JUDGMENT S. Marimuthu, J. 1. This appeal is directed questioning the judgment and decree delivered in A. S. No. 101 of 1993 on the file of the 1st Additional Sub Judge, Ernakulam. That appeal was filed against the judgment and decree in O. S. No. 561 of 1985 on the file of the 2nd Additional Munsiff, Ernakulam, Plaintiff is the appellant. In both the courts below the plaintiff was not successful. 2. Appellant as plaintiff filed the above said suit for perpetual injunction restraining the deceased first defendant, one Devassy, from causing any obstruction to the appellant's free egress and ingress to the plaint schedule property and from attempting to trespass into the plaint schedule property and also for a mandatory injunction to remove the obstruction caused for entering the plaint schedule property from the lane through the gate. First defendant died pending appeal and his legal representatives have been brought on record as respondents in this appeal. The case of the appellant in short is that the suit property measuring 8 cents in extent was purchased under Ext. A-2 (copy), dated 17th July 1969 with specific boundaries and it has got pucca compound walls on all sides. There is an iron gate at the east of the southern wall. Deceased first respondent unauthorisedly constructed a hut on the south of the suit property in puramboke land which lies north of the road, blocking the entry of the appellant to the plaint schedule property. Therefore, the above said suit was filed 3. Suit was resisted by the deceased first respondent with the contentions that he started to reside in the southern property from the year 1967 onwards prior to Ext. A-2 sale deed. At that time there was only a fence on the southern boundary of the plaint schedule property. Only after the purchase, the appellant put up the compound walls. She put up the gate in order to trouble the deceased first respondent. Since it is a puramboke land the Corporation alone is entitled to remove the first respondent from the place and he was not causing any obstruction for the appellant's egress and ingress to the plaint schedule property. Hence the suit is liable to be dismissed. In both the courts, as pointed out above, the appellant did not succeed. 4. Mr. Since it is a puramboke land the Corporation alone is entitled to remove the first respondent from the place and he was not causing any obstruction for the appellant's egress and ingress to the plaint schedule property. Hence the suit is liable to be dismissed. In both the courts, as pointed out above, the appellant did not succeed. 4. Mr. N. Subramaniam, learned counsel appearing for the respondents would contend that the suit is barred by limitation, that as the respondents have been in possession of the property from 1967, they have perfected title by adverse possession over the Corporation land, that they are not bound by the boundaries found in Ext. A-2 since they are not parties to the document, etc. He also contended that there is no illegality or infirmity or irregularity in the Judgments of the courts below warranting this Court to interfere with the concurrent findings. 5. Mr. M. R. Rajendran Nair, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, on the other hand, would contend that Ext. A-2 is so clear regarding the boundaries as per which the southern property belongs to the Corporation in which the first respondent has put up the hut unauthorisedly causing nuisance. When unauthorised construction has been put up causing nuisance which is a continuing one and in such circumstance it could not be said that the suit is barred by limitation. And when that be so, the respondents are not entitled to claim title by adverse possession over the Corporation land. There is no other way for the appellant for her egress and ingress to her property and in fact the gate was damaged by the deceased first respondent. Therefore, for both the reliefs, the suit is perfectly maintainable. 6. In view of the above rival submissions of the learned counsel, the statutory and settled propositions of law on these points can be first examined. 7. The Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Khair Mohd. Khan v. Mt. Jannat A.I.R. 1940 Lahore 359 (F.B.) has held thus: "In considering whether the particular act complained of constitutes a continuing wrong within the meaning of S.23 for which the cause of action arises de die in diem, it is necessary to keep in mind the distinction between an 'injury' and the 'effects of that injury'. Khan v. Mt. Jannat A.I.R. 1940 Lahore 359 (F.B.) has held thus: "In considering whether the particular act complained of constitutes a continuing wrong within the meaning of S.23 for which the cause of action arises de die in diem, it is necessary to keep in mind the distinction between an 'injury' and the 'effects of that injury'. Where the injury complained of is complete on a certain date there is no 'continuing wrong' even though the damage caused by that injury might continue. In such case the cause of action to the person injured arises once and for all, at the time when the injury is inflicted and the fact that the effects of the injury are felt by the aggrieved person on subsequent occasions inter mittently or even continuously does not make the injury a 'continuing wrong' so as to give him a fresh cause of action on each such occasion. If however the act is such that the injury itself is continuous, then there is a 'continuing wrong' and the case is governed by S.23." It is relevant to extract here S.23 of the Indian Limitation Act (Act IX of 1908) which corresponds to S.22 of the Limitation Act (Act 36 of 1963). "23. Continuing breaches and wrongs. In the case of a continuing breach of contract and in the case of a continuing wrong independent of contract, a fresh period of limitation begins to run at every moment of the time during which the breach or the wrong, as the case may be, continues." The Patna High Court in Bhagwan Dutt v. Asharfi Lal AIR 1934 Patna 34 held as follows: "No length of user can justify an encroachment into a public way, as such encroachment is a continuous wrong and no question of limitation arises." In Bibhuti Narayan v. Mahadev Asram A.I.R. 1940 Patna 449 the Patna High Court has held thus: "Upon its terms S.23 can only apply where the wrong is really a continuous one, and this cannot be the case where the encroachment is by an act such as the building of a wall, which is over and done with once completed. A distinction must be made between the continuance of a legal injury and the continuance of its injurious effects. There is however nothing in S.23 upon which to base a distinction between public, quasi public and private rights. A distinction must be made between the continuance of a legal injury and the continuance of its injurious effects. There is however nothing in S.23 upon which to base a distinction between public, quasi public and private rights. Whether the wrong is continuing or not must depend upon the nature of the wrong itself and not upon the nature of the right which is infringed. Where the wrong amounts to dispossession of the plaintiff, then, although it may be a continuing wrong, the plaintiff cannot recover possession after 12 years." Following the decision in Bibhuti's case (stated supra) the Patna High Court in Kuseshwar Jha v. Uma Kant A.I.R. 1942 Patna 188 has held thus: ''Limitation Act (1908) S.23, Art.142. Wrong amounting to dispossession or ouster even though it may be continuing, suit to recover possession is governed by Art.142 and does not come under S.23 Suit after 12 years of such wrong is barred." The Nagpur High Court in Atnbadas Rukhabji v. Dattatraya Parashuram A.I.R. 1945 Nagpur 78 has held thus: "Dispossession is a trespass. Continuance of possession after trespass is a continuance of the original wrong but is not a continuing wrong within the meaning of S.23 which has to be construed in a manner which will reconcile it with Art.142 or 144, Limitation Act. Once there is a dispossession of the owner of the land the wrong is complete and the limitation starts from that date and is not saved by S.23, Limitation Act. It is not a case of a 'continuing wrong' within the case of a 'continuing wrong' within the meaning of S.23.' Following the decisions in Bibhuti Narayan's case and Kuseshwar Jha's case (stated supra), the Patna High Court has in Brij Bhukan v. S.D.O. Siwan A.I.R. 1955 Patna 1 has held thus: "Section 23 can only apply where the wrong is really a continuing one, and it cannot be applied to a case where the encroachment is by an overt act and the person encroaching has ever since the date of encroachment been in possession and has been in possession for a period of twelve years. There is nothing in S.23 upon which a distinction can be made between the case of encroachment upon private land and upon public land, and if in the one case limitation may run, there is no reason why it should not also run in the case of a precisely similar act committed upon public land. The real question is not whether the wrong is continuing or not, but whether the wrong amounts to a complete ouster of the plaintiff, that complete ouster of the plaintiff, that is, to his dispossession." The Supreme Court in Balakrishna v. Shree D. M. Sansthan A.I.R. 1959 S.C- 798 has held thus: "Section 23 refers not to a continuing right but to a continuing wrong. It is the very essence of a continuing wrong that it is an act which creates a continuing source of injury and renders the doer of the act responsible and liable for the continuance of the said injury. If the wrongful act causes an injury which is complete, there is no continuing wrong even though the damage resulting from the act may continue. If, however, a wrongful act is of such a character that the injury caused by it itself continues, then the act constitutes a continuing wrong. In this connection it is necessary to draw a distinction between the injury caused by the wrongful act and what may be described as the effect of the said injury. It is only in regard to acts which can be properly characterised as continuing wrongs that S.23 can be invoked. Where the wrongful act complained of amounts to ouster, the resulting injury to the right; is complete at the date of the ouster and so there would be no scope for the application of S.23 in such a case." Following the decisions in Bibhuti Narayan's case and Kuseshwar Jha's case (stated supra), the Patna High Court in Sheo Narayan v. Ambica Singh A.I.R. 1970 Patna 246 has held thus: "Section 23 applies to a case of obstruction to a right of way unless there is complete ouster. If there is no complete ouster it is a case of continuing nuisance as to which cause of action will be renewed de die m diem so long as the obstruction continues." The Madras High Court in Bharathamatha Desiya Sangam v. Roja Sundaram A.I.R. 1987 Madras 183 held thus: "Owner of land abutting road is entitled to access to it from every point on the boundary of land. He is entitled to enforce his right notwithstanding the fact that there is some space available between the offending constructions. Offending construction would constitute a continuing wrong and though suit is filed five or six years after constructions, it would be maintainable." 8. Regarding nuisance the settled propositions of law can be examined hereunder. The Rajasthan High Court in Pyarelal v. Santlal A.I.R. 1972 Raj 103. had held thus: "Civil Procedure Code (1908), S.91(2) 'Public nuisance'. A person whose right to pass along a highway is obstructed or interfered with can maintain a suit in respect of public nuisance without proving any other damage." The Allahabad High Court in Abdul Ghafoor v. Kwnj Behari Lal A.I.R. 1957 Allahabad 346 has held thus: "A defendant's deliberate avoidance of the witness-box raises a presumption against his contention that he is a permanent tenant." The Patna High Court in Ramji Jankiji v. Manni Baba A.I.R. 1978Patna 48 has held thus: "It is true that there is no rule of law that the plaintiff must examine himself as a witness in order to establish his case. But a Court of law is entitled to draw aa inference adverse to the plaintiff if he does not have the courage to depose what he has claimed to prove facts mentioned, in the plaint. A Court would be fully justified in not accepting the averments in the plaint unless there is other coercive evidence in support of it." The Madras High Court in V.A.A. Nainar v. A. Cettiar A I R.1972 Madras 154 held thus: With reference to the claim for mandatory injunction the principle laid ddvra by the Calcutta High Court in Becharam v. Benode Behari A.I.R. 1928 Calcutta 510 reads thus: "Mandatory injunction is an equitable relief and one of the principles on which such relief is granted is that the plaintiff must show diligence and must not be a guilty of laches. An injunction cannot be granted when the conduct of the plaintiff or his agent is such as to disentitle him to any assistance from Court." 9. So far as S.100 C.P.C. is concerned the following propositions of law have been laid down. The Supreme Court in Basappa v. Puttappa A.I.R. 1928 Calcutta 510 has held thus: "Substantial question of law held, Judgment of High Court suffers from Infirmity if it is not based on a substantial question of law. High Court erred in allowing respondent plaintiff's second appeal without formulating such question Judgment of first appellate court, holding that appellant defendant had perfected title to suit property through adverse possession, restored." In Kondiba Dagadu Kadatn v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar 1999 (3) S.C.C. 722 the Supreme Court has held as follows: "High Court must adhere to the procedure and conditions prescribed in the section and no court has the power to add to or enlarge the conditions of appeal; High Court must satisfy itself that a substantial question of law is involved and must then formulate the question on which the appeal would then be heard; the respondent has the right to argue that no substantial question of law is involved; a second appeal cannot be decided on merely equitable grounds; the court must distinguish between a question of law and a substantial question of law; a substantial question of law must be distinguished from a substantial question of fact; and concurrent findings of fact, however, erroneous, cannot be disturbed under the section. Proviso to S.100 however, in the interests of justice permits the High Court to hear an appeal on a substantial point of law even though not formulated by it Held, on facts, no question of law was involved and High Court wrongly disturbed the findings of facts of the first appellate court without adhering to the principles of and limitations imposed by S.100." The Supreme Court in M. G. Hegde v. Vasudev D. Hegde 2000 (2) S.C.C. 213 it is held as follows: "Jurisdiction limited Words 'primafacie perverse and error apparent on the face of the record' are not a 'mantra' and cannot be employed to permit High Court to do in second appeal what the law enjoins on it not to do Held. High Court erred in going into the evidence and reaching a conclusion contrary to that of lower court." 10. High Court erred in going into the evidence and reaching a conclusion contrary to that of lower court." 10. From the arguments of both the learned counsel, the points which require for decision are: whether the suit is barred by limitation; whether there is sufficient space for the egress and ingress of the appellant to her property; whether the appellant is entitled to prohibitory and mandatory injunction for the removal of the construction of the respondents and whether this Court can interfere with the concurrent finding entered by both the courts below. 11. Learned council appearing for the appellant, would contend that in view of the well settled propositions of law, the suit has been rightly filed within the time of limitation. No doubt, the above contention is countered of the learned counsel appearing for the respondents stating that a thorough and careful scrutiny of the principles of law would evince that the suit is badly barred by limitation. 12. In view of the rival submissions both the learned counsel, I will examine the provision contained ia S.23 of the old Limitation Act. As per S.23 of the said Act, no doubt, in the case of continuing breach of contract or continuing wrong, a fresh period of limitation shall begin to run at every moment of the time during which the breach or the wrong is continuing. Regarding this aspect of continuing wrong of breach, I have extracted above the principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court and various High Courts. The Supreme Court in Balakrishnan's case (stated supra) has laid down the law that when the injury caused by a wrongful act is complete, there is no continuing wrong though the damage resulting from the act may continue and when the injury itself continues, then it can be rightly held that the wrong is continuing. In the instant case as is seen in the evidence of the second respondent examined as D.W. 1, her father began to reside in the property, i.e., the puramboke land, belonging to the Corporation, from the year 1967 and from the year 1967 they have been residing in the said property which lies south of the suit property. The suit property measuring 8 cents was purchased by the appellant under Ext. A-2 on 17th September 1969. The suit property measuring 8 cents was purchased by the appellant under Ext. A-2 on 17th September 1969. D.W. 1 would further depose that they had started their residence in the hut put up in the puramboke land on 9th September 1967 and she remembers the date because it was her birthday. In fact that evidence of D.W. 1 stands unassailed. No evidence is let in by the appellant to rebut that aspect that the respondents began to reside there from 1967 onwards. 13. To inspect the disputed property a Commissioner was appointed by this Court. The Commissioner has filed his report with a plan and they are marked as Exts. C-2 and C-3 respectively. The plaint schedule property and, also the southern property, namely, the puramboke land in which the respondents are residing have been shown by the Commissioner in the plan. A reading of his report would go to show that the respondents after demolishing their old house, have started the new construction more or less in the same place after obtaining necessary permission from the Corporation. Regarding this aspect of obtaining permission from the Corporation, there is no dispute. As noted above, the land in which the respondents are residing does not belong to any individual and It is a puramboke land belonging to the Corporation. The Corporation has not taken any action against the respondents in respect of their occupation of the land from the year 1967 onwards Even the appellant had not moved the Corporation till the filing of the suit in the year 1985 from her purchase in the year 1969 regarding the unauthorised occupation of the land by the deceased first respondent. Even if it is taken for argument sake that any injury is caused by the occupation of the respondents, that injury is caused only to the Corporation and not to the appellant. In that view, it could be rightly said that the decisions referred to above by the appellant are not squarely applicable to the case of the appellant. Once the first respondent has occupied the land, the possession is complete and after occupation he put up the hut and began to reside. Therefore, so far as the land is concerned, namely, the possession of it and also the residence of the respondents in it, the whole act was complete even in the year 1967. Once the first respondent has occupied the land, the possession is complete and after occupation he put up the hut and began to reside. Therefore, so far as the land is concerned, namely, the possession of it and also the residence of the respondents in it, the whole act was complete even in the year 1967. Hence there could be no continuing act or wrong and in that situation the limitation would begin to run only from the year 1967. Therefore, it could be concluded that the suit is barred by limitation even though the appellant has nothing to do with the land. For, as I have pointed out above, it is a puramboke land belonging to the Corporation. 14. The arguments advanced on the side of the appellant would be that by the construction of the hut by the respondents, a nuisance is created or committed by the respondents in obstructing her egress and ingress to her property and that nuisance is a continuing one. Therefore the limitation would start from every day since the nuisance by the obstruction is a continuing one. Hence the principles of law settled by the Supreme C3urt as welt as the other High Courts shall squarely apply to the case of the appellant. That contention, I am unable to appreciate, because as pointed out above the respondents began to reside in the puramboke land from the year 1967 onwards by putting up a hut. Only in the year 1969, the appellant has purchased the plaint schedule property and till 1985, the year of filing of the suit, it appears that no action has been taken by the appellant to the effect that her egress and ingress were obstructed by the respondents. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that nuisance is a continuing one cannot be accepted. For the act was already over in the year 1967. The principle laid down by the Madras High Court in Bharathamatha Desiya Sangam's case (stated supra) shall not be applicable to the case on hand. The facts in that case are entirely different from the facts of the present case. In that case an open space was used by the plaintiff for taking materials in vehicles to his flour mill and those vehicles were stationed in that open space. The facts in that case are entirely different from the facts of the present case. In that case an open space was used by the plaintiff for taking materials in vehicles to his flour mill and those vehicles were stationed in that open space. Flour mill was on the south of the open space and from the mill one can reach the road lying on the north through the open space. That open space was obstructed by the defendant by a construction. In that situation the dispute arose. So also the principle laid down in Pyarelal's case (stated supra) is not applicable to the present -case on hand because there the facts are entirely different from the present case. There the principle laid down is that when the right of a person to pass along a highway is obstructed, he can maintain a suit for nuisance. 15. The case of the appellant would be that there were compound walls on all sides of the plaint schedule property with a gate on the eastern side of the southern compound wall and that was damaged by the deceased first respondent. Therefore the reliefs have been sought for. The Commissioner appointed by this Court has located the gate as well as another opening on the same compound wall on the western side which is having a width of 2.74 meters (9 feet). On the western side of the respondents' property there is an open space. The above opening in the property of the appellant to a width of 9 feet is facing the above said open space. The extent of the open space would be about 3/4th cent. In the report the Commissioner has stated that the appellant can have the access to her property on the demolition of the western side of the southern compound wall. Therefore, no doubt, Mini Lorries and Pleasure Cars can be taken through it. Hence it could not be said that the appellant has no other access to her property from the road. The road as is seen in the plan runs from east to west with slight deviation in front of the respondents' house and in front of the southern property. In between the road lying on the south and the respondents' property there is another patta land. The road as is seen in the plan runs from east to west with slight deviation in front of the respondents' house and in front of the southern property. In between the road lying on the south and the respondents' property there is another patta land. From the new opening the appellant could not go towards south to reach the road lying on the south. And it is not the case of the appellant that the southern owner is also obstructing her egress -and ingress. As pointed out above, it is a patta land. Even if any portion of the building of the respondents is demolished for the way of the appellant, then the southern owners' building has also to be demolished for the comforts of the appellant. But, as I have pointed out above, the southern owner is not a party in the suit and no averments have been put against the building of the southern owner. When I examine the above facts, I feel that the appellant can use the opening having a width of 2.74 meters in the western side of the southern compound wall for her egress and ingress. 16. Yet another submission of the respondents would be that the suit itself is not maintainable since there is no cause of action. It is the case of the appellant that on 12th May 1985 the deceased first respondent attempted to trespass into the plaint schedule property and it is the cause of action. But no evidence is let in by the appellant that the cause of action arose on that day, namely, the deceased first respondent demolished the gate or attempted to trespass into her property, etc. The non-examination of the appellant on her side is fatal to her case. Not doubt, the plaintiff need not in all cases enter the box to set forth the plaintiff's case. However, when there arose necessity for a proper adjudication, the plaintiff must come and depose and in such case when the plaintiff is not entering the box or want only avoiding the box needless to say that an adverse inference can be drawn against the plaintiff. In this case such an occasion has arisen against the appellant. 17. One more important thing in this case is regarding the boundaries in Ext. A-2. It appears that the southern boundary is shown as the road. In this case such an occasion has arisen against the appellant. 17. One more important thing in this case is regarding the boundaries in Ext. A-2. It appears that the southern boundary is shown as the road. To that document the respondents were not parties. Therefore, the boundaries stated thereon shall not bind the respondents. Hence, by the boundaries ia Ext. A-2 the appellant cannot set up a case against the respondents. It is also one of the principles laid down that when a mandatory injunction is sought for, the plaintiff must show that the plaintiff was rot guilty of any laches and in spite of plaintiff's diligence unauthorised construction was put up. In the instant case, to speak of the same, the proper wheels is the appellant herself. But the appellant has not entered the box. Further, when the cause of action itself is not established by the appellant, I do not think that the suit can be properly maintained. In other words, I can go to the extent of even saying that the suit is not maintainable. 18. The other important point is whether this Court can interfere with the concurrent findings recorded by the courts below. The Supreme Court has made the distinction between the question of law and substantial question of law. In a series of decisions, the Supreme Court has also made clear what is substantial question of fact and what is the mixed question of law and facts and when High Court can interfere with under S.100 C.P.C. When the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in all the above aspects are applied to the facts of the present case, I am of the clear view that there is no substance in the contention of the appellant for an interference with the findings entered by both the courts below. 19. On account of the foregoing reasons, I am of the view that there is no necessity to disturb the Judgments delivered by both the courts below and the appeal is only to be dismissed. 20. Before leaving this Judgment, I would observe that both the parties shall use and enjoy the open space, about 3/4th cent, lying in front of the respondents' building and south of the opening in the southern compound wall of the appellant without obstructing one another in any manner and without developing any misunderstanding and bitterness between themselves. 20. Before leaving this Judgment, I would observe that both the parties shall use and enjoy the open space, about 3/4th cent, lying in front of the respondents' building and south of the opening in the southern compound wall of the appellant without obstructing one another in any manner and without developing any misunderstanding and bitterness between themselves. In the result, the Second Appeal stands dismissed.