Research › Search › Judgment

Gujarat High Court · body

2001 DIGILAW 195 (GUJ)

Himatsinh Dolatsinh Baraiya v. State of Gujarat

2001-03-15

S.K.KESHOTE

body2001
JUDGMENT : S.K. Keshote, J. Arguments in all these 4 matters were heard on 18.1.2001. The order was kept C.A.V. The learned counsel for the petitioner was given liberty if he so desire to file written submissions together with authorities on which he desires to place reliance within a week. More than one more week has already passed, he has not filed written arguments till date. 2. All these 4 matters proceed on same facts and grounds and are taken up for hearing together and are decided under this common order. SCA No.8052 of 2000 :- In this petition there is only one petitioner. His qualifications are S.S.C. and C.P.Ed. It is not in dispute that this certificate of Physical Education has been taken by the petitioner from institution of Maharashtra State. Under the order dated 11.2.2000 of the District Primary Education Officer, District Panchayat, Education Branch, Baroda he was appointed as Vidhya Sahayak and posted at Primary School at Goyavant. His appointment was subject to the outcome of Special Leave Appeal (Civil) No.6532 of 1999. Under the order dated 7.7.2000 his services were terminated. This petition has been presented by the petitioner in this court on 12.7.2000. It has come up for preliminary hearing on 24.7.2000. On that day notice has been issued and interim relief has not been granted. SCA No.8054 of 2000 :- In this petition also there is only one petitioner. His qualifications are S.S.C. and C.P.Ed. It is not in dispute that this certificate of Physical Education has been taken by the petitioner from institution of Maharashtra State. Under the order dated 11.2.2000 of the District Primary Education Officer, District Panchayat, Education Branch, Narmada he was appointed as Vidhya Sahayak and posted at Primary School at Samot. His appointment was subject to the outcome of Special Leave Appeal (Civil) No.6532 of 1999. Under the order dated 7.7.2000 his services were terminated. This petition has been presented by the petitioner in this court on 12.7.2000. It has come up for preliminary hearing on 24.7.2000. On that day notice has been issued and interim relief has not been granted. SCA No.8161 of 2000 :- In this petition, there are 4 petitioners. Their qualifications are S.S.C. and C.P.Ed. The certificates of C.P.Ed. were taken by the petitioners from an Institution of Maharashtra State. The petitioners Nos. It has come up for preliminary hearing on 24.7.2000. On that day notice has been issued and interim relief has not been granted. SCA No.8161 of 2000 :- In this petition, there are 4 petitioners. Their qualifications are S.S.C. and C.P.Ed. The certificates of C.P.Ed. were taken by the petitioners from an Institution of Maharashtra State. The petitioners Nos. 1, 2 and 4 were appointed under orders dated 11.2.2000 of the District Primary Education Officer, Narmada District Panchayat Education Branch, Rajpipla and petitioner No.3 was appointed under order dated 2.7.1999 of the same officer. The petitioner Nos. 1 to 4 were posted at Primary School, Javali, Primary School Mahupada, Primary School, Selamba and Primary School Godada respectively. Their appointments are also subject to the outcome of Special Leave Appeal (Civil) No.6532 of 1999. Their services were terminated by order dated 6.7.2000. SCA No.9234 of 2000 :- In this petition there are two petitioners. It is not in dispute that certificate of Physical Education has been taken by these 2 petitioners from an institute of Maharashtra State. Under order dated 11.9.2000 of District Primary Education Officer, District Panchayat, Rajpipla, Narmada. They were appointed as Vidhya Sahayak and posted at their respective places. Their appointments were subject to the outcome of Special Leave Appeal (Civil) No.6532 of 1999. Their services were terminated by order dated 26.7.2000. 3. All these matters have come up for hearing on 16.10.2000. On this date this court after hearing learned counsel for the parties, the Director of Education (Primary), Old Sachivalaya, Gandhinagar is directed to remain personally present in the court on 18.10.2000 to make statement whether the Circular of the Government dated 29.12.1980 still holds the field or not. On 18.10.2000 this court has given direction to the State of Gujarat to file affidavit of the officer not below rank of Director of Primary Education to state how many candidates have been given appointment in the different district panchayats as Vidhya Sahayaks who obtained certificates of Physical Education from the state of Maharashtra and which is as per the case of the respondents is not recognised certificate. The Director has been directed to state on affidavit what action has been taken against those officers who have given the appointment to these candidates as Vidhya Sahayaks possessing C.P.Ed., Maharashtra State. On 14.11.2000 Mr. The Director has been directed to state on affidavit what action has been taken against those officers who have given the appointment to these candidates as Vidhya Sahayaks possessing C.P.Ed., Maharashtra State. On 14.11.2000 Mr. R.K.Chaudhary, Director of Primary Education, Government of Gujarat, Gandhinagar filed affidavit-in-reply and in para 4 thereof he has given out the facts that six candidates who have obtained certificate of Physical Education from Hanuman Vyayam Pracharak Mandal, Amravati (Maharashtra) were appointed as Vidhya Sahayaks in District of Valsad. 2, 10, 3, 10, 4, 3 and 3 candidates were appointed as Vidhya Sahayaks who obtained C.P.Ed. from the Director of Sports and Youth Services, Maharashtra, Pune in the districts of Rajkot, Valsad, Dang, Jamnagar, Junagadh, Kutch and Navsari respectively. In para 5 of the reply affidavit the Director stated that the services of Hanuman Vyayam Pracharak Mandal, Amravati, Maharashtra State in Valsad district total number of Vidhya Sahayaks (C.P.Ed.) are six and to all the Govt. has issued termination notices and the other who are having the C.P.Ed. certificates from Director of Sports & Youth Services of Maharashtra State, Pune, the total numbers are 35. The Government has given direction to the concerned Primary Education Officers to terminate the services of Vidhya Sahayaks having the qualifications of C.P.Ed. from state of Maharashtra. He further stated that Government has also issued notices to District Primary Education Officers to take necessary action so far a the Vidhya Sahayak's appointment is concerned and also the Government has issued show cause notice to the concerned District Primary Education Officer for taking necessary actions against them for appointing unqualified Vidhya Sahayak (C.P.Ed.). 4. In Special Civil Application No.8161 of 2000 the Deputy Director, Primary Education, Sachivalaya, Gandhinagar filed affidavit sworn on 17.10.2000. In para No.3 thereof it is stated that the Circular dated 29.12.1980 of the Government still holds the field. It has further been stated that several directions have been given to all District Primary Education Officers, District Panchayats to follow circular of 29.12.1980. 5. The respondent No.2 District Primary Education Officer, Narmada District in special civil application No.8161/2000 reply-affidavit filed also. In the affidavit, the respondent No.2 has given out that the appointments were given to the petitioner with condition that the same are purely on temporary basis. This is stated to be condition No.5 of the appointment order. 5. The respondent No.2 District Primary Education Officer, Narmada District in special civil application No.8161/2000 reply-affidavit filed also. In the affidavit, the respondent No.2 has given out that the appointments were given to the petitioner with condition that the same are purely on temporary basis. This is stated to be condition No.5 of the appointment order. Reference has been made to condition No.6 that in case of any irregularities, absentees and indiscipline, the services of the petitioner can be terminated without any notice. Reference has also been made to condition No.13 of the appointment that the authority is at liberty to initiate legal action in case of certificates found invalid. Then it is stated that the Narmada District had come into existence in 1999-2000. The revenue limits of District Narmada are carved out from the original district of Bharuch and certain portion of Vadodara district. It is stated that the certificates and decree of Physical Education of Bhartiya Sharirik Shikshan Mahavidhyalaya is invalid in he State of Gujarat for the appointment of teachers in Physical Education Training. Reference has been made to Government Resolution wherein it is stated that the students who got this certificate from Maharashtra State are not eligible in the State of Gujarat. Explanation has been furnished that by mistake the copy of notification dated 29-12-1980 was not placed before the Selection Committee and therefore, the Selection Committee could not consider the aforesaid notification at the time of making appointments of the petitioners. It is stated that the appointments of the petitioners as Vidhya Sahayaks are ab initio void and illegal and therefore, the termination of their services is legal and valid. It is stated in para-5 of the reply that no sooner it had come to the notice of the District Primary Education Officer, the deponent herein, he had verified the aforesaid facts with the State Government and also obtained the copy of the said notification dated 29-12-80 from the Education Department of the State of Gujarat. It is further stated that he had written a letter dated 27-6-2000 to the Regional Officer, National Council for Teacher Education, Western Regional Committee, Bhopal (M.P.) to verify about the recognition granted by the Government of India for the C.P.Ed. courses conducted by the C.P. Ed. College, Wardha and C.P.Ed. College, Amrawati both in the State of Maharashtra. It is further stated that he had written a letter dated 27-6-2000 to the Regional Officer, National Council for Teacher Education, Western Regional Committee, Bhopal (M.P.) to verify about the recognition granted by the Government of India for the C.P.Ed. courses conducted by the C.P. Ed. College, Wardha and C.P.Ed. College, Amrawati both in the State of Maharashtra. It is stated that the National Council for Teacher Education is a statutory body of the Government of India and it vide its letter dated 3-7-2000 signed by the Regional Director, NCTR, Western Regional Committee informed that no institution of Maharashtra had been granted recognition for C.P.Ed. courses. Concluding it is stated that the institution from where the petitioners had passed the course of Sharirik Sikshan i.e. certificate of C.P. Ed. is not recognised and therefore the petitioners are not eligible to be appointed as teachers of Physical Instructor in Vidhya Sahayak scheme. It is reiterated that as per the notification dated 29-12-1980, the petitioners are not eligible to get appointment as Vidhya Sahayaks and therefore the action of the respondent, terminating the services of the petitioners with immediate effect is just and valid. 6. The Deputy Director, Primary Education, Sachivalaya, Gandhinagar in his affidavit dated 17-10-2000 in para-4 thereof, stated that the National Council for Teachers Education (Statutory Body of India), Western Region Committee has also clarified in the letter that no institution of Maharashtra state has been granted recognition of C.P. Ed. course by that region. 7. The petitioner filed rejoinder to the reply affidavit of respondent No.2 and the Director of Primary Education. The sum and substance of both the rejoinders is as under: 8. The petitioners have been selected by a lawfully constituted Selection Committee and on selection, they were appointed and since then working with satisfaction. Their services could not have been brought to an end without affording bare minimum opportunity of hearing. The genuineness of certificates is not at all in question, the same were tendered along with the application and were scrutinised at the time of taking interview. The petitioner are not at fault and as such when the action of the respondent-authority entails civil consequences practically economic death of the petitioners, opportunity of hearing should have been given. The genuineness of certificates is not at all in question, the same were tendered along with the application and were scrutinised at the time of taking interview. The petitioner are not at fault and as such when the action of the respondent-authority entails civil consequences practically economic death of the petitioners, opportunity of hearing should have been given. The decision of the Government was there at the time of appointment of the petitioners and the petitioners still have been appointed and continued in service for six months. At no point of time, the petitioners have been informed that their certificates from Amrawati institution are not recognised. It is stated that to the knowledge of the petitioners somewhere in the year 1993-94 one notification was already issued by virtue of which several candidates have been selected and appointed though who obtained C.P.Ed. from Amrawati. This resolution of the Government has not been supplied to the petitioners. No concrete material has been produced to indicate clearly that those certificate were not recognised in the State of Gujarat. In several other parts of Gujarat including Valsad, Vidhya Sahayaks are working since number of years with these very qualifications. Recently, in one district of State of Gujarat several Vidhya Sahayaks have been actually appointed though those they have obtained C.P.Ed. from Amravati and Wardha. 9. In rejoinder filed to the reply of the State of Gujarat, almost identical grounds have been taken and names of some of the candidates have been given who have been given appointment as Vidhya Sahayaks with the very qualifications. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner raised following contentions :- (i) The termination of the services of the petitioners ensues civil consequences and it could have been done only after following the principles of natural justice. (ii) The petitioner have not concealed anything from the appointing authority. The appointing authority after considering the certificates found the petitioners eligible and appointments have been given and as such their services could not have been brought to an end in this manner. (iii) With these very qualifications in many other districts the candidates have been appointed as Vidhya Sahayaks and they are working. (iv) The Government resolution on which reliance has been placed has not been brought to the notice of the petitioners. Otherwise also, no material has been produced by the respondent that C.P. Ed. (iii) With these very qualifications in many other districts the candidates have been appointed as Vidhya Sahayaks and they are working. (iv) The Government resolution on which reliance has been placed has not been brought to the notice of the petitioners. Otherwise also, no material has been produced by the respondent that C.P. Ed. of Amrawati and Wardha or Pune are not recognised by the State of Gujarat. 11. In contra, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that all the petitioners are possessing C.P. Ed. from the institutes of Maharashtra which are not recognised by the State of Gujarat as well as the National Council for Teachers Education, Western Region. The petitioners were not eligible for appointment as Vidhya Sahayaks. It is by mistake that these appointments were given and when this mistake has come to the notice of the appointing authority, necessary action has been taken for termination of their services. It has next been contended that as per the condition of appointment orders, the services of the petitioners could have been brought to an end by way of the termination order as they are not having recognised certificate of Physical Education. When the petitioners are not eligible for appointment, it is not incumbent upon the respondent to give notice or an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners before terminating their services. It has next been contended that with these qualification the appointments were given in other Districts, but in the cases of those persons also, necessary action has been taken and their services have also been brought to an end. Some of those persons are continued in service as they file the petition in this court and this court has protected them by grant of interim relief. Reference here is made to the special civil application No.12419/2000. Lastly it is contended that against the District Primary Education Officers who have made these appointments of the petitioners and other persons, direction has been given for taking disciplinary action. 12. In rejoinder, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that this Court has already admitted identical petition being Special Civil Application No.12419/2000 and this petition may also be admitted and interim relief may be granted. It has next been contended that when this Court has protected the identically situated persons, these petitioners may also be protected and all the matters may be decided together. 13. It has next been contended that when this Court has protected the identically situated persons, these petitioners may also be protected and all the matters may be decided together. 13. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. 14. The petitioners of the special civil application No.8161/2000 have not disputed that their appointments as Vidhya Sahayaks were subject to following conditions: (i) the appointments were purely on temporary basis. (ii) in case of any irregularities, absentees and indiscipline, their services are liable to be terminated without any notice. (iii) the authority is at liberty to initiate legal action in case of certificates is found invalid. 15. So the appointments of the petitioners were only temporary subject to conditions that where their certificate are found to be invalid, legal action can be initiated. It is not in dispute that the resolution of the Government dated 29-12-1980 has not been superseded by the State of Gujarat. Whether copy of the resolution was circulated to the petitioners or not, it is hardly immaterial as it is not required to be given to the petitioners. In this matter it has to be taken uncontroverted by the petitioners that resolution of 29.12.1980 still holds field. This has been made very clear by the respondent- Director of Primary Education in his affidavit and merely on the basis of what it is alleged by the petitioners, it does not stand controverted. When this certificate of Physical Education taken by the petitioners from the institutes of Maharashtra, which are not recognised, both by the State of Gujarat as well as the National Council for Teachers Education, the petitioners were not eligible for these appointments. It is true that the petitioners have not concealed anything from the appointing authority. They produced the certificate before the appointing authority and appointing authority having knowledge of these facts, has given appointments to the petitioners but that will not act as estoppel against the appointing authority. In the service matters it cannot be applied otherwise it will open flood gates for corruption, nepotism and favouritism. It is different matter that Director of Primary Education has come up with such defence, which is difficult to believe. In the service matters it cannot be applied otherwise it will open flood gates for corruption, nepotism and favouritism. It is different matter that Director of Primary Education has come up with such defence, which is difficult to believe. Despite of this circular of Government dated 29-12-1980, these appointments have been made of the petitioners with the qualification which were not recognised certainly creates suspicion in the mind of the court that the same would have been given by the appointing authority with some consideration. The District Primary Education Officer though has furnished explanation that Narmada was newly created district and this resolution was not available with the Selection Committee but it is difficult to believe. It is not the case that the District Education Officer was a new person. He was already in service and he is to be presumed to have notice of this circular. What about other districts, no explanation has been furnished. In these days of high unemployment in the country, there is all possibility of manipulations in the employment. It is stated by the people that there is rampant corruption in the appointments made in the Government services. There are all possibilities that these appointments have been made deliberately by the concerned officers. It cannot be said to be a simple case of error or mistake. However, nothing can be said finally nor anything more needs to be said as what the respondent-District Primary Education has come up with the case that against those erring officers action has already been initiated. 16. In the facts of this case, I am satisfied that the certificates of Physical Education taken by the petitioners from Amrawati are not recognised qualifications and as a result of which, the petitioners were not possessing the requisite qualifications prescribed for appointment as Vidhya Sahayaks in the State of Gujarat. 17. Now the question does arise for consideration is whether the termination of the services of the petitioners which have been made without notice of hearing is declared to be invalid and to order for their reinstatement in the service. It is not in dispute that before termination of the services of the petitioners, the respondents have not given any notice or opportunity of hearing to them. 18. It is not in dispute that before termination of the services of the petitioners, the respondents have not given any notice or opportunity of hearing to them. 18. The petitioners in rejoinder to reply have not disputed that there was a condition in their appointment letter that where the authority finds the certificate invalid it can initiate legal action. In this case the certificate of physical education taken by the petitioners from Maharashtra State are not recognised in the State of Gujarat and certainly it is a case of invalid certificate. In these facts, the authority was within its competence and legally correct to terminate the services of the petitioners on this ground for which no opportunity of hearing needs to be given. 19. The services of the petitioners undisputedly have been terminated on the ground that the certificate of physical education taken by them from different institutions of Maharashtra State are not recognised by the State of Gujarat. The petitioners' learned counsel, as said earlier, has failed to show that the Circular of the Government dated 29th December, 1980 is not in force. The learned counsel for the petitioners has not produced any material on the record of these special civil applications to show and establish that the certificate of physical education which has been obtained by petitioners from different institutions of Maharashtra State are recognised by the State of Gujarat. The Director of Primary Education as well as the Deputy Director of the Department filed an affidavit on oath stating that the Circular of the Government dated 29th December, 1980 holds field till date. It is also not in dispute that any of the institutions of Maharashtra granting certificate for physical education has been recognised by National Council of Teachers' Education, Western Region. In the absence of any material to prove contrary by the petitioners, it has to be accepted that the Government Resolution dated 29th December, 1980 is in force and the petitioners' certificates in physical education are not recognised by the State of Gujarat and as a result of which, they all are not possessing the requisite qualification prescribed for the post of VIDHYA SAHAYAK. In view of this undisputed position of fact, what useful purpose will be served in case a notice has not been given to the petitioners before terminating their services. In view of this undisputed position of fact, what useful purpose will be served in case a notice has not been given to the petitioners before terminating their services. It is true that termination of services of an employee ensues civil consequences and even if it is an administrative action, principles of natural justice are to be followed before making any adverse order by the employer. But it is not the law that every action or order of the Government has to be set aside by this court in a petition on the ground that principles of natural justice have not been followed in the matter before taking action or passing the adverse orders. What for principles of natural justice are to be followed, it is no more res-integra to give an opportunity to the person who is affected by the order or action of the Government to present his case. In a case where a litigant comes up before this court with a grievance of violation of principles of natural justice in passing of the orders to him, the court will not go by these abstract principles of violation of principles of natural justice. It has to examine the matter on merits ad where it is satisfied that the litigant has made a plausible defence to the action take against him by the Government, the that order may be set aside and the matter may be remitted back to the Government for deciding it after giving notice and opportunity of hearing to that litigant. But where the court is satisfied that against the action of the Government, though adverse to the litigant, the litigant has no defence whatsoever, then the court should not go by these mere formalities. In that case, the court may not be correct in quashing and setting aside that action or order ad remitting the matter back for undergoing these formalities of notice and opportunity of hearing to be given to the litigant. It is no more res-integra that merely because an order adverse to the litigant has been passed without notice and opportunity of hearing to him results in causing prejudice to him. There is not such presumption. It is no more res-integra that merely because an order adverse to the litigant has been passed without notice and opportunity of hearing to him results in causing prejudice to him. There is not such presumption. In the case where the litigant comes up with the grievance that before taking adverse action against him by the Government principles of natural justice have not been followed, he has to satisfy the court that it results in causing prejudice to him and for this, he has to satisfy the court that he has a reasonable and plausible defence in the matter. In this case, the petitioners do not have any plausible or reasonable defence. Their qualification or certificate of physical education is not a recognised qualification in the State of Gujarat and for this what they could have been produced before the appointing authority, this opportunity is thus available to them ad when they have utterly failed to satisfy this court that their certificate of physical education is not a valid certificate in the State of Gujarat in case only on this ground relief is granted to them it will be nothing but only a exercise in futility. I cannot do better than to make here reference to the latest pronouncement of their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan reported in 2000 AIR SCW 1976 Their Lordships of Hon'ble Supreme Court therein held :- Para : 22 Chinnappa Reddy, J. in S.I.Kapoor's case ( AIR 1981 SC 136 ), laid two exceptions (at p. 395 of SCC) : (at pp.147 and 148 of AIR) namely, "if upon admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion was possible", then in such a case, the principle that breach of natural justice was in itself prejudice, would not apply. In other words if no other conclusion was possible on admitted or indisputable facts, it is not necessary to quash the order which was passed in violation of natural justice of course, this being an exception, great care must be taken in applying this exception. Para : 23 The principle that in addition to breach of natural justice, prejudice must also be proved has been developed in several cases. Para : 23 The principle that in addition to breach of natural justice, prejudice must also be proved has been developed in several cases. In K.L.Tripathi v. State Bank of India, (1984) 1 SCC 43 : ( AIR 1984 SC 273 : 1983 Lab IC 1680), Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. (as he then was) also laid down principle that not mere violation of natural justice but de facto prejudice (other than non-issue of notice) had to be proved, it was observed : quoting Wade Administrative Law (5th Ed.Pp.472-475) as follows (Para 31) : ".....It is not possible to lay down rigid rules as to when principles of natural justice are to apply, nor as their scope and extent..... There must have been some real prejudice to the complainant; there is no such thing as a merely technical infringement of natural justice. The requirements of natural justice must depend on the facts and circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject matter to be dealt with and so forth". Since then, this Court has consistently applied the principle of prejudice in several cases. The above ruling and various other rulings taking the same view have been exhaustively referred to in State Bank of Patiala v. S.K.Sharma (1996) 3 SCC 364 : (1996 AIR SCW 1740 : AIR 1996 SC 1669 ). In that case, the principle of 'prejudice' has been further elaborated. The same principle has been reiterated again in Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P., (1996)5 SCC 450 : (1996 AIR SCW 3424 : AIR 1996 SC 2736 ). Page : 24 The 'useless formality' theory, it must be noted, is an exception. Apart from the class of cases of "admitted or indisputable facts leading only to one conclusion" referred to above, - there has been considerable debate of the application of that theory in other cases. The divergent views expressed in regard to this theory have been elaborately considered by this Court in M.C.Mehta, 1999 AIR SCW 2754 : ( AIR 1999 SC 2583 ), referred to above. This Court surveyed the views expressed in various judgments in England by Lord Reid, Lord Wilberforce, Lord Woolf, Lord Singham, Megarry, J. and Straughton, L.J. etc. in various cases and also views expressed by leading writers like Profs, Garner, Craig, De smith, Wade, D.H.Clark etc. This Court surveyed the views expressed in various judgments in England by Lord Reid, Lord Wilberforce, Lord Woolf, Lord Singham, Megarry, J. and Straughton, L.J. etc. in various cases and also views expressed by leading writers like Profs, Garner, Craig, De smith, Wade, D.H.Clark etc. Some of them have said that orders passed in violation must always be quashed for otherwise the Court will be prejudging the issue. Some others have said, that there is no such absolute rule and prejudice must be shown. Yet, some others have applied via-media rules. We do not think it necessary, in this case to go deeper into these issues. In the ultimate analysis, it may be depend on the facts of a particular case". 20. In view of the undisputed position of fact in this case, as well as decisions of their Lordships, Supreme Court considered in the case of Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan (supra), the first contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioners is devoid of any substance and merits. 21. If the matter is examined from another aspect we can reach to the same conclusion. It is the case of the respondents that the petitioners were appointed purely on temporary basis as Vidhya Sahayaks. It is not material whether they were appointed purely on temporary basis or on permanent basis because if the matter is examined from either of the aspect it will not materially effect the result. A candidate who is appointed after selection against the sanctioned permanent post his appointment may be regular permanent appointment and he has to be placed on probation. So even if in this case we proceed with this assumption and presumption that the appointments of the petitioners as Vidhya Sahayaks were regular their position is that of a probationer only. It is no more res integra that the services of a probationer can be brought to an end by simpliciter discharge without giving any notice or opportunity of hearing. It is the case of the simpliciter termination of services of the petitioners without casting any stigma and as such no notice or opportunity of hearing needs to be given to them before this order is made by the respondents. It is the case of the simpliciter termination of services of the petitioners without casting any stigma and as such no notice or opportunity of hearing needs to be given to them before this order is made by the respondents. The ground of termination of services of the petitioners is that their certificates of Physical Education which is one of the requisite eligibility for the appointment as Vidhya Sahayak is not recognised by the State of Gujarat. The termination of services of a probationer on the ground that the certificates submitted by him of his eligibility for the appointment to the post concerned is not recognised does not constitute misconduct nor the termination of the services on the ground cast any stigma. It is also not the case of the petitioners that the termination of their services cast any stigma. It is also not the case of the petitioners that they have been sent back to the home for any misconduct committed or certificate produced by them of Physical Education was forged document. In view of these undisputed factual position, in this matter the respondents were not under any legal obligation whatsoever to give any notice or opportunity of hearing to the petitioners before their services were brought to an end by an order of simpliciter termination of their services. So far as the temporary appointments is concerned I cannot do better than to refer the decision of the apex court in the case of Madhya Pradesh v. Devendrakumar JT 1995(1) SC 198 Their Lordships of Hon'ble Supreme court therein held that a temporary Government servant does not become permanent unless it acquires that capacity by force of any rule or is declared as permanent servant. Their Lordships of Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that no notice or opportunity of hearing needs to be given to a temporary employee while terminating his services. So if the matter is examined from either of the aspect afore stated the grievance made by the petitioners that the termination of their services is bad in law cannot be accepted. 22. Otherwise also, this order of termination of services of the petitioners on this ground of violation of principles of natural justice made in passing thereof cannot be set aside. 22. Otherwise also, this order of termination of services of the petitioners on this ground of violation of principles of natural justice made in passing thereof cannot be set aside. It is no more res-integra that this court, sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may legitimately decline to set aside an order, the consequence thereof be of revival of an illegal order. This court, sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution will not perpetuate any illegality. On setting aside of the impugned order, if illegal order is revived, this court will not grant any relief in such matters to the litigant. For this reference may have to the following decisions :- (1) AIR 1966 SC 828 , Godde Venkateswara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh (2) AIR 1980 Raj. 1 , Jagan Singh v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal & Anr. (3) AIR 1968 Kerala 76, A.M. Mani v. Kerala State Electricity Board (4) AIR 1977 Patna 166, Devendra Prasad Gupta v. The State of Bihar & Ors. (5) AIR 1994 Raj. 53 , Himmat Jain v. The State of Rajasthan & Ors. 23. In this case, it is no more in dispute that the petitioners are not possessing any requisite qualification of physical education, i.e. a certificate duly recognised by the State of Gujarat. They were not eligible for appointment on the post of VIDHYA SAHAYAK and their appointments made on the basis of this certificate is certainly void ab-initio. In case their services have been brought to an end without notice and opportunity of hearing, if that order is set aside on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice, it will result in revival of an ab-initio void order, i.e. their appointment orders. This is another ground on which the contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioners cannot be accepted. 24. As regards, the contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioners that with similar certificate of physical education, many candidates have been given appointments as VIDHYA SAHAYAK in different Districts of the State of Gujarat, it is suffice to say that this contention advances also is of little help to the petitioners. It is not in dispute that in the Valsad, Rajkot, Jamnagar, Dangs, Kutchh, Navsari and Junagadh Districts, candidates were appointed as VIDHYA SAHAYAK who were possessing certificate of physical education from the institutes of Maharashtra State. It is not in dispute that in the Valsad, Rajkot, Jamnagar, Dangs, Kutchh, Navsari and Junagadh Districts, candidates were appointed as VIDHYA SAHAYAK who were possessing certificate of physical education from the institutes of Maharashtra State. Their appointments may also be not legal. This position has been admitted by respondents that in those Districts the candidates on the post of VIDHYA SAHAYAK were appointed with the same qualifications. So far as factual aspect is concerned, there is no dispute but only on these appointments made in other Districts, the petitioners cannot be given relief. It is no more res-integra that on the basis of some other illegal order passed by the authority, no plea of discrimination can be permitted to be raised. Those appointments in those Districts may be illegal and void ab-initio and the same are taken to be so by respondents and their appointments are likely to be terminated and in fact, the appointments have been terminated. It is a different matter that some of the candidates approached to this court and this court has protected them by grant of interim relief. This contention is not available to the petitioners for two reasons, firstly that those appointments are also invalid as per the case of respondents and secondly, the services of those persons have also been terminated. Reference here fruitfully may have to the following decisions :- (1) AIR 1995 SC 705 Chandigarh Administration v. Jagjit Singh (2) JT 1996(8) SC 387 The Secretary, Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur v. Daulat Mal Jain etc. (3) 1996(7) SCC 426 Sneh Prabha v. State of U.P. (4) 2000 AIR SC 2389 State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh In the case of State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Prasad Their Lordships of Hon'ble Supreme Court held :- "The concept of equality as envisaged under Article 14 of the Constitution is a positive concept which cannot be enforced in a negative manner. When any authority is shown to have committed any illegality or irregularity in favour of any individual or group of individuals other cannot claim the same illegality or irregularity on ground of denial thereof to them. Similarly, wrong judgment passed in favour of one individual does not entitle others to claim similar benefits. When any authority is shown to have committed any illegality or irregularity in favour of any individual or group of individuals other cannot claim the same illegality or irregularity on ground of denial thereof to them. Similarly, wrong judgment passed in favour of one individual does not entitle others to claim similar benefits. In this regard this Court in Gursharan Singh v. NDMC, (1996) 2 SCC 459 : (1996 AIR SCW 749 : AIR 1996 SC 1175 ) held that citizens have assumed wrong notions regarding the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution which guarantees equality before law to all citizens. Benefits extended to some persons in an irregular or illegal manner cannot be claimed by a citizen on the plea of equality as enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution by way of writ petition filed in the High Court. The Court observed (para 9): 'Neither Article 14 of the Constitution conceives within the equality clause this concept nor Article 226 empowers the High Court to enforce such claim of equality before law. If such claims are enforced, it shall amount to directing to continue and perpetuate an illegal procedure or an illegal order for extending similar benefits to others. Before a claim based on equality clause is upheld, it must be established by the petitioner that his claim being just and legal, has been denied to him, while it has been extended to others and in this process there has been a discrimination.' Again in Secretary, Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur v. Daulat Mal Jain, (1997) 1 SCC 35 this Court considered the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution and reiterated its earlier position regarding the concept of equality holding: 'Suffice it to hold that the illegal allotment founded upon ultra vires and illegal policy of allotment made to some other persons wrongly, would not form a legal premise to ensure it to the respondent or to repeat or perpetuate such illegal order, nor could it be legalised. In other words, judicial process cannot be abused to perpetuate the illegalities. Thus considered, we hold that the High Court was clearly in error in directing the appellants to allot the land to the respondents.' In The State of Haryana & Ors. In other words, judicial process cannot be abused to perpetuate the illegalities. Thus considered, we hold that the High Court was clearly in error in directing the appellants to allot the land to the respondents.' In The State of Haryana & Ors. v. Ram Kumar Mann (1997) 3 SCC 321 : (1997 AIR SCW 1574) this Court observed (para 3) : 'The doctrine of discrimination is founded upon existence of an enforceable right. He was discriminated and denied equality as some similarly situated persons had been given the same relief. Article 14 would apply only when invidious discrimination is meted out to equals and similarly circumstanced without any rational basis or relationship in that behalf. The respondent has no right, whatsoever and cannot be given the relief wrongly given to them, i.e., benefit of withdrawal of resignation. The High Court was wholly wrong in reaching the conclusion that there was invidious discrimination. If we cannot allow a wrong to perpetrate, an employee, after committing misappropriation of money, is dismissed from service and subsequently that order is withdrawn and he is reinstated into the service. Can a similar circumstanced person claim equality under Section 14 for reinstatement? Answer is obviously 'No'. In a converse case, in the first instance, one may be wrong but the wrong order cannot be the foundation for claiming equality for enforcement of the same order. As stated earlier for enforcement of the same order. As stated earlier, his right must be founded upon enforceable right to entitle lion to the equality treatment for enforcement thereof. A wrong decision by the Government does not give a right decision by the Government does not give a right to enforce the wrong order and claim parity or equality two wrongs can never make a right." 25. Ancillary contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioner that this petition may also be admitted has to be dealt with. In special civil application No.12419/2000, on 4.12.2000, this court issued notice to the respondents therein and ex-parte interim relief has also been grated that the respondents not to terminate the services of the petitioners till returnable date. There is no dispute between the parties that matter was identical to these petitions. However, that was an ex-parte order passed by this court and any order passed for admission of the matter is not a decision. There is no dispute between the parties that matter was identical to these petitions. However, that was an ex-parte order passed by this court and any order passed for admission of the matter is not a decision. In these matters, notice was given much earlier to 4th December, 2000. The respondents have already filed their reply and court is deciding these matters on merits. In view of these facts, this plea raised by learned counsel for the petitioners that these matters may also be admitted and stay may be granted is not available to him in the facts of this case. 26. The contention raised that it is not the case of any concealment of fact by petitioners and the respondents, after scrutinising the certificate produced by the petitioners, have given appointment to them and their services cannot be terminated though seems to be attractive but difficult to accept by the court. If such a contention is accepted and reliefs are granted to the litigants in our country where there is rampant corruption, it will open floodgates for corruption, nepotism and favouritism. It is true that the District Primary Education Officer has come up with the explanation that as new District has been carved out, he was not known of the Resolution dated 29th December, 1980, but it is difficult to accept. Otherwise also, no such defence is put forth by other District Officers. It is very difficult to accept that those officers have bona fidely acted in these matters. It is a different matter that the petitioners have come up with all these contentions, but there are all the possibilities that the petitioners would have got these appointments in connivance of the concerned District Education Officers. Though easy to project but difficult to believe that it is a matter of honest and bona fide error or mistake. There are all possibilities that these District Primary Education Officers would have made these appointments for cash or kind consideration or for some extraneous considerations and now when this matter has been exposed they have decided to terminate their services. It may be one of the modus-operandi and way which is invariably adopted by the officers to induct their own favorites in service with or without consideration. It may be one of the modus-operandi and way which is invariably adopted by the officers to induct their own favorites in service with or without consideration. It is unfortunate that in our country permanent Accountability Cell is not there at all levels and the officers are protected by the higher officers and that is one of the reasons that graph of corruption amongst them are increasing day-by-day. In such matters, the State of Gujarat should not feel content and satisfied by asking simply explanation of those persons. The State of Gujarat needs to go in depth of the matter and if with honest and bona fide intent a deep dip is taken, certainly realities will come and it will be found that these are not bona fide errors or mistakes committed by these officers. Nobody is there to commit such a mistake or error that too, by the officers of the rank of District Primary Education Officer in the State. 27. In case the Director of Primary Education, Government of Gujarat and the State of Gujarat have not taken appropriate action for terminating the services of those candidates who have been appointed possessing qualification of certificate of physical education from Maharashtra State, it is expected of them that they will immediately take this action. They may not go by this fact and permit other persons to continue in service that in one of the case, this court has granted interim relief. Interim relief granted by this court is not a final decision nor a decision applicable to all candidates. It is also expected of the State of Gujarat to take appropriate disciplinary action against those erring and defaulting officers who are responsible for these appointments on the post of VIDHYA SAHAYAK despite of Resolution of the Government dated 29th December, 1980. The Director of Primary Education is directed to report compliance of this direction to the court. 28. In the result, all these petitions fail and the same are dismissed. Notice discharged. Interim relief, if any granted in these matters by the court stands vacated in each case. In the facts of this case, however, no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.