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2001 DIGILAW 243 (ORI)

BENUDHAR MOHANTY v. STATE OF ORISSA

2001-05-18

P.C.NAIK, P.K.MOHANTY

body2001
JUDGMENT : P.C. Naik, J. - By order dated 24-7-2000 (Annexure-1) of the Director, Town Planning, Orissa, Bhubaneswar, the petitioner was placed under suspension. Aggrieved therewith he approached the Orissa Administrative Tribunal, Bhubaneswar in O. A. No. 1934 of 2000 and prayed for quashing of the same. 2, A preliminary objection was raised by the State regarding maintainability of the petition. Relying on a judgment of this Court in State of Orissa represented by the Commissioner-cum-Secretary to Government, Rural Development and another v. Bichitrananda Muduli and another 2001(1) O. L. R. 45, the Tribunal upheld the preliminary objection and held that "the present application being one relating to suspension order, is not justiciable and the Tribunal cannot entertain it". For coming to this conclusion, the Tribunal relied on the following extract from the said judgment which reads thus : "...That is a matter (suspension) within the exclusive domain of the State Government. Neither the Court nor the Tribunal should encroach upon that arena". Hence, this writ petition. 3. Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the State, we are of the view that though the reasoning advanced by the Tribunal is not proper, nevertheless, since the suspension order on the facts of the case is proper, no interference is called for in this petition. 4. Before proceeding further, we may in brief refer to Bichitrananda Muduli's case (supra). In that case, the order of suspension of Muduli was set aside by the Tribunal which was the subject-matter of challenge before this Court. In paragraph-6 of the judgment in Bichitrananda Muduli's case (supra), this Court, after referring to paragraph-12 of the judgment rendered by the Supereme Court in State of Orissa Vs. Bimal Kumar Mohanty, observed thus : 6. The short question that arises for consideration is whether the Government was justified in placing the opposite party No. 1 under suspension in view of what has been stated by it in the counter filed before the Tribunal. Rule 12 of the C. C. A. Rules empowers the appointing authority to suspend a Government servant where a disciplinary proceeding against him is contemplated or is pending or where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation or trial. Rule 12 of the C. C. A. Rules empowers the appointing authority to suspend a Government servant where a disciplinary proceeding against him is contemplated or is pending or where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation or trial. As has been held by the Supreme Court in Bimal Kumar Mohanty (supra), pending inquiry or pending investigation into the grave charges of misconduct or serious acts of omission and commission, order of suspension can be passed after taking into consideration the gravity of the misconduct said to be enquired into or investigation". 5. It has not been held in that judgment that the order of suspension cannot be a subject - matter of challenge before an appropriate forum. The Tribunal has in its order quoted an observation from paragraph-7 oi the judgment in Bichitrananda Mudali's case (supra) by reading it out of context. Had the entire paragraph (paragraph-7) of the said judgment been carefully perused, the Tribunal would have noticed that the passage quoted relates to the question as to whether or not an order of suspension can ba revoked. This is clear from the following extract of paragraph-7 of the judgment in Bichitrananda Muduli's case (supra) which reads thus. 7. xx xx The third reason given by the Tribunal is that since the opposite party No. 1 is going to retire from service by the end of November, 2000 there is little scope of tampering with any evidence or gaining over of any material witness by him. This is totally an extraneous matter for considering whether the order of suspension is legal or not. The necessity of disciplinary action being taken against the Government servant for inefficiency, dishonesty and other appropriate reasons cannot be doubted. Therefore, suspension has to be regarded as the first step before charges are framed against him. There is no dispute that the disciplinary authority can revoke the order of suspension in exercise of its inherent power for good and vaitd reasons. In the case at hand, since the opposite party No. 1 retires on superannuation by the end of November, 2000, the Government may, if it thinks fit, consider to revoke the impugned order. That is a matter within the exclusive domain of the State Government. Neither the Court nor the Tribunal should encroach upon that arena. In the case at hand, since the opposite party No. 1 retires on superannuation by the end of November, 2000, the Government may, if it thinks fit, consider to revoke the impugned order. That is a matter within the exclusive domain of the State Government. Neither the Court nor the Tribunal should encroach upon that arena. We accordingly leave this matter to the State Government for its due consideration". Thus, from the above, it is clearly evident that the observations which have been quoted by the Tribunal in the impugned order do not relate to the maintainability or otherwise of a proceeding raising a challenge to the order of suspension but are confined to the jurisdiction of the authority regarding revocation of an order of suspension. 6. In the above view of the matter, the observations of the Tribunal that "the matter relating to suspension orders is declared to non-justiciable in any Court or Tribunal. Hence the present application being one relating to suspension order, is not justiciable and the Tribunal cannot entertain it" is held to be erroneous and it has to be held that it proceeded on a complete misreading and mis-consttuing the judgment of this Court in Bichitrananda Muduli's case (supra). 7. However, reverting to the case at hand, it is an admitted position that the petitioner had, in connection with P.S. Case No. 186/2000 been taken into custody and remained there for more than forty-eight hours. 8. Sub-rule (2) of rule 12 of the Orissa Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1962 (in short, 'the C. C. A. Rules') lays down that a Government servant who is detained in custody whether on a criminal charge or otherwise, for a period exceeding forty-eight hours shall be deemed to have been suspended with effect from the date of detention, by an order of the appointing authority and shall remain under suspension until further orders. Thus, as the petitioner was admittedly in custody for a period exceeding forty-eight hours, the action of suspending him cannot be said to be suffering from any infirmity. Therefore, it follows that though the reasoning advanced by the Tribunal in not entertaining the Original Application is not proper, no interference is called for, as the petitioner is deemed to have been placed under suspension for remaining in custody for a period exceeding forty-eight hours. 9. Therefore, it follows that though the reasoning advanced by the Tribunal in not entertaining the Original Application is not proper, no interference is called for, as the petitioner is deemed to have been placed under suspension for remaining in custody for a period exceeding forty-eight hours. 9. It is, however, contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the complaint filed against the petitioner is false and fabricated for which be is being unnecessarily harassed and, as such, the Court should direct the authorities to revoke the order of suspension. As to whether the charge levelled against the petitioner is true or false is not to be gone into in this proceeding which is confined to the limited question, as to whether or not the order of suspension is proper. Whether the charge is true or false will naturally be a subject-matter of a trial, in case the Investigating Agency comes to the conclusion that prima facie a case is made out for proceeding against the petitioner. 10. As regards the prayer for revocation of the order of suspension, that again is not for the Court to direct but it is for the authority to decide in terms of sub-rule (5) of rule 12 of the C.C.A. Rules. If so advised, it is for the petitioner to take recourse to the same proceedings. That of course is a matter to be considered by the appropriate authority on its own merits on which this Court expresses no opinion. 11. Accordingly, the writ petition stands dismissed. P. K. Mohanty, J. - I agree. 2. Writ petition dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed