JUDGMENT : B.P. Das, J. - This appeal is directed against the order of conviction recorded by the Addl. Sessions Judge, Kendrapara in Session Trial No. 135/21 or 1992, convicting the Appellant u/s 302, I.P.C. and sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 3000/-, in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a further period of one year. 2. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the Appellant Chaitan Barik was working as a watchman in the Sub-Treasury Office at Pattamundei. Pranakrushna Barik (hereinafter referred to as "deceased") was working as a Senior Clerk in the said Sub-Treasury. On 28.11.1991, the deceased availed casual leave and disclosed to his colleagues that he would return on 28th afternoon to the office to clear up certain pending work. On 19.11.1991 at about 10 A.M., the deceased was found lying dead with pool of blood in the office on two benches joined together having multiple injuries on the various parts of his read. Accordingly, an F.I.R. was lodged by the Sub-Treasury Officer. After due investigation, charge sheet was submitted and the present Appellant stood charged for the offence u/s 302, I.P.C. for having committed murder of the deceased. 3. The plea of defense is one of complete denial, Added to that, the accused has also taken the plea of alibi. 4. The prosecution, in order to bring home the charge, examined witnesses and exhibited a number of documents. The defense has also examined one witness in support of its plea. 5. The trial Court on appreciation of the evidence on record has come to the conclusion that the death of Pranakrushna Barik was homicidal in nature and during the relevant time the accused, which was working as a Watchman-cum-sweeper, was the author of the crime. The plea of the accused, that he was absent from his place of working on the fateful day as he had gone to Puri on Court work in response to summons received by him, has been disbelieved. It has been further held that the plea of alibi taken by the accused having failed; unhesitatingly the accused can be said to be the perpetrator of the murder of Pranakrushna. It has been further held that the plea of alibi taken by the accused having failed; unhesitatingly the accused can be said to be the perpetrator of the murder of Pranakrushna. That apart, the trial Court has relied' upon the extra-judicial confession and appreciated the evidence of P.W.5 before whom the extra-judicial confession was made and accepted the same to be trustworthy which is a corroborating to the case of the prosecution. 6. Mr. Mohapatra, learned Counsel for the Appellant, submits that even if for the sake of argument it is presumed that the plea of alibi has failed, the prosecution is lacking in corroborative circumstance from which an inference of guilt can be drawn. According to Mr. Mohapatra, the circumstance, as revealed from the evidence, has not definitely, unerringly and unequivocally led to us to a conclusion that the Appellant was guilty. There being no eye witness to the occurrence, the Court should be satisfied that the various circumstances in the chain of evidence are established and the complete chain rules out a reasonable likelihood of innocence of the accused. According to the learned Counsel for the Appellant, there is nothing on record to indicate the presence of the Appellant at the place of occurrence all that day. According to him the version of P.W. 1, who is the informant and has stated that the accused was working as Choukidar and his duty was to remain present in he night, does not specifically indicate that on the date of occurrence he was present in the office. That apart, the counsel for the Appellant further stated that even though the deceased had taken C.L. on 27.11.1991, but still mystery shrouded on his presence in the office on the night of 28.11.1991. On the face of the evidence of the colleagues of the deceased, i.e., P. Ws. 2, 3 and 4, that the deceased had not told anything regarding his return to the office on 28.11.1991 in order to clear his pending work. Though, as per prosecution these witnesses have stated before the police that the deceased told them that he would return on 28.11.1991 in order to attend to some pending work, in fact, while confronted, these witnesses denied to have stated the aforesaid fact before the police. Though, as per prosecution these witnesses have stated before the police that the deceased told them that he would return on 28.11.1991 in order to attend to some pending work, in fact, while confronted, these witnesses denied to have stated the aforesaid fact before the police. This being the position, learned Counsel for the Appellant states that there is nothing in evidence to show that the Appellant was present in the office on that night and committed the said crime. Peculiarly, in this case no motive has been proved by the prosecution though it is not necessary in every case. But evidence of P.W. 5 transpires that the accused confessed before him that he killed the deceased by giving successive blows by means of a roller as the deceased asked him for Rs. 100-200/- Barring this, no light has been thrown by the prosecution on the motive of the accused. 7. Learned Counsel for the State, on the other hand, submits that in the statement u/s 313 Code of Criminal Procedure, the accused has specifically taken the plea that he had gone to Puri on 28.11.1991 at about 3 P.M. after getting his salary and also taken summons issued from the Court at Puri in a case where he was cited as witness. This plea was disbelieved because the defense did not produce any document before the trial Court to substantiate its plea that the accused had ever appeared before the Puri Court as a witness in any case. Hence, according to the counsel for the State, once the plea of alibi fails, the irresistible conclusion is that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime, Further, the present case as submitted by him coupled with the aforesaid presumption, the case of the prosecution has been amply proved because of the reason that the sleeping mat, Kantha, pillow made of rags and the Chadar seized from the office premises were all stained with blood and were identified by P. Ws. 1, 4 and 17. Out of them, the pillow and blood-stained Chadar were identified by P.W. 4, who is a peon. The witnesses have also stated that the blood-stained Lungi was also recovered while the accused was arrested in his house situated in the district of Puri. 8. 1, 4 and 17. Out of them, the pillow and blood-stained Chadar were identified by P.W. 4, who is a peon. The witnesses have also stated that the blood-stained Lungi was also recovered while the accused was arrested in his house situated in the district of Puri. 8. On hearing the argument so advanced by the counsel for the State and on going through the evidence on record, there is nothing to dispute that the accused was a pitchman in the office of the Sub Treasury, but the question remains to be decided whether there are sufficient materials in order to rope the accused with the charge u/s 302, I.P.C. and whether there are links to form a chain unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the accused as claimed by the prosecution. 9. In the case at hand, though blood-stained Chadar, Lungi and roller were sent for chemical examination and though there was origin of human blood disclosed in the chemical examination report except from cloth piece, and no opinion could be ascertained regarding the blood group from the Chadar, Lungi, Bed sheet, sweater and napkin. The trial court in its judgment under challenge came to a positive finding that beyond the normal functioning of the office hours, as the nature of the job of the accused as watchman demands, his presence after the office hour cannot be disbelieved. Further, it is held that nonproduction of the register showing delivery of locks and keys to the accused does not in any way affect the case of the prosecution and further finds that the accused being a watchman-cum-sweeper was the custodian of the locks and keys of the office. 10. Keeping the, aforesaid findings of the learned trial Court in tact, there is nothing in the evidence to indicate that any of the witnesses had not seen the accused on the date of occurrence, nor there is any evidence to show the time when he deceased entered into the office, premises. 11. This Court in the case of Sudhakar Naik Vs. State of Orissa held that unless the chain of circumstance in the case is complete, suspicion, howsoever grave, was not a substitute for proof. 11. This Court in the case of Sudhakar Naik Vs. State of Orissa held that unless the chain of circumstance in the case is complete, suspicion, howsoever grave, was not a substitute for proof. In the C.K. Raveendran v. State of Kerala reported in (2000) 18 OCR (St) 233, the apex Court held as follows: ...In our opinion, therefore, on the materials on record, the prosecution has not been able to establish any motive on the part of the accused Raveendran for committing the crime. In this state of affairs the so-called recovery of the wrist watch of the deceased, on the basis of statement made by accused raveendran can hardly be said to be a clinching circumstance for coming to the conclusion that the prosecution case has been' proved beyond reasonable doubt. In the case of Bishikeshan Nag v. The State of Orissa reported in (2000) 19 OCR 276, this Court held thus: xx xx xx In a case depending upon circumstances, there is always a danger that the suspicion may take the place of legal proof. Such suspicion, however, strong, cannot be allowed to take the place of legal proof. The Court must.satisfy itself that the various circumstances in the chain of evidence should be established clearly and that the completed chain must be such as to rule out a reasonable likelihood of the innocence of the accused. 12. Learned Counsel for the State strenuously argues that the blood stained articles so seized point towards the guilt of the accused. There were seizures at two places. First seizure is the blood stained Chadar, bed sheet, pillow and some gauge cloths which were seized from the place of occurrence. Secondly, the seizure of Lungi was made from the house of accused where he was arrested. The blood group of the Appellant was not examined. Blood-stained Chadar found to be blood group of' A'. As the blood-stained materials were. seized from a place like government office having access to various persons including the outsiders cannot be the.sole basis for convicting the accused in an offence like murder. The law is well settled that the fouler is the crime, higher is the degree of proof. 13. With regard to detection of blood-stained articles so seized leads to prosecution to nowhere. The prosecution has not taken any steps for examination of blood group of the Appellant. His blood group might be 'A'. The law is well settled that the fouler is the crime, higher is the degree of proof. 13. With regard to detection of blood-stained articles so seized leads to prosecution to nowhere. The prosecution has not taken any steps for examination of blood group of the Appellant. His blood group might be 'A'. I f on examination it would have been found out that the blood group of the Appellant was not 'A', then some suspicion could have arisen in the mind of the Court. The prosecution has not taken any steps for its investigation in this respect. This view of us finds support from the case of Brusava Naik v. State of Orissa reported in (2000) 19 OCR 330. 14. Regarding extra-judicial confession of the accused, the prosecution relying upon the evidence of P.W. 5 wants to prove that the accused went to the house of P.W. 5 at the dead of the night on 29.11.91 in search of his father, who is a retired Sub-Treasury Officer and told him that he killed the deceased. During his cross-examination this witness stated that for the first time on 3.12.1991, he disclosed this fact to the police. It is well settled that when the extra-judicial confession is proved by independent and trustworthy witness to be voluntary and unambiguous inspiring confidence, the same can be accepted and made the basis of conviction even without corroboration. Relying upon the aforesaid rule of caution and prudence, let us see whether the evidence of the aforesaid witnesses can pass through the test of judicial scrutiny to record a finding of guilt in absence of any corroboration. 15. P.W. 5 has categorically stated that he has not disclosed the fact before anybody for near about four days until he was examined by the police. As it appears, the Appellant has only casual acquaintance with P.W. 5, who is the son of the retired Sub-Treasury Officer. Admittedly, the Appellant had gone to see his father at the dead of night. There is nothing to indicate as to why the accused shall at all repose confidence on P.W. 5 and make a confession before him. Apart from that-non-disclosure of the factum of confession by P.W. 5 is another factor which does not inspire confidence in the evidence of P.W. 5 for which we are unable to rely upon the same and act upon it. 16. Apart from that-non-disclosure of the factum of confession by P.W. 5 is another factor which does not inspire confidence in the evidence of P.W. 5 for which we are unable to rely upon the same and act upon it. 16. In view of the discussions made above, and taking into consideration the circumstances and the evidence on record, we are of the opinion that this is a case where the chain of circumstances was not complete and the prosecution has not proved the case beyond reasonable doubt regarding the presence of the accused on the night of occurrence. Relying on the well settled principle that suspicion however grave is not a substitute for proof and the circumstances, in our opinion, the accused is entitled to get the benefit of doubt. 17. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the judgment of the learned Addl. Sessions, Judge, Kendrapara, convicting the Appellant and sentencing him for the offence as aforesaid is set aside by giving the accused benefit of doubt. The conviction u/s 302, I.P.C. is set aside and the Appellant be set at liberty forthwith if he is not required in connection with any other case. Final Result : Allowed