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2001 DIGILAW 198 (BOM)

Filomena Rosita Ines Rodrigues e Barros and her husband v. Maria Alda Rodrigues e Rebelo

2001-03-06

D.D.SINHA

body2001
ORAL JUDGMENT D.D. Sinha, J.-Heard Shri Kantak, the learned counsel for the petitioners and Shri Dessai, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents No. 15(a) and 15(b). 2. The civil revision application is directed against the order dated 2nd December, 1999, whereby the Civil Misc. Application No. 266/98/ A moved by the petitioners/plaintiffs under Order VI. Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, was dismissed. The learned counsel for the petitioners, contended that subsequent to the filing of the suit by the petitioners, the defendant No. 15 filed an application before the trial Court to implead him as party in the suit. The said application was allowed by the trial Court. The written statement came to be filed on behalf of the defendant No. 15 in the year 1995 in which it has been pleaded that the property "Primeira do Quinto de Praias" alias "Dactcm Naxim" has been transferred to him by the defendants No. 1 to 14 by executing a Deed of Exchange dated 15.5.1990. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the said transfer has been effected by the defendants No. 1 to 14 on the strength of the Will dated 17.1.1978 and the Deed of Succession dated 29.11.1982. It is contended that the petitioners in the present suit have already sought a declaration that the Will dated 17.1.1978 as well as Deed of Succession dated 29.11.1982 be declared null and void. Similarly, the petitioners also sought a declaration that the Deeds of Sale dated 26.4.1979 between defendant No. 1 and her late husband and the defendants No.6, 8, 9 and 11 be declared null and void and not binding on the plaintiffs. It is therefore contended that the plaintiffs, by way of amendment, are merely seeking to add the prayer of declaration that the Deed of Exchange dated 15.5.1990 is null and void as well as for restoration of possession of the property. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioners, canvassed that under Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the party making such application, is entitled to alter and amend his pleadings in such a manner and on such terms as may be just. The Court has wide powers to allow such amendment in the interest of justice. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioners, canvassed that under Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the party making such application, is entitled to alter and amend his pleadings in such a manner and on such terms as may be just. The Court has wide powers to allow such amendment in the interest of justice. It is further contended that liberal approach should be adopted while considering the application for amendment of the pleadings under Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure in order to avoid uncalled-for multiplicity of litigation. 4. It is further submitted that in the instant case, the amendment does not constitute the addition of new cause of action nor raises a different case, but can be termed as different approach to the same facts and, therefore the trial Court ought to have allowed the same. In order to substantiate this contention, reliance is placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of B.K. Narayana Pillai v. Parameswaran Pillai and another reported in (2000) 1 SCC 712 . 5. Shri Dessai, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents, contended that the proposed amendment is not only time barred, but the plaintiffs by moving such an amendment at such a belated stage, are trying to defeat the right accrued in favour of the defendant No. 15 by way of the Law of Limitation. It is further contended that the trial Court was justified in rejecting the application. In order to substantiate this contention, reliance is placed on the case of Radhika Devi v. Bajrangi Singh and others, reported in 1996 (2) Supreme 321 . 6. Considered the contentions raised by the respective counsels and perused the impugned order passed by the trial Court. It is no doubt true that the technicalities of law should not be permitted to hamper the Courts in the administration of justice between the parties and therefore liberal approach needs to be adopted for just decision in the suit in this regard and to avoid uncalled-for multiplicity of litigation. At the same time, a party should not be allowed to set up a new case or new cause of action by filing an application under Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure when the suit on new case or casue of action is barred. 7. At the same time, a party should not be allowed to set up a new case or new cause of action by filing an application under Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure when the suit on new case or casue of action is barred. 7. Similarly, when the party acquires right by bar of limitation and if the same is sought to be taken away by amendment of pleadings, in such circumstances the Court should refuse such application under Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Radhika Devi v, Bajrangi Singh and others, reported in 1996 (2) Supreme 321 is, in my opinion, squarely applicable on the issue in question. 8. In the instant case, the petitioners have not disputed that the proposed amendment is barred by limitation. It is apparently clear that the plaintiffs got the knowledge of the Deed of Exchange dated 15.5.1990 in the month of March, 1995. The application under Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed on 5th August, 1998, that is beyond the period of three years and, therefore, the proposed amendment is barred by limitation. 9. The contention of the petitioners that by the proposed amendment, the petitioners are not introducing a new case or cause of action which is barred by limitation cannot be accepted. As I have already observed hereinabove, in the suit, the plaintiffs have only prayed for declaration that the Will dated 17.1.1978 and the Deed of Succession dated 29.11.1982 are null and void. The defendants No. 1 to 14 executed the Deed of Exchange dated 15.5.1990 in favour of the defendant No. 15 and, on the basis of the said Deed of Exchange, ownership rights have been accrued in favour of the Defendant No. 15 in respect of the property involved in the Deed of Exchange dated 15.5.1990. The proposed amendment, if allowed, would undoubtedly result in taking away the rights accrued in favour of the defendant a No. 15, on the basis of the Deed of Exchange dated 15.5.1990, which in fact, are saved on the ground of bar of limitation and cannot be allowed to be taken away by amendment of the pleadings. The proposed amendment, if allowed, would undoubtedly result in taking away the rights accrued in favour of the defendant a No. 15, on the basis of the Deed of Exchange dated 15.5.1990, which in fact, are saved on the ground of bar of limitation and cannot be allowed to be taken away by amendment of the pleadings. The ratio laid down by the Apex Court in B.K. Narayana Pillai v. Parameswaran Pillai and another, reported in (2000) 1 SCC 712 in the facts and circumstances of the present case, in my opinion, does not help the petitioners. 10. It is no doubt true that this Court while remanding the matter back to the trial Court vide order dated 6.8.1999, directed the trial Court to decide the application under Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure afresh by giving an opportunity to the parties on the point of limitation only. However, merely because the trial Court also considered and recorded the finding on the other aspect of the matter, that by itself, in my opinion, does not render the impugned order invalid or bad in law. Needless to mention that the observations made by the trial Court in the impugned order are prima facie in nature and are made while considering the sustainability of the application under Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure and therefore while considering the suit on merits, the trial Court need not get influenced, by these findings or the observations made by this Court. The trial Court will have to decide the suit on its own merit. 11. For the reasons stated hereinabove, there is no merit in the civil revision application and the same is dismissed with no order as to costs. Revision dismissed.