JUDGMENT 1. - The instant second appeal has been preferred against the judgment and decree dated 4.9.1997, passed by first appellate Court whereby the first appellate Court by its impugned judgment affirmed the judgment and decree of eviction dated 15.2.1991, passed by the trial Court against tenant- defendant-appellants holding that tenant-defendant-appellant Ram Narayan (who expired after decision of first appellate Court and now being represented by his legal representatives), was inducted as a tenant by mortgagees of landlord-plaintiff/respondents and after redemption of mortgage on 15.9.1980, was liable to be evicted from the disputed premises. It is revealed from perusal of impugned judgment of first appellate Court that it has set aside the findings recorded by the trial Court on issues No. 2 and 4. Issue No. 2 pertains by whom Ram Narayan was inducted as a tenant over the disputed premises and issue No. 4 relates reasonable and bonafide necessity of the premises in dispute of the landlord-plaintiff-respondents. 2. The learned trial Court decreed the suit of eviction of the landlord- plaintiff-respondents on the finding recorded on issue No. 4 holding that they have succeeded to establish their reasonable and bonafide necessity for the premises within the meaning of clause (h) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. 3. It is to be noticed that the learned trial Court held that the tenant- defendant Ram Narayan was not inducted as a tenant over the disputed premises by the mortgagees but he was inducted as tenant by the mortgagors landlord- plaintiff-respondents. 4. Against the aforesaid judgment and decree dad 15.2.1991, passed by learned trial Court, the tenant-defendant, Ram Narayan filed an appeal before the first appellate Court under Section 96 C.P.C., whereas the landlord- plaintiff-respondent filed cross-objection under Order 41 Rule 22 C.P.C. against the finding recorded by trial Court on issue No. 2. 5. The learned first appellate Court after marshalling the oral and documentary evidence on record in an intelligible manner with reference to salient features of law, held that the trial Court has misconstrued the judgment and decree dated 21.9.1966 of eviction in a suit filed by mortgagees Ram Gopal and Ram Laxman against Ram Narain claiming him as sub-tenant in which mortgagors Babulal and Ram Niwas were also impleaded as parties. It is held by first appellate Court that after passing of the decree of eviction against Ram Narayan on 21.9.1966, Ram Narayan was instructed by mortgagors to pay rent to mortgagees and on creation of new relationship of landlord and tenant between mortgagees and Ram Narain, the decree for eviction passed on 21.9.1966 was not put to execution against Ram Narain. Ram Narain after passing of decree on 21.9.1966, was continuously paying rent to the mortgagees upto redemption of mortgage on 15.9.1980. Once Ram Narain predecessor-in- interest of appellants chose to enjoy the status of tenant over the disputed premises of mortgagees Ram Gopal and Ram Laxman for a period of about 14 years after passing of decree of eviction against him on 21.9.1966 then after redemption of mortgage on 15.9.1980 by mortgagors Babulal and Ram Niwas he cannot be allowed to breach the doctrine of approbate and reprobate his status as tenant of mortgagors. Claiming change of relationship of landlord and tenant after redeposit of mortgage on 15.9.1980, to hoodwink the legitimate claim of eviction of landlord-plaintiff-respondent is impermissible. The first appellate Court, after taking into account the preposition of law propounded by trial Court on this point, arrived at a conclusion that since mortgage has already been redeemed on 15.9.1980, therefore, after redemption of mortgage by (mortgagors) the landlord-plaintiff-respondents, the tenant of mortgagees, are liable to be evicted from the disputed premises. 6. In support of the aforesaid findings, the learned first appellate Court has given cogent and convincing reasons with which I am at one. 7. In addition to the aforesaid conclusion arrived at by the first appellate Court, it is held that if the judgment and decree of eviction dated 21.9.1966 is correctly and legally construed then the mortgagees, on the case on hand, will fall within the definition of "landlord" as defined under Section 3(iii) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, which provides that "landlord" means any person who for the time being is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of any premises, whether on his own account or as an agent, trustee, guardian or receiver for any other person, or who would so receive or be entitled to receive the rent if the premises were let to a tenant. 8. It is next contended by the learned Counsel for the appellant, Mr. 8. It is next contended by the learned Counsel for the appellant, Mr. Kamlakar Sharma that the cross-objection filed by the landlord-plaintiff-respondent under Order 41 Rule 22 was time barred and was filed alongwith an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act but the first appellate Court without condoling the delay has entertained the cross-objection which is per se illegal. 9. Suffice it to say in this regard that since the decree of eviction was passed in the present case in favour of the landlord-plaintiff-respondents, therefore, they were not required to file cross-objection under the amended Order 41 Rule 22 of the CPC which is made enforceable with effect from 1.2.1977 but they were entitled to support the decree in their favour. I am of the view that cross-objection was filed due to ill advice and as such it was a waste paper on the record, therefore, even if no order was passed on the application moved under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the present appeal is not maintainable within the meaning of amended Section 100 of the CPC. 10. From the discussions made hereinabove, it is held that under amended Section 100 of the CPC, a mere technical question of law having no bearing on the merit of the case cannot be entertained in second appeal unless it partakes the shape of substantial question of law. 11. It is next contended by learned Counsel for the appellants that the first appellate Court has decreed the suit for eviction against the pleadings of the parties. In order to avoid repetition and to maintain brevity, it is held that there are inherent limitations upon this Court to entertain a second appeal under amended Section 100 C.P.C., on a new plea which was not raised before the first appellate Court. I have no hesitation to hold that in the present case in view of proper construction of previous judgment and decree dated 21.9.1966, the pleadings of the parties deserves to be relegated to the background for deciding the controversy between the parties on merit.What has been discussed hereinabove, the instant appeal lacks merit and it is hereby dismissed in limine.Appeal dismissed. *******