B. K. RATHI, J. ( 1 ) THIS second appeal has been preferred against the judgment and decree, dated 31. 3. 1998 passed by the Additional District Judge. Jhansi in Civil Appeal No. 45/96 arising out of Suit No. 33 of 1989. The facts giving rise to this appeal are as follows : ( 2 ) THE suit was filed by the respondents against the appellant alleging that respondent No. 1 is a trust of which respondent No. 2 is Gurdian. Manager and Sewayat. That this trust was created by smt. Jan Id Bat and her father-in-law Mathura Prasad by a gift deed dated 13. 9. 1938 and the zamindari land was gifted to the temple. According to that deed, Smt. Janki Bat and Mathura prasad continued to be the Managers of the property of the temple. After the death of Mathura prasad. Smt. Janki Bai was free to manage the property of the temple during her life-time and was also authorised to appoint some other person as guardian to manage the temple and its property. Smt. Janki Bai by registered deed, dated 9. 12. 1971 appointed respondent No. 2 as manager. Guardian and Sewayat of the temple. It is alleged that thereafter the present appellant on 12. 6. 1978 got a deed executed from Smt. Janki Bai appointing him as manager. Thereafter he filed suit No. Deen Dayal and others v. Ram Sharan (respondent No. 2) in the Court of Munsif. Jhansi to restrain the respondent No. 1 from interfering in the management of the property of the temple by the appellant. Alternative relief sought was that in case the respondent No. 2 is found in possession, then the mandatory injunction be granted removing him from the management of the property. The relief was sought in that suit on the basis of the deed, dated 12. 6. 1978. The suit was ultimately decided by compromise, dated 9. 7. 1979, according to which it was agreed upon that respondent No. 2 will remain in possession of certain land of the trust for ten years and will harvest the crops of that land. That, thereafter, the appellant shall manage the trust in accordance to the deed, dated 12. 6. 1978. ( 3 ) IT is further alleged that after the agreement, respondent No. 2 harvested the crops, but the appellant started misusing the property of the trust. That, thereafter, the appellant shall manage the trust in accordance to the deed, dated 12. 6. 1978. ( 3 ) IT is further alleged that after the agreement, respondent No. 2 harvested the crops, but the appellant started misusing the property of the trust. Therefore, Smt. Janki Bai by notice, dated 17. 1. 1981 informed the appellant that deed, dated 12. 6. 1978 was got executed by fraud and, therefore, is cancelled. Information regarding it, was published in the newspapers. She also executed a deed on 12,6. 1981 registered on 18. 6. 1981 cancelling the deed, dated 12. 6. 1978. That after cancellation of the deed, dated 12. 6. 1978 the appellant has no right to manage the property of the trust. The relief sought in the suit is for declaration that the appellant has no right of management of the property of the temple and that the decree of suit No. 518/78 has come to an end. The relief of permanent injunction restraining the appellant from interfering with the management of the property of the respondent was also claimed. ( 4 ) THE appellant contested the suit admitting that the trust was created by Smt. Janki Bai and mathura Prasad by the deed dated 13. 9. 1938 and the property was gifted to the temple. He pleaded that respondent No. 2 is not the manager of the property, but the appellant is the manager. That after the decree of suit No. 518/78 the deed in favour of the appellant could not be cancelled. That the deed, dated 12. 6. 1978 was not obtained by fraud. Its execution was also admitted in suit No. 518/78. That the parties are bound by the decision of suit No. 518/78 and the decree passed in that suit will operate as res judicata. That a suit No. 18/81 by Smt. Janki Bai was also filed which was dismissed after her death. Her heirs were not substituted. That respondent No. 2 is in possession of 18. 58 acres of the land of the temple in accordance with the judgment of suit No. 518/78. That the appellant is in possession of the other land, ( 5 ) THE trial court considered the contentions and dismissed the suit of the respondents. Her heirs were not substituted. That respondent No. 2 is in possession of 18. 58 acres of the land of the temple in accordance with the judgment of suit No. 518/78. That the appellant is in possession of the other land, ( 5 ) THE trial court considered the contentions and dismissed the suit of the respondents. Against that decree, the respondents filed a Civil Appeal No. 45/96, which have been allowed by the impugned judgment and it was declared that the rights given to the appellant by the decree of suit No. 518/78 has come to an end. The appellant has been restrained from interfering in the management of the property of the temple. It was further ordered that the appellant will not obtain possession of the agricultural land of the temple nor shall get his name mutated in the revenue records. The respondent No. 1 shall remain owner of the property. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the appellate court, the present appeal has been preferred. ( 6 ) THE respondent also filed cross-appeal under Order XLI, Rule 22 of the C. P. C. regarding the order that relief for injunction of appellant No. 2 was dismissed. ( 7 ) I have heard Sri A. N. Bhargava and Sri Sankatha Bai, learned counsel for the appellant and sri Vikram Nath, learned counsel for the respondents and have considered the arguments. ( 8 ) THE contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that there is valid compromise decree in suit No. 518/78 which is binding on the parties. That the rights for the parties have been decided in that suit and, therefore, the suit is barred by res judicata. That the rights conferred on the appellants by the deed, dated 12. 6. 1978 could not have been cancelled because of the decree in suit No. 518 of 1978. ( 9 ) THE facts of the case are almost admitted to the parties and only questions of law are involved in this case. The admitted facts are that the trust was created by Smt. Janki Bai and Mathura prasad by deed, dated 13. 9. 1938 and they gifted their property. ( 9 ) THE facts of the case are almost admitted to the parties and only questions of law are involved in this case. The admitted facts are that the trust was created by Smt. Janki Bai and Mathura prasad by deed, dated 13. 9. 1938 and they gifted their property. The gift deed has been filed which has not been assailed and according to this gift deed, Smt. Janki Bai was entitled to manage the property herself in her life-time after the death of Mathura Prasad or, could have appointed manager of property in her place. Smt. Janki Bai in exercise of that right on 9. 12. 1971 by registered deed appointed Ram Saran, respondent No. 2 who was family member, as manager, guardian and sewayat of the temple. The deed in favour of the appellant appointing him as manager only was executed by Smt. Janki Bai on 12. 6. 1978. That deed was later on cancelled by a notice, dated 17. 1. 1981 and by deed, dated 12. 6. 1981 registered on 18. 6. 1981. The contention of Smt. Janki Bai is that the deed, dated 12. 6. 1978 was obtained by fraud. However, this allegation cannot be accepted as after the execution of deed, dated 12. 6. 1978, suit No. 518/78 was filed by the appellant, which remained pending for long. In that suit, it was not pleaded that the deed was not obtained by fraud. On the other hand, that suit ended in compromise on 9. 7. 1979, according to which the entire rights were given to the appellant except that respondent no. 2 was entitled to harvest crop on certain land of the temple for a period of ten years. It is, therefore, contended that the rights of the parties were finally decided in suit No. 518/78 and operate as res judicata between the parties and the present suit is not maintainable. ( 10 ) THE decree of suit No. 518/78 was based on the deed dated 12. 6. 1978 executed by Janki Bai in favour of the appellant. The decree in that suit was based on the rights claimed by the appellant by the above deed, dated 12. 6. 1978. The question, therefore, is whether the deed, dated 12. 6. ( 10 ) THE decree of suit No. 518/78 was based on the deed dated 12. 6. 1978 executed by Janki Bai in favour of the appellant. The decree in that suit was based on the rights claimed by the appellant by the above deed, dated 12. 6. 1978. The question, therefore, is whether the deed, dated 12. 6. 1978 could have been cancelled by Smt. Janki Bai and the connected question is that in case it is found that she was entitled to cancel the said deed, the decree of suit No. 518/78 will remain operative thereafter or not? ( 11 ) IT does not appear that deed by the appellant regarding management of the property was obtained by fraud. However, from the circumstances of the case it has to be held that there was collusion and Smt. Janki Bai came under influence and got the deed executed in favour of the appellant on 12. 6. 1978. There is no explanation as to what was necessity for the appellant to file the suit immediately in the year 1978 after the execution of the deed on 12. 6. 1978. If there was no dispute and the deed was executed by Smt. Janki Bai after considering all aspects of the matter, there would have been no necessisty of filing suit No. 518/78. ( 12 ) NOW coming to the main question, according to the gift deed dated 13. 9. 1938 by which the property was gifted, after the death of Mathura Prasad. Smt. Janki Bai alone was entitled to manage the property during her life-time or appoint a manager or guardian for the same. Right to appoint also includes the right to cancel the appointment. If Smt. Janki Bai had right to appoint manager or guardian of the property, she was also having right to cancel the appointment or to appoint another person. It appears that Smt. Janki Bai was aware of this right and has exercised that right. She firstly on 9. 12. 1971 appointed respondent No. 2 as manager and guardian of the temple. Thereafter, by another deed, dated 12. 6. 1978, she appointed the appellant as manager and guardian of the temple. It means that appointment of respondent No. 2 was cancelled. It has come in evidence that certain other persons were also appointed and later on their appointments were cancelled. 1971 appointed respondent No. 2 as manager and guardian of the temple. Thereafter, by another deed, dated 12. 6. 1978, she appointed the appellant as manager and guardian of the temple. It means that appointment of respondent No. 2 was cancelled. It has come in evidence that certain other persons were also appointed and later on their appointments were cancelled. If Smt. Janki Bai was authorised to appoint the appellant as manager and guardian in place of respondent No. 2, she had also the right to remove him. Therefore, the revocation deed, dated 12. 6. 1981, registered on 18. 6. 1981 is valid and authority and power conferred upon the appellant were withdrawn by that deed. The appellant, therefore, was not left with any right to manage and possess the property of the trust. ( 13 ) HOWEVER, the question as to what is the effect of the decree of suit No. 518 of 1978. Ordinarily the rights of the parties decided in one suit are final and binding and operate as res judicata in all subsequent proceedings. The rights of the parties finally decided in one suit cannot be challenged in another suit except on the ground of fraud, etc. However, the position in this case is little different. The decree in suit No. 518/78 was based on the basis of the rights given to the appellant by deed, dated 12. 6. 1978. If the deed, dated 12. 6. 1978 is cancelled, the rights claimed in suit No. 518/78 and the decree of the suit cannot exist. Basis of the suit No. 518/78 was the rights claimed by the deed, dated 12. 6. 1978. Therefore, if deed, dated 12. 6. 1978 was validly cancelled as held above, the rights granted to the appellant on the basis of the said deed stand automatically cancelled and that decree will not operate as res Judicata between the parties. The suit is, therefore, not barred by res Judicata. ( 14 ) IN view of this aspect of the matter, it appears that the appeal has been rightly decided. However, before parting with the judgment, it may also be mentioned that the decree of suit No. 518/78 was also collusive which does not confer any right. The property gifted to the temple by deed of the year 1938. ( 14 ) IN view of this aspect of the matter, it appears that the appeal has been rightly decided. However, before parting with the judgment, it may also be mentioned that the decree of suit No. 518/78 was also collusive which does not confer any right. The property gifted to the temple by deed of the year 1938. By compromise of suit No. 518/78, the effect of deed of the year 1938 stood automatically cancelled as appellant was made absolute owner of the property. It was also shared by respondent No. 2. The property was gifted to a temple. The suit for management should have been filed under Section 92, C. P. C. and the suit for injunction was not maintainable. It has not been, explained as to how the property gifted to a trust could have been given by the decree of the Court to the appellant and respondent No. 2. In case the decree of suit No. 518/78 is held to be valid. it will amount that appellant has become owner of the property and the gift to temple by Smt. Janki Bai and Mathura Prasad will come to an end. The agreement of suit No. 518/78 was against the terms of the gift deed. Once the property was gifted to the temple, it could not have been taken back in such a manner by collusive suit. Therefore, the decree passed in suit No. 518/78 is also collusive which does not confer any right on the appellant and does not transfer the property of the temple to the appellant. ( 15 ) AS regarding cross-objection, nothing has been argued by the learned counsel. The decree which have been passed by the first appellate court is un-ambiguous and does not require any modification by the cross appeal. ( 16 ) CONSIDERING the circumstances, I do not find any ground to interfere in the judgment and decree appealed against. ( 17 ) THE appeal as well as the cross appeal both are dismissed accordingly. .