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2001 DIGILAW 248 (JK)

Competent Authority v. Ajay Gupta

2001-10-11

H.K.SEMA, S.K.GUPTA

body2001
1. We have heard Shri D.C. Raina, learned counsel for the appellant. 2. There is delay of 96 days in preferring the LPA. Notice was issued to respondents and Shri V.R. Wazir, learned counsel for the Caveator-respondents appeared and heard him. He has filed objections. 3. According to Mr. V.R. Wazir, sufficient cause as contemplated under section 5 of the Limitation Act has not been explained and, therefore, it is not a fit case to condone the delay of 96 days. At the same time, it is contended by Mr. D.C. Raina that the writ petition has been disposed of after admission without affording any opportunity to the appellant to either submit their counter or without issuing a notice after admission, depriving the applicant of right of hearing and defend his case and, therefore, the substantial justice could not be made to suffer because of the impediment of technicalities. The question of delay is to be considered in the background of the propounded principle by the Apex Court in Catena of decisions that where a technicality is pitted against the substantial justice, the latter must prevail over the former. If otherwise, a meritorious case would be thrown out at the thresh-hold because of the impediments of the technicalities and it would cause injustice to the substantial justice itself. At the same time, there cannot be any presumption for deliberate delay on the part of the parties seeking for condonation of delay because by resorting to deliberate delay the parties would be incurring a high risk. Therefore, a deliberate delay can never be presumed. On the other hand, if the writ petition is disposed of without affording any opportunity to the other side, in our view that itself would constitute a sufficient cause for condoning the delay because in such a situation, it has chained reactions, the parties would be getting a copy of the judgment late and thereafter that the case must be processed for filing an appeal and in that process a reasonable delay is always expected. This apart, in a Government Department the methodology of note-making, file-pushing and passing on the buck is not uncommon. Therefore, a reasonable delay in the process is always expected and that cannot be attributed to a deliberate delay or the delay being caused by latches and negligence of the parties. 4. This apart, in a Government Department the methodology of note-making, file-pushing and passing on the buck is not uncommon. Therefore, a reasonable delay in the process is always expected and that cannot be attributed to a deliberate delay or the delay being caused by latches and negligence of the parties. 4. In the facts and circumstance of the case as stated above, we are clearly of the view that the petition being disposed of without affording any opportunity of hearing to the other party and without issuing of notice after admission would constitute a sufficient case for condoning the delay. We may hasten to add that justice means justice to the parties. Justice does not mean justice to one party at the cost of injustice to the other party. If such a situation arises, it would amount to perpetuation of injustice. At the same time, if a judgment is delivered after hearing the parties it would do complete justice to both the parties. Keeping in view the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are clearly of the view that in the instant case sufficient cause has been shown for condoning the delay. We, accordingly condone the delay. CMP is disposed of. Let the LPA be numbered and listed for admission on 16.10.2001.