JUDGMENT Malay Kumar Basu, J. This revisional application is directed against the order No.27 dt. 10th February, 1998 passed by the ld. Additional Sessions Judge, Uttar Dinajpur at Raiganj in Criminal Revision No.15 of 1995 in connection with an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act. The revision petition has been filed by Sri Chandrika Pros ad Kiran, the husband of the O.P., Smt. Sabitri Kiran, challenging the said order of the Court below as illegal, erroneous and unsustainable on the ground that the ld. Judge has misunderstood the scope of section 5 of the Limitation Act and has given his verdict taking a wrong view of the law, inasmuch as, he has failed to take into account the fact that the petitioner before him (the O.P. in the present application) was not able to explain each day's delay, particularly the delay that occurred during the last two months and the mistake that was committed on the part of the lawyer not inadvertently but with gross negligence could not form a good ground for condonation of the delay in question. 2. The relevant facts leading to this revision are that the O.P. who is the legally married wife of the revisional applicant (hereinafter referred to as the applicant) filed a petition under section 125 Cr. P.C. before the SDJM, Raiganj claiming maintenance from her husband, (that is, the present applicant) for herself and her male child which were registered as Case No.18 UR/91. The applicant (the O.P. in that case) contested that petition under section 125 in the Court of SDJM by filing a written objection denying all the material allegations thereof. Thereafter, that maintenance case came up for hearing before the ld. Judicial Magistrate, Raiganj on 22nd April, 1993 and after hearing both the parties the ld. Magistrate dismissed the petition on the ground that the first party-wife had failed to give a reasonable explanation for not living with her husband and also that she had suppressed material facts in her application, etc. Thereafter, after the lapse of two years twenty-eight days (758 days) from the date of the said judgment of ld. Magistrate the first party-wife filed a revisional application along with a petition under section 5 of the Limitation Act before the ld. Sessions Judge, Uttar Dinajpur on 28th May, 1995 challenging that order of the ld. Thereafter, after the lapse of two years twenty-eight days (758 days) from the date of the said judgment of ld. Magistrate the first party-wife filed a revisional application along with a petition under section 5 of the Limitation Act before the ld. Sessions Judge, Uttar Dinajpur on 28th May, 1995 challenging that order of the ld. Judicial Magistrate dated 22nd April, 1993 as illegal and liable to be set aside. In that petition under section 5 of the Limitation Act the grounds which the condonation of delay was claimed were that she and her lawyer were under the impression that the certified copy of the order of ld. Magistrate would be given to her free of cost and hence no application from her side was made for getting certified copy. But no such copy free of cost was supplied to her and at last on 19.8.1993 her lawyer applied for a certified copy of the order having no other alternative. Thereafter that certified copy was made ready for delivery on 24th November, 1994 but since the father of her lawyer had been seriously ill around that time and the lawyer had to remain busy with the ailing father, he could not collect the certified copy till 23rd December, 1994, his father having died on 5.12.1994. On 24th December, 1994 the copy was obtained. But at that time the applicant had been to the house of a relative out of Raiganj town. She returned to Raiganj on 18th May, 1995 and then she got the revisional application prepared by his Advocate on 19th May and thereafter she filed the same on 20th May, 1995. Thus, according to her, the delay in filing the revisional application was not intentional or wilful, but was due to the cumulative effect of all the factors stated above and unless it is condoned and she is given a chance to challenge the impugned order of the Court of Magistrate, she would suffer irreperable loss and prejudice. The ld. Thus, according to her, the delay in filing the revisional application was not intentional or wilful, but was due to the cumulative effect of all the factors stated above and unless it is condoned and she is given a chance to challenge the impugned order of the Court of Magistrate, she would suffer irreperable loss and prejudice. The ld. Additional Sessions Judge after hearing both the sides and considering the principles of law of Limitation, came to the finding that the delay should be condoned as the petitioner- wife was able to sufficiently explain the delay in view of the reason that she had been misled by the mistaken advice given by his lawyer which should be taken as a sufficient cause since such error of the Counsel was not tainted by any mala fide motive. Ld. Addl. Sessions Judge relied upon in this regard the decisions reported in AIR 1937 P.C. 278 and AIR 1970 SC 1953 . 3. Being aggrieved by this order the husband O.P. (the present applicant) has preferred the present revisional application and the ld. Advocate for him has contended that the Court below fell into error by not considering the settled principle that sufficient cause is to be shown to cover the whole period of delay, that is to say, each day's delay should have to be explained by the petitioner. Here, according to him, the Court ought to have held that there was nothing on record to show that there had been any attempt to given, an explanation for the delay for each day and at the most, delay for a period of two years only could be said to have been explained, if at all, and the remaining period remained totally unexplained. Then again, the petitioner has offerred no explanation in her petition (Annexure-A) for the delayed filing of the application for certified copy or delayed filing of the case after obtaining the certified copy. The further contention of the ld. Counsel for the O.P. is that wrong advice of Advocate is never meant to be unqualified and cannot make the time-limit indefinite. He refers to the rulings reported in Calcutta Law Times 1993 Vol. I P.132 and AIR 1998 SC 2276 . 4. It is an admitted position that there has been a delay for 758 days in all. Counsel for the O.P. is that wrong advice of Advocate is never meant to be unqualified and cannot make the time-limit indefinite. He refers to the rulings reported in Calcutta Law Times 1993 Vol. I P.132 and AIR 1998 SC 2276 . 4. It is an admitted position that there has been a delay for 758 days in all. For the purpose of explanation of the delay as offered by the petitioner-wife before the Court below the whole period may be divided into three phases. The impugned judgment of the trial Court was passed on 22.4.1993. The period up to 18.8.1993 is to be taken as the first phase, because the application for certified copy of the said judgment was filed on this date for the first time and the explanation given for this part of the delay is that she was given to understand by her Advocate that she would be given by the Court a copy free of cost and due to such ignorance of law on the part of both her lawyer and herself they unnecessarily waited for such a copy during these long four months and her case is that she cannot have any responsibility in a matter which was the result of ignorance and mistaken advice of her Counsel. 5. The question is how far such a plea can be accepted. In this behalf the settled position of law is that any and every mistaken advice of the Counsel cannot be regarded as a sufficient cause. The mistake alleged must be bona fide, that is, it must have emerged inspite of due care and attention being paid. It must be worthy of belief that such a mistake was quite likely to be committed by a lawyer and there should not be any room for doubt that such a story of ignorance of law on the part of a Lawyer had been cooked up for the purpose of creation of a ground for explaining the delay. In the present case it is alleged that ld. In the present case it is alleged that ld. Lawyer due to his ignorance of the provisions of law wrongly advised the petitioner-wife to wait for the free-of-cost copy of the impugned judgment, for such a long period, although under the provisions of section 128 of the Cr.P.C. it was clear that only when the wife got favourable order under section 125 of the Code, she was entitled to get such a copy. Giving careful thought to this it does not appear to my mind to be probable that a legal practitioner who conducted the proceeding under section 125 Cr.P.C. in question and on whom the petitioner used to place so much reliance in such respect would be so callous as to be ignorant of such a commonly known provision of law, namely, section 128 Cr.P.C. Whether that Counsel was actually devoid of such knowledge or not does not bother this Court. Because, we are to start with the premise that the Advocate ought to have known this ABC of the law which he had been dealing with. In Bijanlata vs. Bhudhur, reported in AIR 1965 Cal 578, this Court held that where the law is in an unsettled state, a mistake by the Lawyer can be accepted as a sufficient cause, but when the matter is beyond dispute, a statement that the lawyer did not know the law cannot be accepted as sufficiant cause. In the instant case, the Code contains the particular provision in unambiguous language that free-of-cost copy is available only to such a petitioner under section 125 as has obtained an order granting maintenance in her favour and not to one whose petition has been rejected. There is a particular section, namely, section 128 in the Code laying down such provisions in plain and simple terms and it cannot lie in the month of that ld. Lawyer that he never went through that section or was unaware of the same. In Harsha Ltd. vs. Collector of Customs, (1989) 41 ELT 8 (SC), the Apex Court held that when a party pleads mistaken legal advice it should be shown that the party sought advice of competent counsel and such advice was given exercising reasonable skill and care after proper examination and due care and caution. In Harsha Ltd. vs. Collector of Customs, (1989) 41 ELT 8 (SC), the Apex Court held that when a party pleads mistaken legal advice it should be shown that the party sought advice of competent counsel and such advice was given exercising reasonable skill and care after proper examination and due care and caution. Thus it is very clear that in our instant case there was no scope for the counsel of the petitioner to be confused or misled due to the existence of any conflicting legal provisions or decisions. On the other hand, the legal position was settled and well known being provided under a particular section of the Code. So it was not at all a fit case where such mistake or ignorance of law on the part of a lawyer or the alleged fact of the petitioner being misled by the mistaken advice of that lawyer can be taken as sufficient cause for the purpose of condonation of delay. 6. But what is more important, the petitioner before the court below appears to have miserably failed to substantiate her allegation that she was advised by her lawyer to wait till she received the free-of-cost copy of the order of the Court because her lawyer was under the notion that she would be supplied such a copy free of cost. She has been examined as the P.W.1 before the court of Addl. Sessions Judge in connection with the proceeding under section 5 of the Limitation Act and it is curious enough that the above averments of her petition under section 5, Limitation Act have not been testified to in her deposition. Nor she has examined her said lawyer in order to prove such an allegation. In the result, her case as made out in the petition to the effect that as per the mistaken advice of her counsel she unnecessarily waited for four months without filing any petition for certified copy remains totally unsubstantiated. Thus it is clear and evident that the first phase of the delay, that is to say, the fact of her remaining idle during the first four months remains totally unexplained and unjustified, her plea that under the advice of her lawyer she was waiting during this period for a free-of-cost copy of the impugned judgment of the Court being not proved at all. 7. 7. So far as the second phase of the delay is concerned, that is, the delay relating to the period from 24.11.1994 to 24.12.1994, the petitioner has again failed to substantiate her allegations that although the certified copy had been made ready on 24.11.1994, the petitioner's lawyer remaining busy with his sick and ailing father could not take delivery of the same before 24.12.1994. That her lawyer had to remain confined in his home during this period due to his father's illness or death and did not come to court on any day during this time is a question of fact and is required to be proved by adducing evidence. Simple and vague allegation in the petition cannot take the place of proof particularly when these are not undisputed and as a matter of fact the petitioner examined herself in order to establish her case as made out in the petition. It is very conspicuous that the most material witness in this regard, namely, her lawyer himself has not been examined. Curiously she has not even mentioned the name of that lawyer in her petition under section 5. He would have been the best person to reveal the true state of things as to the allegations that due to his father's illness he could not collect the certified copy, even though it was lying ready. Even no affidavit has been sworn by him in this regard. In the absence of such important materials it is difficult to believe the vaguely narrated averments of the petitioner- wife. May be, his father expired on 5th December, 1994 but that fact alone cannot be taken to suggest that since 24th November, the ld. advocate of the petitioner remained busy with his father or that he did not attend the Court during those dates for a single day. Moreover, such matters are not generally pursued by the lawyers, personally, but their clerks are deputed to do such jobs on their behalf. From that point of view also the story of the petitioner does not appear to be very convincing. It is not understood why the said lawyer or at least his clerk has not been examined by the petitioner to substantiate such an allegation. Therefore in respect of this second phase of the delay also the petitioner's explanation remains totally unfounded and unsubstantiated. It is not understood why the said lawyer or at least his clerk has not been examined by the petitioner to substantiate such an allegation. Therefore in respect of this second phase of the delay also the petitioner's explanation remains totally unfounded and unsubstantiated. It is needless to repeat the settled principle on this question that delay for each and every day has got to be explained by an applicant seeking condonation. But it is revealed from the foregoing discussion that the petitioner failed to explain any delay, far less each day's delay. 8. As regards the third phase of the delay, that is, the delay in respect of the period from 25.12.1994 to 18.5.1995 the position is worse. Here the explanation as given in the petition is that after obtaining the certified copy on 24th December, 1994, the ld. Advocate for the petitioner enquired of the petitioner, but the petitioner having gone out of Raiganj town to his relative's house was not available and hence the counsel could not take any action till 18th May, 1995 on which date the petitioner returned to Raiganj and came to know about the already procured certified copy and thereafter her lawyer prepared the revisional application on her behalf on 19th May and the same was filed before the Court on 20th May, 1995. Thus it is palpable that the inaction during this long period, namely, the period from 25th December ,1994 to 18th May, 1995 remains practically unexplained. If the petitioner at her sweet will selects of leave the town at the relevant point of time without taking the necessary steps which are required to be adopted for the purpose of filing the revisional application in question, then, certainly that is an index of her negligence and failure in duty and cannot be used in aid of her attempt to explain away the delay. At any rate it cannot be a satisfactory explanation. It was her prime duty to ensure that her intended revisional application was filed within the prescribed period of limitation and for that purpose she was to remain present in her residence and to contact her counsel regularly indicating her alertness in the - matter. At any rate it cannot be a satisfactory explanation. It was her prime duty to ensure that her intended revisional application was filed within the prescribed period of limitation and for that purpose she was to remain present in her residence and to contact her counsel regularly indicating her alertness in the - matter. But, if instead of doing that, she voluntarily leaves the town of her residence for her relative's house and stays there for about half a year without taking any information regarding her proposed filing of revision or without keeping any contact with the lawyer, then that would certainly indicate that she was not being governed by any sense of urgency in the matter of moving against the impugned order and it cannot be said that she did not contribute to the delay or that the delay occurred due to circumstances beyond her control. On the other hand, from such conduct of her it is clear that she had intentionally and deliberately idled away the time and let the period of limitation cross over the prescribed limit without any reason. It is to be noted that in her deposition before the Court below referred to above she had made no whisper about what prompted her to leave her residence without taking necessary steps in the matter of her filing of revisional application in question or what prompted her to stay there for about long six months without caring to ascertain for a moment what was happening to her proposed filing of revisional application. She disclosed not an iota of concern in respect of such matters. She makes a more broad statement that she was out of station having gone to her relative's house and returned therefrom 3/4 months after. But she does not state the reason for doing so, particularly when such absence at such material point of time would highlight her neglect and carelessness in the matter of filing such a revisional application in time. Thus it is clear that the petitioner has totally failed to offer any satisfactory explanation in respect of this third phase of the delay covering a period of about six months. Merely saying that she had been out of station for a particular period is not enough for the purpose of providing an explanation for the delay. Thus it is clear that the petitioner has totally failed to offer any satisfactory explanation in respect of this third phase of the delay covering a period of about six months. Merely saying that she had been out of station for a particular period is not enough for the purpose of providing an explanation for the delay. Petitioner has to spell out the detailed circumstances which might have compelled her to leave her residence for a distant place and stay away there for such a long period. Absolutely nothing has been done by her in this behalf and she has failed to show that her staying away at a different place at the relevant time was under a compelling necessity and was not a luxury. 9. Ld. Advocate for the O.P.-wife has urged that Courts should adopt a considerably lenient view regarding condonation of delayand should ignore such lapses on her part in the matter of explanation of the delay. He relies upon a judgment of the Apex Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantanag & Anr. vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors., reported in AIR 1987 SC 1353 , wherein it has enjoined upon the Courts to take a liberal approach with regard to the question of condonation of delay. The grounds which prompted their Lordships were as follows: "1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. 'Every day's delay must be explained' does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so." 10. But these instructions which were specially applicable in the circumstances of that particular case cannot be said to be applicable to any and every case of condonation of delay as a general formula. Moreover, in that case under reference the appeal in question was filed after the lapse of only four days beyond the prescribed time, whereas in the present case the delay is of a massive 758 days and that too as a result of utter negligence and indolence on the part of the petitioner. In a more recent decision reported in AIR 1998 S.C. 2276 (P.K. Ramchandran vs. State of Kerala & Anr.) the Apex Court has held completely otherwise seeing that any explanation, much less a reasonable or satisfactory one, having not been offered by the respondent -State for condonation of the inordinate delay of 565 days, their Lordships came to the finding that however harshly the law of limitation may effect a particular party, but it had to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribed and the Courts had no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. 11. Ld. Advocate for the revisional applicant has referred to another ruling of a Division Bench of this Court reported in CAL.L.T. 1993(1) HC 132 (The I.T.O. 'F' Ward Dist. IV Cal vs. I.O. Corpn.). The Court has held in this case, that in exercise of its discretion in respect of condonation of delay it must see whether or not the appellant has acted with reasonable diligence in prosecuting the appeal and the Court must be satisfied that there was diligence on the part of the appellant and it was not guilty of any negligence whatsoever. As I have shown above, in the present case the petitioner before the Court below (the O.P. of the present application) far from being diligent was absolutely unconcerned about her proposed filing of any revision against the order in question and appears to have toyed with the idea by idling away the time. In her petition under section 5 of the Limitation Act she has not practically offered any explanation whatsoever, far less cogent, and what she has stated in the name of explanation has not been substantiated by evidence. 12. In view of all the foregoing reasons I am constrained to hold that the O.P. -wife being the petitioner before the Court below has miserably failed to establish that she was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the revisional application before that Court within the prescribed time. The huge delay of 758 days remaining unexplained is not found condonable and the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act was liable to be dismissed. The Court below appears to have misdirected itself and fallen into error by holding otherwise. The impugned order is, therefore, set aside and in the result the revisional application be allowed. 13. The Lower Court records be sent down to the Court below. Revisional application allowed.