JUDGMENT C.K. Thakker, C.J.—This petition is filed by the petitioner International Institute of Telecom Technology College of Engineering (IITT for short) Kala Amb, District Sirmaur, on December 27, 2000, permitting it to withdraw a petition filed in this Court (CWP No. 956 of 2000). The application is made under Order 23, Rule 1, read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, (hereinafter referred to as the Code. It is, inter alia, stated in the petition that CWP No. 956 of 2000 was filed by the petitioner in this Court and the counsel for the petitioner had tendered interim arguments in the matter. 2. In para 4 of the application, it has been stated thus : “That the main point of issue in the present writ petitioner (sic petition) and the Civil Writ Petition pending before the Honble Delhi High Court are not only overlapping each other but the same are also indirectly related to each other and since the present point of issue involved in the matter is much widely and explicitly under consideration before the Honble High Court and that since the Honble High Court at New Delhi has taken the cognizance of the one part of the issue in the present petition in much wider terms, therefore, it would be in the interest of justice and fairness of law to allow the petitioner to withdraw the present writ petition so as to allow him to effectively proceed with the main Civil Writ Petition pending before the Honble High Court at New Delhi." 3. It was then stated that keeping in view the fact that the point in issue in the matter before this Court and the High Court of Delhi are "overlapping each other", it would be in the interest of justice and fairness that the petitioner may be allowed to withdraw the petition filed in this Court "so as to allow him to effectively proceed with the main matter pending before the Honble High Court at New Delhi." The permission is also sought to allow the petitioner to file a writ petition afresh if circumstances so arise. 4. 4. In the relief clause, the following prayers have been made: "Reliefs It is most respectfully, prayed that: (i) in view of the submissions made hereinabove and in view of the fact that the main point of issue for consideration before this Honble High Court and the Honble Delhi High Court are overlapping each other, therefore, in the interest of justice and fairness of law this Honble High Court may kindly be pleased to allow this application and permit the petitioner to withdraw the present Civil Writ Petition filed before this Honble High Court, so as to enable him to effectively proceed with the main civil writ petition pending before the Honble Delhi High Court at New Delhi. (ii) Permission be also given to the petitioner to file civil writ petition afresh, if the circumstances of the matter so requires." 5. On December 27, 2000, a request was made by Mr. Rakesh Manta, learned Counsel for the petitioner, to take this application for hearing on the next day. On December 28, 2000, a prayer was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner may be permitted to withdraw the main matter, i.e. CWP No. 956 of 2000, which had been heard by this Bench on December 19, 2000, and judgment was reserved. 6. The learned Advocate General vehemently opposed the prayer made in the petition. He stated that after the arguments were over in the main matter and the judgment was reserved on December 19, 2000, one CMP was filed on December 21, 2000. It was not numbered as it was under objections. Subsequently, however, it was registered as CMP No. 8 of 2001; wherein the following prayers were made: "That keeping in view the facts, circumstances and legal status involved in the case, it would be in interest of the justice and fairness of law that this application is allowed and the respondents are directed to comply with the orders dated 14.12.2000 whereby a specific direction was given to them to file the written statement within 2 days. It is, therefore, prayed that: (i) This application be allowed and the respondents be directed to file specific reply to the petition filed by the petitioner so as to enable the petitioner to tender his relevant written submissions and conduct main Arguments for the final disposal of the present writ petition. It is, therefore, prayed that: (i) This application be allowed and the respondents be directed to file specific reply to the petition filed by the petitioner so as to enable the petitioner to tender his relevant written submissions and conduct main Arguments for the final disposal of the present writ petition. (ii) That this Honble Court may kindly be pleased to consider the case after affording a reasonable opportunity to the applicant/petitioner for placing on record the replication/ rejoinder to the written statement to be filed by the respondent and also afford reasonable opportunity to the applicant/petitioner to conduct his main and final arguments on the main case after consideration of the specific arguments in this regard. (iii) That keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the matter, it is humbly prayed that during the pendency and final disposal of the present application before this Honble Court, this Honble Court may kindly be pleased to withhold any judgment/directions till the respondents file their reply and the petitioners are afforded the opportunity of filing their written submissions, conducting their main arguments and being heard on merits." 7. It was also stated by the learned Advocate General that the fact about filing of previous CMP (CMP No. 8 of 2000) had not been disclosed in CMP No. 1711 of 2000. 8. In view of above, we directed the Registry to place earlier CMP (CMP 8 of 2001) also on Board so that both can be heard together and an appropriate order can be passed. 9. Yesterday, i.e. January 3, 2001, all the matters were shown on Board by the Registry. The learned Counsel for the petitioner in CWP No. 956 of 2000 made a prayer that the petitioner may be permitted to withdraw the petition. Reading the application CMP No. 1711 of 2000, the averments made therein and the prayers sought, we asked the learned Counsel as to how such prayers can be granted. The learned Counsel, however, stated that the petitioner makes a prayer to permit it to withdraw the petition (CWP No. 956 of 2000) unconditionally. He also stated that it is not on the basis of the averments made in paras 4 and 5 of CMP No. 1711 of 2000 but it would be unqualified and unconditional withdrawal of the petition. 10. The learned Advocate General strongly opposed even unconditional and unqualified withdrawal of the petition. He also stated that it is not on the basis of the averments made in paras 4 and 5 of CMP No. 1711 of 2000 but it would be unqualified and unconditional withdrawal of the petition. 10. The learned Advocate General strongly opposed even unconditional and unqualified withdrawal of the petition. He has mainly raised three objections. Firstly, he contended that the petition was fully heard by this Bench on December 19, 2000 and the judgment was reserved. Thereafter, it is not open to the party to withdraw even unconditionally the petition and the matter must reach to its logical end, i.e. pronouncement of judgment. Secondly, according to him, averments made in CMP No. 1711 of 2000, were factually incorrect. There was suppression of material facts by the applicant and that application has been made only with a view to take one more chance before the High Court of Delhi. With that oblique motive, a statement has been made in the application that the subject matter and the points raised in CWP No. 956 of 2000 and the points raised in the petition pending before the High Court of Delhi are over lapping. By making such statement, not only the petitioner has concealed true and correct facts but by taking undue advantage, it has attempted to avoid an adverse finding from this Court and such course may not be allowed by this Court. Thirdly, he had submitted that CWP No. 956 of 2000 was in substance and in reality, pro bono publico litigation inasmuch as in the said petition, a grievance was made by the petitioner that if the action taken by the university, vide its communication dated December 1, 2000, (through the Registrar) of not giving Roll Numbers to the students of Information Technology, who had studied in the petitioner institute, the-students community will be seriously prejudiced. It was submitted that it is well settled that a party who is invoking extra-ordinary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution as pro bono publico has no absolute and unqualified right to withdraw the petition and the Court may refuse to allow him to do so. Even if the petitioner intends to go out of the Court, the proceedings may still continue in his absence. 11. Even if the petitioner intends to go out of the Court, the proceedings may still continue in his absence. 11. Alternatively, the learned Advocate General submitted that even if this Court does not uphold his objections and permits the petitioner to withdraw the petition, deliberate and intentional misstatements made by it may not be overlooked by the Court and an appropriate action may be taken against the petitioner by initiating appropriate proceedings. In the submission of the learned Advocate General, such actions are required so that stream of justice may not get polluted by unscrupulous elements. 12. Now so far as withdrawal of petition is concerned, we are of the opinion that if a party makes a prayer to withdraw the proceedings and if such prayer is unconditional and unqualified, it has to be granted. 13. In this connection, it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of Order 23, Rule 1, of the Code. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 1 of Order 23, enacts that at any time after the institution of a suit, the plaintiff may as against all or any of the defendants abandon his suit or abandon a part of his claim. Sub-rule (4) of Rule 1, however, clarifies that where the plaintiff abandons a suit or part of claim under sub-rule (1), he shall be liable to pay costs to the defendant as the Court may award. Moreover, he shall be precluded from instituting a fresh suit in respect of such subject-matter or such part of the claim, which he has withdrawn or abandoned. 14. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 1, on the other hand, provides that where the Court is satisfied that a suit would fail by reason of some formal defect, or there are sufficient grounds for allowing the plaintiff to institute a fresh suit for the subject-matter of a suit or part of a claim, it may grant permission to the plaintiff to withdraw the suit or a part of the claim with liberty to institute a fresh suit in respect of the subject-matter of such suit or such part of the claim. 15. Reading the above two provisions, it clearly appears to us that two types of withdrawal have been contemplated by the Code; (i) withdrawal without leave of the Court, i.e. unconditional, unqualified and unequivocal, and (ii) withdrawal with the leave of the Court, i.e. conditional or qualified withdrawal. 15. Reading the above two provisions, it clearly appears to us that two types of withdrawal have been contemplated by the Code; (i) withdrawal without leave of the Court, i.e. unconditional, unqualified and unequivocal, and (ii) withdrawal with the leave of the Court, i.e. conditional or qualified withdrawal. So far as the first type of withdrawal is concerned, it is the right of the plaintiff to withdraw a suit or a part of his claim. Such withdrawal, however, is subject to payment of costs by the plaintiff to the defendant. Moreover, the plaintiff is precluded from instituting a fresh suit in respect of such subject-matter or such part of the claim, which he has withdrawn or abandoned. If the plaintiff intends to withdraw the suit unconditionally presumably, this Court cannot refuse such prayer. 16. In this connection, it may be profitable to refer to few decisions of the Supreme Court. 17. In Bijayananda Patnaik v. Satrughna Sahu and others, AIR 1963 SC 1566, an application was made by the appellant to withdraw an appeal unconditionally, which was refused by the High Court. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the appellant had right to withdraw his appeal. Considering the relevant provisions of Section 107(2) and Order 23, Rule 1(1) of the Code and without expressing final opinion on applicability or otherwise of sub-section (2) of Section 107 of the Code to the proceedings under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, the Court stated : "......It is unnecessary for our present purpose to decide whether the absolute right of the appellant to withdraw an appeal unconditionally flows from Section 107(2) or is an inherent right of the appellant on the analogy of Order 23, Rule 1(1). But there can be no doubt that an appellant has the right to withdraw his appeal unconditionally and if he makes such an application to the Court, it has to grant it" (Emphasis supplied) 18. In M/s. Hulas Rai Baij Nath v. Firm KB. Bass and Co., AIR 1968 SC 111, a suit was filed by principal for rendition of accounts against his agent. Issues were framed and some evidence was also recorded. No preliminary decree was, however, passed. At that stage, the plaintiff prayed for withdrawal of suit. In M/s. Hulas Rai Baij Nath v. Firm KB. Bass and Co., AIR 1968 SC 111, a suit was filed by principal for rendition of accounts against his agent. Issues were framed and some evidence was also recorded. No preliminary decree was, however, passed. At that stage, the plaintiff prayed for withdrawal of suit. It was objected by the defendant, inter alia, contending that it was a game played by the plaintiff in withdrawing the suit after protracted duration and considerable expenditure had incurred by the defendant and withdrawal of suit by the plaintiff would defeat the right of the defendant. The trial Court held that the plaintiff had right to withdraw the suit under Order 23, Rule 1. Such right was inherent which could be exercised at any time before judgment. All that the defendant could claim was an order for costs in his favour. The Court, therefore, allowed withdrawal of the suit awarding the costs to the defendant. A revision was filed by the defendant against the said order was also dismissed by the High Court. The aggrieved defendant approached the Supreme Court. 19. As observed by their Lordships, the short question before the Court was whether the plaintiff was entitled to withdraw from the suit and have it dismissed at the stage when issues had been framed and some evidence had been recorded, but no preliminary decree for rendition of accounts had yet been passed. Considering the provision of Order 23, Rule 1, the Apex Court has observed: "The language of Order 23, Rule 1, sub-rule (1), CPC, gives an unqualified right to a plaintiff to withdraw from a suit and if no permission to file a fresh suit is sought under sub-rule (2) of that Rule, the plaintiff becomes liable for such costs as the Court may award and becomes precluded from instituting any fresh suit in respect of that subject-matter under sub-rule (3) of that Rule. There-is no provision in the Code of Civil Procedure which requires the Court to refuse permission to withdraw the suit in such circumstances and to compel the plaintiff to proceed with it.” (Emphasis supplied) 20. It is, no doubt, true that CWP No. 956 of 2000 is a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. The provisions of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 stricto sensu do not apply to such proceedings. It is, no doubt, true that CWP No. 956 of 2000 is a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. The provisions of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 stricto sensu do not apply to such proceedings. Moreover, Explanation to Section 141 of the Code also declares that the expression "proceedings" would not include proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. At the same time, however, the general principles regarding withdrawal of suit have been made applicable to petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution. 21. In Shaik Hussain and Sons v. M.G. Kannaiah and another, AIR 1981 SC 1725, a petition was filed by the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was allowed. An appeal was field against the said order. A request was made by the petitioner at that stage that he would like to withdraw the writ petition in order to avoid public inconvenience. The High Court, however, did not allow the application and dismissed the appeal on merits. The appellant approached the Supreme Court. He contended that when he wanted to withdraw the petition and had given good grounds for the same, the High Court was not justified in not considering the application or passing orders thereon. 22. Upholding the contention the Supreme Court stated : “......In our opinion the contention raised by the appellant is well founded and must prevail. It is not necessary for us to go into the merits of the case when the respondent himself did not want to invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court or having invoked the same did not want to press his writ petition. For these reasons, therefore, we allow this appeal set aside the judgment of the High Court on appeal as also that of the single Judge allowing the writ petition." 23. It is, no doubt, true that if a litigation is in the nature of public interest litigation (PIL), the petitioner has no absolute right to withdraw such petition and even if he intends to walk out of the Court, the proceedings may continue in his absence. 24. A direct question arose before the Supreme Court in Sheela Barse v. Union of India and others, AIR 1988 SC 2211. A petition was filed by the petitioner as a public interest litigation. It was entertained by the Court. 24. A direct question arose before the Supreme Court in Sheela Barse v. Union of India and others, AIR 1988 SC 2211. A petition was filed by the petitioner as a public interest litigation. It was entertained by the Court. Subsequently, however, the petitioner made a prayer that she may be permitted to withdraw the petition. Holding that the petitioner in Public Interest Litigation has no absolute right to withdraw the petition, the Court observed that to uphold the right of the petitioner to withdraw the petition at any time by conceding the status of the petitioner as Dominus-Litis is to render "the proceedings in public interest litigations vulnerable to and susceptible of a new dimension which might, in conceivable cases, be used by persons for personal ends resulting in prejudice to the public-wear. It was, therefore, held by the Supreme Court that in such cases, it may be open to the party to walk out of the Court but the proceedings on exit of such petitioner would not ipso facto come to an end and the Court may proceed with the matter and pronounce the order if it is satisfied that such proceedings are required to continue. . 25. Similar view has been taken by the Court in S.P. Anand v. H.D. Deve Gowda and others, (1996) 6 SCC 734. It was observed by the Apex Court that public interest litigation cannot be permitted to be withdrawn by the petitioner without the permission of the Court and whether or not such permission should be granted would be based on consideration of public interest and also checking abuse of process of Court. Such permission may be refused by the Court on relevant considerations. 26. It is thus clear that if the litigation is public interest litigation (PIL), it is for the Court to decide whether to grant or to refuse permission of withdrawal of the petition. In the instant case, however, in our opinion, the litigation is not public interest litigation. The grievance of the petitioner is private and individual. It was tt^e case of the petitioner that an institution had been established in accordance with law and was imparting education as per syllabus prescribed by the University. It was, no doubt, seriously disputed by all the respondents, i.e. State authorities as well as Himachal Pradesh University and it was asserted that institution was not affiliated to the University. It was tt^e case of the petitioner that an institution had been established in accordance with law and was imparting education as per syllabus prescribed by the University. It was, no doubt, seriously disputed by all the respondents, i.e. State authorities as well as Himachal Pradesh University and it was asserted that institution was not affiliated to the University. It was also stated that the recognition was withdrawn by the All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE) and the petitioner does not have approved for the current year in question i.e. 2000-2001. In the instant case, however, it cannot be said that the petitioner itself is not interested at all. According to the petitioner, the students who had taken education in the petitioner-institution would also suffer and it has been highlighted in the petition. In our view, therefore, the law laid down in Sheela Barse and S.P. Anand would not apply to the case on hand. In our considered opinion, if the petitioner prays for withdrawal of the petition and such withdrawal is unconditional and unqualified, it cannot be refused. It is also well settled that once such order is passed legal consequences laid down in Rule 1 of Order 23 would ensue, namely, that since it is not covered by sub-rule (3) of Rule 1 of Order 23, the petitioner shall be precluded from instituting a fresh petition in respect of the cause of action which has been made subject-matter of dispute in the present petition, i.e. CWP No. 956 of 2000, and it is liable to pay costs to the respondents. 27. Regarding hearing of the matter, it may be stated that on December 13, 2000, a request was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that there was an urgent matter and that it may be taken immediately. The prayer was granted and the matter was ordered to be listed on the next day, i.e. on December 14, 2000. On December 14, 2000, the matter was heard arid notices were issued returnable on December 19, 2000. Since advance copies were given to the learned Advocate General for the State Authorities as well as to Mr. S,S. Mittal, learned Standing Counsel for the Himachal Pradesh University, they appeared and waived service of notices on behalf of respective respondents. On December 14, 2000, the matter was heard arid notices were issued returnable on December 19, 2000. Since advance copies were given to the learned Advocate General for the State Authorities as well as to Mr. S,S. Mittal, learned Standing Counsel for the Himachal Pradesh University, they appeared and waived service of notices on behalf of respective respondents. On December 19, 2000, the matter appeared on Board and a special prayer was made by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the matter required immediate attention and may be taken out of turn. Accordingly, the matter was taken out of turn and heard immediately at about 10.30 a.m. On that day, reply was filed on behalf of the State Government. It was stated by Mr. Mittal, learned Counsel for respondent No. 2, University that since proceedings were also initiated by the petitioner and were pending before the High Court of Delhi and the relevant record was at Delhi, the University could not file an affidavit-in -reply and only oral submissions were made on behalf of the University. It was also stated that the University adopted the stand taken by the State Government and the reply filed by the State. 28. We had heard the learned Senior Advocate appearing in the matter on behalf of the petitioner and the leaned Advocate General on behalf of the State Authorities and also for of the respondent-University, instructed by Mr. Mittal, The arguments went on up to 4 p.m. and the Court working was over. It was stated by the learned Advocate General that the proceedings were pending before the High Court of Delhi. Even Contempt Petition was also filed and notice was made returnable in that matter on the next day, i.e. December 20, 2000. He, therefore, requested the Court that if the arguments were over, at least a limited order may be passed that the arguments were over and the judgment was reserved so that on behalf of the authorities a statement could be made in the High Court of Delhi to that effect. Accordingly, we passed the following order in open Court in presence of Counsel for the parties : "Replies be taken on record. Arguments are over. Judgment reserved. A copy of this order, duly authenticated by the Court Secretary, be given to the learned Advocate General." 29. Accordingly, we passed the following order in open Court in presence of Counsel for the parties : "Replies be taken on record. Arguments are over. Judgment reserved. A copy of this order, duly authenticated by the Court Secretary, be given to the learned Advocate General." 29. It was, therefore, submitted by the learned Advocate General that once the matter was heard, arguments were over and the judgment was reserved, it is not open to the party to withdraw the petition. 30. We are unable to uphold the above objection as well. In our opinion, the law is well settled on the point and it is that unless the judgment is dictated and the rights have been crystallised in favour of one party, the petitioner can withdraw the petition and the Court will not refuse such prayer if the withdrawal is unconditional and unqualified. As is clear, on December 19, 2000, the matter was heard and the arguments continued up to 4 p.m. It is because of the fact that the Court working was over, the judgment could not be dictated. But if before the judgment was formally pronounced, a prayer is made by the petitioner for withdrawal of the petition, and if the withdrawal is unconditional and unqualified, in accordance with law laid down by the Supreme Court, such a prayer cannot be refused. Since the prayer made by the petitioner is for unqualified and unconditional withdrawal of the petition, it is hereby granted and the petition is dismissed as withdrawn unconditionally. 31. At the time of hearing of the petition though notices were issued to all respondents, respondent No. 4 All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE), did not appear. Respondents No. 1 to 3- appeared in the matter. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in the light of the circumstances, which we will hereinafter mention, in our opinion, ends of justice would be met if the petitioner-applicant is directed to pay an amount of Rs. 25,000 (Rupees twenty five thousand only) to respondents No. 1 and 3 State of Himachal Pradesh and Director of Technical Education and Rs. 25,000 (Rupees twenty five thousand only) to respondent No. 2 Himachal Pradesh University, in all Rs. 50,000 (Rupees fifty thousand only). At the request of the President of High Court Bar Association, Shimla, the learned Advocate General stated that if the amount of Rs. 25,000 (Rupees twenty five thousand only) to respondent No. 2 Himachal Pradesh University, in all Rs. 50,000 (Rupees fifty thousand only). At the request of the President of High Court Bar Association, Shimla, the learned Advocate General stated that if the amount of Rs. 25,000 (Rupees twenty five thousand only) is ordered to be paid to the High Court Bar Association, Shimla, for the purchase of books in the new complex, respondents No. 1 and 3 will not insist for payment of the amount of costs to them. Accordingly, the petitioner will pay an amount of Rs. 25,000 (Rupees twenty five thousand only) to respondents No. 1 and 3, which would be paid to the High Court Bar Association, Shimla. 32. The matter, however, will not come to an end. An alternative prayer of the learned Advocate General, in our considered view, requires serious attention. It was contended by the learned Advocate General that there was suppression of material facts by the petitioner in the petition. The petitioner has chosen its own facts for the purpose of getting relief from this Court. It was the case of the petitioner in the petition that in spite of all actions taken by the Institution in accordance with law, the respondent-authorities and the University had harassed the Institution and also the students studying in the said Institution. It had also made a complaint that though an order had been passed by a competent Court (learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court), it had not been complied with and a communication was addressed by the Registrar of respondent No. 2 University on December 1, 2000, refusing to allot Roll Numbers to the students, who had studied with the petitioner. According to the learned Advocate General, thus an impression was sought to be created by the petitioner that in violation and wilful disobedience of the order passed by a competent Court, illegal actions were taken by the respondents. The order on which reliance was placed by the petitioner was passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi on July 26, 2000, in CWP No. 6671 of 1999. The order on which reliance was placed by the petitioner was passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi on July 26, 2000, in CWP No. 6671 of 1999. It was, however, clear from the material placed on the record by the respondents that against the said order of the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi, a Letters Patent Appeal was filed by the State of Himachal Pradesh before a Division Bench of the same High Court and even the stay order had also been granted against implementation of the order passed by the learned Single Judge. That order was passed by a Division Bench as early as on September 28, 2000. The present petition was filed by the petitioner as late as on December 13, 2000, i.e. after more than two months. The petitioner was very much aware of the said order. It was, therefore, obligatory on the part of the petitioner to disclose the said fact which was both, relevant as well as material. It was also contended by the learned Advocate General that even in past, the petitioner had approached this Court by filing Civil Writ Petition No. 365 of 1999 and it was withdrawn unconditionally. The said fact was also not reflected in the petition. Relying on several decisions of English Courts as well as of the Supreme Court, it was contended by the learned Advocate General that if there was suppression of material facts by the petitioner, the Court may refuse to exercise extra-ordinary and equitable jurisdiction in favour of such party and may dismiss the petition only on that ground without entering into the merits of the matter. As the petitioner has unconditionally withdrawn the petition, we do not burden our order by referring to all the decisions cited at the Bar. But prima facie we are satisfied that there is suppression of material fact by the petitioner in the petition. So far as filing of the earlier petition in this Court is concerned, it was submitted both, by Mr. Aggarwal, Senior Advocate, appeared on behalf of the petitioner on December 19, 2000, and Mr. Ahluwalia, learned Counsel appeared yesterday i.e. on January 3, 2001, and today i.e. January 4, 2001, that it was neither relevant nor material fact as the subject matter of both the petitions was entirely different. But it was conceded both by Mr. Aggarwal, Senior Advocate, appeared on behalf of the petitioner on December 19, 2000, and Mr. Ahluwalia, learned Counsel appeared yesterday i.e. on January 3, 2001, and today i.e. January 4, 2001, that it was neither relevant nor material fact as the subject matter of both the petitions was entirely different. But it was conceded both by Mr. Aggarwal and Mr. Ahluwalia, that the fact of filing Letters Patent Appeal No. 469 of 2000 by the State of Himachal Pradesh before the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi and an order in CMP No. 1360 of 2000 was indeed relevant. According to both of them, however, it was not a material fact. Prima facie, we are unable to accept the said submission. Frankly speaking, an impression which was sought to be created in the mind of the Court by the petitioner was that an action was taken in disregard and in violation of the order passed by learned Single Judge wherein certain directions were issued. When the said order was stayed by the Division Bench, prima facie, in our opinion, it was incumbent on the part of the petitioner to disclose that fact and to clarify that the order passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi was not final and it was sub-judice before the Division Bench in LPA No. 469 of 2000. It was also the duty of the petitioner to point out to this Court that with effect from September 28, 2000, the order was no more operative as the Division Bench has granted stay against implementation of the order. Thus, not only the petitioner, prima facie, has chosen its own facts but has not disclosed relevant and material fact which it was bound to disclose. Thus, there was suppression veri on the part of the petitioner and prima facie it is answerable to this Court to explain its conduct. There is an additional fact also which cannot be lover-looked. When CMP No. 1711 of 2000 was filed and a prayer was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner to take that CMP on Board as it pertained to withdrawal of the main matter, a statement was made by the learned Advocate General that another CMP (which was subsequently numbered as CMP No. 8 of 2001) was instituted by the petitioner as early as on December 21, 2000. But the said fact was not reflected in CMP No. 1711 of 2000. In that petition (CMP No. 8 of 2001), a curious prayer was made by the petitioner. It was under Section 151 of the Code and the prayers made therein have been quoted in the earlier part of the judgment. 33. Now, in CMP No. 8 of 2001, filed on December 21, 2000, the case put forward by the petitioner was that in CWP No. 956 of 2000, directions were issued by this Court to the respondents on December 14, 2000 to file detailed and parawise reply to the petition within two days. Further direction was also issued to the petitioner to file a replication. It was further stated that no detailed reply was filed by any of the respondents except respondent No. 1. It was also asserted that the learned Counsel for the petitioner was briefed and authorised only for interim arguments and had, accordingly, tendered his interim arguments with regard to the interim relief prayed for by the petitioner. It was also stated that in view of the fact that there was no specific written statement by the main respondents, it was practically impossible for the petitioner to conduct his arguments without there being any specific reply. A prayer was, therefore, made to the Court to withhold the judgment in CWP No. 956 of 2000. 34. Such an application, in our considered opinion, prima facie would amount to interference with the cause of justice. Certain circumstances have also been pointed out by the learned Advocate General which are relevant and material. It was stated by him that CMP No. 8 of 2001 was filed on December 21, 2000. Now, to recall, an order was passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi in CWP No. 6671 of 1999, on July 26, 2000. But the matter was before the Division Bench in Letters Patent Appeal No. 469 of 2000 and in CMP No. 1360 of 2000, stay was also granted. But a Contempt Petition was filed by the petitioner on December 11, 2000, and on December 12, 2000, as stated by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, notice was issued to the respondents as to why contempt proceedings should not be initiated against them for non-compliance with the order dated July 26, 2000 passed by the Court. But a Contempt Petition was filed by the petitioner on December 11, 2000, and on December 12, 2000, as stated by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, notice was issued to the respondents as to why contempt proceedings should not be initiated against them for non-compliance with the order dated July 26, 2000 passed by the Court. The notice was communicated vide a communication dated December 16, 2000, issued through Administrative Officer, (Judicial) Circle-1. It was made returnable on December 20, 2000. On the next date, i.e. December 21, 2000, interim order was made by the Contempt Court directing the University to allow the students to appear at the examination scheduled to be held on December 26, 2000. The learned Advocate General submitted that in the light of the fact that contempt proceedings were initiated and a mandatory order was passed by the Contempt Court, an application was filed in this Court on December 21, 2000, to withhold judgment in CWP No. 56 of 2000, hearing of which was concluded on December 19, 2000 (CMP No. 8 of 2001). But being aggrieved by the order granting mandatory relief by the Contempt Court in the Contempt Petition, an appeal was filed by the University authorities before the Division Bench and an order was passed by the Division Bench staying operation of the order passed by the Contempt Court on December 21, 2000. Even thereafter, a prayer was made on behalf of the petitioner by filing an application to the Division Bench to vacate and/or modify the order but the order was not modified and mandatory direction granted by the Contempt Court was suspended and the stay was continued. Hence, application for modification was dismissed as not pressed by the petitioner. Even that fact has also not been disclosed by the petitioner. Thus, there was suppression of facts, non-disclosure of material particulars and also forum shopping. When all attempts failed, the petitioner has approached this Court by filing present application i.e. CMP No. 1711 of 2000 for withdrawal of the petition. Thus, at all times, in the submission of the learned Advocate General, the petitioner has abused the process of Court and has taken the Judiciary for granted. 35. The learned Advocate General also submitted that the main matter was heard at length out of turn at the request of the learned Senior Advocate on behalf of the petitioner. Thus, at all times, in the submission of the learned Advocate General, the petitioner has abused the process of Court and has taken the Judiciary for granted. 35. The learned Advocate General also submitted that the main matter was heard at length out of turn at the request of the learned Senior Advocate on behalf of the petitioner. He further stated that it was not a limited hearing for the purpose of interim relief as contended by the petitioner at a subsequent stage. He also submitted, that the hearing was concluded on December 19, 2000, and in open Court, an order was dictated that the arguments were over and the judgment was reserved. It was only at a belated stage, such contention was put forward in two applications, namely, CMP No. 8 of 2001 and CMP No. 1711 of 2000 that it was merely interim argument. In paras 5 and 6 of CMP No. 8 of 2001 it was also by the petitioner: "5. That since no detailed reply was filed by any of the respondents except respondent No. 1, therefore, on 19.12.2000 the counsel for the petitioner was briefed and authorized only for interim Argument and had accordingly tendered only his interim arguments with regard to the interim relief prayed for by the petitioner. It is very pertinent to mention here that as no written statement on merits had been filed by the respondents, therefore, the Counsel for the applicant/petitioner was only authorized instructed, briefed and informed about the interim relief prayed for by the petitioner and the Counsel for the petitioner had only tendered his limited arguments with regard to the interim relief prayed for by the petitioner. The petitioner had not authorised the Counsel for the petitioner to have tendered any other arguments/submission except for seeking interim relief and least of all conducting any Main Arguments. 6. That it has come to the knowledge of the petitioner that after hearing the submissions on behalf of the petitioners on the interim arguments tendered by the petitioners for the interim relief prayed for by the petitioner, this Honourable Court was pleased to reserve the judgment in the main case." 36. The learned Advocate General stated that the arguments made in the above paras were false to the knowledge of the petitioner. The learned Advocate General stated that the arguments made in the above paras were false to the knowledge of the petitioner. Moreover, when the matter was heard, the arguments were over and the judgment was reserved and the order was dictated in open Court to that effect, none of the advocates appearing for the petitioner had even stated to the Court that it was merely interim hearing. He, therefore, submitted that to preserve and safeguard majesty of justice, appropriate proceedings may be initiated against the petitioner. In our opinion, on overall considerations, this is imminently a fit case to issue notice to the petitioner as to why appropriate proceedings should not be initiated. In the light of all the facts and circumstances, let notice be issued to Board of Governors of I.I.T.T. College of Engineering, Kala Arnb, District Sirmaur, Himachal Pradesh, as well as to Atul Shairna, who has filed affidavits in the petitions, (CWP No. 956 of 2000, CMP No. 8 of 2001 and CMP No. 1711 of 2000) as to why appropriate actions should not be initiated in accordance with law. The notices are made returnable oh March 19, 2001. 37. CMP No. 1711 of 2000 stands disposed of. 38. Civil Writ Petition No. 956 of 2000 stands dismissed as withdrawn. CMP Nos. 1650 of 2000 and 8 of 2001 39. In view of the disposal of the writ petition, these applications stand disposed of. Petition disposed of.