Judgment :- Kurian Joseph, J. An employee once suspended pending disciplinary proceedings was reinstated later. No doubt, he can be again kept under suspension during enquiry on the basis of sufficient material. But once the enquiry is over after the reinstatement, can he be again kept under suspension pending final orders in the disciplinary proceedings, is the question to be considered in this Original Petition. 2. The petitioner was placed under suspension as per Ext. P2 order 28.8.1998, in view of a case registered against him by the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Bureau, Kottayam. The allegation was that he demanded and accepted illegal gratification. Thereafter, as per Ext. P3 order dated 12.3.1999, the petitioner was reinstated in service. It is stated in Ext. P3 that the reinstatement was pursuant to the report from the 4th respondent-Director of Vigilance and Anti-corruption Bureau that the investigation of the vigilance case against the petitioner had been completed. As per Ext. P4 order dated 12.4.2000, Government referred the charges against the petitioner to the 5th respondent-Vigilance Tribunal for a detailed enquiry. 3. While so, as per the impugned order Ext. P1 dated 4.9.2001, the petitioner was placed under suspension. The operative portion of Ext. P1 reads as follows: "The Vigilance Tribunal after conducting the detailed enquiry found that the accused officer Dr. B. Rajmohan is guilty of the charges levelled against him and has therefore recommended that he may be compulsorily retired from service. Government consider that the retention of Dr. Rajmohan in service during the remaining stages of the disciplinary proceedings will be against public interest. Government therefore order that Dr. Rajmohan, Assistant Surgeon, District Hospital, Kottayam be placed under suspension with immediate effect. The order shall be deemed to have come into effect forthwith." 4. Sri. T.P. Kelu Nambiar, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that once an incumbent placed under suspension while a disciplinary proceeding is pending or contemplated had been reinstated, there cannot be a further suspension pending final orders in the disciplinary proceedings. It is also argued that a second suspension is justified only pending enquiry, on the basis of subsequent material or subsequent sufficient material warranting a further suspension. 5. R.10 of the Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control & appeal) Rules, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as 'the rules') framed in exercise of powers conferred by the proviso to Art.309 of the Constitution of India, deals with suspension. 5. R.10 of the Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control & appeal) Rules, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as 'the rules') framed in exercise of powers conferred by the proviso to Art.309 of the Constitution of India, deals with suspension. Sub-r.(1) of R.10 of the Rules reads as follows: "10. Suspension.-The appointing authority or any authority to which it is subordinate or any other authority empowered by the Government in that behalf may at any time place a Government servant under suspension. (a) where a disciplinary proceeding against him is contemplated or is pending; or (b) where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation or trial; or (c) where final orders are pending in the disciplinary proceeding, if the appropriate authority considers that in the then prevailing circumstances it is necessary, in public interest, that the Government servant should be suspended from service: Provided that the authority competent to place a member of the Kerala Civil Judicial Service or the Kerala Criminal Judicial Service under suspension shall be the High Court of Judicature." The learned Senior Counsel submits that a second suspension is justified only under R.10(1)(a), ie., when a disciplinary proceeding is contemplated or is pending. In other words, once there is suspension or there are different spells of suspension under R.10(1)(a), there cannot be a suspension under R.10(1)(c) under which suspension is contemplated pending final orders, it is contended. Reference is made to the decision of the Apex Court in U.P. Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad v. Sanjiv Rajan (1993 Supp. (3) SCC 483). That was a case where an employee was originally suspended in March, 1991 and on the ground that the co-accused in the case had already been reinstated, the said employee was also reinstated pursuant to order passed by the High Court on that ground. After a few months, on the basis of sufficient material, the said employee was again placed under suspension. To quote from the judgment of the Supreme Court: "Upon preliminary inquiry, it was found that the defalcation was done either with the active involvement of the respondent or with his connivance and in any case he was guilty of dereliction of duty for not scrutinising the accounts of the Market Committee, properly. To quote from the judgment of the Supreme Court: "Upon preliminary inquiry, it was found that the defalcation was done either with the active involvement of the respondent or with his connivance and in any case he was guilty of dereliction of duty for not scrutinising the accounts of the Market Committee, properly. With this prima facie case against the respondent made out in the auditors' report, a fresh order of suspension along with a charge-sheet was served upon the respondent...." On a challenge against the second suspension, the Supreme Court held: "There is no restriction on the authority to pass a suspension order second time. The first order might be withdrawn by the authority on the ground that at that stage, the evidence appearing against is>c delinquent employee is not sufficient or for some reason, which is not connected with the merits of the case". 6. Based on the above decision, Radhakrishnan, J. in Muhammed v. State of Kerala (1997 (2) KLT 394) held that there was no restriction on a competent authority to pass a second suspension order and second suspension under R.10(1)(e) was justified. It is the submission of the learned Senior Counsel that the second suspension in the case dealt with by the Apex Court was one passed under R.10(1)(a) and that cannot be taken as the basis for a further suspension under R.10(1)(c). 7. The paramount consideration in placing a public servant under suspension is public interest. That is the touchstone on which a suspension has to be tested. Therefore, when public interest demands an employee to be kept out of service, there cannot be a fetter on such demand other than those provided under the statute. Clause (a) of sub-r.(1) of R.10 provides for suspension when a disciplinary proceeding against an employee is contemplated or is pending, clause (b) provides for suspension where a case in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation or trial and clause (c) provides that in contemplation of final orders on the disciplinary proceedings, an employee could be placed under suspension. In all these situations, suspension is justified if the appropriate authority in the then prevailing circumstances considers the suspension necessary in public interest. 8. In all these situations, suspension is justified if the appropriate authority in the then prevailing circumstances considers the suspension necessary in public interest. 8. In the instant case, the 5th respondent-Tribunal after conducting enquiry has found that the petitioner is guilty of the charges levelled against him and there is a recommendation that he should be compulsorily retired from service. What is to be completed is the rest of the procedures, ie., passing final orders in the disciplinary proceedings after completing the required formalities provided under the Rules. So, at the stage of completion of the formalities for passing final orders also, the competent authority is fully justified in placing an employee under suspension. The Government while passing Ext. P1 order has adverted to all these aspects and in view of the finding and recommendation of the Tribunal has formed an opinion that it is necessary in public interest to keep the Government servant under suspension. The earlier suspension in 1998 as per Ext. P2 was at the time of initiation of preliminary enquiry and the reinstatement as per Ext. P3 in 1999 was at a time when the investigation by the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Bureau had been completed. It was thereafter the case was referred to the Tribunal and the Tribunal has entered the finding of guilt and recommended compulsory retirement. The circumstance prevailing while passing Exts. P2 and P3 orders is not the one which existed while Ext. P1 order was passed. Merely for the reason that on conclusion of the vigilance enquiry the Government thought it fit to reinstate the petitioner, there cannot be a fetter on the Government in considering his case again for suspension when steps are taken for passing final orders. In other words, it is in view of proposed imposition of punishment, the suspension order under R.10(1)(c) is passed and that proposal is compulsory retirement. Once there is a proposal for imposition of such a major penalty, it is only in public interest that an employee on whom such penalty is proposed is kept under suspension: the continuance of the employee during the period of completion of the procedural formalities for imposition of such a major penalty will not be in public interest. Once there is a proposal for imposition of such a major penalty, it is only in public interest that an employee on whom such penalty is proposed is kept under suspension: the continuance of the employee during the period of completion of the procedural formalities for imposition of such a major penalty will not be in public interest. In such circumstances, the power to place an incumbent under suspension is coupled with a duty to act and the Government is bound to place him under suspension once a major penalty like compulsory retirement, discharge or termination which has the effect of cessation in the post/ service is recommended or proposed. Therefore, I do not find any necessity to reconsider the decision in Muhammed's case (supra). In view of the request of the learned Senior Counsel that the proceedings may not be unnecessarily prolonged, I direct respondents 1 and 2 to complete the proceedings under R.15 of the Rules within a period of four months from today. Subject to the above direction, the Original Petition is dismissed.