Control and Eviction Act. When I so opine, I find support for my view from the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Jain Ink Manufacturing Company Vs. When I so opine, I find support for my view from the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Jain Ink Manufacturing Company Vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India and Another, AIR 1981 SC 670 , in that case a similar contention was raised and their Lordships laid it down, as under; after having made reference to their earlier decision in Shri Ram Narain Vs. The Simla Banking and Industrial Co. Limited, AIR 1956 SC 614 and some other decisions also and laid it down in Paragraph-9, as under: Thus, it would appear that both the scope and the object of the premises Act is quite different from that of the Rent Act. The Rent Act is of much wider application than the Premises Act inasmuch as it applies to all private premises which do not fall within the limited exceptions indicated in Section 2 of the Premises Act. The object of the Rent Act is to afford special protection to all the tenants or private landlords or landlords who are neither a Corporation nor Government or Corporate Bodies. It would be seen that even under the Rent Act, by virtue of an amendment a special category has been carved out under Section 25B which provides for special procedure for eviction to landlords who require premises for their personal necessity. Thus, Section 25B itself becomes a special law within the Rent Act. On a parity of reasoning, therefore, there can be no doubt that the Premises Act as compared to the Rent Act, which has a very broad spectrum, is a special Act and override the provisions of the Rent Act. 12. In case of Indian Bank, Bangalore Vs. Blaze and Central Private Limited AIR 1986 Kar 258 , was raised before the Division Bench, as per observations at Page-264, as has been raised here and that, contention had been rejected by Division Bench, the Court observes: The only plea raised on behalf of the 1st Respondent was, that the need is specified in the notice did not really exist and its requirement was not bona fide, which plea could be taken only in an objection statement to an eviction petition under provisions of Rent Control Act and not in reply to a notice issued under Section 4(1) of the Act. 13. 13. This is sufficient enough to reject the second plea, and it has to be rejected on the ground that because, the Public Premises Act is a special law it has to prevail and not the Rent Control Act in relation to the proceedings for eviction of unauthorised occupants. According to the admitted facts thereof, the Petitioner was a tenant or his lease would have been determined and the Petitioner when continued in occupation of public premises his occupation was unauthorised one and in such cases, such cases are governed by the Special Act, i.e., Public Premises Act, so only ground on which the eviction order can be passed, is namely that the premises, is public premises and the occupant is in unauthorised occupation, thereof. Thus considered in my opinion, the present writ petition is devoid of merits and has to be dismissed and is hereby, dismissed. 14. That no doubt Petitioner is, subjected to furnishing an undertaking in the form of affidavit, stating therein that he will hand over vacant possession to the Respondent within a period of 8 months and will pay off the damages for use and occupation at the rate on which the rent was earlier paid, and he is to be permitted and granted 8 months time to vacate the Public Premises in question. Thus, the Petitioner is allowed 8 months time to vacate the premises and hand over vacant possession to the Respondent, subject to fulfilment of above condition and filing of undertaking. 15. Let the affidavit to the above effect be, filed by the Petitioner on the record of this Court as well as before the Estate Officer, within a period of 6 weeks from today, if affidavit is not filed within the abovementioned period, then it will be open to the Respondent to proceed with the action, according to law.