JUDGMENT C.K. Thakker, J: - This petition was filed by one Kashmir Singh, son of Sohan Singh, Ex-President, Gram Panchayat, Amb Tehsil Amb, district Una against the respondents fox-qtiashing and setting aside various orders passed by the authorities-untler the Himachal Pradesh Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), by declaring certain (?) areas of respondent-Nos. 4 to 9 and by taking appropriate acton in accordance with law. 2. The case of the petitioner in the petition was that he was a permanent resident of village and Tehsil. Amb in Una District. He was also a Pradhan of Gram Panchayat, Amb. According to him, if any person was holding land in excess prescribed by the Act, such land was required to be declared as surplus and to be taken back by the State Government for disposal in accordance with law. The case of trte petitioner was that One Smt. Balwanti Devi widow of AgyaRam, resident of village Amb was holding certain lands. Agya Ram died on 21st July, 1970 i.e. before the commencement of the Act. Proceedings were initiated agianst respondent Nos. 4 to 9 and orders were passed by Collector, Una. Balwanti Devi died on 7th November, 1980 leaving behind her major as well as minor sons. It was alleged by the petitioner that though the Respondent 4 to 9 were holding land in excess of ceiling prescribed under the Act, proceedings were not taken according to law and excess land was not declared surplus. The said action, contended the petitioner, was contrary to law and was liable to be set aside. 3. The Collector, after considering the evidence on record as also the statements of witnesses examined by Smt. Balwanti Devi held that the sales effected by her were bona fide. Considering the facts and circumstance, the Collector disposed of all cases and on the basis of findings recorded, passed orders for preparation of final statement showing the particulars of the land declared as surplus and the Tehsildar, Amb was directed to separate share of Smt. Balwanti Devi from other land owners in the land held jointly by her with others, which had been declared as surplus and to vest in the government. No proceedings were initiated by the authorities against those orders passed by the Collector, Una. 4. No proceedings were initiated by the authorities against those orders passed by the Collector, Una. 4. The petitioner was of the opinion that the action taken by the Collector, Una and orders passed by him were not in consonance with law. He, therefore, preferred a revision petition No.67 of 1989 on 5th May, 1989 i.e. after about fourteen years of the orders passed by the Collector in July, 1975. It was contended by him before the revisional authority that serious irregularities had been committed by the district Collector in deciding Ceiling Cases and in allowing independent unit to each of the heirs of deceased Agya Ram, which had caused great loss to the State Government. It was also contended that Smt. Balwanti Devi died in 1980 and her estate had been sutated in the names of her sons and daughters-in-law in 1981 i.e. after coming into force of the Act. Considering ceiling area under the Act, substantial land was surplus and ought to have been declared as such. It was also stated that the petitioner had approached this court by filing C.W.P. No.99 of 1990 during the pendency of the revision before the Financial commissioner (appeals) and this Court directed, vide its order dated 16th October, 1990 that the petitioner could make proper application before the Court bringing necessary facts to the notice of the revisional authority, which would dispose of the matter within three months from the filing of the application. 5. The revision was then fixed for hearing. It was contested by the respondents. It was contended that the had no locus standi and could not question the orders passed by the Collector. It was also urged that the proceedings were initiated by making false allegations, which were actuated by mala fide, personal enmity and vengeance. It was stated that several litigations were pending between the parties and with a view to harass the respondents and to settle personal accounts; a revision petition was filed by Kashmir Singh. Moreover, there was gross delay and laches on the part of petitioner in approaching the revisional authority and invoking the revisional jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner. It was stated that the orders were passed in 1975 and about fourteen years had elapsed. It was submitted that the revisional authority could not unsettle the things which were already settled before more than a decade. It was stated that the orders were passed in 1975 and about fourteen years had elapsed. It was submitted that the revisional authority could not unsettle the things which were already settled before more than a decade. It was emphasised that the revisional powers ought to be exercised within reasonable time. 6. On behalf of, the revenue, the learned District Attorney submitted that the powers of the Financial Commissioner were not limited to Section 20 of the Act and he was not bound by any illegal order passed by a subordinate officer. It was stated that mere efflux of time would not make illegal orders legal and it was open to the Financial Commissioner to take into account legality or propriety of the orders and to take appropriate action according to law. 7. At the time of hearing of revision, the petitioner was not present. The revisional authority considered the matter. After referring to several decisions of the Honble Supreme Court as well as of High courts, the revisional authority observed that a period of three years could be said to be reasonable time for exercising revisional powers and as the powers were invoked after about fourteen years, it could not be said to be a reasonable period. The revisional authority also observed; "All the cases were finalized on 29.7.1975, which orders had become final since they were not challenged in an appeal." The revisional authority also observed that Agya Ram died in July, 1970 and the issue of succession had opened much prior to "appointed day" under the Act. (It may be stated at this stage that the appointed day has been defined in Seciton 3(b) of the Act as 24th January, 1971). It was also stated that Smt. Balwanti Devi had six sons, who had become owners in their own rights and they had filed returns under the Act and the Rules made thereunder before the District Collector, Una. In the opinion of the revisional authority, there did not appear to be either misstatements or suppression of material facts in the returns submitted by them. It was further observed that there was no evidence that Smt. Balwanti Devi and her six sons were living jointly after the death of Agya Ram. In the opinion of the revisional authority, there did not appear to be either misstatements or suppression of material facts in the returns submitted by them. It was further observed that there was no evidence that Smt. Balwanti Devi and her six sons were living jointly after the death of Agya Ram. It was indicated that respondents had not acquired entire property by inheritance from Agya Ram but each of them held land separately in their own rights much prior to the appointed day. In these circumstances, the holdings of the respondents could not be clubbed when it had been asserted that they were living separately. The revisional authority in the light of those findings, without commenting on laches and delay, decided the matter finally by observing in paragraph 7 thus: "In view of the discussion above, we have no hesitation in saying that the orders passed on 29.7.1975 by the learned District Collector, Una in the ceiling cases of seven respondents are perfectly legal since the learned Collector had not exceeded his jurisdiction. Since there is no impropriety or illegality in his orders, there is no need for us to invoke our revisional powers. Since we have already held that the holding of each of the respondent No.2 to 7 does not exceed the permissible area even after taking into account the land inherited by them from Smt. Balwanti Devi, no interference is called in Mutation Nos.3156 and 3666 in respect of vilalges Andora and amb, respectively. As a result, the revision petition/complaint filed by Shri Kashmir Singh, Pradhan, Gram Panchayat, Amb, Tehsil Amb, District Una, does not succeed and is accordingloy dismissed. The orders passed by the learned district Collector, Una on 29.7.1975 on ceiling cases of the respondents and Mutations Nos.3156 and 3666 attested on 31.5.1981 and 4.7.1981 in respect of villages Andora and Amb respectively but the Assistant Collector in Grade, are also upheld. Order be communicates" 8. Thus, according to the revisional authority, holdings of each of respondent No.2 to 7 did not exceed the permissible area even after taking into account the land inherited by them from Smt. Balwanti Devi and no interference was therefore, called for against the orders passed by Collector, Una. The said order passed by the revisional authority confirming the orders passed by Collector, Una has been challenged by the petitioner in the present petition. 9. The said order passed by the revisional authority confirming the orders passed by Collector, Una has been challenged by the petitioner in the present petition. 9. Notices were ordered to be issued on 8th June, 1992 and respondent No.4 to 9 were restrained from alienating or encumbering the land in any manner. The matter was thereafter admitted. Interim order was subsequently modified. It may also be stated that during the pendency of the petition, Kashmir Singh died and his heirs were brought on record on 10th May, 2000 after hearing the learned counsel for the parties. 10. We have heard Mr. K.D. Sood, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Sanjay Karol, learned Advocate General instructed by Mr. M.L. Chauhan, learned Deputy Advocate General, for respondent No.l to 3 Mr, H.K. Bhardwaj, learned counsel for respondent No.4 to 7 and 9 and Mr. D.D. Sood, learned Senior Cousel, instructed by Mr. Ankush Sood, learned counsel for respondent No.8. 11. Mr. Sood, learned counsel for the petitioner raised several contentions. He submitted that the petition was filed by the petitioner as pro bono publico. Apart from an enlighten citizen, deceased kashmir Singh was also Pradhun of the Gram Panchayat. The petitioner, therefore, had rightly approached this court by filing a petition under Article 226 of the constitution. He also submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case, it could not be contended that revisional jurisdiction was not exercised by the petitioner within reasonable time. The petitioner made several representations to the authorities by addressing applications to the Financial Commissioner, Lokayukata and other authorities. Since nothing was done by them, the petitioner had to invoke revisional jurisdiction under the Act. It was also urged by the counsel that the provisions of the Act and rules have been given complete go-bye and even minors, who had not attained majority at the relevant time were considered major and granted independent and separate units. The said action was contrary to law and inconsistent with various decsions of the Honble Apex court as well as the this court.1 Mr. The said action was contrary to law and inconsistent with various decsions of the Honble Apex court as well as the this court.1 Mr. Sood submitted that from the documentary evidence ncluding the applcations made by some of the respondents, such as filling of forms for getting licences (Stand) to the Bar council of Himachal Pradesh to start practice, it was clearly estbalished that they were minors at the relevant time and hence, could not have been granted benefit of independent unit under the Act. He also made a complaint that in spite of the order passed by this Court in a writ petition,) no opportunity of hearing was afforded to the petitioner and the order was passed, which was contrary to law and violati ve of natural justice. In the submission of Mr. Sood, weaker section of the society has been deprived of the benefit of the land. Under the Scheme of the Act, the land which as been declared surplus has to be distributed amongst the weaker section of the society. The public exchequer has also thereby suffered. The underlying object of agrarian reforms has been defeated. He, therefore, submitted that this is eminently a fit case to alow the petition by setting aside the orders passed by the authorities and by declaring surplus land to be vested in the State and by directing the State to dispose of the same in accordance with law 12. The learned Advocate General instructed by Mr. M.L. Chauhan, learned Deputy Advocate General supported the petitioner stating that an affidavit-in-reply is filed on behalf of respondents No.l and 3 by Om Yadav, son of late Shri R.S. Suchet Singh, Financial commissioner-cum- Secretary (Revenue), wherein it was stated that the share of Smt. Balwanti Devi inherited by her sons, their wives and grand children when taken into account with the existing holding, exceeded the prescribed limit as all of them already had held maximum permissible area with them. It was also stated by the deponent that respondents No.4 to 9 (sons of Agya Ram and Smt. Balwanti Devi, widow of Agya Ram) were owners their lands in their own rights and they were allowed to retian one unit each under the Act. It was also stated by the deponent that respondents No.4 to 9 (sons of Agya Ram and Smt. Balwanti Devi, widow of Agya Ram) were owners their lands in their own rights and they were allowed to retian one unit each under the Act. It was then stated in paragraph 2 as under: "That on inheritance of the land of Smt. Balwanti Devi, respondent No.4 to 9 were required to file returns before the Collector under Section 17 of the H.P. Ceiling on Holding Act and the Collector was required to go into the question whether they owned area in excess of the permissible area under the Act. But in the light of the order of the learned Financial Commissioner (Appeals) dated 7.10.1991, Annexure P/17 the right of the Collector, Una to have recourse to the provisions of the Section of 17 of the Act has been clogged. In view of this position, it would be proper and just if the matter is referred to the Collector, Una, for decision in accordance with the provisions of Section 17(2) of the Act." 13. Finally, in paragraph 12, it was stated that after the death of Smt. Balwanti Devi in 1980, her estate devolved upon her sons and other heirs and their cases were required to be examined for declaration of surplus area under Section 17 of the Act and hence the matter was required to be remanded. 14. Mr. Bhardwaj, learned counsel for respondent No.4 to 7 and 9 and Mr. D.D. Sood, learned Senior Advocate instructed by Mr. Ankush Sood, learned counsel for respondent No.8, on the other hand, vehemently contended that the petition was. liable to be dismissed. According to them, the petitioner had no locus standi to file the petition. Neither the petitioner could be said to be an aggrieved person nor the litigation was in the nature of pro bono public Several cases were filed by Kashmir Singh against the contesting respondents and thus the present proceedings were somewhat settlement of personal accounts and vengeance. It is settled law, submitted the counsel, that the Court wold not exercise its prerogative powers in such cases. It was also urged that the authorities under the Act, in exercise of undoubted jurisdiction and powers, passed orders, which cannot be termed as without jurisdiction. It is settled law, submitted the counsel, that the Court wold not exercise its prerogative powers in such cases. It was also urged that the authorities under the Act, in exercise of undoubted jurisdiction and powers, passed orders, which cannot be termed as without jurisdiction. Those orders were neither challenged by aggrieved party nor even by the authorities either in appeal or in exercise of suo motu jurisdiction or before this Court. They became final and the matter got settled. A revision petition.....by Kashmir Singh against the orders passed by Collector, Una was instituted after about fourteen years. It is well settled that revisional jurisdiction ought to be exercise within a reasonable time. By no stretch of imagination, submitted the counsel, that a period of fourteen years can be said to be "reasonabel time". 15. The counsel submitted that even on merits, the authorities rightly held that the action was taken in accordance with law. Hence, no interference was called for by this court. On all these grounds, it was submitted that the petition deserves to be dismissed. 16. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, in our opinion, the peititon is liable to be dismissed. So far as locus standi is concerned, our attention has been invited by the learned counsel for the parties to several decisions. In our opinion, however, it would not be proper to dismiss the petition on the ground of locus standi for the simple reason that the petition is of 1992. It had been admitted and is pending since last about ten years and has now come up for final hearing. Even prior to the present petition, the petitioner had approached this court by filing a writ petition, which was disposed of by this Court granting him liberty to approach the revisional authority and by directing the revisional authority to decide the revision in accordance with law. We, therefore, do not deal with the case law on locus standi and proceed to consider the matter on other points. 17. So far as hearing to the petitioner is concerned, it was contended by Mr. Sood, learned counsel for the petitioner that no opportunity of hearing was afforded by the revisional authority when the revision was taken up for hearing. 17. So far as hearing to the petitioner is concerned, it was contended by Mr. Sood, learned counsel for the petitioner that no opportunity of hearing was afforded by the revisional authority when the revision was taken up for hearing. Looking to the impugned order passed in revision (P-13; dated 7th October, 1991), it is clear that the arguments were heard on 13th September, 1991 (paragraph 4). In paragraph 3, the revisional authority has also stated that the Financial Commissioner (Appeals) had heard Kashmir Singh, petitioner/complainant. It is no doubt true that the petitioner/complainant did not put his appearance at the time of arguments on merits but when the petitioner was already heard and the matter was considered by the revisional authority, it cannot: be said that principles of natural justice were violated. Henc, the grievance of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was not heard and the order was liable to be set aside on the ground of non- observance of natural justice and fair play cannot be upheld. The contention accordingly stands rejected. 18. In our opinion, however, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that revisional jurisdiction was invoked by the petitioner within a reasonable time. Section 20 of the Act provides for appeal, review and revision, which reads as under: "Appeal, review and revision - (1) Any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Collector may within sixty days from the date of the decision or order prefer an appeal to the Commissioner: Provided that the commissioner may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of sixty days if he is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time. (2) Any person aggrieved by an order of the Commissioner made under sub-section (1) may, within ninety days from the date to the order, file a revision petition before the Financial Commissioner so as to challenge the legality or propriety of such order and the Financial Commissioner may pass such order as he may deem fit. The order of the Financial Commissioner shall be final. The order of the Financial Commissioner shall be final. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing sub-section, the Financial Commissioner may at any time call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of such proceedings or order, and may pass such order in relation thereto as he may deem fit." 19. Reading of the above Section makes it clear that a person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Collector may prefer an appeal to the commissioner within sixty days from the date of decision. A person aggrieved by order of the Commissioner may file of revision petition before the Financial Commissioner within ninety days from the date of such order. Sub-section(3J of Section 20, no doubt, starts with a non-obstante clause and confers powers on the Financial Commissioner to all for "at any time" the records and proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of such proceedings or order. 20. The question for our consideration, therefore, is whether such revisional power can be exercises "at any time". Mr. Bhardwaj, learned counsel and Mr. D.D. Sood, learned Senior Advocate in this conneciton invited our attention to sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act, which provides that a revision application can be filed within ninety days and contended that under the Act, revisional jurisdiction could be invokved within ninety days and as it was not done, the revision petition was time barred. 21. Mr. K.D. Sood, learned counsel for the petitioner, in reply to the above argument, stated that the provision regarding limitation for filing a revision petition under Section 20(3) of the Act applies to filing revision by aggrieved party only and since the petitioner had approached the revisional authority not as "aggrieved party", the limitation under Section 20(3) of the Act does not apply. 22. In the instant case, in our opinion, it is not necessary to enter into larger question. If the revision is filed at the instance of aggrieved person under sb-section (2) of Section 20 of the Act, the same could have been filed within ninety days from the date of the order. The period of limitaiton prescribed under the Act, therefore, has to be kept in mind. If the revision is filed at the instance of aggrieved person under sb-section (2) of Section 20 of the Act, the same could have been filed within ninety days from the date of the order. The period of limitaiton prescribed under the Act, therefore, has to be kept in mind. In the case on hand, the revisional authority has not invoked suo motu power of sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act. It is true that according to the petitioner, the orders passed. by the Collector were not challenged by the petitioner as an "aggrieved person" I and hence sub-section (2) of Section 20 would not apply. At the same time, J however, the period of limitaiton prescribed for a private party to invoke j revisional power of the authority cannot be overlooked. Moreover, when no period of limitation is prescribed, revisional powers are required to be exercised within reasonable time. A similar question arose before the Supreme Court in State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha & Ors., AIR 1969 SC 1297. Considering a similar provision of Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code 1879, in juxtaposition Section 65 of the Code, the Apex Court observed that the revisional power must be exercised within few months. It was indicated by the Supreme Court that the connotation "reasonable time" must be considered in the light of the relevant statute, nature of power to be exercised and the aciton to be taken keeping in mind the order passed by the authority. The said decision has been reiterated in several other cases by the Supreme Court and followed by the High Courts. 23. In the present case, the orders were passed by the competent authority, i.e. District Collector, Una in 1975. The State Authorities had not taken any action against those orders. The revisional authority (Financial Commissioner) did not exercise suo mom powers. It is only the petitioner, who had approached the Financial Commissioner (Appeals) by filing revision in May, 1989 i.e. after about fourteen years.. Though the petitioner did not invoke the jurisdiction of revisional authority as an "aggrieved person", in our considered opinion, priod of about fourteen years could not be said to be reasonable time". If a person, who is aggrieved by the order and could have challenged the order by filing a ! Though the petitioner did not invoke the jurisdiction of revisional authority as an "aggrieved person", in our considered opinion, priod of about fourteen years could not be said to be reasonable time". If a person, who is aggrieved by the order and could have challenged the order by filing a ! revision application could have invoked such jurisdiction within ninety days, I a person, who could not be termed as "aggrieved person", who had several \ litigations with the respondents could not, in our view invoke the revisional after more than a decade. If the argument of the petitioner is upheld, virtually the concept of "reasonable time" would become nugatory and otiose. We are also impressed by the submission of the learned counsel for the contesting respondents that such exercise of power would result in settled matters being unsettled. Hence, the contention raised on behalf of the contesting respondents that revisional jurisdiction was not invoked by the petitioner within reasonable time is well founded and must be upheld. 24. It was contended that once it has been conceeded that the power must be exercised within reasonable time, such power cannot be put in a straight jacket fourmula. We are in agreement with the above submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner. At the same time, however, such power cannot be invoked after unduly long period or unreasonable time. Whether a particular period can be said to be reasonable or not, depends upon the facts and cicumstances of the case keeping in mirjid all relevant circumstances. 25. In Shailesh Jadavji Varia v. Sub Registrar, Narmada Bhavan & Ors. 1996 (2) GLH 848, considering various provisions of the Bombay Stamp Act, 1958, and referring to various decisions on the point, speeking for the larger Bench of the High Court of Gujarat, one of us (C.K. Thakker, J. as he then was) stated; "From the aforesaid decisions, there is no doubt in our minds that the power under sub-section (1) of Section 32-A of the Act can be exercised within reasonable period and no outer limit can be fixed for exercise of such power. The decision in Patel Raghav Naiha, in our considered opinion, cannot be read as laving down universal rule applicable to ali statutes, at all times and under all circumstances without reference to the scheme of the Act, underlying object to grant revisional power and conseqences which may ensue therefrom that revisional powers must be exercisd within particular period. Their Lordships also, were conscious and mindful of all such situaitons which is reflected from the observations to the effect that "the length of reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the order which is being revised". 26. In the facts and circumstances of the case, in our opinion, the order passed by the District Collector, Una in 1975 could not have been challenged by filing a revision petition in 1989 after about fourteen years. Such a long period, to us, appears to be unreasonable. The revisional authority, in our view, has also not committed any error of law or of jurisdiction in passing the impugned order, particularly, when the orders were passed under the Act by the competent authority, i.e. District Collector, Una. The revisional authority also considered the matter on its own merits and satisfied that the Collector had not committed any error of law or of jurisdiction in passing the order. 27. For the foregoing reasons, we see no ground to interfere with the order passed by the revisional authority. The writ petition deserves to be dismissed .and is accordingly dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs. CMP No. 1047 of 2000: 28. In view of the dismissal of the writ petition, the present application stands dismissed.