O. P. GARG, J. ( 1 ) A fine point of controversy in this writ petition has come to be raised whether a police officer within the meaning of U. P. Police Officers of the Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal)Rules, 1991 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules of 1991) can be placed under suspension even before the receipt of report of the preliminary inquiry. This question naturally involves the interpretation of Rule 17 of the Rules of 1991, which reads as follows : "17. Suspension.-- 1 (a) A police officer against whose conduct an inquiry is contemplated, or is proceeding, may be placed under suspension pending the conclusion of the inquiry in the discretion of the appointing authority or by any other authority not below the rank of superintendent of Police, authorised by him in this behalf. (b) A police officer in respect of or against whom an investigation, inquiry or trial relating to a criminal charge is pending may at the discretion of the appointing authority under whom he is serving be placed under suspension, until the termination of all proceedings relating to that charge, if the charge is connected with his position as a police officer or is likely to embarrass him in the discharge of his duties or involves moral turpitude, if the prosecution is instituted by a private person on complaint, the appointing authority may decide whether the circumstances of the case justify the suspension of the accused. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " ( 2 ) THE controversy has come up in the wake of the following facts. Civil Police Constables Yad ali, Bhim Yadav and Om Prakash Tewari-petitioners are posted at police station. Sayed Raja in district Chandauli. They were placed under suspension by the Superintendent of Police, chandauli by order No. 123 of 2000 dated November, 2000, in contemplation of the departmental inquiry with immediate effect in connection with the allegation that they had stopped truck No. DL-1g/4896 in the night of 21. 11. 2000, for checking the papers relating to registration, etc. . of the vehicle and in the process misbehaved and ill-treated its driver. 11. 2000, for checking the papers relating to registration, etc. . of the vehicle and in the process misbehaved and ill-treated its driver. Simultaneously with the order of suspension, the Circle Officer, Chandauli, was directed to hold a preliminary inquiry and submit his report within seven days (endorsement No. 4 of the suspension order ). ( 3 ) BESIDES taking the plea that the order of suspension has been passed in a mala fide manner and on the basis of non-existent or incorrect facts, it has been emphatically canvassed on behalf of the petitioners that the order of suspension could not be passed unless the report of the preliminary inquiry had been received and, therefore, the mention of the fact in the text of the order of suspension that the petitioners were being suspended as an inquiry is contemplated, is of no relevance or consequence. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on the oft-quoted decision of this Court in the case of Tej Pal Singh v. Deputy inspector General of Police, P. A. C. , Agra and another, 1999 (82) FLR 262, in which the scope, object and purpose of the preliminary inquiry as well as regular disciplinary inquiry has been made clear relying upon a decision of this Court in State of U. P. v. Jai Singh Dixit, 1974 ALJ 862 (FB), and the two decisions of the Apex Court, namely, A. C. Benjamin v. Union of India, 1967 (15) FLR 347 (SC) and Rt. Rev. B. P. Sugandhar Bishop in Medak v. Smt. D. Dorothy dayasheela Ebeneser, JT 1996 (6) SC 221. It was asserted that the decision in Tej Pal Singhs case (supra) squarely applies to the facts of the present case and consequently, the order of suspension against the petitioners cannot be legally sustained as it has been passed even before the disciplinary authority had an occasion to make up his mind on the objective assessment of the facts as could be disclosed in the preliminary inquiry report (which was yet to be received and considered ). ( 4 ) LEARNED standing counsel has brought on record a short counter-affidavit to indicate that the circle Officer, Chandauli, who was entrusted with the task of conducting the preliminary inquiry has submitted his report, a copy of which is Annexure S. C. A. 1 to the short counter-affidavit. ( 4 ) LEARNED standing counsel has brought on record a short counter-affidavit to indicate that the circle Officer, Chandauli, who was entrusted with the task of conducting the preliminary inquiry has submitted his report, a copy of which is Annexure S. C. A. 1 to the short counter-affidavit. The preliminary inquiry discloses that out of the three petitioners, Yad Ali and Om Prakash tewari, constables were on duty on 21. 11. 2000 during the period 12 noon to 10 p. m. at taxi stand, tri-junction, Qasba Sayed Raja, district Chandauli. Both of them chased truck No. DL-1g/4896 from the taxi stand upto Sakaldeeha tri-junction in Chandauli town which is about 10 kms. from the taxi stand of Qasba Sayed Raja. It was found that the constables, above-named, were not authorised to check or look into the papers of the vehicle, in question, and on account of the fact that the driver of the vehicle was subjected to assault, a commotion and tension prevailed in the area and the trucks which were coming from both the sides on the G. T. road, blocked the road and jammed the traffic. On getting the information, Senior Sub-Inspector Sri J. P. Singh of police station Chandauli reached the site of the trouble and tried to pacify the rowdy public. The driver of the truck-victim of assault-was required to accompany upto the police station to lodge an F. I. R. but he was not willing to do so as he apprehended that in future, the police officials may harass him. Constables Om Prakash Tewari and Yad Ali escaped from the scene and after great difficulty and at the intervention of senior police officers who held out assurance that stern action against the delinquent constables shall be taken, traffic problem could be sorted out and jam from the road lifted. Hectic search was made for the aforesaid two constables but they were not available for explaining their conduct in the matter or to put forth their version of the incident. The preliminary inquiry report indicates that the allegations are only against Om Prakash Tewari and Yad Ali, constables and that constable C. P. 431-Bhim yadav-petitioner No. 2, prima facie had no part to play in the episode. ( 5 ) THE factual controversy is beyond the pale of writ jurisdiction. The order of suspension has been challenged on legal matrix. The preliminary inquiry report indicates that the allegations are only against Om Prakash Tewari and Yad Ali, constables and that constable C. P. 431-Bhim yadav-petitioner No. 2, prima facie had no part to play in the episode. ( 5 ) THE factual controversy is beyond the pale of writ jurisdiction. The order of suspension has been challenged on legal matrix. Since the relevant material has been brought on record and the legal controversy is to be set at rest, this writ petition, with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, is being finally disposed of, at the admission stage. ( 6 ) HEARD Sri C. B. Yadav, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri M. S. Pipersenia, learned standing counsel for the respondents. ( 7 ) LET us first analyse the powers of the appointing/disciplinary authority to suspend an employee with reference to the implications of the relationship of master and servant. It is one of the implied terms of the relationship between the employer and employee that the employer is entitled to exercise disciplinary control over the employee. The disciplinary matters include any kind of disciplinary action proposed to be taken by the employer against the employee. The power of disciplinary control is an indicia of the relationship of master and servant. This principle has been recognised by the Apex Court in the case of Charanjeet Lal Chaudhary v. Union of India. AIR 1951 SC 41 and State of Assam v. Kanak Chandra Dutta, AIR 1967 SC 884 . The order of suspension comes within the sweep of disciplinary action. To place an employee under suspension is an unqualified right of the employer. This right is conceded to the employer in service jurisprudence everywhere. The above propositions are now well established by a series of pronouncements of the Apex Court. In Management of Hotel Imperial v. Hotel Workers union, AIR 1959 SC 1342 , the Supreme Court while considering the question as to whether a master could suspend his servant during the pendency of an inquiry, observed that in the absence of a power either in express terms in the contract or under statutory Rules governing the service, the master could not direct interim suspension, and even if he did so in the sense that he forbids the employee to work, he will have to pay the wages during the so called period of suspension. Imperial Hotel (supra) was explained in T. Cajee v. U. Jormanik Siem, AIR 1961 SC 1342. In the latter case, the Court pointed out that Imperial Hotel did not lay down that there could not be interim suspension nor did it lay down that the master could not forbid the servant from working while he was inquiring into his conduct with a view to removing him from service. All that imperial Hotel said was that if the master did so forbid the servant and in fact, suspended him as an interim measure, he would have to pay wages during the period of interim suspension. Referring to Imperial Hotel, the Constitution Bench in T. Cajee (supra) observed : "the effect of that decision is that in the absence of such power the master can pass an order of interim suspension but he will have to pay the servant according to the terms of contract between them. " The Court held that though an order of interim suspension could be made against the respondent in the case before it while inquiry into his conduct with a view to his ultimate removal is going on, his remuneration according to the terms and conditions communicated to him could not be withheld unless there was some statute or Rules framed thereunder which would justify the withholding of the whole or part of the remuneration. The Court emphasized that so far as there was no statute or Rule the remuneration could not be withheld from the suspended employee even though an order of suspension in the sense he is told not to do the work of his office, might be made against him. ( 8 ) A Constitution Bench of the Apex Court three decades and six years ago in R. P. Kapur v. Union of India, (1964) 5 SCR 431 : AIR 1964 SC 787 at 792, laid the law that : "the general principle, therefore, is that an employer can suspend an employee pending an inquiry into his conduct and the only question that can arise on such suspension will relate to the payment during the period of such suspension. If there is no express term in the contract relating to suspension and payment during such suspension or if there is no statutory provision in any law or Rule, the employee is entitled to his full remuneration for the period of his interim suspension ; on the other hand if there is a term in this respect in the contract or there is a provision in this respect in the contract or there is a provision in the statute or the Rules framed thereunder providing for the scale of payment during suspension, the payment would be in accordance therewith. These general principles in our opinion apply with equal force in a case where the government is the employer and a public servant is the employee with this modification that in view of the peculiar structural hierarchy of Government, the employer in the case or Government must be held to be the authority which has the power to appoint a public servant. On general principle therefore, the authority entitled to appoint a public servant would be entitled to suspend him pending a departmental inquiry into his conduct or pending a criminal proceeding which may eventually result in a departmental inquiry against him. " ( 9 ) THE legal position was authoritatively summed up by the Supreme Court in V. P. Gindroniya v. State of M. P. AIR 1970 SC 1494 , after particularly approving Balvantrai Ratilal Patel v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 800 , the Supreme Court said : "the law on the subject was exhaustively reviewed in Balvantrai Ratilal Patel v. State of maharashtra, (1968) 2 SCR 577 : AIR 1968 SC 800 . Therein the legal position was stated thus : the general principle is that an employer can suspend an employee of his pending an inquiry into his misconduct and the only question that can arise in such a suspension will relate to the payment of his wages during the period of such suspension. It is now well-settled that the power to suspend, in the sense of a right to forbid an employee to work, is not an implied term in an ordinary contract between master and servant, and that such a power can only be the creature either of a statute governing the conduct, or of an express term in the contract itself. Ordinarily. Ordinarily. therefore, the absence of such a power either as an express term in the contract or in the Rules framed under some statute would mean that an employer would have no power to suspend an employee of his and even if he does so in the sense that he forbids the employee to work, he will have to pay the employees wages during the period of suspension. Where, however, there is power to suspend either in the contract of employment or in the statute or the Rules framed thereunder, the order of suspension has the effect of temporarily suspending the relationship of master and servant with the consequence that the servant is not bound to render service and the master is not bound to pay. It is equally well- settled that an order of interim suspension can be passed against the employee while an inquiry is pending into his conduct even though there is no such term in the contract of employment or in the Rules, but in such a case the employee would be entitled to his remuneration for the period of suspension if there is no statute or Rule under which, it could be withheld. The distinction between suspending the contract of service of a servant and suspending him from performing the duties of his office on the basis that the contract is subsisting is important. The suspension in the latter case is always an implied term in every contract of service. When an employee is suspended in this sense, it means that the employer merely issues a direction to him that he should not do the service required of him during a particular period. In other words, the employer is regarded as issuing an order to the employee which because the contract is subsisting, the employee must obey. " The above principles have come to be reiterated in subsequent decisions, including the one State of Orissa v. Bimal Kumar Mohanty, AIR 1994 SC 2296 . The order of suspension does not put an end to an employees service and he continues to be a member of the service though he is not permitted to work and is paid only subsistence allowance which is less than his salary (see State of M. P. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1977 SC 1466 . The order of suspension does not put an end to an employees service and he continues to be a member of the service though he is not permitted to work and is paid only subsistence allowance which is less than his salary (see State of M. P. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1977 SC 1466 . ( 10 ) THE principles stated above have received statutory recognition under service Rules framed by various authorities ; including Government of India and the State Governments. For example rule 10 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. Even under the general Clauses Act, this right is conceded to the employer by Section 16 which, inter alia provides that power to appoint includes power to suspend or dismiss. The latest addition in the series appears to be the U. P. Government Servant (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999 (published in U. P. Gazette [extraordinary) dated 9th June, 1999) (See Rule 4 ). The service rules usually provide that an employee may be placed under suspension : (a) where disciplinary proceeding against him is contemplated or is pending ; (b) where a case against him of a criminal offence is under investigation, inquiry or trial. Clauses (a) and (b) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 17 of the Rules of 1991, embrace within their ambit the same situations. There is no doubt about the fact that a police officer against whose conduct an inquiry is contemplated and/or is proceeding, may be placed under suspension pending conclusion of the inquiry in the discretion of the appointing authority or by any other authority not below the rank of Superintendent of Police. The appointing/disciplinary authority, therefore, has the discretion to suspend a police officer if an inquiry is contemplated or is going on. Now the question is whether the term inquiry as incorporated in Rule 17 is restricted only to a regular disciplinary inquiry or has something to do with a preliminary probe or fact-finding inquiry. ( 11 ) IN order to reach the proper conclusion and to construe the term inquiry in its true perspective, as used in Rule 17 of the Rules of 1991, one has to consider the purpose, object and scope of the preliminary inquiry as well as the regular departmental inquiry. ( 11 ) IN order to reach the proper conclusion and to construe the term inquiry in its true perspective, as used in Rule 17 of the Rules of 1991, one has to consider the purpose, object and scope of the preliminary inquiry as well as the regular departmental inquiry. The object of the preliminary inquiry is to collect material for prima facie satisfaction of the disciplinary authority to form an opinion whether full fledged inquiry should be initiated against the delinquent officer or not. The purpose of the preliminary inquiry is to verify the correctness or otherwise of the allegations leading to the delinquency on the part of a Government servant. The preliminary inquiry and the formal disciplinary inquiry are mutually exclusive and cannot go together. If a preliminary inquiry against a delinquent employee fails to prima facie substantiate the allegations, regular disciplinary inquiry would not be necessary. The evidence from the material collected during the course of preliminary inquiry generally is without giving an opportunity to the concerned employee and, therefore, though it may be made the basis to launch a regular disciplinary inquiry but on its basis, an order of punishment cannot be passed. The only purpose of the preliminary inquiry is to provide the authority concerned a foot-board to make up his mind whether it is necessary in the circumstances of the case, to initiate formal disciplinary inquiry. It is only a fact-finding inquiry preceding the actual disciplinary proceeding. The preliminary inquiry, therefore, is informal probe or fact finding in nature and precedes the initiation of a formal inquiry. ( 12 ) THE distinction between preliminary inquiry and the formal disciplinary inquiry came to be succinctly drawn in the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Jai Singh Dixit [supra)with reference to the provisions of Rule 49a of the U. P. Civil Services (Classification. Control and Appeal) Rules (hereinafter referred to as the C. C. A. Rules ). It was ruled as follows : "the inquiry contemplated by Rule 49a cannot have reference to an informal preliminary inquiry or a fact-finding inquiry preceding the actual disciplinary proceeding, otherwise it shall be permissible to suspend a Government servant pending such informal inquiry, but not after charges have been framed and regular departmental proceeding is pending. This shall lead to an anomalous situation. This shall lead to an anomalous situation. We are, therefore, of opinion that the inquiry contemplated by Rules 49a and 1-A has reference to the formal departmental inquiry, and not to any informal preliminary or fact finding inquiry preceding the initiation of the formal disciplinary proceeding. " The firm view taken by the Full Bench was that an order of suspension pending an inquiry as contemplated under Rule 49a may be ordered at any stage prior to or after framing of charges when on objective consideration, the authority concerned is of the view that a formal departmental inquiry under Rules 55 and 55a of the C. C. A. Rules or Rules 5 or 5a of the U. P. Punishment and Appeal Rules is expected or such an inquiry is pending. At least one thing is clear from this decision that during the pendency of the regular departmental inquiry, a delinquent employee can be suspended in the discretion of the disciplinary authority. Before the initiation of the disciplinary inquiry or in the expectation that formal inquiry may be necessary, a delinquent employee may be suspended on objective consideration of the allegations and supporting material. The supporting material may be in the form of a preliminary inquiry. ( 13 ) IT is usual that when a preliminary inquiry makes out a prima facie case against the delinquent employee that a formal departmental inquiry is commenced into the conduct of such an employee, in A. G. Benjamins case (supra), Honble Supreme Court took the view with reference to the power to terminate the services of a temporary public servant that where it is intended to take action by way of punishment it often happens that something in the nature of preliminary inquiry is first held in accordance with the alleged misconduct or unsatisfactory work. It was observed that : ". . . . . It is usual when such a preliminary inquiry makes out a prima facie case against the government servant that a formal departmental inquiry is started into the conduct of the government servant. . . . . When a preliminary inquiry of this nature is held in the case of a temporary Government servant, it must not be mistaken for the regular departmental inquiry made by the Government in order to inflict one of the three major punishments already indicated. . . . . When a preliminary inquiry of this nature is held in the case of a temporary Government servant, it must not be mistaken for the regular departmental inquiry made by the Government in order to inflict one of the three major punishments already indicated. So far as the preliminary inquiry is concerned there is no question of its being governed by article 311 (2) for the preliminary inquiry is really for the satisfaction of Government to decide whether punitive action should be taken or action should be taken under the contract of the Rules in the case of the temporary Government servant concerned. There is no element of punitive proceedings in such an inquiry ; the idea in holding such an inquiry is not to punish the temporary Government servant but just to decide whether he deserves to be continued in service or not. " ( 14 ) A clear-cut distinction with regard to a preliminary inquiry and the regular departmental inquiry came to be laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Rt. Rev. B. P. Sugandhar Bishop in Medak (supra) by observing that the purpose of holding a preliminary inquiry is to ascertain whether there was some truth in the complaints made and whether there was enough material on the basis of which misconduct of the delinquent employee could be proved. At the stage of such an inquiry, no formal charge is required to be framed nor even participation by the delinquent employee is necessary. The disciplinary authority had only to broadly indicate the authority entrusted with the job of preliminary inquiry, the nature and scope of inquiry, which it has to make so that after the receipt of the report of preliminary inquiry, a decision may be taken as to whether a full fledged regular inquiry is required to be made or not. ( 15 ) TAKING clue from the above decisions, this Court in the case of Tej Pal Singh (supra) has held that : "from a perusal of the three judgments mentioned above, the scope, object and purpose of preliminary inquiry and subsequent disciplinary inquiry which follows, has been made clear. In rule 17 of the Rules, only word inquiry has been used. Rule 17, as it stands is pari-materia to rule 49a of C. C. A. Rules. In rule 17 of the Rules, only word inquiry has been used. Rule 17, as it stands is pari-materia to rule 49a of C. C. A. Rules. The Full Bench in the above case has already said that the word inquiry has been used only to denote a full-fledged disciplinary inquiry. If Rules 5, 13 and 14 of the Rules are read together, there remains no doubt that the legislative authority had in mind both preliminary inquiry and full-fledged disciplinary inquiry but while framing Rule 17 it has used only word inquiry which clearly demonstrates that the legislative intent was that order of suspension shall be passed only when the authority is satisfied that there is prima facie case for holding a full-fledged inquiry against the delinquent official and not before that. " It was further clarified and held in the case of Tej Pal Singh (supra) that mere mention of the rule in the text of the order of suspension cannot satisfy the requirement of Rule 17 that an inquiry is contemplated. A preliminary inquiry is ordered when the authority feels that the material is not sufficient for forming opinion that there is prima facie case for holding full fledged inquiry against the delinquent official. The view taken in Tej Pal Singhs case (supra) in nutshell is that unless the preliminary inquiry report is received, a delinquent police officer cannot be suspended by merely mentioning in the order of suspension that an inquiry is contemplated against him. The stage to suspend the delinquent official would reach only after the receipt of the report of preliminary inquiry and on which an objective decision is taken-whether a full fledged inquiry is required to be initiated in the light of the delinquencies as prima facie disclosed (in the preliminary inquiry report ). Mere mention of the expression that a departmental inquiry is contemplated in the suspension order though, in fact, no departmental inquiry was contemplated would not validate the order of suspension. On this point, inspiration may be drawn from a recent decision of the Apex Court in K. Sukhendar Ready v. State of A. P. and another, 1999 (6) SCC 257 . On this point, inspiration may be drawn from a recent decision of the Apex Court in K. Sukhendar Ready v. State of A. P. and another, 1999 (6) SCC 257 . ( 16 ) A passing reference may also be made to the decision of this Court in the case of Hari Nath sharma v. State of U. P. , 1997 (3) ESC 1833 (All), on which reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners. The ratio of that decision is not applicable to the facts of the present case. The order of suspension in that case was held to have been passed by way of punishment solely on the basis of the finding of guilt in the preliminary inquiry but not in contemplation of any regular departmental inquiry. It was in the context of these facts that it was observed : "that mere passing of order under Rule 17 (1) (a) of the Rules of 1991. it does not absolve the respondents from indicating for motion of opinion that the order has been passed in contemplation of an inquiry without indicating the same in the order itself. The close look to the order does not specify that even impliedly it is indicated that the inquiry is contemplated. The order of suspension can only be issued when an inquiry is contemplated and it is to be so indicated in the order itself either expressly or by necessary implication. . . . . " This decision does not apply to the facts of the present case as it has been specifically mentioned in the impugned order of suspension that the petitioners were being suspended in contemplation of departmental inquiry. ( 17 ) IN Dulal Krishna Kanjilal v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1980 SC 840 , it was contended that the expression pending inquiry in the Police Regulation, Bengal must mean a regular departmental inquiry and not any probing or an informal inquiry prior thereto. Rejecting the contention, the Apex Court pointed out that the inquiry contemplated in the Police Regulation should be understood in a broader sense including probing inquiry and it would not be proper to limit it to the initiation of a departmental proceedings based on a formal charge-sheet. This decision escaped consideration in Tej Pal Singhs case (supra ). ( 18 ) THERE are three kinds of suspensions. This decision escaped consideration in Tej Pal Singhs case (supra ). ( 18 ) THERE are three kinds of suspensions. The meaning and implications of these kinds of suspension were explained by the Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court in V. P. Gindroniyas case (supra) in the following terms : "three kinds of suspension are known to law. A public servant may be suspended as a mode of punishment or he may be suspended during the pendency of an inquiry against him if the order appointing him or statutory provisions governing his service provide for such suspensions. Lastly he may merely be forbidden from discharging his duties during the pendency of an inquiry against him which act is also called suspension. The right to suspend as a measure of punishment as well as the right to suspend the contract of service during the pendency of an inquiry are both regulated by the contract of employment or the provisions regulating the conditions of service. But the last category of suspension referred to earlier is the right of the master to forbid his servant from doing the work which he had to do under the terms of the contract of service or the provisions governing his conditions of service at the same timekeeping in force the masters obligations under the contract. In other words, the master may ask his servant to refrain from rendering his service but he must fulfil his part of the contract. " Even in the absence of an express term in the contract of service provided for interim suspension or an express statutory provision or rule-conferring power of interim suspension, there is implied power in the employer to direct suspension of performance of duties by the employee. The interim order of suspension is passed with a view to forbid the delinquent employee from discharging his duties during the pendency of the inquiry. There is no doubt that an order of suspension affects an employee injuriously. An interim order of suspension pending inquiry visits the employee with evil consequences. He is not only forbidden from performing his duties but is paid salary at a considerably reduced rates, which is known as subsistence allowance which hardly is sufficient to meet both ends. There is no doubt that an order of suspension affects an employee injuriously. An interim order of suspension pending inquiry visits the employee with evil consequences. He is not only forbidden from performing his duties but is paid salary at a considerably reduced rates, which is known as subsistence allowance which hardly is sufficient to meet both ends. It is, therefore, necessary that even in a case of interim suspension, the disciplinary authority should apply its mind and pass an order of suspension only when it is necessitated taking into consideration the gravity of allegations and to maintain discipline in the department. This aspect of the matter was taken note of by the Apex court in the case of O. P. Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 2257 . The Honble Supreme court pointed out that having regard to the serious repercussions on livelihood, an order of suspension is not to be passed lightly and where there was no question of inflicting any departmental punishment, the order of suspension would, prima facie, tantamount to imposition of a penalty which is manifestly repugnant to the principles of natural justice and fair play in action. An interim order of suspension can only be made after the authority comes to the conclusion that there is sufficient reason for keeping an employee under suspension, i. e. , in other words, there has to be proper application of mind and satisfaction that suspension is called for in a given case. In Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Cold Mines Ltd. , and another, 1999 (82) FLR 627, the Honble Supreme Court deprecated the practice of passing the orders of suspension on trivial grounds at the fancy and caprice of the disciplinary authority. It observed :"exercise of right to suspend an employee may be justified on facts of a particular case. Instances, however, are not rare where officers have been found to be afflicted by suspension syndrome and the employees have been found to be placed under suspension just for nothing. It is their irritability rather than the employees trivial lapse which has often resulted in suspension. " However, the absence of a recital in the order of suspension regarding the requisite satisfaction will not invalidate the order as has been held by the Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Hari Ram Yadav, AIR 1994 SC 1262 . " However, the absence of a recital in the order of suspension regarding the requisite satisfaction will not invalidate the order as has been held by the Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Hari Ram Yadav, AIR 1994 SC 1262 . An order after preliminary inquiry is made with a view to prove the correct facts and unless the correct facts are ascertained, it would be unwise to pass an order of suspension. The disciplinary authority is required to wait for the outcome of the preliminary inquiry and after the receipt of the report of preliminary inquiry if it is found that the allegations are so serious that in order to maintain the discipline, the delinquent employee is required to be placed under suspension, then only an order of suspension should normally be passed. This aspect of the matter was considered by this Court in Awadhesh Singh v. Chief development Officer and others. 1994 (3) UPLBEC 1051. That was a case under Rule 49a which prompted the suspension of a Government servant by the appointing authority pending inquiry. It was held that the order of suspension, no doubt, is discretionary and can be exercised in diverse, varied and variegated circumstances giving rise to a misconduct warranting disciplinary inquiry but it being open to judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution, can be tested on grounds of bad faith, mala fide (personal or legal) or irrationality, unreasonableness or non-application of mind. In that case, a sort of an informal inquiry had been ordered and a report called for but the appointing authority instead of waiting for the preliminary inquiry report suspended the employee. It was observed that in all fairness, the appointing authority ought to have awaited the inquiry report, or in the alternative, he ought to have applied his mind to the gravamen as contained in the complaint made against the petitioner to be decided on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the accusations against him were trustworthy, substantial and serious enough to warrant dismissal, removal or reduction in rank in the event of being established at the end of the formal inquiry. Suspension order without application of mind to the conditions and circumstances relevant to exercise of discretion is held to be mala fide. Suspension order without application of mind to the conditions and circumstances relevant to exercise of discretion is held to be mala fide. The appointing authority, while exercising the discretion under Rule 49a (1) of the C. C. A. Rules directs itself to the question whether the charges are substantial and supported by prima facie evidence or they are baseless, malicious or vindictive and have been made to harass the concerned Government servant or to keep him out of employment. Non application of mind to these aspects would vitiate the order. ( 19 ) A reference further came to be made to the decision of this Court in the case of Vijay shanker and another v. Senior Superintendent of Police, Gorakhpur and others, 1996 (2)UPLBEC 1423, in which it was observed that in normal course, a disciplinary authority should await the result of preliminary inquiry before exercising the power of suspension. On the strength of this observation, it is urged that the order of suspension passed in this case without awaiting the report of preliminary inquiry cannot be said to have been passed by applying mind. ( 20 ) THE fact that the appointing authority should in the normal course await the receipt of report of informal inquiry or for the outcome of the probe is beyond the place of dispute but it cannot be treated to be an inflexible Rule of law. There may be certain circumstances when this Rule may not subserve the real purpose as suspension of a delinquent employee may be immediately necessary even before the receipt of the preliminary inquiry report. Certain contingencies may occur where the order of suspension cannot brook delay or there may be certain pressing circumstances to pass an order of suspension without awaiting the preliminary inquiry report. A whisper of such exceptions is found in the case of Awadhesh Singh (supra ). Suspension is not a punishment but is only one way of forbidding or disabling an employee to discharge the duties of office or post held by him. A whisper of such exceptions is found in the case of Awadhesh Singh (supra ). Suspension is not a punishment but is only one way of forbidding or disabling an employee to discharge the duties of office or post held by him. In other words, it is to refrain him to avail further opportunity to perpetrate the alleged misconduct or to remove the impression among the members of service that dereliction of duty would pay fruits and the offending employee could get away even pending inquiry without any impediment or to prevent an opportunity to the delinquent officer to scuttle the inquiry or investigation or to win over the witnesses or the delinquent having had the opportunity in office to impede the progress of the investigation or inquiry etc. Each case must be considered depending on the nature of the allegations, gravity of the situation and the indelible impact it creates on the service for the continuance of the delinquent employee in service pending inquiry or contemplated inquiry or investigation. It would be another thing if the action is actuated by mala fides, arbitrary or for ulterior purpose. The suspension must be step in aid to the ultimate result of the investigation or inquiry. The authority also should keep in mind public interest of the impact of the delinquents continuance in office while facing departmental inquiry or trial on a criminal charge State of Orissa v. Bimal Kumar Mohanty (supra ). ( 21 ) THERE is yet another aspect of the matter. Sometimes, a preliminary inquiry report is called for not for probing the true facts for the purposes of placing an employee under suspension but a preliminary inquiry report may be necessary to determine whether the disciplinary inquiry is to be held for the purposes of minor punishment or major punishment as the procedure for the two types of inquiries is entirely different. Under Rule 14 (1) of the Rules of 1991, the procedure to be followed in a case where major punishment may be imposed is one as laid down in Appendix 1 while the procedure in a case in which minor punishment can be imposed is one as prescribed in sub-rule (2) of Rule 14, according to which, police officials may be informed in writing of the action proposed to be taken against them and of the implications of the act and omission and commission on which it is proposed to be taken and give a reasonable opportunity of making such representation as he may wish to make against the proposal. No regular inquiry as comprehended by sub-rule (1) of Rule 14 read with Appendix 1 is undertaken in a case involving misconduct which warrants imposition of minor penalty. This aspect of the matter was considered by this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 34161 of 2000, M. B. Yadav v. State of u. P. and others, which was decided on 28. 8. 2000, by Honble S. R. Singh, J. It was observed that the disciplinary authority can adopt the proper course keeping in view the gravity of the misconduct alleged even without a preliminary inquiry but the mere fact that a preliminary inquiry has been ordered by the punishing authority while placing the delinquent under suspension would not by itself, vitiate the suspension order. Sri M. S. Pipersenia, learned standing counsel has rightly propounded the theory that the preliminary inquiry into the allegations against a police official is ordered while placing such official under suspension also for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether it is a case of inflicting major penalty or minor penalty so as to enable the disciplinary authority to follow the relevant course of inquiry. According to the G. O. No. 820/43-2-14-2 (83)/83, dated 28. 2. 1983, issued by Administrative reform Anubhag-2 and the G. O. No. 7/2/77-Karmik-1, dated 28. 2. 1977, the punishing authority can adopt the appropriate course keeping in view the gravity of the misconduct alleged, even without a preliminary inquiry. ( 22 ) THIS fact cannot be lost sight of that interests of administration demand that undesirable elements are thrown out and any charge of misdemeanour is inquired into promptly. 2. 1977, the punishing authority can adopt the appropriate course keeping in view the gravity of the misconduct alleged, even without a preliminary inquiry. ( 22 ) THIS fact cannot be lost sight of that interests of administration demand that undesirable elements are thrown out and any charge of misdemeanour is inquired into promptly. The disciplinary proceedings are meant not only to punish the guilty but to keep the administrative machinery unsullied by getting rid of bad elements. ( 23 ) THE delinquent petitioners belong to a disciplined force. Maintenance of discipline is of the highest priority. If the constables, who are placed in the lowest rung of hierarchy of the police department, become unbriddled, the entire superstructure is likely to collapse. Therefore, discipline has to be enforced at all costs. If the Superintendent of Police finds that the misdemeanour or the delinquencies committed by his subordinates are of such a nature that would tarnish the image of the department and the confidence of common people in the institution is shaken, he would be justified in placing such employee under suspension even without a preliminary inquiry provided the allegations are so serious as would justify their suspension. ( 24 ) IN the instant case, the petitioners who were constables were not authorized to ask for, and inspect the documents of a motor vehicle. It is for the Enforcement Branch of the Transport department to check the documents. If the police constables who have absolutely no authority to do so take upon themselves the task, they shall be presumed to have been actuated by extraneous considerations for illegal gains. The petitioners are alleged to have chased the truck for a distance of about 10 kms. and when they were successful in stopping the vehicle, they ill-treated the driver. This unauthorised act and misbehaviour on the part of the petitioners evoked immediate commotion and tension with the result, there was a total traffic jam for hours together and when the senior officer reached the spot to quell the crowd and to clear the road, the petitioners fled away and were not available for ascertaining their version of the incident. As a matter of fact, the facts as were obtaining on the spot were speaking for themselves and no further preliminary inquiry was required to be made. As a matter of fact, the facts as were obtaining on the spot were speaking for themselves and no further preliminary inquiry was required to be made. In the public interest, it became necessary to suspend the petitioners immediately with a view to clear the road and to pacify the enraged crowd. If any delay was brooked in the matter, it might have resulted in an insurmountable ugly situation. The road could be cleared only on the assurance of the higher authorities that the delinquent officials shall be placed under suspension. At least two petitioners, namely, Yad All and Om Prakash Tewari were identified to have generated the crisis. There was oblique reference to the name of Bhim Yadav, the third petitioner. It was, therefore, an eminently suited case in which delinquent employees against whom the allegations were serious in nature, of necessity, were required to be suspended in public interest even without the receipt of the preliminary inquiry report. ( 25 ) THE order of suspension of the petitioners may be viewed yet from another angle. The report of preliminary inquiry has come on record. It indicts petitioner Nos. 1 and 3-Yad Ali and Om prakash Tewari, of the allegations, which, if proved, would ultimately warrant infliction of major penalty upon them. They have been prima facie, found guilty of the serious allegations and now a departmental inquiry is likely to be initiated against them on the basis of the preliminary inquiry. There is, therefore, no scope for this Court to interfere with the order of suspension passed in respect of Yad All and Om Prakash Tewari. ( 26 ) THE preliminary inquiry report does not indicate the complicity of Bhim Yadav, petitioner no. 2. It has been found that he had no role to play in originating about the incident. Even his presence, at the relevant point of time, was not established. ( 27 ) IN the conspectus of the above facts, the challenge on behalf of Yad Ali and Om Prakash tewari, petitioner Nos. 1 and 3 to the order of suspension dated 22. 11. 2000 is unwarranted. They have been rightly suspended in the contemplation of departmental inquiry which could be initiated against them by serving upon them the requisite charge-sheet. The order of suspension of Bhim Yadav-petitioner No. 2, appears to be unwarranted in view of the report of preliminary inquiry. The Superintendent of Police. 11. 2000 is unwarranted. They have been rightly suspended in the contemplation of departmental inquiry which could be initiated against them by serving upon them the requisite charge-sheet. The order of suspension of Bhim Yadav-petitioner No. 2, appears to be unwarranted in view of the report of preliminary inquiry. The Superintendent of Police. Chandauli would do well to revoke his order of suspension immediately. ( 28 ) THE conclusions which are deducible from various decisions of the Apex Court as well as of this Court, as discussed above, may be stated in a condensed form for the sake of clarity and future guidance of the appointing/disciplinary authority concerned dealing with the matters of government servants, particularly in relation to orders of suspension, pending inquiry or in contemplation thereof or during investigation, inquiry or trial of a criminal charge. (1) It is one of the implied terms of relationship between employer and employee that the employer is entitled to exercise disciplinary control over the employees. Power of disciplinary control is an indicia of the relationship of master and servant, (2) The order of suspension comes within the sweep of disciplinary action. To place an employee under suspension is an unqualified right of the employer. (3) In the absence of specific powers, the employer can always forbid the employee and, in fact, suspend him as an interim measure, but he would have to pay the wages during the period of interim suspension (which is popularly known as subsistence allowance ). (4) The Service Rules usually provide that an employee may be placed under suspension : (i) where any disciplinary proceeding against him is contemplated or is pending and (ii) where a case of a criminal nature against him is under investigation, inquiry or trial. (5) The order of suspension may be passed by the appointing or disciplinary authority, (who may be an authority inferior in rank to the appointing authority) provided there is a specific Rule or delegation or authorization in favour of the latter. (6) The order of suspension does not put an end to the employees service and he continues to be a member of the service though he is not permitted to work and is paid only subsistence allowance which is less that the normal salary or emoluments. (7) The order of suspension, no doubt, affects an employee injuriously. (6) The order of suspension does not put an end to the employees service and he continues to be a member of the service though he is not permitted to work and is paid only subsistence allowance which is less that the normal salary or emoluments. (7) The order of suspension, no doubt, affects an employee injuriously. An interim order of suspension visits an employee with serious evil consequence. He is not only forbidden from performing his duties but is paid salary at considerable reduced rates which is hardly sufficient to meet both ends. (8) In view of the serious repercussions on the career and the livelihood of the suspended employee, it is, therefore, necessary that the order of suspension should not be passed at the fancy, frenzy or caprice of the authority concerned, meaning thereby, an employee should not be suspended just for nothing. A note of caution is sounded that the authority concerned should not be afflicted by suspension syndrome. (9) Where the disciplinary authority seeks to suspend an employee pending inquiry or contemplated inquiry into grave charges of misconduct or serious acts of commission or omission, the order of suspension would be passed after taking into consideration the gravity of the misconduct thought to be inquired into and the nature of the evidence placed before the disciplinary authority and on application of mind by such authority. Even in a case of interim suspension, the disciplinary authority should apply its mind and pass an order of suspension only when it is necessitated taking into consideration the gravity of the allegations and to maintain discipline in the department. The disciplinary authority should consider the above aspects and decide whether it is expedient to keep an employee under suspension pending aforesaid action. It would not be as an administrative routine and in every case of inquiry, automatic order of suspension is not to follow. (10) Normally suspension should not be resorted to unless the allegations against the government servant are so serious that in the event of their being established may ordinarily warrant major penalty. This has now come to be incorporated in the shape of a proviso to Rule 4 of the Uttar Pradesh Government Servant (Disciplinary and Appeal) Rules 1999, published in the u. P. Gazette (Extraordinary) dated 9th June. 1999. This has now come to be incorporated in the shape of a proviso to Rule 4 of the Uttar Pradesh Government Servant (Disciplinary and Appeal) Rules 1999, published in the u. P. Gazette (Extraordinary) dated 9th June. 1999. (11) The preliminary inquiry by its nature implies that it is a sort of informal probe or, to say, a fact-finding exercise into the allegations made against the delinquent employee. (12) In order to ascertain the true facts and to gauge the veracity of the complaint or the allegations made against an employee, an order of suspension is passed after a preliminary inquiry. The order of preliminary inquiry is made with a view to ascertain the correct facts and unless the correct facts are made available, it would be unwise to pass an order of suspension. The disciplinary authority is required to wait for the outcome of the preliminary inquiry and after the receipt of the report of such inquiry, if it is found that the allegations are so serious that in order to maintain discipline, the delinquent employee is required to be placed under suspension, then only an order of suspension should, in the ordinary course, be passed. (13) It is a Rule of prudence that the disciplinary authority should await the result of the preliminary inquiry before passing an order of suspension but it is not an inflexible rule of law. Since suspension is not a punishment but is only one way of forbidding from disobeying to discharge of duties by an employee of the office or post held by him, an order of suspension, even without a preliminary inquiry, may be passed to refrain the delinquent employee to avail further opportunity to perpetrate the alleged misconduct or to remove the impression among the members of service that dereliction of duty would pay fruit and the offending employee would get away even pending inquiry without any indictment. There may be cases where an employee may be suspended to prevent an opportunity to scuttle the inquiry or investigation or to win over the witnesses or the delinquent having had the opportunity in office to impede the progress of the investigation or inquiry etc. (14) The discretion of the disciplinary authority to suspend an employee pending inquiry or in contemplation of inquiry cannot be taken away by prescribing a straitjacket formula. (14) The discretion of the disciplinary authority to suspend an employee pending inquiry or in contemplation of inquiry cannot be taken away by prescribing a straitjacket formula. Each case must be considered depending on the nature of the allegations, gravity of the situation and the indelible impact which creates in the service for the continuance of the delinquent employee in service pending inquiry or contemplated inquiry or investigation. The suspension must be a step in aid to the ultimate result of the investigation or inquiry. (15) Even without a preliminary inquiry, if the disciplinary authority feels satisfied or convinced that the accusations against a delinquent employee are trustworthy, substantial and serious enough and with a view to maintain discipline, it is necessary to suspend him, he shall brook no delay to pass an order of interim suspension in public interest. (16) The decision in Tejpal Singhs case (supra) cannot be stretched to the unreasonable length that without receipt of the preliminary inquiry report, an employee in no circumstance can be suspended in spite of the fact that the expression inquiry occurring in the Rules of 1991, means a regular departmental inquiry. (17) The order of interim suspension, which is, no doubt, discretionary in nature and is passed in diverse and variegated circumstances, is open to judicial review under Article 226 of the constitution and can be tested on grounds of bad faith, mala fide (personal or legal) or irrationality, unreasonableness or non-application of mind. (18) The Court or the Tribunal must consider each case on its own facts and no general Rule can be laid in that behalf. (19) Even in those cases where preliminary inquiry has been ordered, it would not necessarily mean that such an inquiry has been ordered with a view to collect prima facie material against the delinquent employee. In a case where the preliminary inquiry has been ordered, the order of suspension cannot be treated to have vitiated merely on the ground that the competent authority has not waited for the result of the preliminary inquiry. The preliminary inquiry may be ordered simultaneously with the order of suspension with a view to ascertain whether on the facts and in the circumstances and the nature of the allegations against a delinquent employee the procedure prescribed for inflicting the major punishment or the minor punishment is to be adopted. The preliminary inquiry may be ordered simultaneously with the order of suspension with a view to ascertain whether on the facts and in the circumstances and the nature of the allegations against a delinquent employee the procedure prescribed for inflicting the major punishment or the minor punishment is to be adopted. (20) The crux of the matter is that a Government servant can be placed under suspension by the competent authority after objective consideration of the allegations, the material available and the telling circumstances requiring suspension in public interest, even without a preliminary inquiry. If a preliminary inquiry has been ordered simultaneously with the order of suspension, it shall not stand vitiated, and in all the cases it is not necessary for the competent authority to wait for the result of the preliminary inquiry. ( 29 ) THIS writ petition is disposed of with the direction that the contemplated departmental inquiry against the petitioners shall be brought to a logical end subject to active cooperation and regular participation of the petitioners within a period of four months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order before the appointing/disciplinary authority. It is further directed that the Superintendent of Police, Chandauli-respondent No. 1, shall consider the feasibility of revoking the order of suspension of Bhim Yadav-petitioner No. 2, as the preliminary inquiry report does not indicate his involvement in the case. ( 30 ) THE Registrar General of this Court is directed to ensure that a copy of the judgment and order is sent to each and every District Magistrate, Senior Superintendent of police/superintendent of Police of the State including the Chief Secretary. Government of Uttar pradesh, Vidhan Bhavan. Lucknow. The State Government is directed to issue appropriate instructions to all Heads of Departments (particularly, the District Magistrates. Senior superintendent of Police and Superintendent of Police, in the light of the guidelines contained in the body of this judgment.