JUDGMENT M.R. Verma, J. (Oral):-This Regular Second Appeal has been preferred by appellant -defendant against the judgment and decree dated 7.4.1997 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Solan in Civil Appeal No. 51-NS/13 of 1994/1993 whereby the judgment and decree passed by the learned counsel Sub Judge 1st Class, Kandaghat has been set aside on the basis of a compromise. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the records. 3. This appeal has been admitted for hearing on the following substantial questions of law : (1) Whether the proceedings taken before the Lok Adalat wherein all the parties to the dispute did not agree make the statement nor shown their willingness and consent to the statement made by either parties to the proceedings be held binding on all the parties to the said appeal ? (2) Whether the compromise between few of the parties who have no right, title or interest in the property in which the compromise was entered into could be held to be binding on the defendant - appellant divesting him from the title to the property without his consent and his having entered into the compromise with respect to the said property? (3) Whether the learned Lower appellate Court has illegally held the compromise to be binding on defendant - appellant when neither the compromise was in conformity with provisions of order 23 rule 3 CPC nor the. application made by the plaintiff- respondent conform to the said provisions? (4) Whether the compromise was apparently void for want of consent of the defendant - appellant when he specifically disputed the proceedings before the Lok Adalat, whether it was incumbent for the court to have enquired the allegations made by the defendant-appellant by holding regular enquiry before proceeding to record the compromise?" 4. In fact all the aforesaid questions in totality amount to a single question: "Whether the compromise which was entered into between the parties was in conformity with the relevant provisions of law and could be acted upon to pass the impugned decree?" 5. There is no dispute that on 27.9.1996, the appeal in which the impugned decree has been passed was identified for conciliation and was listed conciliation on6.11.1995 in the lower appellate Court. There is no dispute that on 27.9.1996, the appeal in which the impugned decree has been passed was identified for conciliation and was listed conciliation on6.11.1995 in the lower appellate Court. On 6.11.1995, the lower appellate Court observed that the parties have agreed to settle their dispute and ordered the matter to be listed on 21.12.1995. As per the zimini order dated 21.12.1995, it appears that the parties had not arrived at a final settlement by way of compromise, therefore, time was prayed for and was allowed till 7.3.1996. As per the contents of zimini order dated 7.3.1996, the Court was informed that the compromise has been effected. However, the Court did not proceed to record the compromise as might have been effected between the parties but instead, directed the matter to be placed before the Lok Adalat is not known as the record thereof has not been maintained. However, zimini order dated 16.3.1996 of the lower appellate Court reads as follows: 16.3.1995 File taken from the Lok Adalat Present: Sh. Shankar Dass plaintiff appellant in person with counsel Sh. B.S.Mehta, Advocate. Respondent No. 1 Gurditta Mai, respondent No. 3 Kala Ram and respondent No. 4 Krishan Swaroop in person with counsel Sh. O.P. Moudgill, Advocate. Statement of plaintiff - appellant Shankar Dass and respondents Kala Ram and Krishan Swaroop recorded before Lok Adalat. As per their statements they have amicably settled down their dispute. The respondents as pertheir joint statements have agreed to give 150 meters land i.e. 15X10 meters in front of the house which is and half meters away from the house and the above said land shall be given to the appellant in lieu of his share in the property. The statement of Sh. Shankar Dass also separately recorded and placed on record vide which he has stated that he has heard and understood the joint statement of the respondents which is correct. Thus, the parties have finally settled down their dispute except tatima is to be got prepared for which purpose the appellant seeks reasonable time. Accordingly, the case is taken from lok Adalat. It be fixed in court on 20.4.1996 for production of tatima. The parties are directed to be present on the date fixed. Sd/ Addl. District Judge, Solan District at Solan. 6. Accordingly, the case is taken from lok Adalat. It be fixed in court on 20.4.1996 for production of tatima. The parties are directed to be present on the date fixed. Sd/ Addl. District Judge, Solan District at Solan. 6. Before listing of the matter in the Court on 20.4.1996, the appellant -defendant on 16.4.1996 moved an application before the learned additional District Judge averring therein that a compromise had allegedly been made between the parties on the day of Lok Adalat but he was not a party to the alleged compromise, therefore, prayed for decision of the appeal on merits. 7. On 5.5.1996, respondent Shankar Dass filed an application before the lower appellate Court under order 23 rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereafter referred to as the Code) cum reply to the application filed by the appellant - defendant claiming therein that a lawful compromise has been entered into between the parties and has been signed by them and their counsel. Therefore, i.e. application moved by the appellant defendant is devoid of any merit and he is bound by the terms of the compromise. 8. The appellant - defendant contested the said application cum reply and filed reply cum rejoinder denying thereby that he ever agreed to compromise the matter by giving the land as alleged and that he is a very old person aged about 97 years and is of frail health having difficulty in hearing. It is further claimed that he was never told about the compromise and he had refused to sign any paper and declined to take part in any compromise between the parties. He had, thus, denied the existence of any lawful compromise having been arrived at between the parties. 9. The lower appellate Court after hearing the parties held that the claim in the suit had been adjusted by lawful agreement/compromise before the Lok Adalat on 16.3.1996 and accordingly passed the impugned judgment and decree. 10. Rule 3 of Order 23 of the Code reads as follows: "3. 9. The lower appellate Court after hearing the parties held that the claim in the suit had been adjusted by lawful agreement/compromise before the Lok Adalat on 16.3.1996 and accordingly passed the impugned judgment and decree. 10. Rule 3 of Order 23 of the Code reads as follows: "3. Compromise of suit.- Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise, in writing and signed by the parties or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to the parties to the suit whether or not the subject matter of the agreement, compromise of satisfaction is the same as the subject matter of the suit: Provided that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the Court shall decide the question but no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding the question, unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to grant such adjournment. Explanation.- An agreement or compromise which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this rule." 11. It is evident from a bare reading of the above quoted rule that even in a case where there is an agreement/compromise to adjust the suit, the Court can act on it where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the suit has been adjusted wholly or in part. Thus, before acting on the agreement/compromise, the Court must be satisfied that the suit has been lawfully adjusted wholly or in part, it is further clear from the proviso to the rule that where one party claims that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at but it is denied by the other party and claims that no such adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the Court shall decide the question. Thus, in either case, the rule enjoins a duty on the Court to inquire whether the compromise has lawfully been arrived at or not. Thus, in either case, the rule enjoins a duty on the Court to inquire whether the compromise has lawfully been arrived at or not. Therefore, the Court is expected 16 apply its judicial mind while examining the terms of the compromise allegedly arrived at between the parties and where such compromise is alleged by one party and denied by the other, the Court has to decide the question be holding an inquiry which necessarily implies that parties have to be afforded an opportunity to prove their rival claims. It cannot be lost sight of that rule 3 A Order 23 of the Code bars institution of a suit to set aside the decree passed on a compromise on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful. Therefore, it follows that since the parties have no remedy of suit against such a decree, therefore, ambit and scope of an inquiry should not be narrow but the inquiry must be comprehensive enough as may be warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case so that any injustice is avoided. 12. In the case on hand , the appellant - defendant has denied to be a party to the alleged compromise whereas the respondent No.1 claims that the alleged compromise has been arrived at between the parties lawfully and with the consent of the parties. The learned Additional District Judge, without calling upon the parties to substantiate their rival claims, proceeded to dispose of the controversy only on the basis of the averments as made in the application/reply and the oral submissions made by the learned counsel representing the parties. 13. Without expressing any considered opinion on merits for want of any opportunity having been afforded to the parties to prove and disprove the compromise, it may be pointed out that the consistent claim of the appellant - defendant is that he was not a party to the compromise and that he was never informed of the compromise and had refused to sign any paper and declined to take part in any compromise between the parties. These allegations evidently required an inquiry into the question whether the compromise has in fact been lawfully arrived at or not. These allegations evidently required an inquiry into the question whether the compromise has in fact been lawfully arrived at or not. It is more so because of the allegations of the appellant defendant, namely Gurditta Mal (since deceased and represented by his legal representative) that at the material time he was an old person of about 97 years having frail health and difficulty in hearing. There are circumstances which prima facie lend support to the claim of the appellant - defendant that the deceased appellant defendant was not a party to the compromise. The case was adjourned for arriving at the compromise vide order dated 6.11.1995 and was listed on 21.12.1995 when further time was prayed for compromise and the case was ordered to be listed on 7.3.1996. On that date, the learned Additional District Judge, vide order dated 7.3.1996, observed that the parties had effected compromise. However, the record does not show that any written compromise was filed on that date nor any compromise was reduced into writing by the Court below when it was informed of the compromise having been effected instead, the Court directed that the matter be listed before the Lok Adalat. In case any settlement had been arrived at between the parties, evidently there was no need to refer the matter to the Lok Adalat. What happened before the Lok adalat is not known as the record thereof has not been maintained. However, it appears from the order dated 16.3.1996 that statements of Shankar Dass, Kale Ram and Krishan Swaroop were recorded before the Lok Adalat. It is specifically mentioned in the order dated 17.3.1996 that "as per their statements they have amicably settled down their dispute. Thus, even the order dated 16.3.1996 discloses that Lok Adalat recorded the statements of Shankar Dass, Kalo Ram and Krishan Swaroop and as per their statements, they have amicably settled the dispute. The order does not mention that any statement of Gurditta Mal who was present, was recorded and if not, why it was not recorded when he was present. Nor the order disclose that he has also settled the dispute by being a party to the compromise. The order does not mention that any statement of Gurditta Mal who was present, was recorded and if not, why it was not recorded when he was present. Nor the order disclose that he has also settled the dispute by being a party to the compromise. It may be pointed out that said Kale Ram and Krishan Swaroop, by virtue of a gift deed executed by Gurditta Mal, prima facie had no right, title or interest in the land agreed to be transferred by the alleged compromise, a perusal of the record further reveals that joint statements of Kale Ram and Krishan Swaroop had been recorded whereby they and he had accepted that offer. The tone and t nor of the said joint statement of Kale Ram and Krishan Swaroop is that whatever they have agreed to do, was their personal obligation. 14. It was contended by the learned counsel for respondent No. 1 that since the joint statement of kale Ram and Krishan Swaroop is signed by the counsel for all the defendants including the appellant - defendant Gurditta Mal, now deceased, therefore, by necessary implications, said Gurditta Mal and his legal representatives are bound by the compromise and, therefore, the decree has rightly been passed by the earned Additional District Judge on the basis of the compromise. 15. Whatever has been reduced into writing, are the statements of kale Ram, Krishan Swaroop and Shankar Dass. At the bottom, these statements purport to have been signed by the advocates representing the parties, therefore, the signatures of the advocates, at the most, can be taken to have authenticated these statements having been made by the makers and no inference can be drawn from their mere signing at the bottom of the statements that they have also made a similar statement on behalf of the other parties represented by them more so in view of the circumstance that statement of Gurditta Mal was not recorded when he was present and prima facie the only man competent to transfer the land agreed to be transferred by Kale Ram and Krishan Swaroop. 16. In the aforesaid circumstances, particularly the want of affording due opportunity to the parties to prove or disprove the compromise, the findings of the learned district Judge that the compromise was lawfully entered into cannot be said to be legal and sustainable. 16. In the aforesaid circumstances, particularly the want of affording due opportunity to the parties to prove or disprove the compromise, the findings of the learned district Judge that the compromise was lawfully entered into cannot be said to be legal and sustainable. Therefore, the impugned judgment and decree cannot be sustained. 17. As a result, this appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and decree are set aside and the appeal is remanded to the lower appellate Court for readmission, with the direction that the learned Additional District Judge shall give an opportunity to the parties to prove/disprove their rival claims regarding the legality an validity of the compromise in question and thereafter proceed to dispose of the appeal in accordance with law. no order as to costs. 18. Parties are directed to appear before the lower appellate Court on 24.9.2001. -