Yumnam Brojen Singh @ Kunjo @ Boss v. District Magistrate, Bishnupur and Ors.
2001-08-30
B.LAMARE, J.N.SARMA
body2001
DigiLaw.ai
J.N. SARMA, J. — Heard Mr. Kh. Mani, Learned Advocate for the petitioner, Mr. Ibohal Singh, Learned Govt. Advocate for State of Manipur and Mr. N. Ibotombi Singh, Learned C.G.S.C. for the Union of India. 2. This writ application has been filed challenging the order of detention dated 7.10.2000, Annexure-A/1 by the District Magistrate at Bishnupur. The petitioner was detained under National Security Act, 1980 on the ground mentioned therein on 7th October, 2000 and it was approved by the State Government on 17.10.2000. Thereafter, on the same day a report was sent to the Central Govt. and the matter also was placed before the Advisory Board on 17th October, 2000 as is evident from the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the State Govt. as well as from the record produced by the State Govt. Following are the points urged on behalf of Learned Advocate for the petitioner. i) That the requirement of Section 3(4) of the N.S.A. Act, 1980 (hereinafler called the Act) was violated. The mandate of Section 3(4) is that whenever detention order is made by the District Magistrate he shall forthwith report the fact to the State Govt. to which he is subordinate together with the other things as mentioned therein. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that in this case the order of detention was passed on 7th October, 2000 and the report was made to the State Govt. only on 11th October, 2000. The distance between the Bishnupur and the Imphal where the seat of the Govt. is about 25 to 30 kms. The Dictionary meaning of the word forth with is as follows:- "FORTHWITH. Immediately; without delay, directly hence within a reasonable time under the circumstances of the case; promptly and with reasonable dispatch. State ex rel. Board of Education of City of Tulsa-Vs-Morley, 168 OKL. 259,34 p. 2d 258,261; 1 Chit. Archb. Pr.( 12th Ed.) 164. Within such time as to permit that which is to be done, to be done lawfully and according to the practical and ordinary course of things to be performed or accomplished. Harris-Vs-Steward, 187 Miss. 489,193, So, 339, 342. The first opportunity offered. Abbott -vs- State, 117 Nab. 350,220 N. W. 578,579." It is really a pity that to cover this distance of 25 to 30 kms. It took the authority four days.
Harris-Vs-Steward, 187 Miss. 489,193, So, 339, 342. The first opportunity offered. Abbott -vs- State, 117 Nab. 350,220 N. W. 578,579." It is really a pity that to cover this distance of 25 to 30 kms. It took the authority four days. That is not the compliance with the requirement of Section 3(4) of the N.S.A. Act. No doubt, in interpreting this Section we must adopt a pragmatic approach. There may be reasonable explanation for the delay, if that explanation is reasonable one the court is bound to accept it. There may not be any conveyance available, there may be flood, there may be other disaster for which the District Magistrate may not be in a position to report the matter forthwith. That is not the case in hand. In AIR 1982 SC Page 710 (A.K. Roy-Vs-Union of India) the Apex Court upheld the validity of the Act but at the same time emphasised on compliance with the procedural requirements and that is the decision of the Constitutional Bench and still holding the field. We find in this case that procedural requirement was not adhered to. ii) The next submission made by Learned Counsel for the petitioner is based on Section 10 of the National Security Act, 1980. Section 10 of the Act deals with the reference to the Advisory Boards. It provides that the appropriate Government shall within three weeks from the date of detention of a person under the order, place before the Advisory Board constituted under Section 9 the grounds and other materials on which the order has been passed. 3. There is no denying of the fact that the detention order was approved by the State Govt. on 17th October, 2000 and it was placed before the Advisory Board on the same day. So, there was compliance with this requirement and we do not find any infirmity. If any authority is required for this proposition of law one may have a look at AIR 1986 SC Page 207(State of Uttar Pradesh-Vs-Mahant Singh) wherein in paragraph 5 it has been pointed out as follows: "5. Section 10 provides that the State Government has the obligation to cause the papers relating to detention to be placed, along with the representation, if made, within three weeks from the date of detention before the Advisory Board." 4.
Section 10 provides that the State Government has the obligation to cause the papers relating to detention to be placed, along with the representation, if made, within three weeks from the date of detention before the Advisory Board." 4. In the instant case also it was placed before the Advisory Board within three weeks from the date of detention. In AIR 1984 SC Page 46(Raisuddin alias Babu Tamchi-Vs- The State of Uttar Pradesh and another) the Supreme Court pointed out as follows:- "Section 10 does not enjoin the State Government to take steps to see that the case of the detenue is considered by the Advisory Board within three weeks from the date of detention. It only casts a duty on the appropriate Government to "place before" the Advisory Board constituted under Section 9 within three weeks from the date of detention the grounds on which the order of detention has been made and the representation, if any, made by the person affected by the order. The word "place before" cannot be interpreted to mean anything more than forward to or submit before the Advisory Board the relevant papers relating to the detention of the detenue. More so the Advisory Board is not an entity subordinate to the Government. It is a wholly independent body consisting of persons who are or have been or are qualified to be appointed as Judges of a High Court and it is entirely for the Advisory Board to regulate its schedule of holding meetings and conducting its business in accordance with the procedure laid down under Section 11." 5. So, this contention of learned counsel for the petitioner shall fall through. But we are satisfied that after detention order was made, the District Magistrate did not report the matter to the State Govt. forthwith as is the mandate of law. Accordingly, on that ground the order of detention shall stand quashed. The petitioner shall be released forthwith, if he is not wanted in connection with other cases. 6. Records produced by the learned Govt. Advocate is returned to him.