These petitions shall stand disposed of vide this common order. As to what should be the procedure to be followed when election of a returned candidate is challenged is a question which has acquired significance in view of the divergent stand taken by the counsel for the petitioner and the respondents. Can a petition preferred calling upon the election of a returned candidate under the Jammu and Kashmir Panchayati Raj Act of 1989, be. decided on the basis of pleadings in the application and the stand taken by the respondents and thereafter on the basis of affidavits submitted by the parties, without taking recourse to the method of vouchsafing of the authenticity of the stand taken which according to the petitioner can be done only by subjecting the person submitting the affidavit to cross-examination. The stand of the counsel for the respondent No. 2 is that as such a procedure is not envisaged by the Act and Rules, the petition preferred has to be decided on the basis of pleadings in the petition and the affidavits which are filed on a later date. 2. If the authority which is to decide the matter has the trappings of the Court and if the proceedings taken by the said authority have trappings of the judicial precedence, then the further consequence is that the authority has the power of summoning and enforcing attendance and compelling production of evidence. In such an eventuality, the authority concerned is expected to observe the elementary and fundamental principles of a judicial enquiry to comply with the rudiment requirements of fair play and to safeguard the fundamental constitutional rights of the citizens. In the absence of an express provision in the statute or statutory rule, such an authority would be at liberty to device its own procedure. Even though, such an authority may not be bound to follow the elaborate rules and procedure, but such an authority must follow some procedure so that the lis before it comes to an orderly end and the determination made by it is in consonance with the rules of fair play and justice. The question as to what is meant by a Court and what is meant by the term judicial power would be adverted to again; first facts be noticed : 3. The question as to what is meant by a Court and what is meant by the term judicial power would be adverted to again; first facts be noticed : 3. A petition was preferred under Section 43 of the Jammu and Kashmir Panchayati Raj Act of 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). It was pleaded that the election of respondent Romesh Chander, respondent No. 2 in this writ petition, was liable to be declared null and void as this respondent had committed corrupt practices of bribery and undue influence. It was also pleaded that there was illegal acceptance of void votes. So far as undue influence is concerned, the plea taken was that the Electricity department had installed an electric pole in a Charitable hospital. This was got removed by respondent No. 2 with the assistance of one Rishi Kumar, Junior Engineer and was installed at Jogi Mohalla. This was done with the object of influencing the voters of the said area. In para 2 of the petition, it is further submitted that in village Hotli Bajalan, the same Junior Engineer at the behest of said respondent, installed three electric poles and fitted electric wires on the same. This was done a week before the election date. The old water supply pipes were got repaired and in doing so, the services of the officials of the Public Health Engineering department were obtained. The name of Baldev Chand and Prem Nath have been mentioned in this regard in para 3 of the petition. In para 1, it is stated that a free langar was arranged and the voters were provided food in the house of one Das Raj of village Sarna. It was further pleaded in para 1 that the local MLA from the constituency called the residents of the locality in a temple of Maji Deva. There, a declaration was made by the concerned MLA that he ha been successful in arranging a sum of Rs.One crore from Nabad and this would facilitate the construction of a motorable road from Maji Deva temple to village Miari. It is submitted that the voters were called upon to take an oath that they would vote for Romesh Chander respondent. It was further stated in para 1 of the petition that the returned candidate repaired water tanks at his own expense. It is submitted that the voters were called upon to take an oath that they would vote for Romesh Chander respondent. It was further stated in para 1 of the petition that the returned candidate repaired water tanks at his own expense. In addition to this, in para 5 of the petition, it was stated that votes of several persons whose names have been mentioned in this para, were accepted illegally. It was submitted that these persons were, in fact, not physically present in the area on the date of election. It is this application preferred under Section 43 of the Act, which was adjudicated upon by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, (Collector), Reasi, and the same has been dismissed. 4. Before noticing the reasoning given by the said officer, it would be apt to notice the stand of the respondent also. It is stated that respondent Romesh Chander appeared before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Reasi. He states that after hearing both the sides, the matter was decided. This respondent had filed objections and had also filed counter-affidavit to rebut the allegations levelled against him. It was on the basis of the plea taken by the respondent and on the basis of affidavits and counter-affidavits, the issue was decided. As the respondent had taken a plea that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate is not competent to decide the petition, this was also adverted to by the said officer. It was concluded : i) That the said officer was conferred with the power to decide the petitions in terms of SRO 48 issued on 29th Jan., 2001; ii) That the other contentions raised by the respondent No. 2 are of much relevance. This is because the writ petitioner who was petitioner before the prescribed authority, had not raised any dispute or lodged any complaint before the Returning Officer. As the Returning Officer was present at the polling station and as the polling process took place in his presence, therefore, it was inferred that this was not a case where any material irregularity was committed in the method of acceptance of votes. 5. So far as other allegations are concerned i.e. the allegations of corrupt practice, all that has been stated is that....."I have examined the propositions advanced by the learned counsel of parties and examined the records produced by the petitioner. These documents did not prove the allegations as raised on the petition. 5. So far as other allegations are concerned i.e. the allegations of corrupt practice, all that has been stated is that....."I have examined the propositions advanced by the learned counsel of parties and examined the records produced by the petitioner. These documents did not prove the allegations as raised on the petition. The application for supplementary affidavits of six persons presented by petitioner filed on 22-3-2001 after the arguments had also been rejected. It was stated that the grounds on the basis of which dispute was raised are not covered by Section 43 of the Panchayati Raj Act of 1988. It was in this manner, the petition was rejected. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petition could not have been rejected. It is submitted by him that the opportunity to substantiate the allegations should have been given. The fact that supplementary affidavits were filed is being projected. On the other hand, the stand taken by the respondent No. 2 is that whatever was stated stood rebutted by filing counter-affidavits. It is submitted that the application preferred under Section 43 is to be decided in a summary manner and that there is no requirement to record oral evidence or to record statement of witnesses. Such is the precise stand taken by the respondent No. 2 in para 5(a) of the counter-affidavit filed by this respondent. 7. The subject of elections has been dealt with in Chapter X of Jammu and Kashmir Panchayati Raj Act of 1989. The disputes regarding elections are dealt with under Section 43. The election can be set aside if the returned candidate is found guilty of corrupt practice of bribery or undue influence and also if there is improper acceptance or rejection of any nomination or there is gross failure to comply with the provisions of concerned Act and Rules. The disputes regarding elections are dealt with under Section 43. The election can be set aside if the returned candidate is found guilty of corrupt practice of bribery or undue influence and also if there is improper acceptance or rejection of any nomination or there is gross failure to comply with the provisions of concerned Act and Rules. Section 43 is relevant and is being reproduced below : - "43 : Disputes regarding elections : (1) The election of a person as Sarpanch, Panch of a Halqa Panchayat or as a Chairman of the Block Development Council shall not be called in question except by an application presented to such authority within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed on the grounds that :- a) the election has not been a free election by reason that the corrupt practice of birbery or undue influence has extensively prevailed at the election: b) that the result of the election has been materially affected- i) by the improper acceptance or rejection of any nomination; or ii) by gross failure to comply with the provisions of this Act or the rules framed thereunder." 8. The above chapter does not indicate as to what procedure is to be followed by the authority which is to decide the election dispute under Section 43. Section 44 only makes mention of the fact that a Civil Court would not have jurisdiction to question the legality of any action taken or any decision given by an officer or authority appointed under this Act in connection with the conduct of elections, Thus, one thing is clear that so far as the Act is concerned, it only makes mention of the fact that election can be called in question in accordance with an application presented before the prescribed authority in terms of Section 43 and the grounds of challenge in this regard have been indicated in Section 43. The question arises as to whether such an authority is supposed to observe the norms which are normally adopted by an authority deciding a lis between the opposing parties. 9. Coke on Littleton and Stroud defined the word "Court" as the place where justice is judicially administered. The question arises as to whether such an authority is supposed to observe the norms which are normally adopted by an authority deciding a lis between the opposing parties. 9. Coke on Littleton and Stroud defined the word "Court" as the place where justice is judicially administered. According to Stephen, "In every Court, there must be at least three constituent parts-the actor, reus and judex; the actor or plaintiffs, who complains of an injury done; the reus, or defendant, who is called upon to make satisfaction for it; and the judex, or judicial power, which is to examine the truth of the fact, and to determine the law arising upon that fact and if any injury appears to have been done, to ascertain and by its officers to apply, the remedy." 10. Section 3 of Evidence Act defines "Court" as including all Judges and Magistrates, and all persons, except arbitrators, legally authorised to take evidence. This definition, however, has been held to be not exhaustive but framed only for the purpose of Evidence Act and is not to be extended where such an extension is not warranted. Sections 19 and 20 of the Penal Code, define the words "Court" as also the "Court of Justice" as under : "Section 19 : The word Judge denotes not only every person who is officially designated as a Judge, but also every person-who is empowered by law to give, in any legal proceedings, civil or criminal, a definitive judgment which, if not appealed against be definitive, or a judgment which, if confirmed by some other authority would be definitive, or who is one of a body of persons, which body of persons is empowered by law to give such a judgment. Section 20- The words "Court of Justice" denote a Judge who is empowered by law to act judicially alone, or a body of Judges which is empowered by law to act judicially as a body, when such Judge or body of Judges is acting judicially." 11. The pronouncement of a definitive judgment is thus considered the essential sine qua non of a Court and unless and until a binding and authoritative judgment can be pronounced by a person or body of persons it cannot be predicated that he or they constitute a Court. 12. The Privy Council in the case of Shell Co. The pronouncement of a definitive judgment is thus considered the essential sine qua non of a Court and unless and until a binding and authoritative judgment can be pronounced by a person or body of persons it cannot be predicated that he or they constitute a Court. 12. The Privy Council in the case of Shell Co. of Australia v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation, 1931 AC 275 thus defined "Judicial Powers" at page 295. "Is this right? What is "judicial power? Their Lordships are of opinion that one of the best definitions is that given by Griffith, C.J. in- Huddart, Parker and Co. v. Moore-head, (1909) 8 CLR 330 at page 357 where he says : "I am of opinion that the words, judicial power as used in Section 71 of the Constitution mean the power which every sovereign authority must of necessity have to decide controversies between its subjects, or between itself and its subjects, whether the rights relate to life, liberty or property. The exercise of this power does not begin until some tribunal which has power to give a binding and authoritative decision (whether subject to appeal or not) is called upon to take action." 13. Their Lordships further enumerated at page 297 certain negative proposition in relation to this subject: " 1. A Tribunal is not necessarily a Court in this strict sense because it gives a final decision; 2. Nor because it hears witnesses on oath; 3. Nor because two or more contending parties appear before it between whom it has to decide: 4. Nor because it gives decisions which affect the rights of subjects; 5. Nor because there is an appeal to a Court; 6. Nor because it is a body to which a matter is referred by another body. See Rex v. Electricity Commissioner, 1924 1KB 171". and otserved at page 298 : "An administrative tribunal may act judicially, but still remain an administrative tribunal as distinguished from a Court, strictly so called. Mere externals do not make a direction to an administrative officer by an ad hoc tribunal an exercise by a Court of judicial power." 14. See also Royal Aquarium and Summer and Winter Garden Society Ltd. v. Paron., 1892 (1) QB 431, and the observations of Fry, LJ., at page 446 therein : "I do not desire to attempt any definition of a Court". See also Royal Aquarium and Summer and Winter Garden Society Ltd. v. Paron., 1892 (1) QB 431, and the observations of Fry, LJ., at page 446 therein : "I do not desire to attempt any definition of a Court". It is obvious that, according to our law, a Court may perform various directions. Parliament is a Court. Its duties as a whole are deliberative and legislative; the duties of a part of it only are judicial. It is nevertheless a Court. There are many other Courts which, though not Courts of justice, are nevertheless Courts of investigation like the coroners Court. In my judgment, therefore, the existence the immunity claimed does not depend on the question whether the subject-matter of consideration is a Court of Justice, but whether it is a Court in law. Wherever you find a Court in law, to that the law, attaches such privileges, among which is the immunity in question.". 15. The question involved in that case was whether the defendant was entitled to absolute immunity from action for anything done by him while performing his duty as a member of the County Council in dealing with the adoptions for licences for music and dancing. It was contended on behalf of the defendant that he was exercising a judicial function when he spoke the words complained of and therefore was entitled to absolute immunity in respect of anything he said. The argument that "wherever you find a Court of law to that the law attaches certain privileges among which is the immunity in question used on behalf of the defendant and Fry, LJ. dealt with the same as under at page 447 : "It was said that the existence of this immunity is based on considerations of public policy, and that, as a matter of public policy, wherever a body has to decide question and in so doing has to act judicially, it must be held that there is a judicial proceeding to which this immunity ought to attach. It seems to me that the sense in which the word "judicial" is used in that argument is this; it is used a meanings that the proceeding are such as ought to be conducted with the fairness and impartiality which character proceedings in Courts of Justice and as proper to the functions of a Judge not that the members of the supposed body are members of a Court. Consider to what lengths the doctrine would extend, if this immunity were applied to every body which is bound to decide judicially in the sense of deciding fairly and impartially. It would apply to assessment committees, boards of guardians, to the Inns of Court when considering the conduct of one of their members, to the General Medical Council when considering questions affecting the position of a medical man, and to all arbitrators. Is it necessary, on grounds of public policy, that the doctrine of immunity should be carried as far as this? I say not, I say that there is ample protection afforded in such cases by the ordinary law of privilege. I find no necessity or propriety in carrying the doctrine so far as this argument requires." 16. Lord Esher, M. R. expressed himself as follows while dealing with this argument at page 442 : "It is true that, in respect of statements made in the course of proceedings before a Court of Justice, whether by a judge or counsel, or witnesses, there is an absolute immunity from liability to an action. The ground of that rule is public policy. It is applicable to all kinds of Courts of Justice; but the doctrine has been carried further; and it seems that this immunity applies wherever there is an authorized inquiry which, though not before a Tribunal which has similar attributes. In the case of Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby, (1873) 8 QBD 255, the doctrine was extended to a military Court of inquiry. It was so extended on the ground that the case was one of an authorized inquiry before a tribunal acting judicially, that is to say, in manner as nearly as possible similar to that in which a Court of Justice acts in respect of an inquiry before it. This doctrine has never been extended further than to Courts of Justice and tribunals acting in a manner similar to that in which such Courts act. This doctrine has never been extended further than to Courts of Justice and tribunals acting in a manner similar to that in which such Courts act. Then can it be said that a meeting of the county council, when engaged in considering applications for licences for music and dancing, is such a tribunal? It is difficult to say who are to be considered as judges acting Judicially in such a case." 17. The case of Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby, (1873) 8 QBD 255 was a case where immunity was claimed by a witness who had given evidence before a military Court of Inquiry. The case went to House Lords and the Lord Chancellor, in his speech at page 754, in Dowkins v. Lord Rokeby, (1875) 7 HL 74, observed : "Now, my Lords, adopting the expressions of the learned Judges with regard to what I take to be the settled law as to the protection of witnesses in judicial proceedings. I certainly am of opinion that upon all principles, and certainly upon all considerations of convenience and of public policy, the same protection which is extended to a witness in a judicial proceeding who has been examined on oath ought to be extended, and must be extended to a military man who is called before a Court of Inquiry of this kind for the purpose of testifying there upon a matter of military discipline connected with the army." 18. The position is thus summarised in the following passage in Halsburys Laws of England, Halisham Edition, Volume 8, page 526: "Many bodies are not Courts, although they have to decide questions and in so doing have to act judicially, in the sense that the proceedings must be conducted with fairness and impartiality, such as assessment committees, guardians committees, the Court of referees constituted under the Unemployment Insurance Acts to decide claims made on the insurance funds the benches of the Inns of Court when considering the conduct of one of their members, the General Medical Council, when considering questions affecting the position of a medical man." 19. The same principle was reiterated by the Supreme Court of India in Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees of Bharat Bank Ltd., AIR 1950 SC 188; and Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay, AIR 1953 SC 325 : (1953 Cri LJ 1432) where the test of a judicial tribunal as laid down in a passage from Cooper v. Wilson, 1937 (2) KB 309 at page 340, was adopted by the Court. "A true judicial decision presupposes existing dispute between two or more parties and then involves four requisites : (1) The presentation (not necessarily orally) of their case by the parties to the dispute; (2) If the dispute between them is a question of fact by mean of fact the ascertainment of the fact by mean of evidence adduced by the parties to the dispute and often with the assistance of argument by or on behalf of the parties on the evidence; (3) if the dispute between them is a question of law, the submission of legal arguments by the parties; (4) a decision which disposes of the whole matter by a finding upon the facts in dispute and an application of the law of the land to the fact as found, including where required a ruling upon any disputed question of law." 20. Maqbool Hussains case above referred to, was followed by the Supreme Court in S. A. Venkataraman v. Union of India, AIR 1954 SC 375 : (1954 Cri LJ 993) where a constitution Bench laid down that finality and authoritativeness were the essential tests of a judicial pronouncement. 21. Thus in view of what was stated by the Supreme Court in the case of Maqbool Hussains case and which view was approved in the case of SA Venkataraman, it becomes apparent that a true judicial decision must exhibit the four requisites indicated in Maqbool Hussains case. Leading of evidence and the right of opponent to cross examine the witnesses has necessarily to be incorporated. Without this; there can be no true determination of a dispute between the parties. Therefore, the authority which seized with the matter has to decide the dispute by following the procedure which enables the parties to put across their case and this necessarily includes recording of evidence also. In the present case, a prayer was made for taking into consideration the supplementary affidavits. This is commented upon by the prescribed authority. Therefore, the authority which seized with the matter has to decide the dispute by following the procedure which enables the parties to put across their case and this necessarily includes recording of evidence also. In the present case, a prayer was made for taking into consideration the supplementary affidavits. This is commented upon by the prescribed authority. This prayer was declined. As to why this was declined is, however, not apparent from the record. Therefore, it is held that in the present case, the procedure which was supposed to be followed by the authority exercising quasi-judicial powers, was not followed and the said authority did not afford opportunity to the parties to put across their point of view. The evidence in the shape of affidavits was sought to be brought on the record; this was not taken. 22. In addition to this, the argument raised that no objection was taken before the Returning officer of before, the Polling Officer, and therefore, this cannot be made a grievance in the petition, is an argument which cannot be accepted. Merely because, an objection is not taken before the Returning Officer or before the Polling Officer is no ground to hold that the election process was smooth and fair or that the votes which were accepted were properly accepted. In this regard, reference be made to the decision of the Supreme Court reported as AIR 1959 SC 422, N. T. Veluswami Thevar v. C. Raja Nainar. The view expressed was that the enquiry before the authority who is trying a election petition is not restricted to the material placed before the Returning Officer. It was observed that if the authority who is to decide an election dispute is to look into those matters which are placed before the Returning Officer, then, ultimate decision of that authority would become illusory. Therefore, to say that what was urge before the Returning Officer, only that matter can be taken note of is an argument which is without any basis. Again nothing prevents the authority dealing with the election dispute to not to take into consideration an averment, which on the fact, of it, even if taken as correct, would not vitiate the result of the election. Under the Election Law, a distinction is made between the material facts and the particulars. Again nothing prevents the authority dealing with the election dispute to not to take into consideration an averment, which on the fact, of it, even if taken as correct, would not vitiate the result of the election. Under the Election Law, a distinction is made between the material facts and the particulars. The material facts are those, which will go to make out the petitioners case from the charge against the respondent. If the material facts constitute a corrupt practice certain amount of details would be necessary to ensure clearness. The function of particulars is to point out or indicate the nature of the defence expected of the respondent. The Court has the power to struck of the pleadings if no material issue remains to be considered. In this regard, reference be made to the decision of the Supreme Court reported as AIR 1986 SC 1253 : (1986 All LJ 625), Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi. In view of the above, it is concluded : i. That an authority constituted to try a dispute pertaining to election, has to decide the dispute in a quasi-judicial manner; ii. That even though, nothing has been mentioned in the Act and the Rules as to what procedure is to be adopted, but this will not mean that the concerned authority is not to follow the norms which are normally followed by a judicial or quasi-judicial authority; iii. That even if something has not been brought to the notice of the Returning Officer, that cannot debar that party to urge something before the authority trying the election petition; iv. That if on the face of it and if everything said by the petitioner is taken as correct, no ground is made out for interference, then the authority can express a view to the said effect, but this course should be adopted in the rarest of rare case. 23. This petition is accordingly allowed. The matter shall stand remanded to the appellate authority. 24. Now the facts in OWP No. 398/ 2001 be noticed. 25. In the present case, an election petition was preferred under the Panchayati Raj Act of 1989 and Panchayati Rules, 1996. In this petition, it was pleaded that the election of the returned candidate is vitiated as he had committed corrupt practice of bribery and undue influence. 24. Now the facts in OWP No. 398/ 2001 be noticed. 25. In the present case, an election petition was preferred under the Panchayati Raj Act of 1989 and Panchayati Rules, 1996. In this petition, it was pleaded that the election of the returned candidate is vitiated as he had committed corrupt practice of bribery and undue influence. The result of the election was challenged inter alia on the following grounds : - i. That the respondent No. 2 is not a State subject; ii. That respondent No. 2 was involved in an espionage case and was dismissed from service; iii. That the counting of votes was not properly done; iv. That false representation was made. This was to the effect that he represented himself as a retired Deputy Superintendent of Police; v. That some favour was given by respondent No. 1; vi. That bad faith was shown to respondent No. 2. 26. The learned Counsel for the respondents submit that respondent No. 2 is not a dismissed employee. It is stated that he was reinstated in pursuance of the direction given by this Court in CIA No. 17/ 1987 on 12th March, 93. Copy of this has been placed on the record as Annexure A with the counter-affidavit. It is stated that allegations on the basis of which recount is being sought are not sufficient to seek re-count. For this reliance is being placed on a decision given by the Supreme Court of India in the case reported as AIR 1964 SC 1249, Ram Sewak Yadav v. Hussain Kamil Kidwai. It is submitted that with regard to the allegations of corrupt practice, these are vague and these cannot be made subject matter of inquiry. 27. It be seen that the proper course for the authority which decided the issue was to go into the matter in detail. It would have been apt to frame the issues. This is essential so that the parties are made aware of the case. Thereafter, opportunity to lead evidence should have been given. This apparently has not happened in this case. Order dated 10th May, 2001 does not satisfy the test of a speaking order. In this situation, order passed by the District Panchayat Officer acting as appellate authority on 10-5-2001 is set aside. The said authority would pass a fresh order in accordance with the law. 28. This apparently has not happened in this case. Order dated 10th May, 2001 does not satisfy the test of a speaking order. In this situation, order passed by the District Panchayat Officer acting as appellate authority on 10-5-2001 is set aside. The said authority would pass a fresh order in accordance with the law. 28. It is urged by the respondent No. 2 that the elected candidate should not be debarred from functioning as Sarpanch during the period the trial is pending. 29. The above prayer of respondent No. 2 is allowed. 30. These petitions are accordingly disposed of with the following directions : i. That the matter shall stand remanded to the appellate authority; ii. That the said authority would take notice of the pleas put forward by the parties and would decide the matter afresh by passing a speaking order; ill. The said authority would decide the matter within a period of six months from the date, a copy of this order is made available to it; iv. That till the matter is decided afresh, the candidates already elected shall continue to perform their duties as such. 31. Before parting with this judgment, it would be apt to point out that the authority deciding an election dispute must pass a speaking order. The requirement to pass a speaking order was laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Bhagat Raja v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1606. The reasoning given was that it is only when reasons are contained in the order, the superior authority can examine as to whether order passed is on valid grounds. It is in these circumstances, an order which is called a speaking order is supposed to be passed. The order should give precise reasoning. In the present cases, as indicated above, the concerned authority in OWP No. 502/2001, did not take the supplementary affidavits on the record and did not give opportunity to the parties to cross-examine. Thus, a procedure which is normally to be followed by a quasi-judicial authority has not been followed in the present cases. Even though, such an authority comes to a conclusion that no case is made out and on that basis, the prescribed authority is well within its rights to reject the petition, but this opinion has not to be formed lightly. Even though, such an authority comes to a conclusion that no case is made out and on that basis, the prescribed authority is well within its rights to reject the petition, but this opinion has not to be formed lightly. As the right to contest election, no doubt, is not a fundamental right but a civil right which is recognised by a statute and this right has to be safeguarded with a view to permit the democratic institutions which institutions are the backbone of the system. The establishment of Panchayati Raj is one of the cherished wishes of the framers of the Constitution and finds mentioned in the Directive Principles of Constitution. Therefore, if this Will of the Parliament is to be respected, then, this right is not to be taken away lightly. The matter, as indicated above shall stand remanded to the prescribed authority who would re-decide the same after affording proper opportunity of hearing to both the sides. So far as writ petitions, OWPs Nos. 656/ 2001, 679/2001, 678/2001, 728/2001, 720/2001, 719/2001, 718/2001, 624/ 2001, 627/2001, 753/2001 are concerned, a challenge is being made to the instructions conveyed by the Chief Electoral Officer dated 4th July, 2001, which were to the effect that, cases where decisions have not been given shall stand disposed of. The fax message given in this regard is as under : - "Despite several messages details of pendency and disposal with each Appellate Authority is pending with your district (.) Please expedite (.) All pending cases may be treated as closed and report sent immediately (.)" 32. The challenge is being made on the plea that such an interference cannot be made. It is urged that the authority which is to decide the dispute is to decide the issue as quasi-authority and with that decision, the Chief Electoral Officer is not competent to interfere with. Any interference by that agency or an officer who is not the prescribed authority would be an illegal action. 33. It be seen that the above fax message stands withdrawn vide order dated 19th Sept., 2001. A copy of this order/message is placed on the record as Annexure C.1. For facility of reference, this is also being reproduced below :- "Instructions conveyed vide this office wireless/fax message No. 5124/PE/2K1/ Cases/889-93 dated 04-7-2001 are hereby withdrawn (.)" 34. 33. It be seen that the above fax message stands withdrawn vide order dated 19th Sept., 2001. A copy of this order/message is placed on the record as Annexure C.1. For facility of reference, this is also being reproduced below :- "Instructions conveyed vide this office wireless/fax message No. 5124/PE/2K1/ Cases/889-93 dated 04-7-2001 are hereby withdrawn (.)" 34. In view of the above, the writ petitions aforementioned in which challenge is being made to the instructions issued by the Chief Electoral Officer on 4th July, 2001, would obviously be rendered infructuous. However, one thing is required to be said is that if on account of the instructions issued on 4th July, 2001, any petition was decided as per the said instructions, then, that order shall not be given effect to and the decision in that petition would now be taken on merits. As already indicated above, the authority deciding the election dispute is a quasi-judicial authority having the trappings of a Court and its procedure is to be regulated by that authority. Any interference with the same may amount to interference with the process issued by a quasi-judicial authority and may bring the action which is taken with a view to interfere with that process within the meaning of contempt also. This matter is left as it is. As a fax message has now been received which as indicated above is placed on record as Annexure C. 1 withdrawing the earlier instructions issued on 4th July, 2001, the only direction which is given is that all those cases where proceedings came to an end on account of instructions issued on 4th July, 2001, shall stand revived and decision as indicated above would be taken on merits. All the petitions are disposed of accordingly along with connected CMPs, in the manner indicated above. Ordered accordingly.