JUDGMENT 1. - This criminal revision petition was filed by two accused-petitioners-Rambalirajgar and Kamla Prasad to quash the charges framed against them for offences under section 302 r/w Section 120-B IPC. It may be stated that Rambalirajgar has expired and it is admitted position by both the parties, therefore, no order is required to be passed on his petition. However, I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner-Kamla Prasad and learned counsel for the C.B.I. 2. Briefly stated, on the basis of a parcha Bayan of Govind Ram dated 6.7.1979, a case under section 307 IPC was registered at Police Station Gandhi Nagar, Jaipur. This Parcha Bayan stated that Govind Ram was a Chowkidar and was on duty from 6.00 p.m. to 12 O'clock in the night. At about 9.00 p.m. he heard noise of some 4 or 5 fires from the side of Takhte Shahi Road, Jaipur. Then he saw a crowd of labourers near the building of Reserve Bank of India which was under construction. He did not go there. However, police came then he went and found that a person was lying in injured condition. The injured person was lying unconscious due to the injuries caused by fires. He was S.N. Das Gupta, an officer of the Customs Department. The person who was injured later on died. It was the C.B.I. who investigated the case and submitted challan. Accused-petitioner was charged under section 302 with the aid of Section 120 B IPC by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jaipur District, Jaipur by order dated 17.8.1995 and the order was challenged by this revision petition. 3. Learned counsel for petitioner-Kamla Prasad submitted that originally charge-sheet was not filed against the petitioner and that this petitioner has been charged on the basis of a confessional statement of co-accused recorded by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, S.P.E. Cases, Jaipur named Sarabjeet Singh. Learned counsel submitted that there is no evidence of conspiracy that the accused-petitioner could not have been charged on the basis of statement of co-accused and that the petitioner may be discharged. 4. On the other hand, learned counsel for C.B.I. submitted that charge could be framed on the basis of statement of Sarabjeet Singh as he inculpated himself and that the prosecution has examined 17 witnesses in this case and now the petition should be dismissed. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. 4. On the other hand, learned counsel for C.B.I. submitted that charge could be framed on the basis of statement of Sarabjeet Singh as he inculpated himself and that the prosecution has examined 17 witnesses in this case and now the petition should be dismissed. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. Rathore cited State of U.P. v. Sukhbasi & Ors., AIR 1985 SC 1224 to show as to what type of evidence should be there to make out an offence under section 120-B IPC. In this citation, it has been held to substantiate a charge u /s. 120-B of the Indian Pedal Code, there must be a criminal conspiracy at least between two or more persons. He also drew my attention to Section 10 of the Evidence Act which provides that where there is reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons have conspired together to commit an offence or an actionable wrong, anything said, done or written by any one of such persons in reference to their common intention, after the time when such intention was first entertained by any one of them, is a relevant fact as against each of the persons believed to so conspiring, as well for the purpose of proving the existence of the conspiracy as for the purpose of showing that any such person was a party to it. Mr. Rathore submitted that there was no such evidence in this case and there was only the statement of co-accused-Sarabjeet Singh in which in reply to question No. 60, he stated as follows : " fueZy us gesa dgk gS fd mn;jkt HkS;k tsy esa cUn gks x;s vkSj vHkh ih0th0 vLirky esa HkrhZ gks x;s vkSj mn;jkt us deyk izlkn o cYyh mQZ cfy;k dks dg fn;k gS fd og gesa ,d yk[k :i;k nsxkA fQj dgk fd deyk izlkn o cYyh mQZ vfy;k nksuksa ,d&,d yk[k :i;k gesa nsxsA vkSj fueZy us dgk fd og nks yk[k :i;k eq>s fey x;k gs vkSj viuh ikWapksa feydj nks xkM+h [kjhnsxsa vkSj V~kUliksVZ dk /kU/kk djsaxsA " 6. According to Mr. Rathore, statement of co-accused cannot be read against the petitioner on the basis of which charge has been framed. He submitted that it is the only evidence. According to Mr. Rathore, statement of co-accused cannot be read against the petitioner on the basis of which charge has been framed. He submitted that it is the only evidence. He cited Nagar Mal v. State of Rajasthan, 1993 Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 175 in which it was observed that the confession of the co-accused can be considered against the other accused, but it is not an evidence on the basis of which either a charge can be framed, or a conviction can be sustained. He also relied on Haricharan Kurmi & Anr. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1964 SC 1184 in which probative value of a confessional statement of co-accused as well as its use to be made in joint trial was considered in view of Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act. It was observed that as a result of provisions contained in Section 30 of the Evidence Act, the confession of a co-accused has to be regarded as amounting to evidence in a general way, because whatever is considered by the Court is evidence; circumstances which are considered by the Court as well as probabilities do amount to evidence in that generic sense. Thus, though confession may be regarded as evidence in that generic sense because of the provisions of Section 30, the fact remains that it is not evidence as defined by Section 3 of the Evidence Act. The result, therefore, is that in dealing with a case against an accused person, the Court cannot start with the confession of a co-accused person, it must begin with other evidence adduced by the prosecution and after it has formed its opinion with regard to the quality and effect of the said evidence, then it is permissible to tan to the confession in order to receive assurance to the conclusion of guilt which the judicial mind is about to reach on the said other evidence. It was further observed that the confession of a co-accused person cannot be treated as substantive evidence and can be pressed into service only when the Court is inclined to accept other evidence and feels the necessity of seeking for an assurance in support of its conclusion deducible from the said evidence. 7. Mr. It was further observed that the confession of a co-accused person cannot be treated as substantive evidence and can be pressed into service only when the Court is inclined to accept other evidence and feels the necessity of seeking for an assurance in support of its conclusion deducible from the said evidence. 7. Mr. Rathore also cited State of Madhya Pradesh v. Mohan Lal Soni, AIR 2000 SC 2583 and submitted that trauma of trial is very painful and the trial Court should not have framed charge against the accused-petitioner as there is no iota of evidence against him. In Kamal Kishore v. State (Delhi Administration), (1972) 2 Crimes 169 (Delhi) which has also been relied in which it was observed that the statement of the accused leading to the discovery, or the informatory statement amounting to confession of the accused, cannot be used against the co-accused with the aid of Section 30 of the Evidence Act. 8. On the other hand, learned counsel for cited Shyam Sunder us. State of Rajasthan,1998 Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 297 in which it was observed that when some witnesses of the prosecution have been examined, charge should not be interfered with. I find from the file that a stay application was also filed by the petitioner but no stay was granted and record was called and in the meantime the witnesses were examined by the trial Court. In such circumstances, the citation relied by the learned counsel for C.B.I. would not be of any use to the prosecution to pass an order that since some witnesses have been examined by the prosecution, the charge should not be interfered with. 9. Mr. N.C. Chowdhary also cited Naresh J. Sukhawani v. Union of India, AIR 1996 SC 522 in which statement which was recorded by the customs official and it was held that it was not a statement recorded under section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, therefore, it was held to be a material piece of evidence and could be used against co-accused. In the case in hand, the statement of co-accused has been recorded under section 164 Cr.P.C. and cannot be regarded as a statement regarded in the said citation. In the case in hand, the statement of co-accused has been recorded under section 164 Cr.P.C. and cannot be regarded as a statement regarded in the said citation. He also relied on Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 119 in which it was held that confession or admission was admissible against maker unless excluded by some provision of law but not in the manner in which it was made in the present case. The citation is not applicable to facts of the present case at all. 10. The settled position is that statement of one co-accused cannot be read against other. I find from the record that there is no other evidence against petitioner-Kamla Prasad to involve him in this case. It is also found that first of all charge-sheet was filed against some other persons but investigation was kept pending against the petitioner and after statement of co-accused-Sarabjeet Singh was recorded under section 164 Cr.P.C., petitioner-Kamla Prasad was challaned by the prosecution. 11. In these circumstances, when there is no other evidence against the petitioner except the only evidence of co-accused (statement of co-accused) on the basis of which charge could have been framed, the charge framed against the petitioner should be quashed. 12. Consequently the revision petition is hereby allowed and the charge qua petitioner-Kamla Prasad is hereby quashed.Revision petition allowed. *******