JUDGMENT C.K. Thakker, C.J. (Oral) :- In this matter, notice was confined to respondents 1 and 2 for admission as well as for final hearing returnable on June 7. 2001. Today we have heard the learned counsel for the parties. Admitted. Mr. M.L. Chauhan. learned Deputy Advocate General waives service of notice of admission on behalf of respondent No.l and Mr. Anil Chauhan. learned Advocate waives service of notice of admission on behalf of respondent No.2. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the matter is taken up for final hearing. 2. This petition is filed by the petitioner Municipal Council Paonta Sahib, for an appropriate writ, order or direction quashing and setting aside the communication (Annexure P-l) issued by theappropriate Government in exercise of the powers under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. 1947. (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") referring matter to the Labour Court. Shimla. The reference which has been made under sub-section (1) of Section 10 of the Act reads thus:- "Whether termination of services of Shri Nisar Ali by (1) Executive Officer. Municipal Council Paonta Sahib. Sirmaur. H.P. and (2) The Director. Urban Development. Himachal Pradesh. Shimla-2. w.e.f. 3.10.1988 without any notice, chargesheet. enquiry and without compliance of section 25(F) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 1947. as alleged, is legal and justified. If not., to what relief of service benefits and amount of compensation. Shri Nissar Ali is entitled?" 3. The case of the petitioner in the petition is that respondent No.2 was appointed as a Labourer on daily wages by the petitioner as Tool Tax Barrier Peon on February 3. 1988.pursuant to his application dated January 28. 1988. He was informed that he was appointed on daily wages at Tool Box Barrier. Paonta Sahib on daily wage of Rs.15/- per day. His appointment may per.day. His appointment was purely, temporary (Annexure P-2). The respondent No.2 was not performing his functions and discharging his duties satisfactorily as it appears from the record which has been produced before the Government and at a number of occasions, respondent No.2 was either found sleeping or defeating in collecting toll tax as required by law. In the circumstances, after issuing notice, services of respondent No.2 were terminated vide order dated October 5. 1988 (annexure P-3. Respondent No2. did nothing for quite long. For the first time, an application was made by him on June 13. In the circumstances, after issuing notice, services of respondent No.2 were terminated vide order dated October 5. 1988 (annexure P-3. Respondent No2. did nothing for quite long. For the first time, an application was made by him on June 13. 1999 (Annexure P-4). that is after about eleven years of termination of services and conciliation proceedings were initiated. A reply was filed by the petitioner on October 8. 1999 (Annexure P-5) wherein service history of respondent No.2 was stated and it was contended that the claim of respondent No.2 was hopelessly time barred and no reference could be made. The appropriate Government, however vide the impugned order made a reference which has been challenged by the petitioner in this petition. 4. We have heard Mr. S.S. Mittal learned counsel for the petitioner. Mr. M.L. Chauhan. learned Deputy Advocate General for respondent No.l and Mr. Anil Chauhan. learned counsel for respondent No.2. 5. Mr. Mittal submitted that it is true that there is no period limitation for making reference under Section 10 of the Act but the condition precedent which can be said to be a jurisdictional fact must exist. It is that an appropriate Government before making reference must be satisfied that an industrial dispute either "exists" or "is apprehended". The counsel submitted that in the instant case it could neither be said that industrial dispute existed nor apprehended. An action of termination of services of the workman was taken in October. 1988 and an application was made by respondent No.2 in June. 1999 and reference was made by the "appropriate Government on February 14. 2001. The dispute, if any. got settled and the reference will unsettle settled matter. In support of the contention, our attention was invited by the learned counsel to several decisions. We will refer to some of the decisions at an appropriate stage. 6. Learned Deputy Advocate General for respondent No.l stated that affidavit in reply is filed on behalf of respondent No.l contending therein that there is no period of limitation for making reference under Section 10 of the Act. After the report was submitted by the Conciliation Officer under sub-section (4) of Section 12 of the Act. appropriate Government applied its mind and prima-facie satisfied that provisions of Section 25-F of the Act were not complied with and hence, a reference was made. After the report was submitted by the Conciliation Officer under sub-section (4) of Section 12 of the Act. appropriate Government applied its mind and prima-facie satisfied that provisions of Section 25-F of the Act were not complied with and hence, a reference was made. At this stage, the court may not enter into other questions or merits of the matter. He. therefore, submitted that the petition deserves to be dismissed. 7. Learned counsel for respondent No.2 supported Mr. Chauhan. learned Deputy Advocate General and submitted that since there is no period of limitation, the action cannot be said to be bad in law and does not require interference by this Court. 8. Let us now deal with the rival contentions of the parties bearing in mind the relevant provisions of law and decided cases. 9. Sub-section (1) of Section 10 of the Act enables the appropriate Government to make reference if it is of the opinion that a industrial dispute exists or is apprehended". Relevant part of said sub-section reads thus:- "(1) Where the appropriate Government is of opinion that am industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, it may at any time, by order in writing.-. (a) refer the dispute to a Board for promoting a settlement thereof: or (b) refer any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to the dispute to a court for inquiry: or (c) refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to. the dispute, if it relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule, to a Labour Court for adjudication: or (d) refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to the dispute, whether it relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule or the Third Schedule, to a Tribunal for adjudication: Provided................." (Emphasis supplied). 10. Bare reading of the aforesaid provision makes it clear that there is no period of limitation for making reference by the appropriate Government and such reference can be made "at any time". The question for our consideration, however, is: When a statute does not prescribe period of limitation for doing any act and uses the expression "at any time", does it mean that an action can be taken at any time notwithstanding time factor or without keeping in mind delay, laches or other similar circumstances? 11. In our opinion. The question for our consideration, however, is: When a statute does not prescribe period of limitation for doing any act and uses the expression "at any time", does it mean that an action can be taken at any time notwithstanding time factor or without keeping in mind delay, laches or other similar circumstances? 11. In our opinion. law is well settled on the point. Before more than four decades in Ms. Shalimar Works Limited v. Their Workmen AIR 1959 SC 1217. a similar question came up for consideration before the Supreme Court. Section 33-A of the Act makes special provisions for adjudication as to change of conditions of service, etc. during the pendency of proceedings before Conciliation Officer/Board/Arbitrator/Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal/National Tribunal, etc. Where such conditions are changed, an aggrieved employees may make a complaint in writing in the prescribed manner to Conciliation Officer. Board or to such Arbitrator. Labour Court or Tribunal where the proceedings are pending. No period of limitation is prescribed under Section 33 A of the Act for making such complaint. A dispute was pending before the appropriate Tribunal and a order of discharge of workmen was passed in April. 1948 in violation of Section 33 of the Act. A reference was made in October. 1952 which was not entertained. It was argued on behalf of the workmen that no period of limitation was prescribed for making such reference of dispute to an Industrial Tribunal and hence the reference ought to have been entertained. The contra contention for the company on the other hand, was that the Tribunal committed an error of law and of jurisdiction in considering the matter on merits which could not have been done in view of delay and laches by the workman. 12. Considering the ambit and scope of Section 33-A of the Act. the Supreme Court observed :- "..It is true that there is no liimitation prescribed for reference of disputes to an Industrial Tribunal: even so it is only reasonable that disputes should be referred as soon as possible after they have, arisen and after conciliation proceedings hose failed, particularly so when disputes relate to discharge of workmen wholesale, as in this case. The industry has to carry on and if for any reason there has been a wholesale discharge of workmen and closure of the industry followed by its reopening and fresh recruitment of labour, it is necessary that a dispute regarding reinstatement of a large number of workmen should be referred for adjudication with in a reasonable time. We are of opinion that in this particular case the dispute was not referred for adjudication within a reasonable time as it was sent to the Industrial Tribunal more than four years after even re-employment of most of the old workmen; We have also pointed out that it was open to the workmen themselves even individually to apply under Section 33-A in this case: but neither that was done by the workmen nor was the matter referred for adjudication within a reasonable time. In these circumstances, we are of opinion that the tribunal would be justified in refusing the relief of reinstatement to avoid dislocation of the industry and that is the correct order to make." (Emphasis supplied) 13. In Sational Engineering Industries Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.. 2000 (I) SCC 371. again, a question came up for consideration before a Bench of three Judges of the Supreme Court. A tripartite settlement was arrived at between the parties. A dispute arose thereafter. Failure report was submitted and the Workers Union filed a writ petition before the High Court seeking direction to the State Government to refer the matter to Industrial Tribunal. A communication was issued by the State Government in March. 1989 referring the dispute relating to the demands raised by the Workmen Union to the Industrial Tribunal. The contention on behalf of the employer was that no dispute could have been referred in view of the fact that there was tripartite settlement and it could not be said that a dispute existed or apprehended. Treating the fact of existence or apprehension of industrial dispute as a condition precedent1 for making a reference, the Court observed:- "It will be thus seen that the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition when there is an allegation that there is.no industrial dispute and none apprehended which could be the subject matter of reference for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal under Section 10 of the Act. Here it is a question of jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal which could be examined by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction.the existence of the Industrial Tribunal (sic) dispute) which would clothe the appropriate Government with power to make the reference and the Industrial Tribunal to adjudicate it. If there is no industrial dispute in existence or apprehended the appropriate Government lacks power to make any reference. (Emphasis supplied). 14. Almost an identical situation to the present one came up for consideration in Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K.P.Madhavankutty & Ors.. 2000 (2) SCC 455. In that case also, a reference was made by appropriate Government to the Industrial Tribunal in exercise of power under Section 10 of the Act. The respondent, who was working as a Clerk in the Bank was proceeded departmental and dismissed from service with effect from August 11. 1972. An appeal filed against that order was dismissed by the Board of Directors of the Bank on January 30. 1973. After about seven years, the respondent served a notice on 15. Negativing the contention of the workman and quoting with approval, observations in Sectional Engineering Industries Ltd.. the Court stated:- "Law does not prescribe any time-limit for the appropriate Government to exercise its powers under Section 10 of the Act. It is not that this power can be exercised at any point of time and to revive matters which had since been settled. Power is to be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner.. There appears to us to be no rational basis on which the Central Government has exercised powers in this case after a lapse of about seven years of the order dismissing the respondent from service. At the time reference was made no industrial dispute existed or could be even sad to have been apprehended. A dispute which is stale could not be the subject-matter of reference under Section 10 of the Act As to when a dispute can be sad to be stale would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. When the matter has become final, it appears to us to be rather incongruous that the reference be made under Section 10 of the Act in the circumstances like the present one. In fact it could be sad that there was no dispute pending at the time when the reference in question was made. When the matter has become final, it appears to us to be rather incongruous that the reference be made under Section 10 of the Act in the circumstances like the present one. In fact it could be sad that there was no dispute pending at the time when the reference in question was made. The only ground advanced by the respondent was that two other employees who were dismissed from service were reinstated. Under what circumstances they were dismissed and subsequently reinstated is nowhere mentioned. Demand raised by the respondent for raising an . industrial dispute was ex facie bad and incompetent. In the present appeal it is not the case of the respondent that the disciplinary proceedings, which resulted in his dismissal, were in any way illegal or there was even any irregularity. He availed his remedy of appeal under the rules governing his conditions of service. It could not be said that in the circumstances an industrial dispute did arise or was even apprehended after a lapse of about seven year of the dismissal of the respondent. Whenever a workman raises some dispute it does not become an industrial dispute and the appropriate Government cannot in a mechanical fashion make the reference of the alleged dispute terming it as an industrial dispute. The Central Government lacked power to make reference both on the ground of delay in invoking the power under Section 10 of the Act and there being no industrial dispute existing or even apprehended. The purpose of reference is to keep industrial peace in an establishment. The present reference is destructive to the industrial peace and defeats the very object and purpose of the Act. The Bank was justified in thus moving the High Court seeking an order to quash the reference in question." (Emphasis supplied). 16. Strong reliance, however, was placed by the learned counsel for respondent No.2 on a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Sapan Kumar Pandit v. UP State Electricity Board & Ors.. 2001 (6) SCC 222. In Sapan Kumar Pandit, the Supreme Court was considering the provisions of Section 4-K of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. 1947. which is in pari material to sub-section (I) of Section 10 of the Act. There also, a reference was made by the appropriate Government after lapse of fifteen years. 2001 (6) SCC 222. In Sapan Kumar Pandit, the Supreme Court was considering the provisions of Section 4-K of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. 1947. which is in pari material to sub-section (I) of Section 10 of the Act. There also, a reference was made by the appropriate Government after lapse of fifteen years. When the action was challenged, the High Court upheld the contention raised by the Electricity Board that the reference was.,not made within reasonable period and. hence. ,it was liable to be quashed and set aside. Being aggrieved by the said order, the employee approached the Apex court. •Considering the relevant provisions of the U.P. Act and referring to Nedungadi Bank Ltd.. the court held that in the case on hand, the action of making reference could not be said to be invalid or contrary to law. The court observed that under the Act such reference could be made "at any time". Such opinion as to existence of dispute must be formed by the Government and it could be farmed in the light of facts and circumstances before the Court. In that case, the Court took into account the fact that alongwith the appellant, the Board had retrenched ten other workmen. The Union raised a dispute in 1976 against the action of termination of services of the workmen in 1975 and the State Government referred the matter to the Industrial Tribunal. Kanpur. From the decision of the Supreme Court, it also appears that the Board gave an assurance to the appellant that in the event any of the claim of ten workmen would be upheld by the Court, the same benefit would be extruded to the appellant no matter he did not take up his cause to any legal forum. The matter of ten workmen was decided and reinstatement was ordered of all the workmen by the High Court in 1988. A Special Supreme Court in 1989. According to the petitioner, he was entertaining expectation that the Board would extend the same benefits to him but it was not done. He also requested the authorities but he was not re-employed. In these circumstances, he approached the Conciliation Officer but the conciliation proceeding was disallowed. The Deputy Fabour Commissioner, however, came to the rescue of the workman and condoned delay and conciliation proceedings were revived. He also requested the authorities but he was not re-employed. In these circumstances, he approached the Conciliation Officer but the conciliation proceeding was disallowed. The Deputy Fabour Commissioner, however, came to the rescue of the workman and condoned delay and conciliation proceedings were revived. In the light of these facts, reference was made by the Government in 1993. but the High Court quashed the reference on account of delay. 17. Keeping in mind the above facts and peculiar circumstances, the Supreme Court held that the decision in Nedungadi Bank Ltd.. would be distinguishable and accordingly order was passed in favour of the workman. 18. In our opinion, the ratio laid down in Sapan Kumar Pandit would not apply to the facts of the case. The instant case is directly covered by the decision of three Judges Bench in National Engineering Industries ltd., and followed in Nedungadi Bank Ltd. In the instant case, the action was taken in 1988 when the services of respondent No.2 were terminated and for the first time, an application came to be made in 1999 that is after about eleven years. Nothing has been brought on record as to whether any assurance was given by the petitioner municipality to him or any proceedings were initiated by the workman. Such reference, in our considered opinion, therefore, was not called for and maintaintable. Even in Sapan Kumar Pandit, on which reliance was placed, in paragraph 15. the Supreme Court reiterated the principle laid down in earlier cases. The Court stated:- "There are cases in which lapse of time had caused fading or even eclipse of the dispute. If nobody had kept the dispute alive during the long interval, it is reasonably possible to conclude in a particular case that the dispute ceased to exist after some time. But when the dispute remained alive though not galvanized by the workmen or the union on account of other justified reasons, it does not cause the dispute to wane into total eclipse. In this case, when the Government has chosen to refer the dispute of adjudication under Section 4-K of the U.P. Act the High Court should not have quashed the reference merely on the ground of delay. Of course, the long delay for making the adjudication could be considered by the adjudicating authorities while molding its reliefs. That is a different matter altogether. Of course, the long delay for making the adjudication could be considered by the adjudicating authorities while molding its reliefs. That is a different matter altogether. The High Court has obviously gone wrong in axing down the order of reference made by the Government for adjudication. Let the adjudicator process reach its legal culmination." (Emphasis supplied). 19. In the present case, the lapse of time had caused fading of the dispute. It had not been kept alive by the respondent workman and hence, industrial dispute could be said to have existed or apprehended. The action of making reference by the appropriate Govemment therefore, cannot be said to be legal and valid and reference deserves to be quashed. The petition is accordingly allowed. Reference made by the appropriate Government is hereby quashed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no orders as to costs. 20. Ad-interim order dated June 7. 2001 is vacated and the application is dismissed as having become in fructuous in view of the orders passed in the main matter. -