Per Gandhi J (Oral): 1. This Letters Patent Appeal has been directed against the judgment dated September 1st, 1999 whereby SWP No. 927/98, seeking to quash the termination order of the appellant, has been dismissed by the learned Single Judge. 2. A few facts necessary for the disposal of the appeal are that the appellant was working as Staff Graduate Nurse in the Sher-i-Kashmir Institute of Medical Sciences, Soura, Srinagar (herein after referred to as "the Institute") on 16-02-1991 she submitted an application for sanction of 15 days earned leave in her favour and without the leave having been sanctioned, she proceeded on leave. She extended the leave on the ground that she was ailing and shall report for duty after she is certified by the Doctor to be fit to resume the duty. The respondent proceeded against her being absent from duty. Her services came to be terminated vide order dated 31st January 1995. She challenged the legality and validity of the termination order by means of SWP No. 252/95. The court vide judgment dated: 07-07-1997, while allowing the writ petition, quashed the termination order reserving liberty with the respondents to conduct fresh enquiry against the appellant for her alleged unauthorised absence with effect from 21st February 1991 to 8th December 1994. This order was challenged by means of LPA No. 291/97. The Letters Patent Bench while rejecting the appeal vide its order dated 24th October 1997 directed that the appellant be allowed to join her duties and in case the management of the Institute decides to initiate disciplinary proceedings against her they shall do so in accordance with law and complete it within a period of six months. 3. Pursuant to the direction of the court, the appellant was allowed to join her duties with effect from 22nd December 1997. The Enquiry Committee came to be constituted. The charge sheet was drawn up on l0th February 1998 by the Director of the Institute and served upon the appellant. The charge sheet has been replied through counsel by the appellant on 24th January 1998 demanding fresh charge sheet and the statement of allegations whereupon the charge was based. After holding the enquiry, the report of the Enquiry Committee has been served on the appellant and post enquiry notice also stood served. The post enquiry notice was challenged by means of SWP No. 328/98. After holding the enquiry, the report of the Enquiry Committee has been served on the appellant and post enquiry notice also stood served. The post enquiry notice was challenged by means of SWP No. 328/98. Respondents served another post enquiry notice which also came to be challenged by means of SWP No. 647/98. Both these writ petitions have been dismissed. The appellant has filed reply to the show cause notice served by the respondents for proposed penalty as to why the appellant be not removed from service. After completing the enquiry the respondents have terminated the service of the appellant vide order dated 22nd April, 1998. 4. The termination order was challenged by means of SWP No. 927/98 which has been disposed of by the learned Single Judge upholding the enquiry and the termination order. 5. Aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge, the appellant has questioned the validity and legality of the order on the grounds that:- i) the appellant was not served with the statement of allegations in terms of Rule 33 of the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules 1956; ii) the documents on which reliance has been placed to substantiate the charge have not been supplied to the appellant; iii) the services of a lawyer have not been made available to the appellant despite demand; and iv) the procedure prescribed by law for holding enquiry has not been fairly adopted by the respondents. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 7. The contention of Mr. Haqani, learned counsel representing the appellant is that the statement of allegations has not been served upon the appellant in terms of the mandate contained in Rule 33 of the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules of 1956). Thus it has prejudiced her right. Before dilating upon this proposition it is to be seen as to what is the charge against the appellant. The appellant absented from duty for a period of 04 years and was aware of the fact that the concerned respondent in the charge sheet has conveyed to her that she is absent from 21st February, 1991 to 8th December, 1994. This is a simple charge against the appellant. The appellant absented from duty for a period of 04 years and was aware of the fact that the concerned respondent in the charge sheet has conveyed to her that she is absent from 21st February, 1991 to 8th December, 1994. This is a simple charge against the appellant. The requirement of the law in terms of the mandate of Rule 33 of the Rules of 1956 is that the delinquent official is required to be informed in writing of the grounds on which it is proposed to take action and to afford an adequate opportunity of defending himself. The submission of Mr. Haqani is that the respondents were bound to frame a charge in a particular form. It is also his submission that the charge sheet should have been accompanied by imputations of charge which has not been done by the respondents and thereby the appellants rights have been prejudiced. In support of his contention, he has relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in case State of U.P. Vs. Singhara Singh (AIR 1964 SC 358) particularly laying stress upon para 8 of the judgment wherein it is provided that it is obligatory upon respondents to act in the manner law provides, otherwise it will frustrate the purpose of the enactment. By means of charge sheet what was required to be conveyed in this particular case is that the appellant has to explain her conduct with regard to her absence for a particular period. It is not denied that the charge sheet must contain the imputations of the charges. The imputations of the charge upon which the charge has been framed is only that the appellant was absent from 21st February 1991 to 8th December 1994. The charge is not that ambiguous which needs elaborate imputations of charge for framing a definite charge. In this case, particularly the charge itself is simple, definite and specific what is the requirement of Rule 33 of the Rub of 1956 is that the delinquent officer is required to be informed about the accusations against in which he has to rebut. It is not the form, but the substance of the allegations which was to be conveyed and served upon the appellant. The respondents, accordingly, in the charge sheet have conveyed to the appellant to explain her conduct with regard to her absence. It is not the form, but the substance of the allegations which was to be conveyed and served upon the appellant. The respondents, accordingly, in the charge sheet have conveyed to the appellant to explain her conduct with regard to her absence. Therefore, the substance of the charge has been conveyed and we do not feel that if the charge is not framed and conveyed in a particular form it will prejudice the rights of the appellant. 8. The next contention of Mr. Haqani is that appellants right is also prejudiced to defend herself because the documents on the basis of which the charge was framed has not been supplied to the appellant which amounts to denial of an opportunity of being heard and breach of principles of natural justice. In support of this contention he has relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in S.L. Kapoor vs. Jagmohan 1980 (4) SCO 379 and Mafatlal Barot Vs. Divl. Controller, State Transport Mehsana AIR 1966 SC 1364. To appreciate this contention of Mr. Haqani, we have to appreciate that what are the documents which have not been supplied to the appellant whereby her right has been prejudiced. His submission is that the respondents stand is that the application of the appellant for sanction of earned leave has not been accepted. Leave has been refused and communicated through telegram to the appellant. Copy of this telegram has not been made available to the appellant which prejudiced her right. Therefore, the appellant was not in a position to defend her case. Assuming that copy of the telegram which according to the respondents was posted to the appellant has not been made available, yet it cannot be denied and is borne out from the record and the pleadings that in the charge sheet it has specifically been stated that the leave applied for has been refused. Assuming this document was supplied, it is not understandable how that would have improved the case of the appellant. We are not convinced on this score also that if the communication whereby the leave has been refused is not supplied, under such circumstances attending to this case, it will materially cause any prejudice to the case of the appellant or it could be termed as breach of the principles of natural justice. 9. We are not convinced on this score also that if the communication whereby the leave has been refused is not supplied, under such circumstances attending to this case, it will materially cause any prejudice to the case of the appellant or it could be termed as breach of the principles of natural justice. 9. So far as the plea with regard to the permission for the services of a lawyer to the appellant is concerned Mr. Magrey representing the respondents has stated that the appellant has not made any such request. Mr. Haqani has drawn the attention of the court on the counter affidavit filed by the respondents which indicates that the respondents in the reply affidavit recorded that her request was considered and rejected. What is required to be seen here is that if the appellant has not been granted permission to avail herself of the services of a lawyer in the currency of the enquiry proceedings, does it amount to denial of an opportunity of being heard but and breach of the principles of natural justice? In support of his contention Mr. Haqani has relied on the judgment, Board of Trustees Port of Bombay Vs. Dilip Kumar 1983 Labour Industrial Cases Vol. 16,419. It cannot be denied on fact that the appellant has taken a stand for her unauthorised absence that she could not attend the duties being suffering from ailment. The respondents have written two letters to the appellant during the course of the enquiry on 18-02-1998 requesting her to present before the Enquiry Committee on the scheduled date along with all documentary evidence, if any, in support of her claim. The other letter dated 21st February, 1998 was also sent to the appellant requesting her to produce medical evidence, if any, before the Committee otherwise it shall be presumed that the appellant has nothing to substantiate the charge and the claim shall be treated as baseless. Despite that no evidence was placed on record by the appellant. Let us recall here that this is a case where the appellant has not at all produced any evidence with regard to her ailment despite the fact that the simple charge against her was to explain her conduct with regard to absence which according to the appellant was due to her ailment. Let us recall here that this is a case where the appellant has not at all produced any evidence with regard to her ailment despite the fact that the simple charge against her was to explain her conduct with regard to absence which according to the appellant was due to her ailment. Assuming the services of the lawyer would have been provided to her, it is not understandable as to how the appellant would have improved her case. The proposition of law cited at the Bar is not disputed, but again the question is that the appellant has not taken the trouble to substantiate claim of her ailment, therefore, the services of the lawyer would not have improved her case and in such circumstances it cannot be said that opportunity of being heard has been denied or principles of natural justice breached. 10. Another plea of Mr. Haqani is that the procedure prescribed for holding enquiry has not been followed. We have gone through the judgment of the learned Single Judge who has recorded a finding in the course of the judgment that there is no breach of the statutory procedure contained in Rules 33 and 34 of the Rules of 1956, which deals with and prescribed procedure for holding enquiry. It has not been specifically stated as to how the procedure has not been followed. The observance of the procedure has been disputed on the ground that the respondents have not supplied the documents and framed the proper charge. We, therefore, could not find out that there is any breach in following the procedure for conducting the enquiry. 11. His another argument is that the report has been submitted by the Enquiry Committee vide letter dated: 11-03-1998 which has been annexed as annexure B with the writ petition whereas annexure ˜D™ annexed with the writ petition also reveals that this report has been j sent on 20th March, 1998. Pointing out this, his submission is that the enquiry report is pre-dated j and that the appellant approached the respondents on 20th March, 1998 and she was told that j the enquiry is complete. As a result the appellant could not place before the enquiry committee the material evidence. Pointing out this, his submission is that the enquiry report is pre-dated j and that the appellant approached the respondents on 20th March, 1998 and she was told that j the enquiry is complete. As a result the appellant could not place before the enquiry committee the material evidence. Assuming this is the situation, an offer has been extended to the appellant in the court if the appellant is in possession of any evidence of her ailment, she is at liberty to place it before the court, taking the court into confidence that the appellant was really ailing. Learned counsel for the appellant could not do so. It is, therefore, immaterial whether the report is forwarded on 11th or 20th March, 1998. 12. The last argument of learned counsel for the appellant is that the punishment awarded is disproportionate to the misconduct and reliance has been placed by him on the fact that in the same Institute the other employees alike the appellant, they have been imposed lesser punishment. These employees are not parties in the writ petition. It is for the respondents to appreciate what should be the quantum of the punishment in a particular case where on the basis of the enquiry punishment has been awarded. It is settled proposition of law that the court cannot sit in appeal over any proceedings of enquiry. Notwithstanding that, it is still required to be seen as to whether penalty imposed is disproportionate. It depends upon the facts of the case. Herein the appellant applied for earned leave by submitting an application. She did not wait for its sanction. She treated it as sanctioned or in the alternative it can be said that she abandoned the service without waiting for sanction of the leave. The appellant is working in Medical Institute as Staff Graduate Nurse where such staff is required on emergency basis. Earned leave cannot be claimed as a matter of right. Employer is within his rights even to refuse leave. The leave application put by the appellant on the first instance is not on account of ailment. Extension of leave was sought on the ground of ailment. The public servant cannot assume that once the application is presented it stood sanctioned. If the public servant behaves in such a manner it amounts to abandonment of the service on the part of the public servant. 13. Extension of leave was sought on the ground of ailment. The public servant cannot assume that once the application is presented it stood sanctioned. If the public servant behaves in such a manner it amounts to abandonment of the service on the part of the public servant. 13. It is also to be seemed that what prevented the appellant from resuming the duty. The appellants stand is that she was suffering from ailment. After the charge was framed, to meet it during enquiry or even before us, not an iota of evidence has been placed on record by the appellant to substantiate her claim. It appears that this claim of the appellant was totally false. Had there been any truth, it is unexpected that the appellant would have with-held the said evidence. It is expected that the appellant would have brought it before the Enquiry Officer for appreciation, to exhibit and establish her stand. In such circumstances we do not feel that the punishment awarded is disproportionate. 14. On the cumulative effect of all the facts and law discussed above, we could not find any reason or sustainable ground to interfere with the judgment of the Learned Single Judge. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed.