JUDGMENT Arun Kumar Goel, J.:- Appellant is aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 21.7,1997, passed by the learned District Judge, Shimla, in c.a. No. 149-S/l 3 of 1995 upholding the decree passed by the trial Court in civil suit No.228/1 of 1992, dated 30.3.1995. Trial court had decreed the suit of the respondent for possession in respect of Quarter No.6, Block 5, i.e. premises in dispute, as detailed in the plaint. 2. Respondent filed a suit for mandatory injunction as well as for possession against the appellant on the plea that one late Shri Mohan Lal was tenant in respect of quarter No.6, Block No, 5, Cecil Hotel, Shimla-4. Till his death, i.e. 10.12.1990, he was in occupation of the premises. Monthly rent of the demised premises was rupees 151- plus rupees II- as water charges. He was inducted as tenant in 1966. 3. Further case of the respondent was that the appellant is a trespasser into the premises and continues to be in possession without having any right, title and interest to remain in forcible occupation thereof. Thus, he is liable to pay rupees 50/- per-rnonth as mesne profits. According to them, amount of mesne profit for the period 1.1.1991 to 31.5.1992 works out to rupees 850/-. for this amount also decree was prayed. 4. This suit was contested and resisted by the appellant who amongst other things, pleaded that he is a tenant within the meaning of Section 2(j) of-the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 as such, petition was not maintainable and the plaintiff had no cause of action to maintain the suit. Estoppel was also set-up as a ground for dismissal of the suit. Appellant further claimed that he was residing with late Shri Mohan Lal and was his adopted son. When he went to pay the rent, officials of respondent assured that since defendant was the person who was ordinarily residing with the deceased at the time of his death, therefore, they will receive it only after the decision of the case. His further case was that he was liable to pay only rupees 151- plus rupees 2/as water charges and nothing more. Service of the notice on him was admitted by defendant. 5. His further case was that he was liable to pay only rupees 151- plus rupees 2/as water charges and nothing more. Service of the notice on him was admitted by defendant. 5. In replication filed on behalf of the plaintiff, averments (made in the written statement were denied, which were contrary to what was stated in the plaint and at the same time those in the plaint reiterated. In this background, following issues were framed by the trial Court. 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the possession of the prtynises? OPP 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the amount claimed? OPP 3. Whether the suit is not competent? OPD 4. Whether the suit has been filed without any cause of action? OPD 5. Whether the plaintiff is estopped from filing the suit as alleged? OPD 6. Relief. 6. Record of the trial Court shows that appellant was represented by his counsel. Respondent closed its evidence on 5.12.1994 when the case was listed on 30.12.1994 for evidence of the appellant. No steps were taken and prayer for adjournment of the case was made for production of evidence. It was allowed on the condition that defendant shall produce his DWs on self responsibility on 21.2.1995. Again, no evidence was produced this date. Case was adjourned to 24.3.1995. 7. No one appeared on behalf of the defendant on this date therefore, he was proceeded against ex parte and finally arguments were heard on 30.3.1995 when a decree for possession and mesne profit was passed in favour of the respondent and against the appellant. 8. Having felt aggrieved from the said decree of the trial Court, appellant preferred appeal before the learned District Judge. After hearing, it was dismissed, as aforesaid. Hence this appeal at the instance of the appellant. 9. This appeal was admitted on 9.11.1998, though no-substantial questions of law involving adjudication in the appeal were framed, as required under Section 100 C.P.C. at that juncture. After hearing, it was dismissed, as aforesaid. Hence this appeal at the instance of the appellant. 9. This appeal was admitted on 9.11.1998, though no-substantial questions of law involving adjudication in the appeal were framed, as required under Section 100 C.P.C. at that juncture. However, at the time of hearing of this appeal, learned counsel for the parties stated that the only question of law, if at all it can be termed, is whether the civil court had jurisdiction to have entertained the suit in view of the express stand of the appellant that he was a tenant within the meaning of Seciton 2(j) of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent control Act, 1987 and thus suit could not have been maintained against the appellant and was liable to be dismissed. 10. In this view of the matter, parties heard on the following substantial questions of law when it was stated by learned counsel for the respondent that he does not seek any adjournment and he prayed for final hearing of the appeal. 1, Whether the civil court had the jurisdiction to entertain and pass a decree for possession against the appellant in view of his stand that he was a tenant in the premises in quesiton and thus could only be evicted as per the provisions of Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act? Whether the suit in its present from for mandatory injunction was maintainable? 11. So far first question of law is concerned, it may be appropriate to observe that the appellant has taken a definite stand of his being adopted son of Mohan Lal, tenant of the premises in question. That is what he had specifically stated in para 2 of the written statement. Once this plea was put up, it was for the appellant to have led evidence of there being legal and valid adoption as envisaged under law. There is no evidence worth the name in this behalf. Even while filing his written statement, he has neither placed on record any document of adoption nor has relied upon any such document to substantiate his plea of so called adoption. Besides this, in the written statement, there is no plea set-up by the appellant other than his being the adopted son, to the effect that he was in any way related/connected with the deceased. Besides this, in the written statement, there is no plea set-up by the appellant other than his being the adopted son, to the effect that he was in any way related/connected with the deceased. In the face of this factual position, ipsidixit of the appellant in his written statement remains as it is and cannot be accepted. Thus, the civil court had jurisdiction to have entertained the suit and then passed a decree against the appellant and in favour of the respondent. 12. As there was no protective umbrella available to the appellant under the Rent Act so as to exclude jurisdiction of the civil court, so in this view of the matter, no exception can be taken to the concurrent findings recorded by the trial Court decreeing the suit of the respondent against the appellant. In addition to this on the basis of pleadings of the parties and evidence produced by the respondent, decree has been lawfully passed and respondent is entitled to its usufruct. 13. So far second substantial question of law is concerned, great emphasis was laid on the heading of the plaint and thus it was argued that claim of mandatory injunction could not have been granted. This is an argument raised simply to be rejected. Reason being that in addition to the relief of mandatory injunction, a decree for possession was also asked for by the respondent in its favour and against the appellant besides mesne profits. Decree has been passed in that behalf. For ready reference claim, as decreed by the trial Court, which has been upheld in first appeal was in the following terms:- "This suit is coming on this day for final disposal before Shri P.C. Sharma, Senior sub Judge, Shimla in the presence of Sh. R.S. Verma Advocate, for the plaintiff and Naresh Gupta, Advocate, for the defendant, it is hererjy ordered that the suit of the plaintiff for possession of Servant Qr.No.6 Block No.5, Hotel Oberoi Civil, Chaura Maidan, Shimla-4, and mesne profits of rupees 850/- is decreed, with costs." 14. In this view of the matter, substantial question No.-2 is also decided against the appellant. 15. In this view of the matter, substantial question No.-2 is also decided against the appellant. 15. While picking up the last straw, learned Senior Counsel made a vigorous attempt to persuade the court on the plea that his client has not been afforded reasonable hearing even if it be assumed for the sake of argument that the respondent could maintain the suit. This he submitted as a plea in the alternative. Again from the dates noted in the preceding pares of this judgment, this plea has been again raised to be rejected. As per the provisions of Order XVI C.P.c, both the parties were required to file their list of witnesses (in case they wanted to examine), within fifteen days of the date of framing of issues. In case any of the parties wanted to summon any witness through court, it could proceed further as envisaged under law. Appellant did not take any steps. Despite that, court allowed adequate opportunity to him (appellant) to produce his evidence. After availing the opportunity, as above, he chose to get himself proceeded ex-parte and thereafter suffered the decree. In this context, it may be appropriately observed that it is not requirement of law that a party, like appellant, must be afforded umpteen number of opportunities despite his being , not following the law; with a view to expedite, the provision of Order XVI were , amended by Central Act 104of 1976. When nothing was done, trial Court was perfectly justified in allowing opportunity to the appellant for production of his evidence at his own responsibility. Instead of either appearing himself or producing his evidence, he chose to remain ex parte and thereafter suit stands decreed. In these circumstances it cannot be said that adequate opportunity has not been allowed to him. 16. No other point is urged in support of the aforesaid two substantial questions of law. 17. In view of the aforesaid discussion, there is no merit in this appeal, which is dismissed with costs throughout.