JUDGMENT M.C.Jain, J. Accused-appellant Smt. Leela Pathak has been convicted by the Sessions Judge, Pithoragarh, through judgment and order dated 17-11-2000 passed in S.T. No. 40 of 1999, U/s 302 and 201, I.P.C. She has been sentenced to undergo life imprisonment u/s 302, I.P.C. and two years' rigorous imprisonment u/s 201, I.P.C. Both the sentences have been ordered to run concurrently. 2. She is in jail and has preferred this appeal therefrom. As she had no lawyer to represent her in this appeal, an Amicus Curiae came to be appointed by this Court who has argued the appeal on her behalf. 3. A resume of relevant facts is necessary for proper appreciation. The deceased was her own daughter Km. Bhawana, aged about 11 years. The incident took place on 26-04-1995 between 6 a.m. and 8 a.m. The accused-appellant herself lodged the F.I.R. at the police station the same day at 9.45 a.m. She was an employee of Roadways and was under suspension since May, 1994. She was living in a rented house at Aincholi. On the day of incident at about 6.08 a.m., according to her, she had gone to the school of her daughter at Takana to make over the application of her leave as she was ill since the last day. While going to the school, she had locked her house from outside with her daughter sleeping inside. When she returned back to her house at about 8 a.m. and went inside after opening the lock, she found her daughter to have died of burning. A jerry can of kerosene was lying nearby. A case was registered and police entered into investigation. On reaching the spot, the investigating officer inspected dead body of the deceased and the site of the incident. After completing the formalities required by law, the dead body was sent for post-mortem. 4. The post-mortem was conducted by P.W. 3 Dr. H.C.Pathak on 26-04-1995 at 4.13 p.m. It revealed that the deceased had died due to asphyxia and shock owing to extensive burn injuries. There were 90% burns on her body. The dead body was smelling of kerosene. The death had occurred between 12 to 24 hours before the time of post mortem. 5. H.C.Pathak on 26-04-1995 at 4.13 p.m. It revealed that the deceased had died due to asphyxia and shock owing to extensive burn injuries. There were 90% burns on her body. The dead body was smelling of kerosene. The death had occurred between 12 to 24 hours before the time of post mortem. 5. As a result of investigation, it was found that the accused-appellant had herself committed the murder of her daughter and had lodged a false report in an attempt to screen the reality. She was accordingly charge sheeted and put to trial. Her defence as disclosed in her statement u/s 313, Cr.P.C. was that she had falsely been accused of murder of her daughter. According to her, her landlord used to say that she would kill her daughter; he had even attempted to commit theft in her house; One Pratiman Chand of Roadways also used to offer threat to kill her daughter; in the morning, she had gone to give leave application in the school of her daughter when she (daughter) was sleeping; on return she found that her daughter was burnt and had died. 6. At trial, the prosecution examined four witnesses including the doctor and Investigating Officer. None was examined by the accused-appellant in her defence. The trial concluded in her conviction and she was sentenced as stated earlier. The matter is now in appeal before this court. 7. We have heard Smt. Mamta Bisht, learned Amicus Curiae on behalf of the accused appellant and the learned A.G.A. on behalf of the State. We have also carefully gone through the record and evidence of the case. 8. It has first been argued for the accused-appellant that there was no motive on the part of the accused-appellant to commit murder of her own daughter. Suffice is to say in this regard that motive is not evidenced in the case. Absence of motive can not override the importance of the overwhelming circumstantial evidence which goes to prove the accused to be guilty of this crime. 9. In fact, the circumstantial evidence against the accused-appellant is of very strong nature. A number of clinching circumstances are lined up to prove that actually she committed this crime. It would be proper to enumerate the same here. Admittedly, the incident took place in the house of the accused-appellant. The dead body of the deceased was found there. 9. In fact, the circumstantial evidence against the accused-appellant is of very strong nature. A number of clinching circumstances are lined up to prove that actually she committed this crime. It would be proper to enumerate the same here. Admittedly, the incident took place in the house of the accused-appellant. The dead body of the deceased was found there. The own case of the accused-appellant is that when she had left her house at about 6a.m. to go to the school of her daughter to make over the application of her leave on account of illness, she (daughter) was sleeping inside. She had locked the house and gone to the school. On return from the school at about 8 a.m., the door of the house was found locked by her and it was she who opened it. The dead body of her daughter was then found lying inside the house in burnt condition. There had not been the entry of anyone else inside the house by breaking open the lock or in any other unauthorized way. The death did occur within 12 -24 hours of the time of post-mortem which was conducted at 4.13 p.m. on 26-04-1995. There were 90% burn~ on the dead body and a jerry can of kerosene was also found lying nearby. There could hardly be any question of commission of suicide by the deceased, who was simply a girl of 11 years of age. 10. Another strong circumstance speaking voluminously against the accused-appellant is that it was her most unnatural conduct that she according to her, had gone to the school of her daughter at an early hour of 6 a.m. simply to make over the application for leave on account of her illness. The daughter had gone to school even the previous day as mentioned by her in the F.I.R. and was unwell when she had returned. Obviously, her daughter was not in employment. Sudden casual absence from the school for a day on account of illness was not such an emergency that she (accused-appellant) would have gone to her school to make over the leave application at the break of the day, particularly when the daughter was ailing and there was no other member in the family. Sudden casual absence from the school for a day on account of illness was not such an emergency that she (accused-appellant) would have gone to her school to make over the leave application at the break of the day, particularly when the daughter was ailing and there was no other member in the family. The natural conduct of the accused-appellant would have been to be there by the side of her daughter, instead of rushing to make over application of her leave in the school at the earliest hour of the day leaving the ailing daughter alone locked inside the house. It is the statement of her landlord Bhuwan Chandra Pande, P.W. 1 that only the accused-appellant and her daughter used to live in the tenanted accommodation. 11. On careful consideration, this court is in agreement with the learned Sessions Judge that the circumstantial evidence against the accused-appellant is of clinching and conclusive character excluding every hypothesis other than that it was she who committed her daughter's murder by burning and then made a false report at the police station to screen herself and to cause to disappear the evidence of this crime committed by her. Her conviction u/s 302 I.P.C. and 201, I.P.C. is perfectly justified. For the offence of murder, she has been awarded lesser of the two sentences prescribed for the said offence. The sentence awarded for the offence punishable u/s 201, I.P.C. is two years' R.I. which has been ordered to run concurrently with life imprisonment and as such it is of theoretical importance only. 12. The net conclusion is that the appeal has no merit and is liable to be dismissed. 13. We hereby dismiss this appeal and maintain the conviction and sentence passed against the accused-appellant Leela Pathak by the Sessions Judge, Pithoragarh. She is in jail. She shall serve out the sentences awarded to her. 14. Smt. Mamta Bist, who argued the appeal on behalf of the accused-appellant as Amicus Curiae shall get Rs. 3000/- (Rupees Three Thousand only) as her fee. 15. Let a copy of this judgment alongwith record of the case be sent to the Court below for needful compliance under intimation to this Court within two months positively.