S. B. SINHA, C. J. ( 1 ) CONSTRUCTION of G. O. Ms. No. 32 education (Rules) Department, dated 2-2-1988 and Government Memo No. 1636/ kk. 1/68-2, Education Department, dated 25-6-1968 falls for consideration in this Writ petition which is directed against the judgment dated 2-12-1999 passed by A. P. Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad in o. A. NO. 4672 of 1995. ( 2 ) PETITIONERS herein are teachers working in various schools of the State whereas the respondent Nos. 7 to 13 are the teachers of various schools run by Mandal parishad or Social Welfare Department and the original official respondents are working in Tribal Welfare Ashram schools in Adilabad District. The six applicants (respondents herein) who filed the Original application No, 1320 of 1994 had at all material times and still are working in tribal Welfare Ashram schools in Adilabad district. Out of them, original applicant nos. 1, 3, 5 and 6 were working as headmasters while applicant Nos. 2 and 4 were working as School Assistants. By reason of a Government Order No. 302 education ( I. E. I) Department, dated 30-12-1993 methodology with regard to the filling up of the vacancies of Junior lecturers was specified. Rule 2 thereof refers to the constitution of service. In this case, however, this Court is concerned with the recruitment to Category 6 Junior lecturers wherefor Rule 3 which deals with the method of appointment is relevant and reads thus:" (I) By direct recruitment. (ii) By transfer from School Assistants in Category 1 (b) of Class (c) Language pandits including Hindi Pandits and munshis Grade-I in Category 1 of class (d) of the Re-issued Andhra pradesh School Education Subordinate service Rules (OR) (iii) By recruitment by transfer from any other service. Method of recruitment: (i) Direct recruitment 50% (ii) Recruitment by transfer form:- (a) School Assistants in Category (b) of class (c) Language Pandits including Hindi Pandits and munshis Grade-I in Category 1 of class D of Andhra Pradesh School education Subordinate Service rules as per combined seniority of government/panchayat Raj teachers; (b) Any other service in Education department (Non-teaching staff of education Department)". ( 3 ) THE learned Tribunal upon considerations of the materials placed on record inter alia came to the conclusion that the original applicants - respondents are also entitled to be considered for appointment by way of transfer to the post of Junior Lecturers under the said Rules. ( 3 ) THE learned Tribunal upon considerations of the materials placed on record inter alia came to the conclusion that the original applicants - respondents are also entitled to be considered for appointment by way of transfer to the post of Junior Lecturers under the said Rules. Sri Sundaram, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners herein inter alia submitted that as the conditions of service of the teachers who are working in the schools belonging to the state Government are governed by the A. P. School Education Service Rules and in terms thereof service has been constituted which would amount to constitution of cadre; the question of filling up of the higher posts by the teachers belonging to another service and consequently another cadre does not arise. The learned Counsel sri Sundaram would urge that G. O. Ms. No. 32 Education Department dated 2-2-1988 whereby and whereunder rules known as A. P. Educational Institutions (Inspection and Visits) Rules, 1988 were made could not have been taken recourse to by the learned Tribunal below in view of the fact that for the purpose of construction of one rule recourse to the provision of another rule is not permissible. In any event, contends the learned Counsel, government institution and Non- government institution have been defined separately, the applicants before the tribunal would not come within the purview thereof. According to the learned counsel, by reason of the impugned judgment the learned Tribunal has in fact issued a Writ of Mandamus directing the state to make a rule which is impermissible in law. Reliance in this connection has been placed on State of A. P. vs. V. Sadanandam and Asif Hameed vs. State of J and K. ( 4 ) SRI P. V. Subrahmanya Sharma, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant-respondents on the other hand submits that his clients before the learned tribunal neither challenged the rules nor sought for issuance of any writ in the nature of mandamus directing the State government to make a rule. Sri Sharma would urge that having regard to the plain words used in G. O. Ms. No. 32, dated 2-2-1988 as the State wrongly interpreted the same, the petitioners had to move the tribunal. Sri Sharma would urge that having regard to the plain words used in G. O. Ms. No. 32, dated 2-2-1988 as the State wrongly interpreted the same, the petitioners had to move the tribunal. The A. P. Education Act, 1982 was enacted to consolidate and amend the laws relating to educational system in the State of Andhra Pradesh for organising and developing the educational system and to provide for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The said Act applies to all educational institutions and tutorial institutions of the State except those specified in sub-section (3) of Section 1. It is not in dispute that in terms of the provisions of the said Act school education, intermediate education and College education are governed. This Court in this writ petition is concerned with the intermediate education. Section 78 of the said Act provides for constitution of educational service in the following terms:"constitution of Educational service: (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Act or the rules made thereunder, the Government may, by notification, constitute any officer or class of officers or any teacher or class of teachers appointed or deemed to be appointed under this Act into an educational service for the State. (2) Upon issue of a notification under sub-section (1), the Government shall have power to make rules to regulate the classification, methods of recruitment, conditions of service, pay and allowances and discipline and conduct of the members of the educational service thereby constituted and such rules may vest jurisdiction in relation to such service in the Government or in such authority or authorities, as may be prescribed". ( 5 ) SECTION 92 of the said Act empowers the Government, by order, to direct the director or any other officer to issue directions to any educational institution, etc. Section 99 provides for rule making power. The State in exercise of the power conferred upon it under Article 309 of the constitution of India made special rules called A. P. Intermediate Education Service rules in supersession of the special and ad hoc rules issued in that regard by reason of various Government orders issued from time to time. Junior lecturer falls within category 8 of the Intermediate Education service Rules whereby service has been constituted. The mode of appointment of the Junior Lecturer is as follows:" (I) By Direct Recruitment. Junior lecturer falls within category 8 of the Intermediate Education service Rules whereby service has been constituted. The mode of appointment of the Junior Lecturer is as follows:" (I) By Direct Recruitment. (ii) By transfer from School Assistants in category I (b) of Class (c) Language pandits including Hindi Pandits and munshis Grade-I in Category-I class (d) of the reissued Andhra pradesh School Education Subordinate service Rules or by recruitment by transfer from any other service. (i) Direct Recruitment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50% (ii) Recruitment by transfer from: (a) School Assistants in category I (b) of class (c) Language Pandits including Hindi Pandits and munshis, Gr.-I Category-I of Class d of Andhra Pradesh School education Subordinate Service rules as per combined seniority of government / Panchayat Raj teachers. . . . . . . . . . 40% (b) Any other service in Education department (Non-teaching Staff of education Department ). . . . . . 10% ( 6 ) A bare perusal of the aforementioned rule dearly shows that the State intended to fill up the said posts by two methods only i. e. , by direct recruitment or appointment by transfer. Another mode of filling the post i. e. , by way of promotion had not been specified. In terms of the said rule 50% of the vacancies are earmarked by way of direct recruitment whereas the remaining 50% of the vacancies are to be filled up by resorting to the method of appointment by transfer. The first limb of Rule 3 under category B refers to appointment by transfer from School Assistants in category 1 (b) of class (c) Language Pandits including Hindi Pandits and Grade 1 in category 1 of class D of the re-issued A. P. School Education Subordinate Service Rules or by transfer from any other service. The words from any other service in our opinion, are significant. It is not in dispute that the A. P. State and Subordinate Services Rules would be applicable in the instant case having regard to rule 1 (d) thereof. The words from any other service in our opinion, are significant. It is not in dispute that the A. P. State and Subordinate Services Rules would be applicable in the instant case having regard to rule 1 (d) thereof. "rule 2 (30): "service" means a post or a group of posts or categories of posts classified by the State Government as State or Subordinate Service, as the case may be: provided that for the purpose of recruitment, probation and transfer, each class included in the Andhra Pradesh General Service and the Andhra Pradesh General Subordinate Service shall be regarded as a separate service. Note: Where the context so requires "service" means the period during which a person holds a post in accordance with these rules, special or Ad hoc rules except Rule 10 or a lien on a post or is a member of a service as above defined. Rule 2 (5): Appointment or recruitment by transfer: A candidate is said to be appointed or recruited by transfer to a service: (a) if, at the time of his first appointment thereto he is an approved probationer in the Andhra Pradesh High Court Service or A. P. Legislature Service or in any other service, the rules for which prescribed a period of probation for members thereof, or (b) in case at the time of his first appointment thereto he is the holder of a post which has been included in another service but for which no probation has been prescribed, if he has put in that post, satisfactory service for a total period of two years on duty within a continuous period of three years". ( 7 ) AS noticed hereinbefore the rules permit of filling up of posts of Junior Lecturers either by taking recourse to one method or the other including transfer from any other service. ( 8 ) IT has not been disputed before us that the original applicants-respondents are Government servants. It is also not disputed that they, having been appointed in the various schools situated in the agency area, the said schools are under the control of Social Welfare Department. It is also not in dispute-that the original applicants are teachers working in schools run by a department of the State. From a bare perusal of the provisions of the A. P. Education Act, it would appear, that the same covers a wide spectrum viz. It is also not in dispute-that the original applicants are teachers working in schools run by a department of the State. From a bare perusal of the provisions of the A. P. Education Act, it would appear, that the same covers a wide spectrum viz. , education whether imparted through Government agency or private agency. Section 2 (20) of the said Act defines government to mean State Government of Andhra Pradesh. Section 2 (29) refers to minority educational institutions. Section 2 (30) defines municipal corporation or municipal council . Section 2 (32) defines panchayat Samithi whereas private institution is defined in Section 2 (35) thereof. ( 9 ) THE cause of action for the original applicants arose in view of an order dated 30-8-1995 where the Commissioner and director of Schools inter alia held:"in view of the orders issued by the government in Memo No. 1262/ser. II- 1/95-1, dt 30-8-95, the Regional Joint director of School Education, warangal is informed that the teachers working in Tribal Welfare Department who were appointed by the Project officer in the Tribal Welfare department, ITDAs are outside the purview of the School Education department and these teachers are not governed by the service rules issued by the Education Department in a. P. S. E. S. S. in G. O. Ms. No. 40, education, dt 7-2-92 and these teachers were neither appointed by the District educational Officer nor District development Officer to claim for inclusion in the integrated seniority list of Government and Panchayat Raj institution teachers". ( 10 ) IT is relevant to note at this stage that apart from making A. P. Intermediate education Service Rules by G. O. Ms. No. 302, dated 30-12-1993, the State in exercise of its power under Section 99 of the A. P. Education Act has also made rules known as A. P. Educational Subordinate Service rules by reason of G. O. Ms. No. 538 education (Ser. II) Department, dated 20-11-1998. Rule 3 of the said rule provides for the method of appointment and designating appointing authority for several categories of teachers mentioned therein. From the order impugned before the learned Tribunal it appears that therein the provisions of the said G. O. Ms. No. 538 had not been referred to. No. 538 education (Ser. II) Department, dated 20-11-1998. Rule 3 of the said rule provides for the method of appointment and designating appointing authority for several categories of teachers mentioned therein. From the order impugned before the learned Tribunal it appears that therein the provisions of the said G. O. Ms. No. 538 had not been referred to. It further appears that the Commissioner and the Director of school Education in the said order dated dated 30-8-1995 committed an error in so far as he held that the original applicants having not been appointed by the District educational Officer nor the District development Officer they cannot claim for inclusion in the integrated seniority list of the Government and the Panchayat Raj institution teachers inasmuch as he failed to take into consideration the admitted fact that they are Government servants. ( 11 ) IT is true that the normal rule is that a person cannot be appointed in another cadre either by way of transfer or otherwise from one cadre to another cadre but where there exists any special rules, in the opinion of this Court, the said principle will not apply. Appointment by way of transfer from one service to another service is a well-known mode of recruitment. It is, therefore, not correct to contend that under no circumstances such appointment by transfer is permissible. ( 12 ) RULE 3 of the Rules clearly states that 50% of the vacancies may be filled up from the second group i. e. , School Assistants of re-issued A. P. Subordinate Service Rules or by recruitment by transfer from any other service (emphasis is ours ). The words "any other service" are significant which would necessarily imply service under the State. Having regard to the words used in the said rules there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the words any other service must be construed as service under any department of the State as contra distinguished from service under private institution. ( 13 ) THE object and purport of the said special rules appear to be that all eligible candidates to the extent of 50% quota may be appointed to the post of Junior Lecturer irrespective of the category of service they belong to. ( 13 ) THE object and purport of the said special rules appear to be that all eligible candidates to the extent of 50% quota may be appointed to the post of Junior Lecturer irrespective of the category of service they belong to. It is also to be noted that a combined seniority list of the Government and Panchayat Raj teachers is to be prepared so as to enable the competent authority to consider fillingup of 40% vacancies of junior Lecturers from the second limb of category 8 of Rule 3. Furthermore, the category of teachers who would be considered therefor not only comprises of schools Assistants in category 1 (b) of class C language Pandits but also includes hindi Pandits and Munshies as also group 1 in class (d) of the A. P. School Education subordinate Service Rules as per the combined seniority of Government and panchayat Raj teachers. The submissions of mr. Rao that having regard to the interpretation clause obtaining in Rule 3 item (ii), (Government/panchayat Raj) the oblique standing between government and panchayat raj teachers would be that both government and Panchayat Raj teachers are included thereby. Reliance placed by mr. Rao on Mallikarjuna Rao vs. State of A. P. is misplaced. In the said decision the Apex court inter alia was considering the question as to whether the State government can be directed to frame or amend the existing statuary rules to alter the conditions of service of the civil servants in terms of the directions. ( 14 ) IN Asif Hameed vs. State of J and K (supra) it is observed thus:"17. Before adverting to the controversy directly involved in these appeals we may have a fresh look on the inter se functioning of the three organs of democracy under our constitution. Although the doctrine of separation of powers has not been recognised under the Constitution in its absolute rigidity but the constitution makers have meticulously defined the functions of various organs of the State Legislature, executive and Judiciary have to function within their own spheres demarcated under the Constitution. No organ can usurp the functions assigned to another. The Constitution trusts to the judgment of these organs to function and exercise their discretion by strictly following the procedure prescribed therein. The functioning of democracy depends upon the strength and independence of each of its organs. No organ can usurp the functions assigned to another. The Constitution trusts to the judgment of these organs to function and exercise their discretion by strictly following the procedure prescribed therein. The functioning of democracy depends upon the strength and independence of each of its organs. Legislature and Executive, the two facets of people s will, they have all the powers including that of finance. Judiciary has no power over sword or the purse nonetheless it has power to ensure that the aforesaid two main organs of State function within the constitutional limits. It is the sentinel of democracy. Judicial review is a powerful weapon to restrain unconstitutional exercise of power by the Legislature and Executive. The expanding horizon of judicial review has taken in its fold the concept of social and economic justice. While exercise of powers by the Legislature and Executive is subject to judicial restraint, the only check on our own exercise of power is the self imposed discipline of judicial restraint. 18. Frankfurter, J. of the U. S. Supreme court dissenting in the controversial expatriation case of Trop vs. Dulles (1958) 356 US 86 observed as under: "all power is, in Madison s phrase," of an encroaching nature". Judicial power is not immune against this human weakness. It also must be on guard against encroaching beyond its proper bounds, and not the less so since the only restraint upon it is self-restraint rigorous observance of the difference between limits of power and wise exercise of power - between questions of authority and questions of prudence - requires the most alert appreciation of this decisive but subtle relationship of two concepts that too easily coalesce. No less does it require a disciplined will to adhere to the difference. It is not easy to stand aloof and allow want of wisdom to prevail to disregard one s own strongly held view of what is wise in the conduct of affairs. But it is not the business of this court to pronounce policy. It must observe a fastidious regard for limitations on its own power, and this precludes the Court s giving effect to its own notions of what is wise or politic. That self-restraint is of the essence in the observance of the judicial oath, for the Constitution has not authorized the Judges to sit in judgment on the wisdom of what congress and the Executive Branch do". That self-restraint is of the essence in the observance of the judicial oath, for the Constitution has not authorized the Judges to sit in judgment on the wisdom of what congress and the Executive Branch do". 19. When a State action is challenged, the function of the Court is to examine the action in accordance with law and to determine whether the Legislature or the Executive has acted within the powers and functions assigned under the Constitution and if not, the Court must strike down the action. While doing so the Court must remain within its self-imposed limits. The court sits in judgment on the action of a co-ordinate branch of the government. While exercising power of judicial review of administrative action. The Court is not an appellate authority. The Constitution does not permit the Court to direct or advise the executive in matters of policy or to sermonize qua any matter which under the Constitution lies within the sphere of Legislature or Executive, provided these authorities do not transgress their constitutional limits or statutory powers". ( 15 ) IN Mallikarjuna Rao s case (supra), it is observed thus:"12. The Special Rules have been framed under Art. 309 of the constitution. The power under art. 309 of the Constitution to frame rules is the legislative power, This power under the Constitution has to be exercised by the President or the governor of a State as the case may be. The High Courts or the administrative Tribunals cannot issue a mandate to the State Government to legislate under Article 309 of the constitution. The Courts cannot usurp the functions assigned to the executive under the Constitution and cannot even indirectly require the executive to exercise its rule making power in any manner. The Courts cannot assume to itself a supervisory role over the rule making power of the executive under article 309 of the Constitution". ( 16 ) AS indicated hereinbefore in this case only the question as regards the interpretation of the said rules arises for consideration. The Courts cannot assume to itself a supervisory role over the rule making power of the executive under article 309 of the Constitution". ( 16 ) AS indicated hereinbefore in this case only the question as regards the interpretation of the said rules arises for consideration. It is now a well settled principle of law that rules of purposive construction have to be taken recourse to for giving full effect to the object and purpose for which rules have been framed in Ananta Kumar Bej vs. State of W. B. (Calcutta) it has been noticed: "it is a well settled principles of law that despite absence of a rule, the selection Committee is entitled to short list the candidates. Rule 9 (c) (ii) of the rules only gives a statutory recognition to the aforementioned service jurisprudence. In a case of this nature, therefore, the doctrine ol purposive interpretation should ba invoked, and in such a situation the word "written test must be held to be incorporated within the word interview . The answer to the question posed in this appeal, thus in the opinion of this Court, should be rendered in affirmative as otherwise the word written examination would become totally otiose. Such a construction is permissible by taking recourse to the doctrine of strained construction, as has been elaborately dealt in by Francis Bennion in his statutory Interpretation. At Section 304, of the treatise purposive construction, has been described in the following manner: "a purposive construction of an enactment is one which give effect to the legislative purpose by - (A) following the literal meaning of the enactment where that meaning is in accordance with the legislative purpose (in this Code called a purposive-and-literal construction), or (B) applying a strained meaning where the literal meaning is not in accordance with the legislative purpose (in the Code called a purposive-and-strained construction ). 23. In DPP vs. Schildkamp (1971) AC 1, it was held that the rule that severance may be effected even where the blue pencil technique is impracticable. 24. In Tones vs. Wrotham Park Settled estates (1980) AC 74 at page 105, the law is stated in the following term: ". . . I am not reluctant to adopt a purposive construction where to apply the literal meaning of the legislative language used would lead to results which would clearly defeat the purposes of the Act. 24. In Tones vs. Wrotham Park Settled estates (1980) AC 74 at page 105, the law is stated in the following term: ". . . I am not reluctant to adopt a purposive construction where to apply the literal meaning of the legislative language used would lead to results which would clearly defeat the purposes of the Act. But in doing so the task on which a Court of justice is engaged remains one of construction, even where this involves reading into the Act words which are not expressly included in it. Kammins Ballrooms Co. Ltd. vs. Zenith Investments (Torquay) ltd. (1971 AC 850) provides an instance of this; but in that case the three conditions that must be fulfilled in order to justify this course were satisfied. First, it was possible to determine from a consideration of the provisions of the Act read as a whole precisely what the mischief was that it was the purpose of the Act to remedy; secondly, it was apparent that the draftsman and Parliament had by inadvertence overlooked, and so omitted to deal with an eventuality that required to be dealt with if the purpose of the Act was to be achieved; and thirdly, it was possible to state with certainty what were the additional words that would have been inserted by the Draftsman and approved by Parliament had their attention been drawn to the omission before the Bill passed into law. Unless this third condition is fulfilled and attempt by a Court of justice to repair the omission in the Act cannot be justified as an exercise of its jurisdiction to determine what is the meaning of a written law which parliament has passed". 25. Furthermore, the word written test cannot be said to be casus omissus. 26. In Principles of Statutory interpretation of Justice G. P. Singh, 5th edition, 1992, it is stated: "the Supreme Court in Bangalore water Supply vs. A. Rajappa ( AIR 1978 sc 548 ) Approved the rule of construction stated by Denning, L. J. while dealing with the definition of industry in the Industrial Disputes act, 1947. The definition is so general and ambiguous that BEG, C. J. said that the situation called for "some judicial heroics to cope with difficulties raised". The definition is so general and ambiguous that BEG, C. J. said that the situation called for "some judicial heroics to cope with difficulties raised". K. Iyer, J. , who delivered the leading majority judgment in that case referred with approbation the passage extracted above from the judgment of denning, L. J. in Seaford Court Estates ltd. vs. Asher. But in the same continuation he also cited a passage from the speech of Lord Simonds in the case of Magor and St. Mellons r. D. C. vs. Newsport Corporation, 1951 (2) All ER 839 as if it also found a part of the judgment of Denning, L. J. This passage reads: "the duty of the Court is to interpret the words that the legislature has used. Those words may be ambiguous, but, even if they are, the power and duty of the Court to travel outside them on a voyage of discovery are strictly limited. " As earlier noticed Lord Simonds and other Law Lords in Magor and St. Mellon s case were highly critical of the views of Denning, L. J. However, as submitted above, the criticism is more because of the unconventional manner in which the rule of construction was stated by him. In this connection it is pertinent to remember that although a court cannot supply a real casus omissus it is equally clear that it should not so interpret a statute as to create a casus omissus when there is really none". 27. In Hameedia Hardware Stores vs. B. Mohan Lai Sowear reported in AIR 1988 sc 1060 , at 1067 the rule of addition of word had been held to be permissible in the following words: "we are of the view that having regard to the pattern in which clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Sec. 10 of the Act is enacted and also the context, the words if the landlord required it for his own use or for the use of any member of his family which are found in sub-clause (ii) of section 10 (3) (a) of the Act have to be read also into sub-clause (iii) of section 10 (3) (a) of the Act. Sub- clauses (ii) and (iii) both deal with the non-residential buildings. Sub- clauses (ii) and (iii) both deal with the non-residential buildings. They could have been enacted as one sub-clause by adding a conjunction and between the said two sub-clauses, in which event the cause would have read thus: in case it is a non-residential building which is used for the purpose of keeping a vehicle or adapted for such use, if the landlord required it for his own use or for the use of any member of his family and if he or any member of his family is not occupying any such building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own; and in case it is any other non-residential building, if the landlord or member of his family is carrying on, a non- residential building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own. if the two sub-clauses are not so read, it would lead to an absurd result". ( 17 ) SPECIAL rules were framed by the state in exercise of its power under article 309 of the Constitution of India. Whenever such special rules come up for interpretation before a Court or Tribunal an attempt should be made to give due effect thereto. It is also well-known that for the purpose of interpreting a statute the same has to be read at the first instance and then chapter by Chapter and thereafter section by section. In Reserve Bank of India vs. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co ltd. the law has been laid down in the following terms:"33. Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute-maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provide by the context. If a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute-maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provide by the context. With those glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place arid everything is in its place. It is by looking at the definition as a whole in the setting of the entire Act and by reference to what preceded the enactment and the reasons for it that the Court construed the expression prize Chit in Srinivasa and we find no reason to depart from the Court s construction". ( 18 ) IT is also now well settled that while interpreting the provisions, efforts shall be made to uphold the statutes and give effect to tile legislative policy. The Court will restrain itself from tinkering with the legislative wisdom unless it is found that the same is violative of any constitutional provision. Individual hardship by itself cannot be held to be arbitrary so as to attract the wrath of Article 14 of the Constitution of india. In Devi Prasad vs. Govt of A. P, it has been held:"in the present case, there may be truth in the case of the appellants that they are hit hard because of the new rule. Dr. Chitale tried to convince us of the hardship that his clients sustain consequent on this rule and weightage conferred thereby. But mere hardship without anything arbitrary in the rule does not call for judicial intervention, especially when it flows out of a policy which is not basically illegal". ( 19 ) FURTHERMORE, when the special rules provide for appointment by transfer, the general rules could be deemed to be not applicable. Such rule may have some exception. But mere hardship without anything arbitrary in the rule does not call for judicial intervention, especially when it flows out of a policy which is not basically illegal". ( 19 ) FURTHERMORE, when the special rules provide for appointment by transfer, the general rules could be deemed to be not applicable. Such rule may have some exception. But we have no doubt in our mind that in the event the State intends to appoint the teachers who are working in the tribal Welfare Ashram under the Social welfare Department they would also be eligible therefor. The private respondents herein had not prayed before the Tribunal that they should be directed to be promoted, but they prayed for the preparation of a joint seniority list so that in the event the State considers it expedient to take recourse to the provision by way of transfer, the same can be given effect to. 20. For the aforementioned reasons, we are of the opinion that no case has been made out for interference with the impugned judgment of the Tribunal. The writ Petition is accordingly dismissed, but, in the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.