MOHAMED ANWAR, J. ( 1 ) HEARD the learned Counsel on both sides. ( 2 ) THIS petition under Section 482 Cr. P. C. is presented by the petitioners who are accused Nos. 2 and 3, in C. C. No. 13799/97 pending on the file of the Court below, praying to quash that criminal proceeding initiated against them on the complaint of respondent for an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 ('the N. I. Act' for short ). ( 3 ) THE complaint allegations are that: the accused-petitioner shappened to be the dealers of the produce of M/s. Vicco Corporation limited. The products of the said Corporation, which were purchased by the complainant and stocked with him as on 21. 01. 1997, were transferred to the office/godown of the accused, who, in turn, issued the cheque in question bearing No. 656816, dated 31. 03. 1997, drawn on State Bank of India, Attavara Branch, Mangalore, for Rs. 1,95,139. 00 in complainant's favour towards the value of the said materials. When the cheque was presented for encashment to the bank on 2. 4. 1997, the same was bounced by it with its endorsement indicating the reason "insufficient fund", in the account of the accused. Then, the statutory demand notices dated 11. 4. 1997 were got issued by the complainant to all the three accused demanding payment of the cheque amount within fifteen days, failing which necessary legal action will be taken against them. When they failed to pay the said amount within fifteen days, the said complaint against them was filed by the complainant before the learned Magistrate on 6. 5. 1995. ( 4 ) THE main ground on which the Criminal proceeding again staccused was sought to be quashed is that the cornpiaint filed against them on 6. 5. 1995 before the learned Magistrate is a premature complaint and therefore, it is liable to be quashed. Learned Counsel for petitioner to substantiate this ground, argued that indisputably the said demand notice dated 11. 4. 1997 issued by the complainant was served on both the petitioner-accused Nos. 2 and 3, on 21. 4. 1997. Therefore, fifteen days period prescribed by Proviso (b) to Section 138 of the N. I. Act, for the accused to make payment of the cheque amount expired on 6. 5. 1997, and. 4. 1997 issued by the complainant was served on both the petitioner-accused Nos. 2 and 3, on 21. 4. 1997. Therefore, fifteen days period prescribed by Proviso (b) to Section 138 of the N. I. Act, for the accused to make payment of the cheque amount expired on 6. 5. 1997, and. therefore, the alleged offence against them could occur on the following date 7. 5. 1997. In that view of the matter, the complaint filed against them on 6. 5. 1995 was before accrual of the cause of action to the complainant and was premature. Reliance was sought to be placed on a Single Bench decision of this Court in the case of ASHOK HEGDE vs JATHIN V. ATTAWAN1 in support of the contention that any such premature complaint is liable to be quashed in law. ( 5 ) PER contra, it was argued by learned Counsel for respondent- complainant that the said demand notice dated 11. 4. 1997 issued to accused No. 1-Company, of which Accused Nos. 2 and. 3 are the directors, was infact served on it on 16. 4. 1997 itself, though the said notices on Accused Nos. 2 and 3 were served on 21. 4. 1997. ( 6 ) IT was argued by Mr. R. B. Deshpande for respondent-complainant that the service of demand notice on Accused No. 1 - company was sufficient notice to its Directors-Accused Nos. 2 and 3, as well since they were its Directors. Support for this contention was sought to be drawn by him on a decision of Calcutta High court in the case of DILIP KUMAR JAISWAL vs DEBAPRIYA banerjee. ( 7 ) ON consideration of the rival contention, I find sufficient legalforce in the submission of Mr. Deshpande. learned Counsel for respondent-complainant Section 141 of the N. I. Act deals with the offences by Companies It states that: "141. Offences by Companies: (1) If the person committing an offence under Section 138 is a company, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, Was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the cor duct of the business of the company as well as the company shalli be deeded to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. . . . . . . . . . . . . (2) xxx xxx xxx sub-clause (b) of Section 138 envisages giving of the demand notices to the drawer of the cheque. ( 8 ) IN the instant case, prime facie it transpires from the complainant allegations that the cheque in question had been jointly issued by Accused 2 and 3 on behalf of Accused No. 1 - Company in connection with the business transactions. Therefore, in the light of the relevant provisions contained in sub-section (1) of Section 141 and Section 138 (b), the position becomes clear that the service of demand notice on Accused No. 1 - Company, shall be deemed to be also the service thereof on its Directors, who are Accused Nos. 2 and 3 (petitioners ). The law to this effect is also laid down by the calcutta High Court in Dilip Jaiswal supra. It is held therein that a separate notice upon the Executives or the Directors is not required to be served for compliance of Proviso (b) to Section 138 of the N. I. Act for prosecuting them along with the Company for the offence alleged to be committed by the Company under Section 138 of the n. I. Act. Therefore, in view of this emerging legal principle, the complaint filed in the instant case on 6. 5. 1997 was clearly after expire of the fifteen days period next after service on 16. 4. 1997 of the demand notice stipulated in proviso (b) to Section 138. Thus the complaint filed on 6. 5. 1997 after accrual of cause of action on 16. 4. 1997 is a ripe and valid one. ( 9 ) APART from the above, the point in controversy is no longerres-integra, as it stands resolved by authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court in a recent decision in tne case of NARSINGH das TAPADIA vs GOVERDHAN DAS PARTANi. Adverting to the relevant provisions under Section 138 and 142 of the N. I. Act, the supreme has at Paragraphs 7 and 10 of its judgment laid down: "7. Tne compliance of clause (c) of provisd to Section 138 enables ;he Court to entertain a complainl, Clause (b) of Section 142 prescribes a period within which the coinpiant can be filed from the date of the cause of action ansing under Clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138. Tne compliance of clause (c) of provisd to Section 138 enables ;he Court to entertain a complainl, Clause (b) of Section 142 prescribes a period within which the coinpiant can be filed from the date of the cause of action ansing under Clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138. No period is preserved before which the complaint cannot be filed, and if filed not disclosing the cause of action in terms of Clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138, the Court may not take cognizance til! the time the cause of action arises to the complainant. "10. Mere presentation of the complaint in the Court cannot be held to mean, that its cognizance had been taken by the magistrate. If the complaint is found to be premature, it can await maturity or be retumed to the complainant for tiling later and its mere presentation at an earlier date need not necessarily render the complaint liable to be dismissed or confer any right upon the accused to absolve himself from the criminal liability for the offence committed. . . " ( 10 ) THE Supreme Court has thus ruled lhat if the complaint is found to be premature, it can await maturity or be returned to the complainant for filing later and mere presentation at an earlier date need not necessarily render the complaint liable to be dismissed or confer any right upon the accused to absolve himself from the criminal liability for the offence committed. In view of this clear law so laid down by the Supreme Court, the objection raised for the petitioners-accused against maintainability of the complaint will have no legal force. For the same reason, the decision rendered by this court in the case of ASHOK HEGDE vs JATHIN V. ATTAWAN could be no longer a good law. ( 11 ) THERE was no any other substantive objection or ground of attack raised against the Criminal proceeding initiated against the accused, meriting by serious consideration. Therefore, the petition is bound to fail and it fails. --- *** --- .w