Judgement JUDGMENT :- This second appeal is at the instance of defendants in a suit for eviction and is directed against the judgment and decree dated March 28, 1992 passed by the learned Assistant District Judge, Second Court, Nadia in Title Appeal No. 34 of 1988 thereby setting aside those dated September 14, 1987 passed by the learned Munsif, Kalyani in Title Suit No. 291 of 1987. 2. The respondents filed the aforesaid suit for eviction of the appellants, their tenants from the suit room on the grounds of default in payment of rent and reasonable requirement. 3. So far the ground of default is concerned, the appellants by complying with the provisions contained in S. 17(2A) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act (Act) got protection under S. 17(4) thereof. 4. As regards the ground of reasonable requirement, the definite case of the respondents was that they required the suit room for starting a business of the son of the respondent No. 6. 5. The aforesaid suit was contested by the appellant by filing written statements thereby denying the material allegations made in the plaint. 6. The learned Munsif however dismissed the suit on twofold grounds. First, there was no averment made in the plaint that "the plaintiffs had no reasonably suitable accommodation elsewhere" in terms of last part of S. 13(1)(ff) of the Act. 7. Secondly, the learned trial Judge was of the view that it was mandatory on the part of the plaintiffs to examine the son of the plaintiff No. 6 in the suit and the said son of the plaintiff having failed to appear as a witness, the suit should be dismissed. 8. Being dissatisfied, the plaintiffs preferred an appeal being Title Appeal No. 34 of 1988 which was ultimately heard by the learned Assistant District Judge, Second Court, Nadia and by the judgment and decree impugned in this second appeal, the said Court set aside those passed by the learned trial Judge and decreed the suit on the ground of reasonable requirement. 9. Being dissatisfied, the defendants have preferred the instant second appeal. 10. At the time of hearing of this Appeal the appellants have come up with an application under Order 41, Rule 27 of the Code for taking note of subsequent events. 9. Being dissatisfied, the defendants have preferred the instant second appeal. 10. At the time of hearing of this Appeal the appellants have come up with an application under Order 41, Rule 27 of the Code for taking note of subsequent events. In this application, it has been alleged that a shop room belonging to respondent No. 3 is lying closed and that the said room can be given to the son of the respondent No. 6. It is also alleged that the son of the plaintiff No. 6 has since married and is running business jointly with his father. It has also been alleged that the said son of the plaintiff No. 6 is a supplier of various stationery goods in different stationery shops at Naihati and as such there is no requirement of the suit room for the said son of plaintiff No. 6. It is further alleged that the plaintiff Nos. 1 to 3 had constructed a house and further the plaintiff Nos. 1 to 3 had a big shop which has since been transferred to a third party. 11. The aforesaid application has been opposed by the plaintiffs by filing affidavit-in-opposition thereby denying the allegations made in the application for taking note of subsequent events. 12. After going through the aforesaid application for taking note of subsequent events I am of the view that those are immaterial for the purpose of disposal of the instant appeal. Even if the plaintiff Nos. 1 to 3 have constructed a residential house of their own, the plaintiff No. 6 has no right therein and as such she cannot use those accommodation for starting a business for her son. Similarly, the plaintiff No. 6 has no right over the shop room of the plaintiff No. 3. No material has been placed before this Court indicating that any new accommodation has been acquired by the plaintiff No. 6 of her own or jointly with the other plaintiffs. The existence of the grocery shop belonging to the husband of the plaintiff No. 6 is evident from the evidence of P.W. 1 during trial. Therefore, the said shop room was in existence even at the time of trial and it is clear that the said business belongs to the husband of the plaintiff No. 6. I find no substance in the contention of Mr. Therefore, the said shop room was in existence even at the time of trial and it is clear that the said business belongs to the husband of the plaintiff No. 6. I find no substance in the contention of Mr. Rakshit appearing on behalf of the appellants that the son of the plaintiff No. 6 should be satisfied by helping his father in the said business although the plaintiff No. 6 wants that her son should have business of his own. Therefore, merely because it is alleged that the said son of the plaintiff No. 6 does a business of supply of stationery goods in different shops, this Court should not remand the matter to the trial Court for deciding such fact when such allegation has been denied by the respondents. Moreover, even for want of an accommodation, if the son of the plaintiff No. 6 sits with his father in his fathers business or supplies goods to stationery shops, the requirement of starting a new business has not been extinguished. I thus find no substance in the application under Order 41, Rule 27 of the Code filed by the appellants and the same is dismissed. 13. Now turning to merit of this appeal, I find that the learned first Appellate Court below rightly held that the learned trial Judge erred in law in dismissing the suit on the ground that the son of the plaintiff No. 6 did not appear as witness. It is pointed out by the learned first Appellate Court below that the fact that the son of the plaintiff No. 6 had no business of his own and was unemployed, having been established and further the necessity of starting a new business by him having also been proved, the suit could not be dismissed only because he did not appear as witness. The finding on the question of requirement of the son of the plaintiff No. 6 being essentially a finding of fact based on appreciation of evidence. I do not find any reason to interfere with such finding recorded by the first Appellate Court below, the final Court on fact. 14. Mr. Rakshit however has raised a pure question of law in support of this appeal. 15. I do not find any reason to interfere with such finding recorded by the first Appellate Court below, the final Court on fact. 14. Mr. Rakshit however has raised a pure question of law in support of this appeal. 15. According to him, the palintiffs having failed to aver in the plaint in terms of S. 13(1)(ff) of the Act that "they have no other reasonably suitable accommodation", the suit filed on the ground of reasonable requirement was not maintainable. 16. Mr. Das, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents however has pointed out that although there is no direct averment in terms of last part of S. 13(1)(ff) of the Act as indicated above but if the plaint is read as a whole it will be apparent that the plaintiffs made it clear that apart from the suit room there is no other room in their possession to accommodate the son of the plaintiff No. 6. Mr. Das also points out that a specific issue being issue No. 5 was framed in the following terms : "Whether the plaintiffs have any other suitable accommodation other than the suit premises?" 17. Mr. Das further points out that the P.W. 1 made specific statement in his evidence that apart from the suit room there is no other accommodation available to the plaintiffs for providing the son of the plaintiff No. 6. But the defendants did not suggest anything to him to the contrary in cross-examination. Mr. Das further submits that the D.W. 1 in his evidence although denied the suggestion that the plaintiffs have no other reasonably suitable accommodation but he could not specify any such accommodation. 18. At the time of admission of this appeal although the Division Bench did not formulate any substantial question of law as required, after hearing the learned Counsel for the parties I formulate the following question of law for determination : "Whether a suit for eviction of a tenant on the ground mentioned in S. 13(1)(ff) of the Act is liable to be dismissed for want of an averment in plaint that the landlord has no other reasonably suitable accommodation notwithstanding the fact that specific issue to that effect has been framed and the parties led evidence on such issue?" 19. At the very outset, I accept the contention of Mr. At the very outset, I accept the contention of Mr. Rakshit that a Court cannot pass a decree for eviction of a tenant on the ground of reasonable requirement of the landlord unless it records the following findings. (a) landlord is the owner of the suit premises; (b) landlord reasonably requires the suit premises for his own use and occupation; and (c) landlord has no other reasonably suitable accommodation. 20. Now the question is whether a Court can at the time of final hearing refuse to record any finding on the point (c) above simply because the plaintiff has not averred in the plaint that he has no other reasonably suitable accommodation inspite of the fact that the Court earlier framed a specific issue on point No. (c) and the parties without protest led evidence on such issue. 21. There is no dispute with the proposition of law that a Court should not generally permit a party to lead evidence in support of an issue of fact when there is no foundation of such issue of fact in the pleading. But there are exceptions to the aforesaid rule of law. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in the case of Nagubai Ammal v. B. Shama Rao reported in AIR 1956 SC 593 , the aforesaid rule has no application to a case where parties go to trial with knowledge that a particular question is in issue, though no specific issue has been framed thereon and adduce evidence relating thereto. In the said case, although no specific plea that the sale in favour of the defendants was affected by the doctrine of lis pendens was raised in the pleading of the plaintiff and no specific issue was directed to that question, the defendants went to trial with full knowledge that the question of lis pendens was in issue, had ample opportunity to adduce evidence thereon and fully availed themselves of the same. Under such circumstances, the Apex Court held that absence of a specific pleading on the question was a mere irregularity which resulted in no prejudice to the defendants. 22. In the case before us, a specific issue viz. whether the plaintiffs have any other reasonable accommodation other than the suit premises was framed as issue No. 5 without any objection and the parties led evidence in support of such issue. 22. In the case before us, a specific issue viz. whether the plaintiffs have any other reasonable accommodation other than the suit premises was framed as issue No. 5 without any objection and the parties led evidence in support of such issue. Therefore, the learned trial Judge erred in law in refusing to go into the aforesaid quetion on the ground of absence of plea of non availability of other reasonably suitable accommodation in the plaint at the time of hearing when the Court itself framed such issue. 23. If at the stage of framing issue, the Court refused to frame such issue, the plaintiffs could amend their plaint by incorporating such plea. Moreover, the point No. (b) as mentioned above is very much related with point No. (c). A person cannot reasonably require the suit property if he has other reasonably suitable accommodation. Therefore, once a person asserts that he reasonably requires the suit property it necessarily follows that he is also claiming that he has no other reasonably suitable accommodation elsewhere. Thus point No. (c) is implied within the point No. (b). Thus, in such a suit, the Court having framed issue No. 5 and the parties having led evidence, there was no ground of refusal to answer such issue The present case is therefore a better one than the case of Nagubai Ammal (supra) where even specific issue was not framed. 24. Mr. Rakshit has relied upon the following decisions in support of his contentions :- (1) B. Banerjee v. Smt. Anita Pann, AIR 1975 SC 1146 , (2) Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 255 , (3) Smt. Bedana Devi v. Abdul Jawab, 1986 (1) CHN 92, (4) West Bengal Provincial Co-operative Bank Limited v. Sailendra Nath Ghosh, 1980 (84) CWN 221, (5) Sibapada Roychodhury v. Sudhangsu Kumar Sen, AIR 1980 Cal 90 . (6) Smt. Chameli Singha v. Sham Sundar Nag, 1998 WBLR (Cal) 241, (7) Adhir Kumar Das v. Smt. Juthika Sen, AIR 1981 Cal 334 . 25. In none of the aforesaid seven cases, Court framed specific issue even in the absence of pleading. Thus, in all these cases the Court applied the general rule that evidence should not be permitted to be led in support of a plea when there is no foundation in the pleading. 25. In none of the aforesaid seven cases, Court framed specific issue even in the absence of pleading. Thus, in all these cases the Court applied the general rule that evidence should not be permitted to be led in support of a plea when there is no foundation in the pleading. Thus, the principles laid down there in cannot have any application to the fact of the present case where the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Nagubai Ammal (supra) will be applicable. Mr. Rakshit could not place a single authority where a Court has taken a view that inspite of framing of issue on a point and leading evidence in support of such issue, a party is entitled to take a plea at the time of argument that Court should not look into the evidence adduced in support of such issue and should dismiss the suit on the ground of absence of necessary pleading. 26. I thus find no substance in the aforesaid contention of Mr. Rakshit and answer the question formulated here in negative. 27. Although the plaintiffs before this Court has filed an application for amendment of plaint for incorporating the plea of absence of reasonably alternative accommodation. Mr. Das, appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted that for abundant precaution his clients have filed such application and in the event this Court hold that absence of such plea did not vitiate the trial, he will not press such application. In view of my aforesaid finding I hold that such amendment is not necessary and as such the said application for amendment of plaint is dismissed as not pressed. 28. I therefore find no substance in this appeal and the same is dismissed. 29. No costs. Appeal dismissed.