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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2001 DIGILAW 207 (MP)

Sardar Bhajan Singh v. Central Bank of India

2001-03-05

ARUN MISHRA, BHAWANI SINGH

body2001
Judgment ( 1. ) THE appellants, who stood as guarantors, have filed the present appeal challenging the judgment and decree passed by the learned Single Judge in First Appeal No. 80 of 1982. ( 2. ) A money suit was filed by the Central Bank of India (respondent No. 1) for recovery of the loan amount of Rs. 18,000/- advanced on 1. 11. 1973. The loan was taken by Kaushal Kumar Sharma and the appellants Sardar Bhajan Singh and Govind Prasad Sharma stood guarantors and had executed deed of guarantee in favour of the Bank. The principal borrower failed to repay the loan and hence the suit was filed. The guarantors took the plea in their written statement that they did not furnish any guarantee for the said amount of loan and their signatures were obtained on some blank papers at their residence by the principal borrower. The recovery should be made from the principal borrower by taking possession of the car. Since the Bank Manager did not listen to the request of the guarantors to take possession of the car, no decree can be passed against them. ( 3. ) THE Trial Court passed a decree against the principal borrower and came to the conclusion that the documents were not executed by the guarantors, hence, absolved them from the liability and as against them, the suit was dismissed, against which the Bank preferred First Appeal (No. 80 of 1982) before this Court, which has been allowed by the Single Bench of this Court by the impugned judgment, and decree. ( 4. ) LEARNED Counsel for the appellants has submitted that the Trial Court has given the finding that the suit was barred by limitation against the guarantors and that finding has not been disturbed by the Single Bench while allowing the appeal. Hence it was not open to pass a decree against the guarantors without reversing the finding. Secondly, it is strenuously urged by the learned Counsel for the appellants deed of guarantee bears the date 26. 10. 1973 whereas the loan was advanced on 1. 11. 1973. Hence, it cannot be a deed of guarantee with respect of the loan taken on 1. 11. 1973. ( 5. ) IT is not in dispute in the instant case that the deed of guarantee bears the signatures of the guarantors. 10. 1973 whereas the loan was advanced on 1. 11. 1973. Hence, it cannot be a deed of guarantee with respect of the loan taken on 1. 11. 1973. ( 5. ) IT is not in dispute in the instant case that the deed of guarantee bears the signatures of the guarantors. The case of the guarantors was that their signatures were obtained by the defendant No. 1, principal borrower which case has not been found established. Learned Single Judge, on elaborate discussion of evidence, has found that signatures of the appellant-defendants are proved on the document-Exhibit P-8 and it was signed in the presence of Madan Mohan Samrat (P. W. 2 ). Though the appellants tried to wriggle out in their deposition before the Court that the document-Exhibit P-8 was not signed by them. However, this plea is negatived by a bare reading of the written statement wherein it was pleaded that the signatures were obtained on blank forms. ( 6. ) THE Trial Court has simply dismissed the suit as barred by limitation against the appellants only on the ground that it was not established that they had executed the document with respect to the furnishing of the guarantee. No other reason was assigned by the Trial Court for holding the suit as barred by limitation. Thus, the learned Single Judge has, on appreciation of evidence, came to the conclusion that the deed of guarantee was executed and the liability of the borrower is co-extensive with that of the principal borrower. The suit against the principal borrower is well within limitation. Hence, it could not be said to be barred by limitation as against guarantors as the liability is co-extensive. It is neither shown nor contended by the appellants that the suit was barred by limitation against the principal borrower. Thus, as a matter of fact, the Single Bench has reversed the finding of the Trial Court on the basis of which the suit was held to be barred by limitation with respect to the execution of the document. It follows necessarily that finding of the Single Bench is that the suit is within limitation particularly when guarantors liability has been held to be coextensive with that of the principal borrower. With reference to the difference in the dates 26. 10. 1973 and 1. 11. It follows necessarily that finding of the Single Bench is that the suit is within limitation particularly when guarantors liability has been held to be coextensive with that of the principal borrower. With reference to the difference in the dates 26. 10. 1973 and 1. 11. 1973, the matter has been examined by the Single Bench in extensive detail, we find ourselves in agreement with the findings of the learned Single Judge, so recorded. Moreover the difference is not so much material as the appellants had executed deed of guarantee and it bears their signatures. ( 7. ) THE appeal is devoid of merit and is dismissed.