J. N. Sarma, J. — The question of law referred is as follows : "Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal has erred in law and in facts to recall its final order with a view to rectify the same under section 254 (2)?" 2. The brief facts of the case are as follows. 3. That the proceedings under section 34 (1) (a) of the IT Act, 1922, for the assessment years 1953-54 and 1954-55 were initiated by the Assessing Officer and reassessment was completed by the AO accordingly. 4. Being aggrieved by the reassessment made application under section 34 (1) (a) of the IT Act, 1922, the assessee went up in appeal before the CIT (Appeals), Guwahati. The CIT (Appeals) cancelled the aforesaid proceedings for both the assessment years under reference. 5. Being aggrieved, the Revenue came up in appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal noticed that the notices under section 34(1) (a) of the FT Act, 1922, for the aforesaid assessment years were challenged by the assessee before the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court and the Hon'ble High Court had rejected the contention of the assessee and upheld the validity of issue of the notices. The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the Revenue vide its order dated 24th September, 1993 passed in Income Tax Appeal Nos 537 and 538 (Gau) of 1990. 6. Being dissatisfied with the order dated 24th September, 1993 of the Tribunal, the assessee filed miscellaneous applications for both the assessment years under consideration contending that certain decisions were relied in support of the assessee's view which were accepted by the CIT (Appeals) but the Tribunal failed to consider the same. Having regard to the facts and materials of the case on record and on careful consideration of the rival submissions, the Tribunal was c of the opinion that its order dated 24th September, 1993 should be recalled for consideration and accordingly the order dated 24th September, 1993 was recalled. The Miscellaneous Application Nos 3 and 4 (Gau) of 1994 filed by the assessee were allowed by the Tribunal vide its order dated 20th December, 1994 for both the assessment years. 7. Before we go further let us have a look at section 254 (1) (2): "254. The Miscellaneous Application Nos 3 and 4 (Gau) of 1994 filed by the assessee were allowed by the Tribunal vide its order dated 20th December, 1994 for both the assessment years. 7. Before we go further let us have a look at section 254 (1) (2): "254. (1) The Appellate Tribunal may, after giving both the parties to the appeal an opportunity of being heard, pass such orders thereon as it thinks fit. (2) The Appellate Tribunal may, at any time within four years from the date of the order, with a view to rectifying any mistake apparent from the record, amend any order passed by it under sub-section (1), and shall make such amendment if the mistake is brought to its notice by the assessee or the Assessing Officer." 8. Proviso to Rule 34A (3) and (4) of the Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1963 provides for procedure for dealing with applications under section 254 (2). The relevant portion of the rule is quoted below: "Provided it shall not be necessary to post miscellaneous application for hearing if it prima facie appears to be a petition for review. (4) An order disposing of an application, under sub-rule (3), shall be in writing giving reasons in support of its decision." 9. In the instant case the Tribunal passed the following order: "We had perused the rival submissions, facts and materials on record. In our opinion, the orders of the Tribunal passed on 24.9.93 should be recalled for reconsideration. We, therefore, recall this order and direct the Registry to post the case for fresh hearing." 10. The question is whether the Tribunal has the power to recall the earlier order for reconsideration. That power may be available only when the power of review is given and as indicated above from the portion quoted above the Tribunal is to reject the application if it appears an application for review. The submission which was made before the Tribunal was that during the course of the hearing certain decisions were relied in support of the assessee's view which were accepted by the learned CITA, but the Tribunal failed to consider the same. The second argument was that there was no such concession on the part of the husband of the assessee in respect of the notice under section 34 (1) as opined by the Tribunal in the impugned order. The second argument was that there was no such concession on the part of the husband of the assessee in respect of the notice under section 34 (1) as opined by the Tribunal in the impugned order. Relying on the decision in (1976) 3 ACC, a 677 the Tribunal recalled the earlier order and directed it to be placed for further hearing for reconsideration. A bare look at section 254 (2) of the Act quoted above will show that this section gives the power as follows: (1) To rectify any mistake apparent from the record. (2) To amend any order passed by it and to make such amendment if the mistake is brought to the notice to the Assessing Officer by the assessee 11. So, when we speak of amendment of rectifying the mistake the earlier order can never be recalled by the Tribunal. The earlier order must hold the field and the mistake can be rectified or amendment can be made to the order. In this connection let us have a look at the relevant portion of the CPC. Section 152 of the CPC gives the power to the Court for correction of the mistakes. Of course, it must be stated that the power under section 254 (2) of the Act is much wider than the power given under section 152 of the CPC. The Supreme Court in connection with section 152 of the CPC in (1999) 3 SCC 500 (Dwaraka Das vs. State of MP & another) pointed out as follows : "Section 152 CPC provides for correction of clerical or arithmetical mistakes in judgments, decrees or orders of errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission. The exercise of this power contemplates the correction of mistakes by the Court of its ministerial actions and does not contemplate of passing effective judicial orders after the judgment, decrees or order. The settled position of law is that after the passing of the judgment, decree or order, the Court or the Tribunal becomes functus officio and thus being not entitled to vary the terms of the judgments, decrees and orders earlier passed. The corrections contemplated are of correcting only e accidental omissions or mistakes and not all omissions and mistakes which might have been committed by the Court while passing the judgment decree or order. The corrections contemplated are of correcting only e accidental omissions or mistakes and not all omissions and mistakes which might have been committed by the Court while passing the judgment decree or order. The omission sought to be corrected which goes to the merits of the case is beyond the scope of section 152 for which the proper remedy for the aggrieved party is to file appeal or review application. It implies that the section cannot be pressed into service to correct an omission which is intentional, however erroneous that may be. It has been noticed that the Courts below have been liberally construing and applying the province of section 151 and 152 of the CPC even after passing of effective orders in the list pending before them. No Court can under the cover of the aforesaid sections, modify, alter or add to the terms of its original judgment, decree or order." 12. What is error apparent on the face of the record that came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in AIR 1965 SC 1372 (M/s Thungabhadra Industries Ltd (in all the appeals) vs. Govt of Andhra Pradesh represented by the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes) and the Supreme Court in paragraph 11 has pointed out as follows: "But it would suffice for us to say that where without any elaborate argument one could point to the error and say here is a substantial point of law which stares one in the face, and there could reasonably be no two opinions entertained about it, a clear case of error apparent on the face of the record." 13. In AIR 1960 SC 137 (Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde & others vs. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale) in paragraph 17 it has been pointed out as follows: "The Bombay Revenue Tribunal took the view that the plaintiff-respondent must fail in his application for possession because he had failed to terminate the tenancy by notice before taking proceedings for ejectment. Is the conclusion wrong and if so, is such error apparent on the face of the record ? If it is clear that the error if any is not apparent on the face of the record, it is not necessary for us to decide whether the conclusion of the Bombay High Court on the question of notice is correct or not. If it is clear that the error if any is not apparent on the face of the record, it is not necessary for us to decide whether the conclusion of the Bombay High Court on the question of notice is correct or not. An error which has to be established by a long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record." 14. We have heard Sri U. Bhuyan, learned Advocate for the IT Department and Mr. DK Mishra, learned Advocate for the respondent. Mr. Bhuyan, learned Advocate for the Department made two fold submissions: (i) That in the garb of rectification of the mistake the earlier judgment/order cannot be recalled. (ii) That there was absolutely no ground as required by the mandate of law to recall the earlier judgment. 15. Sri Bhuyan, in support of his contention places reliance on the following decisions: (i) 82 ITR 50 (TS Balaram, Income Tax Officer, Company Circle IV, Bombay vs. Volkart Brothers & others). That was a case where the rectification was made by the Income Tax Officer in the assessment of the respondent for certain years and the Supreme Court considering the section 154 of the present Act has laid down the law as follows : "A mistake apparent on the record must be an obvious and patent mistake and not something which can be established by a long drawn process of reasoning on points on which there may conceivably be two opinions." (ii) 182 ITR 361 (Commissioner of Income Tax vs. KL Bhatia). This is a case from Delhi High Court and there the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court was also dealing with this aspect of the matter. The Delhi High Court laid down the law as follows : "As we have already observed, the Tribunal is a creation of die statute. It is an admitted case, and it is now well settled, that though the Tribunal has no inherent power of reviewing its order on merits, the Tribunal has incidental or ancillary powers which can be exercised by it. But such power cannot be invoked to rehear a case on merits. The Tribunal can, after disposing of the appeal wider section 254 (1), rehear the matter on merits only within the purview of section 254 (2). But such power cannot be invoked to rehear a case on merits. The Tribunal can, after disposing of the appeal wider section 254 (1), rehear the matter on merits only within the purview of section 254 (2). The Supreme Court has held in Patel Narshi Thakershi vs. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, AIR 1970 SC 1273 , that the power to review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. It does not stand to reason that if the power of review is not present with the Tribunal, it, nevertheless, can exercise such power indirectly when it cannot do so directly. If the contention of learned counsel for the respondent is correct, then it could mean that, even on merits, the Tribunal can recall its earlier order and then hear the case afresh and pass a different order. If this is so, it would amount to the Tribunal exercising power of review when it does not have any such power. To give an example, under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, Order 47 provides the circumstances in which a judgment may be reviewed. If the contention of learned counsel for the respondent is correct, then, applying the same analogy to a civil case, it would be open to a Court to recall its judgment in a case where the provisions of Order 47 are not applicable, and then to rehear the case. With respect, we see no warrant for this in legal jurisprudence. The appellate Court can never and decide it on merits, once for all, and cannot keep on rehearing the same appeal over and over again. Full " effect has to be given to the provisions of section 254 (4) which specifically provides that a decision of the Tribunal passed in appeal is final. This decision is final not only for the assessee but also final as far as the Tribunal itself is concerned." We respectfully agree with this Division Bench decision of the Delhi High Court. (iii) 196 ITR 590 (Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal & another). This is a case from Orissa High Court where the Division Bench of the Orissa High Court has laid down the law as follows : "A bare look at section 254 (2) makes it clear that a 'mistake apparent from the record' is rectifiable. (iii) 196 ITR 590 (Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal & another). This is a case from Orissa High Court where the Division Bench of the Orissa High Court has laid down the law as follows : "A bare look at section 254 (2) makes it clear that a 'mistake apparent from the record' is rectifiable. In order to attract the application of section 254 (2), me mistake must exist and the same must be apparent from the record. The power to rectify the mistake, however, does not cover cases where a revision or review of the order is intended. 'Mistake' means to take or understand wrongly or inaccurately; to make an error in interpreting; it is an error; a fault; a misunderstanding; a misconception. 'Apparent' means visible; capable of being seen; easily seen; obvious; plain. A mistake which can be rectified under section 254 (2) is one which is patent, which is obvious and whose discovery is not dependent on argument or elaboration." We respectfully agree with this decision. (iv) 203 ITR 497 (Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Ramesh Electric and Trading Co). This is a case from Bombay High Court wherein the Bombay High Court has pointed out that the failure of the Tribunal to consider an argument advanced by either party for arriving at a decision is not error apparent on the face of the record, although it may be an error of judgment. We accept this decision. 16. On the other hand, Mr. Mishra, learned Advocate appearing for the respondent submits that in the order which was recalled, there was error apparent in view of the fact that in the earlier judgment passed by this Court in Civil Rule No. 57 of 1975 there was no finding regarding validity of the notice under section 34 (1). He produced before us a photocopy of the judgment and we have perused it and we find that this Court found that the petitioner's husband did not take any action for quashing the notice during that period and it was further pointed out by this Court that if now, long after lapse of eight years, i.e., the period of limitation prescribed for initiation of such a proceeding, the notices are quashed, the Revenue will undoubtedly be highly prejudiced. On the other hand, if the writs prayed for are refused, the petitioner will be able to challenge the proceedings by adducing evidence before the FTO she will also have her right of appeals to the higher authorities, as provided in the Act. 17. Accordingly, the writ application was rejected. In this writ application Court refused to quash the notice under section 34 (1) (a) of the Income Tax Act a as well as notice under section 24 of the said Act issued by the Income Tax Officer, Nagaon. As this Court refused to quash the notice that will hold the field. As against this a Special Leave Petition (Civil) being Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 2574-2574 of 1975 was filed before the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court passed the following order in that S]LP (Civil): "As the High Court has said that the petitioner has got his remedy open for raising all the points in question on merit before the Income Tax Authorities, we do not think that there is any error in the exercise of discretion. The petition is, therefore, dismissed as withdrawn." 18. The ITO accepted the notice to be valid and completed reassessment. There was an appeal before the Commissioner, Income Tax Appeals by the assessee and the said appeal was allowed. As against that the Department filed an appeal before the Tribunal and the Tribunal held that it is difficult to take any other view than expressed by the Hon'ble High Court with regard to the quashing of the proceeding by cancelling the notice after the lapse of so many years. The relevant portion of the judgment is quoted below: "The above observation of the Hon'ble High Court clearly vindicate its opinion about the validity of the notices under section 34 (1) (a) of the Act and as it has been clearly opined to cancel this proceeding after lapse of so many years would not be proper. It is difficult for us to take any other view than expressed by the Hon'ble Court as pointed out above, the Hon'ble High Court was clearly against cancellation of the notices after lapse of so many years and, therefore, we uphold the proceedings under section 34 (1) (a) taken by the AO. It is difficult for us to take any other view than expressed by the Hon'ble Court as pointed out above, the Hon'ble High Court was clearly against cancellation of the notices after lapse of so many years and, therefore, we uphold the proceedings under section 34 (1) (a) taken by the AO. It will not be out of place to mention that the Hon'ble High Court also into consideration the conduct of the husband of the present legal heir of the assessee in this matter. In view of this, we are unable to interfere with the orders of the AO in respect of issuing notices under section 34 (1) (a) for these two assessment years." Thereafter, that judgment was recalled by the impugned order. 19. Sri Mishra submits that this recalling is absolutely within the purview of section 254 (2) of the Act and in support of this contention he places following decisions : (i) 158 ITR 755 (Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Mithalal Ashok Kumar). This is a judgment of Madhya Pradesh High Court and the Madhya Pradesh High Court laid down the law as follows : “'Mistake' is an ordinary word but in taxation law it has a special signification. It is not an arithmetical or clerical error that comes within its purview. It comprehends errors which are discerned after a judicious probe into the record from which it is supposed to emanate. It is difficult to axiomatise and lay down dictates for the discovery of a mistake from official records. It is inherently indefinite in scope and mostly subjective, the dividing line being thin and indiscernible. In the ultimate analysis, the conclusion a well equipped and trained judicial mind will reach after scrutinising die record will govern and its finding whether it is a mistake or not has to be accepted." We cannot accept this to be a correct interpretation of law as that will open a pandora's box and will make settled things uncertain and we cannot give such a broad interpretation to the word mistake to use if as an instrument/tool/weapon to recall the order under section 254 (2) of the Income Tax Act. We cannot accept the definition of mistake as indicated above and given by the Court. a (ii) 174 ITR 579 (Kil Kotagiri Tea and Coffee Estates Co Ltd vs. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal & others). We cannot accept the definition of mistake as indicated above and given by the Court. a (ii) 174 ITR 579 (Kil Kotagiri Tea and Coffee Estates Co Ltd vs. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal & others). This is a case from Kerala High Court wherein the law has been laid down as follows : "Section 254 (2) and section 154 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, enable the concerned authorities to rectify any mistake apparent from the record. The said expression has a wider content than the expression 'error apparent on the face of Ac record' occurring in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. The restrictions on the power of review under Order 47, Rule 1, do not hold good in the case of section 254 (2) and section 154 of the Income Tax Act." We have no quarrel with this proposition of law but that does not help the respondent. (iii) 160 ITR 840 (Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi VIII vs. Shakuntala Rajeshwar). That also is a case from Delhi High Court and the Delhi High Court laid down the law as follows: "When mat assumption, apparent from its appellate order and record, was found to be erroneous, the Tribunal was justified in invoking its powers under section 254 (2) and in reconsidering the issue afresh in that case what was the mistake that will appear from page 847 to 848. That is quoted below: "Subsequently, me assesses came to know that the concession made before the Tribunal and recorded in the above two paragraphs of the appellate order proceeded on the basis of a mistake. Actually, the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) at Chandigarh was the subject matter of an appeal to the Tribunal at Chandigarh not by the Department but by the assessee. The Tribunal at Chandigarh had gone into the matter in detail and had arrived at the value of the consideration for the transfer at Rs. 18,00,000. When this came to the knowledge of the assessee, an application was made to the Tribunal under section 254 (2) seeking a rectification of the original appellate order dated July 7,1970. The Tribunal by its r order dated March 18,1981, accepted the application. 18,00,000. When this came to the knowledge of the assessee, an application was made to the Tribunal under section 254 (2) seeking a rectification of the original appellate order dated July 7,1970. The Tribunal by its r order dated March 18,1981, accepted the application. It was observed: The assessee had now pointed out mat appeals were actually filed against the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), Chandigarh, in the case of the other co-sharer, Sri Rajeshwar Nath, and the above concession was made by the authorised representative of the assessee under a bonafide mistake of fact. Copy of the order of the Chandigarh Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Rajeshwar Nath deciding the appeals of the Department and the assessee dated November 17,1980, had also been filed. The Chandigarh Bench has taken the value of 30% carpet area in the case of Rajeshwar Nath at Rs. 18 lakhs. In the above circumstances, we are of the view that the concession was made by the authorised representative of the assessee under a bonafide mistake - the fact that no appeal had been filed against the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), Chandigarh in the case of Shri Rajeshwar Nath. The correct factual position is that appeals were filed and the Chandigarh Bench decided the same, vide order dated November 17,1980. It is, therefore, a case in which concession was made by the authorised representative under a bonafide mistake of fact and, consequently, there is a mistake apparent from the record with requires rectification." Factually this is a case on different footing. (iv) 171 ITR 586 (HH Maharaja Martant Singh Ju-Deo vs. Commi­ssioner of Income Tax). This is a case from Madhya Pradesh High Court and the Madhya Pradesh High Court pointed out as follows: "Section 254 (2) of the Act, inter aha, provides that the Appellate Tribunal may, at any time within four years from die date of the order, with a view to rectifying any mistake. from the record, amend any order passed by it under sub-section (1), and shall make such amendment if the mistake is brought to its notice by the assessee or the Income Tax Officer. In the instant case, as indicated above, a mistake apparent from the record had been committed by the Tribunal. from the record, amend any order passed by it under sub-section (1), and shall make such amendment if the mistake is brought to its notice by the assessee or the Income Tax Officer. In the instant case, as indicated above, a mistake apparent from the record had been committed by the Tribunal. This mistake was brought to its notice within four years from the date of the order by the assessee and was rectified by the Tribunal by making necessary amendments in die earlier order. The case, therefore, squarely fell within the purview of rectification of mistakes as contemplated by section 254 (2) of the Act and it was not a case where the Tribunal could be said to have reviewed its earlier order." 20. We agree with this proposition of law but it does not help the respondents. Having given our consideration to the entire matter and having considered the facts and law we hold and answer that the Tribunal cannot in law and facts recall and destroy its final order as a whole with a view to rectify the same under section 254 (2). The action of the Tribunal shall factually amount to review its earlier order and that power of review is not available to the Tribunal. Further, no reasons have been assigned to recall the order which is required, under the garb of rectification the Tribunal cannot exercise the power of review. The error must be apparent on record. Accordingly, we answer question In favour of the Revenue. 21. We find there is no such error. The judgment does not disclose any such apparent error. Rightly the view was taken that the question of validity of notice was decided earlier and the approach of this Court was adopted.