Judgment B.N Srikrishna, J. The facts necessary for disposal of this civil revision application are very short and they are: The petitioners filed Regular Civil Suit No. 2030 of 1996 in the trial court for permanent injunction to restrain the defendants from interfering with the possession of the plaintiffs. The case put forward by the petitioners was that they were in settled possession for an unbroken period of more than 35 years and that the defendants were attempting to disturb their possession. An application for temporary injunction was also taken out by the petitioners. Prima facie evidence of possession was sought to be given by way of 7 × 12 extracts of the village. These indicated, that, for almost 35 years, the petitioners' names were shown as being in possession of the suit land. Mutation Entry No. 1713 also supported the case of the petitioners. As against this evidence, the respondents sought to rely on receipts issued by a cooperative society for supply of sugarcane alleged to have been grown on the suit land. The trial court examined the said receipts and prima facie took the view that the survey number of the suit land appeared to have been inserted on the said receipts and declined to prima facie accept the said receipts as dislodging the presumptive value of the mutation entry and entries in the 7 × 12 extracts in favour of the petitioners. The trial court also considered the circumstance that there was no proper explanation given by the respondents as to why for about 35 years they had taken no steps to have their names entered in the revenue records. It also took into account that, as per Mutation Entry No. 901, when the name of the father of the 1st plaintiff was recorded in the 7 × 12 extract on 18-8-1962, two persons Chima Bala and Hari Bharya were present. The said Chima appears to be the father of the 1 respondent and had admitted the recording of the name of Raju Chima Pawar on the 7 × 12 extract. Taking an overall view of the material before it, the trial court was, prima facie, of the view that, pending hearing and disposal of the suit, temporary injunction should be granted to restrain the respondents from interfering with the possession of the plaintiffs. 2. The defendants carried an appeal to the lower appellate court. Taking an overall view of the material before it, the trial court was, prima facie, of the view that, pending hearing and disposal of the suit, temporary injunction should be granted to restrain the respondents from interfering with the possession of the plaintiffs. 2. The defendants carried an appeal to the lower appellate court. The lower appellate court seems to have been impressed by the contention with regard to title of the defendants. The lower appellate court took the view that the plaintiff-petitioners had not been able to establish their title while the defendant-respondents had relied on a registered sale deed to establish their title. In this view of the matter, the lower appellate court interfered with the order of the trial court and set it aside. Being aggrieved thereby, the petitioners are before this Court. 3. At this stage of granting a temporary injunction, the trial court was not concerned with the issue of title at all. It was concerned with the only issue as to whether the petitioners (original plaintiffs) could be said to be in settled legal possession of the suit land. There was more than adequate material on record of the trial court which indicated, prima facie, that the petitioners were in settled legal possession for 35 years and odd. The presumptive value of the revenue records was held not to have been dislodged by the trial court. On this material, the trial court rightly took the prima facie view that the temporary injunction had to issue. In my judgment, the lower appellate court was not justified in interfering with this prima facie view taken by the trial court which would have operated pending hearing and disposal of the suit itself. At the stage of a temporary injunction pending hearing of the suit, it was unnecessary to go into issues of title. This was not a case where the defendant respondents were suggesting that they were in settled possession or that just before the suit was brought by the plaintiff-petitioners they had been dispossessed. They also had no explanation as to why, despite their claim to have title to the suit land by a registered sale deed, they had taken no steps whatsoever for 35 years and more to have their names brought on the revenue records. They also had no explanation as to why, despite their claim to have title to the suit land by a registered sale deed, they had taken no steps whatsoever for 35 years and more to have their names brought on the revenue records. In these circumstances, I am of the view that the order made by the trial court was more than justified and there was no reason to interfere with it. 4. In the result, the civil revision application is allowed. The impugned order of the lower appellate court is hereby quashed and set aside. The order of the trial court dated 13-1-1997 is restored to continue pending hearing and final disposal of the suit. 5. Rule accordingly made absolute. 6. Cost to be cost in the suit. 7. Parties to act on ordinary copy of this order duly authenticated by the Court Sheristedar.