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2001 DIGILAW 227 (JK)

Ghulam Ahmad Bhat v. Life Insurance Corporation of India

2001-09-27

A.M.MIR

body2001
JUDGEMENT 1. This petition calls in question an order of discharge passed by respondent-corporation on 14.08.2000. The petitioner, consequent upon applying for the post of a watchman in response to an advertisement notice, was appointed by the respondent-corporation. He worked on the post with effect from 28th April, 2000 to 14th August, 2000. Subsequently the order impugned was passed which reads as under:- "We had offered you appointment vide our letter dated 28.04.2000 on the basis of the facts/certificates produced by you along with your bio-data and application form for the post of watchman. In this regard please refer to your school certificate bearing admission No. 2310 from file No. 700 a copy of which was enclosed alongwith your Bio-Data form and as per your application dated 23.03.2000 for the above post. As per the discharge you were studying in 10th and your date of birth is 13.01.1974. On routine verification it is found that the discharge certificate bearing admission no. 2310/H under file No. 700 was not issued to you, instead it was issued to someone whose date of birth is reported to be 04.08.1939. The Principal, Khalsa High School, Srinagar has clearly remarked that the discharge certificate under reference is not genuine and all the signatures affixed thereon are fake. Based on this documentary evidence it is evident that you have made entry into the corporation through fraudulent means. Please refer to the declaration you have made in your Bio-Bata form as well as you application form dated 23.03.2000 that the information given by you are true and in case any information is bound false you may be disqualified from holding any appointment. We also draw your attention to para 3 and 5 of the appointment letter dated 28.04.2000 which reads as under: Para 3: "Your appointment shall be governed by the (Staff) Regulations, 1960 Rules framed by Central Government under Section 48 of the L.I.C. Act, 1956. The rules of the corporation and such instructions and/or orders that may be issued to you both verbal or in writing from time to time. The rules of the corporation and such instructions and/or orders that may be issued to you both verbal or in writing from time to time. Para 5: During probationary period, which may be extended by another six months, you are liable to be discharged without notice and without any case whatsoever being assigned to you for such discharge Apropos to above facts it is decided hereby to discharge you from the services of the corporation with immediate effect under provisions of Regulation 14(4) of the (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Yours faithfully, Sd/- Sr. Divisional Manager (Appointing Authority). 2. Obviously, the ground taken for discharging the petitioner was that at the time of applying for the post he had produced a fake certificate. The petitioner has with his writ petition filed a school leaving certificate issued by Headmaster. Government Secondary School, Panzan (Chadoora). According to Mr. Qayoom, petitioner had never produced any certificate other than the one he has enclosed alongwtith the petition. Apart form this ground, he has heavily dwelt upon the argument that the order, which is punitive in nature, could not have been passed without affording an opportunity of being heard to the petitioner. In this behalf he has referred to a judgement passed by the Supreme Court in case A.P. Ahuja vs. State of Punjab and others, reported in AIR 2000 SC 1080. 3. The case of the respondent-corporation, as represented by Mr. Andrabi, is that the petitioner had at the time of applying for the post produced a certificate said to have been issued by Khalsa High School, Srinagar. When the certificate was cross-checked after issuance of appointment order, it came to light that the certificate was forged and fake. In this behalf Principal, Khalsa High School was approached who wrote a couple of communications clarifying that the certificate was fake and that the one issued under admission No. 2310 has been issued to one Sikh boy, named, Sumeer Singh Son of Veer Singh. It is also contended that the respondent - corporation conducted an enquiry and called the petitioner also confronting him with the certificate wherein he certified as under: (Yeh certificate Mera Hai aur Maine Ye Naukari Ke Liye Diya Hai). 4. This certificate recorded by the petitioner seems to have been acknowledged by an independent witness also. Enquiry, according to Mr. It is also contended that the respondent - corporation conducted an enquiry and called the petitioner also confronting him with the certificate wherein he certified as under: (Yeh certificate Mera Hai aur Maine Ye Naukari Ke Liye Diya Hai). 4. This certificate recorded by the petitioner seems to have been acknowledged by an independent witness also. Enquiry, according to Mr. Arshad, was held wherein it was revealed that the certificate produced by the petitioner was fake. 5. I. have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and gone through the whole life. 6. The respondent-Corporation has placed on record the xerox copy of tile application filed by the petitioner for his appointment. In para 8 he states therein that Govt. Khalsa High School was the institution which he last attended. He was produced the same certificate which had been issued by Khalsa High School and later on, during the enquiry, endorsed the factual of such production. Communications written by Principal, Khalsa High School on 15.06.2000 and 16.08.2000 are a strong testimony to the fact that the respondents had conducted an enquiry wherefrom the allegation of forgery/fraud seems to have emerged. 7. Law with respect to forgery and fraud is distinct from ordinary law. The citation referred to by Mr. Qayoom relates to the discharge of a person who was on probation. Law with regard to such discharge is that no enquiry is required to be held. To this general rules, the Supreme Court by virtue of this judgement has carved out an exception that whenever an order is punitive or is based upon some reflections on the work, conduct and character of the employee then an enquiry is to be held and the absolute doctrine of pleasure, which is otherwise available to the employer, is qualified by the condition that an enquiry is to be held. The case in hand is on a distinct footing. Here the petitioner has applied for appointment on the strength of a qualification certificate obtained from a definite institution. That document was found to be fake. Therefore, the appointment itself gets blurred because of this circumstances. This is not an order punitive in nature. What has been done by the impugned order is to bring to an end the employment of the petitioner which is procured through a fake certificate. Whenever a fake certificate is produced, the process of selection is defrauded. Therefore, the appointment itself gets blurred because of this circumstances. This is not an order punitive in nature. What has been done by the impugned order is to bring to an end the employment of the petitioner which is procured through a fake certificate. Whenever a fake certificate is produced, the process of selection is defrauded. Therefore, as and when the factum of fakeness or forgery comes to light the employer is justified in withdrawing the order of appointing or discharging the person. Such a person can not invoke the writ process of this court exercisable in terms of Article 226 of the Constitution because this provides for an equitable relief which cannot be granted to a person who does not come to the court with clean hands. 8. This bench had an occasion to deal with SWP Nos. 817-22/1996 titled Manzoor Ahmad Sheikh and others vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir and others. In these petitions also the court came across with appointments which were fake. These writ petitions were dismissed and the judgement delivered on 29.06.1997 was upheld. The appellate bench while delivering its judgement in LPA No. 338/ 1997 on 11.07.2001 observed as under: "... Allowing them to continue in their respective posts despite of the fact that they entered into the service by playing fraud, would amount allowing perpetuation of fraud. If such situation arises, it will affect the moral of the public at large and set a bad precedence of grave consequences. On the other hand, the problems if any that may be faced by the appellants are self-creation and nobody shall be blamed". 9. The question as to how should the courts deal with cases were appointments are procured on fake certificates also came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in case titled B.Laxmidevamana vs. State of A.P. and others, reported in JT 2000 (8) SC 201. In that case the order by virtue of which the writ-petitioner's petition for grant of writ of Mandamus, directing the respondents to do a certain act, was dismissed. The Supreme Court upheld the order of dismissal and observed that writ remedy is not available to a person who approaches the court on the strength of fake orders. 10. In that case the order by virtue of which the writ-petitioner's petition for grant of writ of Mandamus, directing the respondents to do a certain act, was dismissed. The Supreme Court upheld the order of dismissal and observed that writ remedy is not available to a person who approaches the court on the strength of fake orders. 10. The question as to whether such a person can invoke the writ powers of the Court, came up for consideration in case D.Nagaraj vs. State of Karnataka & Ors reported in All India Services Law Journal, 1999 SC 217 wherein the Apex Court held as under: "The sole question that requires to be determined in these appeals is whether the appellants could maintain the aforesaid writ petitions. It is well settled that though Article 226 of the Constitution in terms does not describe the classes of persons entitled to apply thereunder, the existence of the right is implicit for the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction by the High Court under said Article. It is also well established that a person who is not aggrieved by the discrimination complained of cannot maintain a writ petition..." 11. Mr. Qayoom, appearing for the writ-petitioner, has strongly advocated that while passing the order impugned, the petitioner was not given an opportunity of begin heard. It seems that this ground is not wholly correct. The respondents have conducted an enquiry and confronted him with the certificate produced by him at the time of applying for the post. They have also approached the Principal, Khalsa High School, for verification of the document. After holding this enquiry, they arrived at the conclusion that the certificate was fake. Be that as it may. I had, during the course of hearing of the case, also liked to know the exact circumstances which the petitioner would explain in support of this argument. Mr. Qayoom in this behalf, relied upon a distinct School Leaving Certificate issued by the Headmaster, Government Secondary School; Panzgam (Chadoora) under Admission No. 307. No doubt that material particulars of this certificate are the same as found in the certificates issued by the Principal, Khalsa High School. This certificate was never produced by the petitioner at the time of applying for the post. Production of the certificate before this court (forming annexure A to the petition) worsens the situation. No doubt that material particulars of this certificate are the same as found in the certificates issued by the Principal, Khalsa High School. This certificate was never produced by the petitioner at the time of applying for the post. Production of the certificate before this court (forming annexure A to the petition) worsens the situation. The petitioner could have never attended two school at a time. The court, by production of this fresh certificate, gets fully convinced that the certificate produced by the petitioner at the time of seeking employment was fake. It is a well acknowledge principle of law the concept of natural justice is not an unruly horse not is it a lurking landmine, the scope of which can be expanded to unimaginable extent. I, therefore, regret my inability to agree that rules of natural justice, in the present case, could have been observed to the extent of absurdity. 12. On the analogy of the foregoing observations, I find no merit in this petition which I dismiss.