Research › Search › Judgment

Andhra High Court · body

2001 DIGILAW 211 (AP)

Gajula Rajaiah v. State Of A. P.

2001-03-02

S.B.SINHA, S.R.NAYAK

body2001
S. B. SINHA, J. ( 1 ) CONSTITUTIONALITY of the A. P. Civil Courts Laws (Amendment) Act, 1997 whereby and whereunder the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Senior Civil Judge from unlimited jurisdiction to matters valued at or below Rs. 5. 00 lakhs has been effected, falls for decision in these applications. The petitioner in Writ Petition No. 2140 of 2000 is said to be a resident of a remote place in Karimnagar district. His lands had been acquired by the respondent No. 5 and an award was passed. He filed an application under S. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act which was numbered as O. P. No. 45 of 1992. An execution petition was filed for executing the award passed by the Senior Civil Judge on 27-1-1999. Allegedly the execution petition filed by the petitioner was returned for being presented before the proper Court in view of the said provision. ( 2 ) THE learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner would strenuously urge that having regard to the fact that Article 39-A of the Constitution of India postulates effective and speedy justice at the doorstep of the litigant and the Services Authority Act, 1987 having been enacted to achieve the said purpose, the impugned Act must be held to be ultra vires having regard to the difficulties which may be faced by a large number of litigants like the petitioner. Accordingly the learned counsel, in a situation of this nature even Article 21 of the Constitution of India would be attracted. ( 3 ) SECTION 16 of the A. P. Civil Courts Act, 1972 is as follows :"jurisdiction of District Judge, Senior Civil Judge and Junior Civil Judge in Original Suits and other proceedings :- (1) The pecuniary jurisdiction of a District Judge, shall subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the other provisions of this act, extend to all Original Suits and proceedings of a civil nature including Land Acquisition Original Petitions, the amount or value of the subject matter of whic exceeds rupees five lakhs. (2) The pecuniary jurisdiction of a Senior Civil Judge shall extend to all like suits and proceedings of a civil nature including Land Acquisition Original Petitions not otherwise exempted from his cognizance under any other law for the time being in force, the amount or value of the subject matter of which exceeds rupees one lakh but does not exceed rupees five lakhs. (3) The pecuniary jurisdiction of a Junior Civil Judge shall extend to all like suits and proceedings, not otherwise exempted from his cognizance under any other law for the time being in force, the amount or value of the subject matter of which does not exceed rupees one lakh. " ( 4 ) SECTION 2 (ii) and (iii) of the A. P. Civil Courts Laws (Amendment) Act, 1997 whereby S. 5 of the A. P. Civil Courts Act, 1972 has been amended reads thus:" (ii) for section 5, the folowing shall be substituted, namely :- ( 5 ) (1) - The pecuniary jurisdiction of the Chief Judge and an Additional Chief Judge shall be subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the other provisions of this Act, extend to all original suits and proceedings of a civil nature including land acquisition original petitions, the amount or value of the subject matter of which exceeds rupees five lakhs. (2) the pecuniary jurisdiction of a Senior Civil Judge shall extend to all like suits and proceedings of a civil nature including land acquisition original petitions not otherwise exempted from his cognizance under any other law for the time being in force, the amount or value of the subject matter of which exceeds rupees one lakh but does not exceed rupees five lakhs. (3) the pecuniary jurisdiction of a Junior Civil Judge shall extend to all like suits and proceedings not otherwise exempted from his cognizance under any other law for the time being in force, the amount or value of the subject matter of which does not exceed rupees one lakh. (3) the pecuniary jurisdiction of a Junior Civil Judge shall extend to all like suits and proceedings not otherwise exempted from his cognizance under any other law for the time being in force, the amount or value of the subject matter of which does not exceed rupees one lakh. (iii) for Section 16, the following shall be substituted, namely:16 (1) The pecuniary jurisdiction of a District Judge, shall subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the other provisions of this Act, extend to all original suits and proceedings of a Civil nature including Land Acquisition Original Petitions, the amount or value of the subject matter of which exceeds rupees five lakhs. (2) The pecuniary jurisdiction of a Senior Civil Judge shall extend to all like suits and proceedings of a Civil nature including land acquisition original petitions not otherwise exempted from his cognizance under any of the subject matter of which exceeds rupees one lakh but does not exceed rupees five lakhs. (3) The pecuniary jurisdiction of a Junior Civil Judge shall extend to all like suits and proceedings, not otherwise exempted from his cognizance under any other law for the time being in force, the amount of value of the subject matter of which does not exceed rupees one lakh. " ( 5 ) THE said Act has undergone a further amendment by reason of A. P. Civil Courts (Amendment) Act, 2000 (Act No. 28 of 2000) whereby the pecuniary jurisdiction of Senior Civil Judge has been raised from Rs. 5 lakhs to Rs. 10 lakhs. ( 6 ) IN terms of Items 11-A and 13 of List III of the VII Schedule of the Constitution of India- Administration of Justice, Constitution and organisation of Courts and civil procedure including all matters included in the Civil Procedure Code at the commencement of the Constitution may be subject matter of State legislation subject to the provisions of Article 246 of the Constitution of India. Clause (20) of Article 246 reads thus :"notwithstanding anything in clause (3), Parliament, and, subject to clause (1) the Legislature of any State also, have power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the concurrent List ). " ( 7 ) THE legislative competence of the State is not in dispute. " ( 7 ) THE legislative competence of the State is not in dispute. It is also not in dispute that the State has the requisite jurisdiction to amend a statute enacted by it. A legislation, as is well known, cannot be declared unconstitutional only because it causes hardship to some citizens or to a class of citizens. Having regard to the principles of separation of power, the Court will exercise its jurisdiction of judicial review of legislation only when it is violative of Part III or any other provisions of the Constitution and not otherwise. ( 8 ) IN Devi Prasad v. Govt. of A. P. , AIR 1980 SC 1185 : (1980 Lab. IC 708), it has been held at Page 1187 :"in the present case, there may be truth in the case of the appellants that they are hit hard because of the new rule. Dr. Chitale tried to convince us of the hardship that his clients sustain consequent on this rule and weightage conferred thereby. But mere hardship without anything arbitrary in the rule does not call for judicial intervention, especially when it flows out of a policy which is not basically illegal. " ( 9 ) DOES a statutory provision limiting the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court violates Article 14 or 21 of the Constitution of India. The answer to the said question must be rendered in negative. Ubi jus ibi remedium is a well known jurisprudential principle. But it is equally well settled that whereas a litigant has a remedy to ventilate his grievances before a Court of Tribunal if he has any cause of action but he does not have any choice of forum. The forum for adjudication of the rights of a citizen undoubtedly would be within the legislative competence of the State. ( 10 ) THE court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not entitled to question the legislative wisdom nor the legislative policy laid down in a statute. Article 39a of the Consitution of India or the provisions of Legal Services Authority Act, 1987 cannot have any application whatsoever as regards the enactments limiting pecuniary jurisdiction of the Courts. The State should strive to facilitate the object of making justice accessible to all as provided for under Article 39a of the Constitution of India. Article 39a of the Consitution of India or the provisions of Legal Services Authority Act, 1987 cannot have any application whatsoever as regards the enactments limiting pecuniary jurisdiction of the Courts. The State should strive to facilitate the object of making justice accessible to all as provided for under Article 39a of the Constitution of India. But that does not mean that Courts having all jurisdiction and particularly the Courts having unlimited pecuniary jurisdiction should be constituted at every nook and corner of the society. Even where a provision has been made for holding Benches of the High Court or Supreme Court as for example Article 130 of the Constitution of India the same merely being an enabling one, no Court can give direction to the Chief Justice of India or the President of india as regard thereto. In Union of India v. S. P. Anand, AIR 1998 SC 2615 , wherein it has been held at Pages 2618 - 2619 :"13. We may now examine whether an arguable issue can be said to have been raised in the Writ Petition. After pursuing the Writ Petition, we are constrained to say that it suffers from the same defects as were pointed out by this Court in S. P. Anand, Indore v. H. D. Deve Gowda, (1996) 6 SCC 734 : 1997 AIR SCW 18 : ( AIR 1997 SC 272 ) which arose out of a writ petition filed by petitioner No. 1 herein, under Article 32 of the Constitution. In that case, this Court has observed :-"we cannot but observe that the averments in the petition are of a rambling nature and lack cohesion. It is regretable that a petition challenging the appointment to the high office of the Prime Minister of this country should have been drafted in such a cavalier fashion betraying lack of study, research and seriousness. The petition abounds in casual and irrelevant averments ranging from cases on freedom of speech to fraternity, from judicial independence to judicial review, from Civil Code to cow slaughter and so on and so forth. "[pp. 739, 740] (of SCC) : (at p. 22 of AIR SCW): ( 15 ) ARTICLE 130 of the Constitution reads as follows :-"130. The petition abounds in casual and irrelevant averments ranging from cases on freedom of speech to fraternity, from judicial independence to judicial review, from Civil Code to cow slaughter and so on and so forth. "[pp. 739, 740] (of SCC) : (at p. 22 of AIR SCW): ( 15 ) ARTICLE 130 of the Constitution reads as follows :-"130. Seat of Supreme Court - The Supreme Court shall sit in Delhi or in such other place or places, as the Chief Justice of India may, with the apapproval of the President, from time to time, appoint. "the submission of the petitioners is that under Article 130 a mandatory duty has been cast on the Chief Justice of India to appoint a place or places other than Delhi in various parts of the country for the seat of the Supreme Court and that failure on the part of the Chief Justice of India to carry out this mandatory duty can be enforced by seeking appropriate direction from the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. It has been urged that the said power conferred on the Chief Justice of India under Article 130 is justiciable and is subject to judicial review by the Courts. Reliance has been placed on the observations in the majority judgment of Verma J. [as the learned Chief Justice then was ] and in the concurring judgment of Pandian J. made in the context of Article 216 of the Constitution in Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association v. Union of India, (1993) 4 SCC 441 : (1993 AIR SCW 4101 ). It has been submitted that language used in Article 216 of the Constitution is very similar to that used in Article 130 and the said observations are, therefore, applicable in the present case. This contention, in our opinion, is without substance. Article 130 makes provision for seat of the Supreme Court and lays down that the Supreme Court shall sit in Delhi or in such other place or places, as the Chief Justice of India may, with the approval of the President, from time to time, appoint. It is in the nature of an enabling provision which empowers the Chief Justice of India, with the approval of the President, to appoint place or places other than Delhi as the seat of the Supreme Court. It is in the nature of an enabling provision which empowers the Chief Justice of India, with the approval of the President, to appoint place or places other than Delhi as the seat of the Supreme Court. Article 130 cannot be construed as casting a mandatory obligation on the Chief Justice of India to appoint place or places other than Delhi as seat of the Supreme Court. The question as to whether Supreme Court should sit at a place other than Delhi involves taking a policy decision by the Chief Justice of India which must receive the approval of the President of India. If after taking into consideration the relevant factors the Chief Justice of India forms an opinion that the Supreme Court should sit at a particular place or places other than Delhi, he has to seek the approval of the President for the proposal and, if the President approves the proposal, an order appointing the place or places where the Supreme Court shall sit is passed. Exercise of the power under Article 130 thus postulates (i) a decision by the Chief Justice of India as to whether the Supreme Court should sit at a particular place or places other than Delhi; and (ii) approval of the President to the proposal made by the Chief Justice of India for appointing the particular place or places for the sitting of the Supreme Court. Thus making of an order under Article 130 of the Constitution providing for sitting of the Supreme Court at a place other than Delhi requires in the first place a decision by the Chief Justice of India in that regard and thereafter the approval of the proposal of the Chief Justice of India by the President on the advice of the Council of Ministers. No Court can give a direction either to the Chief Justice of India or the President to exercise the power conferred under Article 130 and to pass an order appointing Indore and/or any other place or places in India as the seat/seats for the sitting of the Supreme Court as sought by the petitioners in the Writ Petition. " ( 11 ) FURTHERMORE, as indicated herein before even the jurisdiction of a Civil Court can be taken away expressly or by necessary implication under a statute. " ( 11 ) FURTHERMORE, as indicated herein before even the jurisdiction of a Civil Court can be taken away expressly or by necessary implication under a statute. ( 12 ) IN N I Insurance Company v. Shanti Misra, AIR 1976 SC 237 , the Apex Court while considering the provisions of S. 110-A and 110-F inserted in the Motor Vehicles Act by reason of Act No. 100 of 1956 held :"on the plain language of Ss. 110a and 110f there should be no difficulty in taking the view that the change in law was merely a change of forum i. e. , a change of adjectival or procedural law and not of substantive law. It is a well established proposition that such a change of law operates retrospectively and the person has to go to the new forum even if his cause of action or right of action accrued prior to the chage of forum. He will have a vested right of action but not a vested right of forum. If by express words the new forum is made available only to causes of action arising after the creation of the forum, then the retrospective operation of the law is taken away. Otherwise the general rule is to make it retrospective. " (Underlining is ours for emphasis) ( 13 ) CHANGE of forum being a procedural law, thereby no substantive right has been taken away far less any right of life and liberty as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. ( 14 ) FOR the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in these applications which are accordingly dismissed. But in the facts and circumstances of this case there is no order as to costs. Application dismissed.