JUDGMENT Arun Kumar Goel, J (Oral):- This appeal is directed again compromise decree passed on the statement of respondent No.l proforma respondent. No.3 and learned counsel for the parties, who appeared before the first appellate court below. In fact, the matter was compromised with the intervention of the learned counsel for the parties when conciliation was brought around. First appeallate court on being satisfied that terms of the agreement and compromise arrived at between the parties before it were lawful and reasonable, as such statements of the parties/their learned counsel were ordered to be recorded. 2. A brief resume of facts of this case is as under:- A suit for possession was filed by Smt. Hazara Bibi, respondent No. 1 (hereinafter referred to as "the plaintiff"), against proforma respondents No.s. 1 & 2 Shahab Dee alias Shahed Deen Mohammad Akram; and Mohammad Aslam-appellant. All three are being referred to as defendants hereinafter. This suit was based on title, as according to the plaintiff, she was owner of land measuring 0-5 biswas comprised in khewat/khatauni No.29/39, khasra No. 1012 and two rooms, one latrine and bath room and a stair-case. Though this property was in her ownership, but was in occpation of the defendants as licensees. On the other hand, defendants claimed that it is they who have built the same on their own land and thus, they are occupying it as owners. It was in this background that suit came to be filed. 3. After conclusion of the trial, it was held that plaintiff has failed to establish having constructed house on khasra No. 1012, having given it for use and occupation to defendants in April, 1992 for few days, though she was held to be owner in possession of the land. It was further held that house has been constructed by defendants on their own land purchased in the year 1954 from one Nazir Ahmad. 4. In this context, it may also be noted that admittedly Nazir Ahmad was the sisters husband of the plaintiff, as is revealed from her statement and according to her, suit property was gifted to her by the said nazir Ahamad being its owner. Property stood mutated in her favour as far back oh 28th January, 1971 vide mutaiton No.l 133. 5. Against dismissal of the suit, plaintiff preferred appeal No.272/95/86, which came up before the first appellate court below. Property stood mutated in her favour as far back oh 28th January, 1971 vide mutaiton No.l 133. 5. Against dismissal of the suit, plaintiff preferred appeal No.272/95/86, which came up before the first appellate court below. It was during the pendency of this appeal that the matter has been compromised. 6. As per this compromise, out of the suit land 42.25 Sq. mtrs area in khasra Nos.349 and 354, as entered in the missal haquiat, was given to Mohammad Akram, defendant No.2, who was declared to be its owner subject to his paying rupees 9,000/ to the plaintiff on or before 15th June, 1994. Regarding rest of the land, i.e. 168.75 Sq.mtrs. comprised in khasra Nos.355,356 and 370 a decree for possession was granted in her favour. It was further agreed between the parties that in case defendat No.2 Mohammad Akram, failed to pay rupees 9,000/- or deposit the same in court on or before the stipulated date, plaintiff would also become entitled to get possession of the area comprised in khasra Nos.349 and 354, (i.e. the area of which the said Mohammad Akram was declared to be owner in terms of the statement of the plaintiff recorded by the appellate court below.) 7. Admittedly, all the defendants during the course of trial as well as in appeal were represented by their learned counsel. Statement was made by defendant No.2, Mohammad akram for himself as well as by their learned counsel (shri S.D. Ahluwalia, Advocate) on behalf of the defendants, which was in the following terms:- "Statement of Mohammad Akram, respondent No.2, on S.A. alongwith Shri S.D. Ahluwalia, Advocate for the respondents. Stated1 that we have heard the above statement made by the appellant alongwith her counsel, which is admitted to be correct and that the terms of compromise are also admitted to be correct and binding upon the parties. Stated further that if respondent No.2 fails to pay the amount of consideration to the tune of rupees 9,000/- to the appellant on or before 15th June, 1994, the suit of the plaintiff shall be deemed to have been decreed for posse sion of the entire area of land in suit including khasra Nos.359 and 354. Sd/- Sd/- Mohammad Akram District Judge Sd/- Bilaspur, HP. S.D. Ahluwalia, Adv. 13.4.1994 8. Sd/- Sd/- Mohammad Akram District Judge Sd/- Bilaspur, HP. S.D. Ahluwalia, Adv. 13.4.1994 8. On the basis of the aforesaid statement made by the plaintiff, defendant No.2 and respective counsel for the parties, through whom they were duly represented, first appellate court passed a compromise decree on 13th April, 1994. This has been challenged in the present appeal. 9. This appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law on 8th December, 1994:- 1. Whether the Ld. District Judge below committed an error in recording compromise ignoring the interest of all parties before the Court? 2. Whether compromise decree can bind a person not party to the compromise? 10. At the time of hearing learned counsel for the plaintiff has raised a serious contention based on section 96 of the C.P.C. and urged that this appeal deserves to be dismissed being not, maintainable under law, since it is passed with the consent of the parties based On the statements made by their respective counsel as well as plaintiff and defendant No.2. According to him, said compromise decree stands already implemented inasmuch as that plaintiff has got possession of three khasra Numbers (supra), measuring 168.75 Sq.mtrs and defendant No.2, Mohammad Akram is also enjoying the property in two khasra numbers measuring 42.25 Sq.mtrs. Money has been received by the plaintiff. 11. Before dealing with this contention, it will be appropriate to notice what was urged on behalf of defendant No.3 in the present appeal by Mr. Pathak, his learned counsel According to Mr. Pathak, this compromise is null and void and it neither binds his client nor defendats No.l & 2 in the suit. Only reason given by his is that none of the defendants much less his client instructed his counsel to enter into any compromise as well as to make any statement, therefore, according to him, this is good and sufficient ground to allow this appeal. With a view to buttress his submission, he placed reliance on Order 23 Rule 3 CPC as well as decision of the Honble Supreme Court reported in Gurpreet Singh v. Chatur Bhuj Goel AIR 1988 Supreme Court 400. Thus, according to him compromise having been entered into at the time of hearing of the appeal, but having not been reduced into writing was thus no compromise in the eyes of law and thus it dos not bind the parties. Thus, according to him compromise having been entered into at the time of hearing of the appeal, but having not been reduced into writing was thus no compromise in the eyes of law and thus it dos not bind the parties. He, however, fairly stated that Shri S.D. Ahluwalia, Advocate, was counsel of all the defendants, who all are arrayed as appellant and proforma respondents No.s 1 & 2 in this appeal. According to him, said learned counsel had not acted adversely to the interest of either his client or other two defendants, though he hastened to say that he had no authority to enter into said compromise. 12. On the other hand, learned counsel for the plaintiff pointed out that decision in the case of Gurpreet Singh, supra, gets into oblivion, inasmuch as that by subsequent decision of the Honble Supreme court in the case of Byram Pestonji Gariwala v. Union Bank of India & Ors. (AIR 1991 Supreme Court 2234), the matter is no more res-integra. He further pointed out that even by amendment of order 23 rules 3; the express/implied authority of the counsel is not whittled down or in any manner effected. According to him, if a constituted attorney of a party can enter into compromise, there is no good reason in law to deny such right in favour of counsel, who is placed at a much higher position than a constituted attorney. According to him, defendant No.2 i.e. present appellant, is bound by the statement of his advocate and even in the absence of a written compromise, coupled with the prohibition of Seeiton 96(3) of the C.P.C. there is no question of law much less substatial question of law involved in this case. 13. After having heard learned counsel for the parties and for the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, there is no merit in this appeal which is liable to be dismissed. 14. No doubt, in the case of Gurpreet Singh, supra, the Honble Supreme Court has said that where a compromise entered during the. Course of a suit or appeal, court must insist that it has to be in writing and to be signed by the parties. Matter relating to the authority of an advocate to compromise cases on behalf of his client had seen attending the attention of apex court. Course of a suit or appeal, court must insist that it has to be in writing and to be signed by the parties. Matter relating to the authority of an advocate to compromise cases on behalf of his client had seen attending the attention of apex court. After the decision of Gurpreet Singh, supra, matter again came up for consideration in the case of By ram Pestonji Gariwala supra, and what was observed and is relevant for the purposes of present case is extracted herein below:- "28. After the amendment of 1976, a consent decree, as seen above, is executable in terms thereof even if it comprehends matters falling outside the subject matter of the suit, but concerning the parties. The argument of the appellant counsel is that the legislature intended that the agreement or compromise should be signed by the parties in person, because the responsibility for compromising the suit, including matters falling outside its subject-matter, should be borne by none but the parties themselves. If this contention is valid, the question arises why the legislature has, presumably being well aware of the consistently followed practice of the British and Indian Courts, suddenly interfered with the time-honored role of lawyers in the conduct of cases without specifically so stating, but by implication? Can the legislature be presumed to have fundamentally altered the position of counsel or a recognized agent, as traditionally understood in the system of law and practice followed in India and other common law countries without expressly and directly so stating? There is no indication in preparatory work such as the 54th Report of the Law Commission dated 6.2.1973 or in the statement of Objections and Reasons qr in the words employed by the legislature that the concept of agents, and pleaders of O.III. C.P.C. was in any manner altered, there is no warrant for any such presumption." "30. There is no reason to assume that the legislature intended to curtail the implied authority of counsel, engaged in the thick of proceedings in Court, to compromise or agree on matters relating to the parties, even if such matters exceed the subject-matter of the suit. C.P.C. was in any manner altered, there is no warrant for any such presumption." "30. There is no reason to assume that the legislature intended to curtail the implied authority of counsel, engaged in the thick of proceedings in Court, to compromise or agree on matters relating to the parties, even if such matters exceed the subject-matter of the suit. The relationship of counsel and his party or the recognized agent and his principal is a matter of contract; and with the freedom of contract generally, the legislature does not interfere except when warranted by public policy, and the legislative intent is expressly made manifest. There is no such declaration of policy or indication of intent in the present case. The legislature has not evinced any intention to change the well recognized and universally acclaimed common law tradition of an ever alert, independent and active Bar with freedom to manoeuvre with force and drive for quick action in a battle of wits typical of the adversarial system of oral hearing which is in sharp contrast to the inquisitorial traditions of the civil law of France and other European and Latin American countries where written submissions have the pride of place and oral arguments are considered relatively insignificant. (See Rene David, English law and French Law - Tagore law Lectures, 1980). The civil law is indeed equally efficacious and even older, but it is the product of a different tradition, culture and language; and there is no indication whatever that Parliament was addressing itself to the task of assimilating or incorporating the rules and practices of that system into our own system of judicial administration." "35. So long as the system of judicial administration in India continues unaltered, and so long as Parliament has not evinced an intention to change its basic character, there is no reason to assume that Parliament has, though not expressly, but impliedly reduced counsels role or capacity to represent his clients as effectively as in the past. On a matter of such vital importance, it is most unlikely that Parliament would have resorted to implied legislative alteration of counsels capacity or status or effectiveness. On a matter of such vital importance, it is most unlikely that Parliament would have resorted to implied legislative alteration of counsels capacity or status or effectiveness. In this respect, the words of Lord Atkin in Surendra (AIR 1930 PC 158) (supra) comparing the Indian advocate with the advocate in England, Scotland and Treland, are significant: "There are no local conditions which make it less desirable for the client to have the full benefit of ^an advocates experience and judgment. One reason, indeed, for refusing to imply such a power would be a lack of confidence in the integrity or judgment of the Indian Advocate. No such considerations have been or indeed could be advancede, and their Lordships mention them but to dismiss them... (Page 161)." "38. Considering the traditionally recognised role of counsel in the common law system, and the evil sought to be remedied by Parliament by the C.P.C. (Amendment) Act, 1976, namely, attainment of certainty and expeditious disposal of cases by reducing the terms of compromise to writing signed by the parties, and allowing the compromise decree to comprehend even matters falling outside the subject-matter of the suit, but relating to the parties, the legislaute cannot, in the absence of express words to such effect, be presumed to have disallowed the parties to enter into a compromise by counsel in their cause or by itself duly authorised agents. Any such presumption would be inconsistent with the legislative object of attaing quick reduciton of arrears in Court by elimination of uncertainties and enlargement of the scope of compromise." "39. To insist upon the party himself personally signing the agreement or compromise would often cause undue delay, loss and inconvenience, especially in the case of non-resident persons. It has always been universally understood that a party can always act by his duly authorised represntative. If a power-of-attorney holder can enter into an agreement or compromise on behalf of his principal, so can counsel, possessed of the requisite authorization by vakalatnama, act on behalf of his client. Not to recognize such capacity is not only to cause much inconvenience and loss to the parties personally, but also to delay the progress of proceedings in court. If. the legislature had intended to make such a fundamental change, even at the risk of delay, inconvenience and needless expenditure, it would have expressly so stated." "40. Not to recognize such capacity is not only to cause much inconvenience and loss to the parties personally, but also to delay the progress of proceedings in court. If. the legislature had intended to make such a fundamental change, even at the risk of delay, inconvenience and needless expenditure, it would have expressly so stated." "40. Accordingly, we are of the view that the words in writing and signed by the parties, inserted by the C.P.C. (Amendment) Act, 1976, must necessarily mean, to borrow the language of O.III, R.I, C.P.C.:-"any appearance, application or act in or to any Court, required or authorized by law to be made or done by a part in such court, may except where otherwise expressly provided by any law for the time being in force, be made or done by the part in person, or by his recognized agent, or by a pleader, appearing, applying or acting as the case may be, on his behalf: Provided that any such appearance shall, if the Court so directs, be made by them party in person". "43. A judgment by consent is intended to stop litigation between the parties just as much as a judgment resulting from a decision of the Court at the end of a long drawn out fight. A compromise decree creates an estoppel by judgment. As stated by spencer-Bower & Turner in Res judicata, Second Edition, page 37: "Any judgment or order which in other respects answers to the description of a res judicata is nonetheless so because it was made in pursuance of the consent and agreement of the parties.... Accordingly, judgments, orders, and awards by consent have alwaysTjeen held no less efficacious as estoppels than other judgments, orders, or decisions, though doubts have been occasionally expressed whether, strictly, the foundation of the estoppel in such cases is not representation by conduct, rather than res judicata. See also Mohanlal Goenka v. Benoy Kishna Mukherjee, AIR 1953 SC 65." "44. The consent decree made on 18.6.1984 remained unchallenged. None questioned it. The appellant never raised any doubt as to its validity or genuineness. He had no case that the decree was vitiated by fraud or mis-representation or his counsel lacked authority to enter into a compromise on his behalf. Nevertheless, after six years he questioned its validity by means of chamber summons. None questioned it. The appellant never raised any doubt as to its validity or genuineness. He had no case that the decree was vitiated by fraud or mis-representation or his counsel lacked authority to enter into a compromise on his behalf. Nevertheless, after six years he questioned its validity by means of chamber summons. This was an unsuccessful challenge by reason of delay, estoppel or res judicata, and was rightly so held by the High Court." 15. A compromise decree or decree by conset primarily is aimed at reducing and minimising the Litigation which is in consonance with public policy also. Besides this, in what manner and what prejudice has been caused to defendant No.3 with the passing of the compromise decree could not be satisfactorily explained, though Shri Pathak persisted that no compromise could be done by Shri Ahluwalia in the absence of his client. This is a plea urged simply to be rejected. 16. In Smt. Jamilabai Abdul Kadar v. Shankarlal Gulabchand & Ors. AIR 1975 SC 2202 while considering the authority of a pleader under order 3 rules 1 & 4, the Honble Supreme Court held as under:- "22. While we are not prepared to consider in this case whether an Advocate or pleader is liable (o legal action in case of deviance or negligence, we must uphold the ac:ua;, though implied, authority of a pleader (which is a generic expression including all legal practitioners as indicated in Seciton 2(15). Civil P.C.) to act by way of compromising a case in which he is engaged even without specific consent from his client, subject undoubtedly to two overriding considerations: (i) He must act in good faith and for the benefit of his client; otherwise the power fails (ii) It is prudent and proper to consult his client and take his consent if there is time and opportunity. In any case, if there is any instruction to the contrary or withdrawal of authority, the implicit power to compromise, in the pleader will fall to the ground. We need hardly emphasize that the Bar must sternly screen to extirpate the black-sheep among them, for Caesars wife must be above suspicion, if the profession is to comman the confidence of the community and the Court." 17. We need hardly emphasize that the Bar must sternly screen to extirpate the black-sheep among them, for Caesars wife must be above suspicion, if the profession is to comman the confidence of the community and the Court." 17. In view of the aforesaid two decisions of the Honble Supreme Court > including the latter one of 1991, as well as bar under Section 96(3), the present appeal on behalf of defendant No.3-appellant is not maintainable. 18. Shri Pathak also pointed out that while defendant No.2 has been declared as owner in terms of compromise of two khasra numbers, his client has not got any benefit which is deterimental to his interest. In the circumstances and background of this case, this by itself is not enough to hold that his counsel did hot adequately protect his interest in the matter. Reason being that all the three defendants were represented by a common counsel in the trial Court where they had filed a common written statement. So this plea is hereby rejected. 19. No other point is urged in support of the two substantial questions of law extracted hereinabove. 20. For the foregoing reasons, it is held that there is no question of law much less substantial question of law involved in the appeal requiring determination under Section 100 CPC and at the same time, it is further held that appeal I is not maintainable in view of bar under Section 96(3) CPC. Thus, the appeal! is dismissed with no order as to costs. Interim order passed on 8th December, 1994 while disposing of CMP No.376/94 shall stand vacated forthwith.