P. V. REDDI, C. J. ( 1 ) THE question that falls for our consideration, in this case, is whether multi-point levy is permissible on the same item of agricultural produce though the fee was collected by the same Marketing Committee on the first transaction of sale. The answer to this question depends on the interpretation of Section 65 of Karnataka Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' ). When the matter came up before V. K. Singhal, J. , the learned Judge felt it necessary to have an authoritative pronouncement from the Full Bench. The learned Judge apparently felt that there is a conflict between two division Bench decisions of this Court viz. , Rajasekhariah v Tiptur Agricultural produce Market Committee and Another and Sri Gangadhara rice Mills v State of Karnataka and Another. In the first case it was held that there cannot be levy on every successive sale of the same agricultural produce in the same market area. In the second case, it was held that market fee could be levied once at the stage of paddy and later at the stage when the same paddy is converted into rice. In the case on hand, there was no such conversion of agricultural produce into different form. Hence, there is no conflict between the two decisions where there is none. When the decision in Rajasekhariah's case, supra, was not doubted, the learned Single Judge ought to have followed that decision and disposed of the writ petition. However, as the matter has already been referred to the Full Bench on the papers being placed before the learned Chief Justice, we consider it proper to decide the question, more so when the learned Counsel, taking advantage of this reference to Full bench, has questioned the correctness of decision in Rajasekhariah's case, supra. ( 2 ) COMING to the facts of the case, the writ petitioner, which is a trading firm having its business place in the notified market area of puttur in Mangalore District, purchased raw cashewnut and pepper from the agriculturists-sellers during the year 1992-93 and paid market fee at one per cent as the buyer of the said commodities. The petitioner sold the same raw cashewnut and pepper at the price of Rs. 1,39,56,404/- and Rs. 1,49,007/- respectively. The petitioner sold the same raw cashewnut and pepper at the price of Rs. 1,39,56,404/- and Rs. 1,49,007/- respectively. By a notice dated 29-9-199 (Annexure-E), the petitioner was called upon to pay the sum of Rs. 1,41,054/- on the same commodities which were sold to other traders. Penalty of 30% was also proposed to be levied for non-payment of market fee. On behalf of the petitioner an elaborate reply was sent denying the liability. But the third respondent (Secretary, APMC, Puttur) by his impugned order dated 20-11-1993 determined the market fee at Rs. 1,41,054/- and also levied the penalty at three times the market fee. Thus, an amount of Rs. 5,64,216/- was demanded from the petitioner. That led to the filing of the present writ petition. This Court granted stay subject to the condition of payment of market fee demanded i. e. , Rs. 1,41,054/ -. A number of contentions were raised in the writ petition, one of which is that in the absence of a market yard no liability can be fastened on the trader to pay the market fee. However, the arguments are restricted to the only contention that there cannot be a multi-point levy of market fee and, therefore, the impugned order dated 20-11-1993 (Annexure-H) is bad in law. ( 3 ) SECTION 65 (2), the charging section omitting unnecessary words reads as follows:"the Market Committee shall levy and collect market fees from every buyer in respect of agricultural produce bought by such buyer in the market area, at such rate as may be specified in the bye-laws which shall not be more than two rupees per one hundred rupees of the value of such produce bought in such manner and at such times as may be specified in the bye-laws". How and from whom the market fee shall be realised is provided for by section 65 (2-A ). Section 65 (2-A) insofar as it is relevant is as follows:" (2-A) The market fee payable under this section shall be realised as follows, namely. (ii) if the produce is purchased directly by a trader from a producer, the trader shall be liable to pay the market fee to the committee; (iii) if the produce is purchased by a trader from another trader, the trader selling the produce shall realise it from the purchaser and shall be liable to pay the market fee to the Committee". ( 4 ) IN the instant case, the produce having been purchased directly by a trader from a producer, the trader i. e. , the writ petitioner was liable to pay the market fee and accordingly he paid the same. Taking advantage of the words 'every buyer' occurring in the charging section, the Market committee wants to realise the market fee once again from the petitioner under clause (iii) of sub-section (2-A ). ( 5 ) THE question is whether the demand of market fee on the second transaction of sale between trader and trader is authorised by law. What connotation has to be given to the words 'every buyer" is the ultimate question to be answered. That issue is no more res Integra as it has been settled by a Division Bench decision of this Court as long back as in 1979. The Division Bench speaking through Jagannatha Shetty, J. , took the view, as already noted, that the expression does not connote levy of fee on every successive sale of same agricultural produce. The learned judges gave a restricted meaning to the otherwise expansive word 'every' qualifying the word 'buyer1 having regard to the legislative background and the concession made by the learned Advocate-General appearing for the State. In that case an attack was made on Section 65 (2) of the Act on the ground that it provided for multiple stage levy and in such an event the impost would really be in the nature of a tax. The learned Judges while observing that even if Section 65 (2) would authorise multi-point levy, the impost ipso facto cannot be deemed to be a tax, however, considered it is unnecessary to deal with this contention in detail in view of the submission made by the learned Advocate-General that Section 65 does not authorise multi-point levy on the successive sales or purchases in the same market area. The learned Advocate-General contended that Section 65 merely authorised the levy of fee on every seller or buyer including producer-seller or a trade-seller. It is relevant to point out here that when the decision was rendered Section 65 (1) was also on the statute book. It provided for levy and collection of market fee from every seller too. The learned Advocate-General contended that Section 65 merely authorised the levy of fee on every seller or buyer including producer-seller or a trade-seller. It is relevant to point out here that when the decision was rendered Section 65 (1) was also on the statute book. It provided for levy and collection of market fee from every seller too. Apart from the concession, the learned Judges gave their own reasoning at paragraph 24, which reads as follows:"even otherwise, it appears to us that on a plain construction there is nothing in Section 65 (2) to compel the view that it envisages a multi-point levy. According to us, the true purpose of the word "every" qualifying the word "buyer" in Section 65 (2) was to identify the "buyer" as not merely the producer-seller but also a trade-seller. It does not connote a levy on every successive sale of the same agricultural produce in the same market area. A buyer may, in a market area, buy different items of notified agricultural commodity and each of these transactions and not successive transactions in the same market area of the same commodity attracts the levy. The language of the sub-section also admits of and does not exclude a levy on the same commodity, if it were brought and sold in another market area, provided the second market committee also renders service for marketing". There is a little inaccuracy in referring to the 'buyer' as a 'producer- seller' or 'trade-seller' in the above passage. What their Lordship obviously meant was that a buyer of goods from the producer-seller as well as from a trade-seller is comprehended within the scope of expression 'every buyer' occurring in Section 65 (2 ). ( 6 ) THE word 'every' was thus interpreted to be descriptive of the status of buyer. There is a definite reason why the Division Bench in rajasekhariah's case, supra, advisedly assigned a restricted meaning to the expression 'every' qualifying the word 'buyer. The reason is this: In k. N. Marularadhya v Regulated Market Committee, Shimoga and Others, this Court which was dealing with the scope of Section 65 (1) of the act, as it originally stood, held that the provision empowered the Market committee to levy and collect the market fee from the buyers in respect of agricultural produce brought in person or other trader to the market or sub-market in the market area. Construing that provision, the Division bench, in K. N. Marularadhya's case, supra, held as follows:"34. When we proceed to understand the provisions of that section in that way, it would be observed that section does not authorise the recovery of a fee from every buyer in the areas to which it refers but empowers the levy of the fee and its collection 'from the buyer in respect of agricultural produce. . . . . 38. The conclusion which emerges from this discussion is that under Section 65 the levy of the market fee is on the first sale by the producer inside the yard or outside the market as the case may be to a trader or any other person and that once the agricultural produce has been sold in that manner, no market fee could be recovered from a buyer who buys the agricultural produce subsequently. . . . . . . . ". As per the said decision, it is only the sale by the producer-seller that could attract the levy. In fact such interpretation was not approved by the Supreme Court in Ram Chandra Kailash Kumar and Company and others v State of Uttar Pradesh and Another. The Supreme Court agreed with the view of the Patna High Court in the case of Mangal chand Ramchandra v State of Bihar, that the Mysore High Court was right to the limited extent of holding that only earliest purchase could be subjected to fee and not subsequent purchases, but was not justified in confining it to the earliest purchase of produce from the agriculturist only. In other words, on the language of the provision similar to Section 65 as it stood originally, the Supreme Court held that there can be no bar against the levy of fee even if the purchase was from a dealer-trader. However, even before the Supreme Court's decision in Ram Chandra kailash Kumar and Company's case, supra, the State legislature considered it expedient to amend the law so as to overcome the difficulty created by the decision in K. N. Marularadhya's case, supra. That is why the old section was substituted by a new Section 65 (2) in the year 1975, which is extracted above. The expression 'every buyer' was introduced so that the buyer need not necessarily be the buyer of the agricultural commodities from the producer. That is why the old section was substituted by a new Section 65 (2) in the year 1975, which is extracted above. The expression 'every buyer' was introduced so that the buyer need not necessarily be the buyer of the agricultural commodities from the producer. The buyer could be one who had purchased the agricultural produce from a trader-seller as well. Thus, as rightly observed by the Division Bench in Rajasekhariah's case, supra, the expression 'every' qualifying the word 'buyer' was meant to identify the buyer; in other words, to bring in all types of buyers within the fold of charging section, but, the object was not to levy market fee on successive transactions. For instance, let us take a case where a trader had purchased the agricultural produce from a non-market area outside the purview of the market area in which he is doing business, he will not suffer fee on such transaction of purchase. Supposing, the same produce is sold to another trader within his market area, on the interpretation placed by the learned Judges in K. N. Marularadhya's case, supra, on the then existing Section 65, no market fee is liable to be paid by him, because he is not a buyer from the agriculturist producer. Thus, he will be totally absolved from payment of fee. Let us also take a case where the trader purchases the agricultural produce in a different market area and pays the market fee to that Market Committee. He brings the produce to his shop within the jurisdiction of a different Market Committee. As per the interpretation placed by K. N. Marularadhya's case, supra, the trader when he sells the same goods to another trader, need not have to pay the market fee to the Market Committee within whose jurisdiction the sale is effected though it is the first sale in that market area. These are the loopholes which the legislature wanted to plug by substituting a new sub-section and to ensure that the fee is collected atleast at one stage. Obviously, it was not the intention of the legisla- ture to provide for multiple point levy by inserting the expression 'every before the word 'buyer'. These are the loopholes which the legislature wanted to plug by substituting a new sub-section and to ensure that the fee is collected atleast at one stage. Obviously, it was not the intention of the legisla- ture to provide for multiple point levy by inserting the expression 'every before the word 'buyer'. The legislature, when it was amending the provision, if really wanted to provide for multi-point levy, one would expect the legislature to employ clear and straightforward language such as "on every transaction of sale or purchase effected in the market". Such a multiple point levy was not contemplated by the provision was conceded by the learned Advocate-General on behalf of the State in order to get over the challenge to the provision that the impost is in the nature of tax and not fee. That concession was held to be quite justified by the learned judges who supplemented their own reasoning. That view held the field for nearly two decades. At no point of time the correctness of decision was challenged by the State or the Market Committee. The decision in rajasekkariah's case, supra, was cited with approval by another Division bench on 17-4-1998 in Writ Petition Nos. 44438 to 44452 of 1992 and in Writ Appeal Nos. 2357 to 2364 of 1997. The ratio of that decision was not questioned. The decision in Rajasekhariah's case, supra, was referred to and distinguished because the point with which the Division bench was concerned was a different point. Earlier to that decision, a learned Single Judge of this Court, Raveendran, J. (in Writ Petition Nos. 33800 to 33803 of 1995, DD: 11-12-1995) approvingly referred to the principle laid down by the Division Bench in Rajasekhariah's case, supra, that Section 65 (2) does not envisage multi-point levy. Even here, there was no demur to the decision in Rajasekhariah's case, supra, dicated. Another learned Single Judge (Hari Nath Tilhari, J.) has taken the same view in Writ Petition No. 28777 of 2000. In our view, it is too late in the day to question the correctness of the Division Bench decision in Rajasekhariah's case, supra, on the principle of 'stare decisis'. ( 7 ) THAT takes us to a brief discussion on the doctrine of Stare decisis which is in the realm of the law of precedents. In our view, it is too late in the day to question the correctness of the Division Bench decision in Rajasekhariah's case, supra, on the principle of 'stare decisis'. ( 7 ) THAT takes us to a brief discussion on the doctrine of Stare decisis which is in the realm of the law of precedents. ( 8 ) 'stare decisis' broadly means "to stand by things decided"; "to abide by former precedents where the same points came again in litigation" (vide Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law ). The Supreme Court in Maktul v Mst. Manbhari, explained the doctrine by referring to the passages from Halsbury's Laws of England and Corpus Juris Secundum. We quote from paragraph 9 of the judgment. "the principle of stare decisis is thus stated in Halsbury's Laws of england, Second Edition:"apart from any question as to the Courts being of co-ordinate jurisdiction, a decision which has been followed for a long period of time, and has been acted upon by persons in the formation of contracts or in the disposition of their property, or in the general conduct of affairs, or in legal procedure or in other ways, will generally be followed by Courts of higher authority than the Court establishing the rule, even though the Court before whom the matter arises afterwards might not have given the same decision had the question come before it originally. But the Supreme appellate Court will not shrink from overruling a decision, or series of decisions, which establish a doctrine plainly outside the statute and outside the common law, when no title and no contract will be shaken, no persons can complain, and no general course of dealing be altered by the remedy of a mistake". The same doctrine is thus explained in Corpus Juris Secundum: "under the stare decisis rule, a principle of law which has become settled by a series of decisions generally is binding on the courts and should be followed in similar cases. This rule is based on expediency and public policy, and, although generally it should be strictly adhered to by the Courts it is not universally applicable". The Corpus Juris Secundum, however, adds a rider that:"previous decisions should not be followed to the extent that grievous wrong may result; and accordingly the Courts ordinarily will not adhere to a rule or principle established by previous decisions which they are convinced is erroneous. The Corpus Juris Secundum, however, adds a rider that:"previous decisions should not be followed to the extent that grievous wrong may result; and accordingly the Courts ordinarily will not adhere to a rule or principle established by previous decisions which they are convinced is erroneous. The rule of stare decisis is not so imperative or inflexible as to preclude a departure therefrom in any case, but its application must be determined in each case by the discretion of the Court and previous decisions should not be followed to the extent that error may be perpetuated and grievous wrong may result" ". ( 9 ) ON the facts of that case, it was held that the principle did not apply because the correctness of the Full Bench decision of the Punjab high Court (Narotam Chand v Mt. Durga Devi) was being challenged from time to time and in fact the said decision was reversed in 1950. It was also noticed that in 1908, the Privy Council (Attar Singh v Thakar singh) made certain observations which considerably impaired the validity of Full Bench decision. Thus the Full Bench decision of has not been consistently followed for long. Moreover, the Supreme Court pointed out that the reversal of the decision did not shake any title or contract. It cannot also be said that any pending actions would be disturbed because of the view taken by the later Full Bench in 1950. Further, it was pointed out that in the light of the view taken by the Supreme Court in reiteration of the Full Bench decision of 1950, the titles of the alienees would be more secure. Above all, it was found that the decision of the first Full Bench (in 1895) was wholly unsustainable. In those circumstances, their Lordships felt that the rule of stare decisis will not present any obstacle for taking a different view from what was expressed in the first Full Bench decision. ( 10 ) VIEWING from different angles from which the Supreme Court considered the question of applicability of stare decisis rule, we are unable to find any basis for not applying that rule in the instant case. This is a case in which the doctrine of stare decisis will apply with full vigour. First of all, the view taken by the Division Bench was a view which could be plausibly and reasonably taken. This is a case in which the doctrine of stare decisis will apply with full vigour. First of all, the view taken by the Division Bench was a view which could be plausibly and reasonably taken. There is no absurdity in the interpretation placed by the Division Bench in Rajasekhariah's case, supra. It is not a case where a grievous wrong would result by adhering to the legal proposition that no multi-point levy of market fee is permitted. On the other hand, the injury resulting from the multi-point levy is apparent when we consider the fact that the consumers will have to ultimately bear the burden of fee levied at different stages. No one has doubted the correctness of the decision so far, as pointed out in this judgment supra. Above all, it must be borne in mind that the State committed itself to the definite stand that the charging section did not authorise multi-point levy and on that basis resisted the challenge to the validity of the provision. It is not open to the Market Committee to take a different stand now and try to reagitate the question especially when the State Government has not taken a different stand in the writ petition. To give effect to the decision in Rajasekhariah's case, supra, would not render violence to the language of the section nor does it result in grievous injury to public nor unintended consequences. We are therefore of the view that on the principle of stare decisis, the respondent-Market committee should not be permitted to take a stand contrary to what was laid down in Rajasekhariah's case, supra. The Supreme Court while dealing with the question of revision of its own view taken in an earlier decision, which held the field for a long time, had this to say in Keshav Mills Company Limited, Petlad v The commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay North, Ahmedabad:"when it is urged that the view already taken by this Court should be reviewed and revised it may not necessarily be an adequate reason for such review and revision to hold that though the earlier view is a reasonably possible view, the alternative view which is pressed on the subsequent occasion is more reasonable. In reviewing and revising its earlier decision, this Court should ask itself whether in the interests of the public good or for any other valid and compulsive reasons, it is necessary that the earlier decision should be revised. When this Court decides questions of law, its decisions are, under Article 141, binding on all Courts within the territory of India, and so, it must be the constant endeavour and concern of this Court to introduce and maintain an element of certainty and continuity in the interpretation of law in the country. Frequent exercise by this Court of its power to review its earlier decisions on the ground that the view pressed before it later appears to the Court to be more reasonable, may incidentally tend to make law uncertain and introduce confusion which must be consistently avoided. That is not to say that if on a subsequent occasion, the Court is satisfied that its earlier decision was clearly erroneous, it should hesitate to correct the error; but before a previous decision is pronounced to be plainly erroneous, the Court must be satisfied with a fair amount of unanimity amongst its members that a revision of the said view is fully justified. It is not possible or desirable, and in any case it would be inexpedient to lay down any principles which should govern the approach of the court in dealing with the question of reviewing and revising its earlier decisions. It would always depend upon several relevant considerations. What is the nature of the infirmity or error on which a plea for a review and revision of the earlier view is based? on the earlier occasion, did some patent aspects of the question remain unnoticed, or was the attention of the Court not drawn to any relevant and material statutory provision, or was any previous decision of this Court bearing on the point not noticed? Is the Court hearing such plea fairly unanimous that there is such an error in the earlier view? What would be the impact of the error on the general administration of law or on public good? Has the earlier decision been followed on subsequent occasions either by this Court or by the High Courts? And, would the reversal of the earlier decision lead to public inconvenience, hardship or mischief? What would be the impact of the error on the general administration of law or on public good? Has the earlier decision been followed on subsequent occasions either by this Court or by the High Courts? And, would the reversal of the earlier decision lead to public inconvenience, hardship or mischief? these and other relevant considerations must be carefully borne in mind whenever this Court is called upon to exercise its jurisdiction to review and revise its earlier decisions". These considerations should be equally relevant in reaching a decision on the question whether this Court should strike a different note and reach a different conclusion from what was recorded in Rqjasekhariah's case, supra. ( 11 ) NOW, let us see what is the ratio of decision in Sri Gangadhara rice Mills case, supra. There, the question was whether it was permissible to levy market fee on the same commodity twice, first at the stage of paddy and later at the stage of rice and whether such impost amounts to multi-point levy. The learned Judges rightly followed the decision of the supreme Court in Sreenivasa General Traders v State of Andhra pradesh and overruled the contention of the appellant-trader. The Supreme court held that the market fee is leviable both on purchase of paddy by a rice miller from a producer and also on purchase or sale of rice by a miller-trader or by a trader to a trader because paddy and rice are distinct commodities separately specified as notified agricultural produce. In the Kanataka Act also, paddy and rice are two separate items notified in the Schedule. The learned Counsel for the Market Committee, however, placed reliance on the following sentence in the judgment which follows immediately after the extract of the section: "from a reading of the above section, it is clear that there is no bar upon the number of sales that could take place in respect of a commodity which has been notified". We cannot understand this observation as tantamount to saying that on successive sales of same commodity market fee could be levied. In fact, such a contention did not arise for consideration of their Lordships in that case. We cannot understand this observation as tantamount to saying that on successive sales of same commodity market fee could be levied. In fact, such a contention did not arise for consideration of their Lordships in that case. It may be mentioned that the decision in Sri Gangadhara Rice Mills case, supra, was followed by a Division Bench of this Court consisting of bhaskar Rao, C. J. and Bannurmath, J. , in a batch of Writ Petition Nos. 44438 to 44452 of 1993 etc. , in the judgment dated 17-4-1998. Referring to Rajasekhariah's case, supra, the Division Bench observed that fee cannot be levied again on the same commodity once the fee is collected. It was pointed out that the decision in Rajasekhariah's case, supra, is not an authority for the proposition that a commodity processed out of another commodity cannot be subjected to fee again. ( 12 ) WE are, therefore, of the view that the decision taken in Rajasekhariah's case, supra, does not require reconsideration and we find no justification in levying and collecting market fee under Section 65 (2) even though the market fee was collected by the same Market Committee on the first transaction. The impugned order and the demand notice are, therefore, quashed. However, we are not inclined to straightaway give a direction to refund the amount paid by the petitioner towards the disputed market fee during the pendency of the writ petition. We are not sure whether the incidence of fee has been passed on by the petitioner to the buyer. If it realised the market fee from the buyer and ultimately paid it over to the Market Committee, it cannot be said that the petitioner had suffered any injustice or injury even though the levy is illegal. It is by now fairly well-settled that the powers of the High Court under article 226 cannot be so utilised as to enable a party to unjustly enrich himself. When the Supreme Court was faced with somewhat similar situation in M/s. Shivshankar Dhal Mills v State of Haryana, it was observed as follows:"article 226 grants an extraordinary remedy which is essentially discretionary, although founded on legal injury. It is perfectly open for the Court, exercising this flexible power, to pass such order such as public interest dictates and equity projects. It is perfectly open for the Court, exercising this flexible power, to pass such order such as public interest dictates and equity projects. "courts of equity may, and frequently do, go much further both to give and withhold relief in furtherance of the public interest than they are accustomed to go where only private interests are involved. Accordingly, the granting or withholding of relief may properly be dependent upon considerations as of public interest. . . . . . . " ". The Supreme Court gave certain directions to the Market Committee to deposit the excess collection with the Registrar of the High Court so as to enable the eligible dealers and others to prefer claims and further directing that the unclaimed amount, if any, shall be permitted to be used by the respective Market Committees for statutory purposes. However, as we are concerned with an individual case here, we are not inclined to adopt the course of such magnitude. It is enough that the flexible power of this Court under Article 226 is moulded to see that the party seeking relief does not get unjust benefit by securing refund. We, therefore, direct that the petitioner may prove his claim before the Sec- retary of Market Committee that he has not passed on the burden of market fee to its buyers by producing the relevant material. If such a claim is made within one month from the date the judgment copy is made ready, the Secretary, Market Committee shall thereupon decide whether the claim is correct and if it is correct, the amount shall be refunded within one month thereafter, with interest at 12% p. a. from the date of collection. ( 13 ) ACCORDINGLY, writ petition is allowed subject to the above direction. No costs. --- *** --- .