In this writ petition, the writ petitioner made a prayer for grant of the following reliefs: (a) Order re-opening the earlier order of punishment as in Annexure 1 to be quashed; (b) Order of dismissal from service as in Annexure 2 be quashed; (c) Consequent upon the grant of relief vide (a) and (b) above, respondents be directed to reinstate the petitioner to service with full back wages; (d) Adequate compensation to the petitioner for illegal dismissal of her from service, and unspeakable sufferings inflicted on her and her five minor children from the date of her dismissal on and from 20.1.98; (e) Any other relief or relief that their Lordships may like to grant in their discretion. Supporting the case of the petitioner, Mr. BN Dutta, learned senior counsel contended, that in the year 1994 the petitioner was placed under suspension with immediate effect, i.e. on and from 7.7.94 pending a related disciplinary proceeding and inquiry on the charges namely, theft and dishonesty in connection with the business of the Board in violation of Regulation 10 (b); causing loss of the Board's property in violation of Regulation 10 (c); and wilful insubordination to the lawful and reasonable order of superior authority in violation of Regulation 10 (a), and after due inquiry into the mater, the Meghalaya State Electricity Board has decided that the misappropriation of Board's money from the revenue collection by the " writ petitioner, Smti Batkynti Shabong, Bill Clerk, should be disposed of as follows: "(a) Smti Batkynti Shabong who was found to be guilty for misappropriation of Rs. 78,263 (Rupees seventy eight thousand two hundred sixty three) only, should be penalised by stopping of two increments. The order to that effect should be issued by the appropriate authority (the CE (Electrical) (b) After issue of the stoppage of increments Smti Batkynti Shabong should be reinstated in service and to transfer her from her present place of posting and to be posted in a place where there is no scope for handling cash. (c) Recovery of the amount Rs. 78,263 (Rupees seventy eight thousand two hundred sixty three) only alongwith interest from arrear dues if any, and the balance amount at the rate of 50% of pay plus DA as monthly instalment towards recovery. (c) Recovery of the amount Rs. 78,263 (Rupees seventy eight thousand two hundred sixty three) only alongwith interest from arrear dues if any, and the balance amount at the rate of 50% of pay plus DA as monthly instalment towards recovery. , (d) Suspension period to be treated as dies-non." Vide, office order No. Coru 7112/94/3 dated 12.1.95 as in Annexure 8 to the writ petition and thereafter, in pursuance of the related Board's order, the petitioner has been reinstated in service in the same post with immediate effect on the following condition with punishment: "1. The period during suspension is to be treated as dies-non. 2. Stoppage of 2 (two) increments is imposed on her as a measure of punishment. 3. Recovery of the amount of Rs. 78,263 (Rupees seventy eight thousand two hundred sixty three) only along with interest from arrear dues if any, and the balance amount at the rate of 50% of pay plus DA as monthly instalment towards recovery. 4. Smti Batkynti Shabong is hereby warned that service action would be taken against her, if she is found indulging in such acts of fraudulence in future. 5. On her reinstated on the terms stipulated above, the services of Smti B. Shabong Bill Clerk are hereby transferred and posted under the Executive Engineer (E), Shillong South RE Division MeSEB, Shillong with immediate effect and until further orders." Vide office order No. 31 dated 4.3.95 as in Annexure 9 to the writ petition. 5. On her reinstated on the terms stipulated above, the services of Smti B. Shabong Bill Clerk are hereby transferred and posted under the Executive Engineer (E), Shillong South RE Division MeSEB, Shillong with immediate effect and until further orders." Vide office order No. 31 dated 4.3.95 as in Annexure 9 to the writ petition. But, to the great astonishment, a notice dated 20.11.97 as in Annexure 1 to the writ petition (impugned herein) was served upon the petitioner in which the Chairman of the Meghalaya State Electricity Board (herein after referred to as Board) was of the opinion that it is a fit case for dismissal of the petitioner from service under Regulation 9 (B) (e) of the Meghalaya State Electricity Board Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulation, 1996, and, in accordance with Regulation 27 (D) of Regulation, 1996, the petitioner has been given an opportunity of making a representation in writing as to why the major penalty under Regulation 9 (B) (e) of the Regulations, 1996, should not be imposed against her and, in compliance with the related impugned order of 20.11.97, the petitioner submitted her representation and thereafter the Chairman of the Board issued the impugned order of dismissal dated 20.1.98 as Annexure 2 to the petition dismissing the petitioner from service of the Board with immediate effect by invoking the provisions of the Regulation 10 (viii) of the ASEB (General Service) Regulations, 1960, herein after referred to as 'Regulations, I960' without any justification. 2. According to Mr. Dutta, the Chairman of the Board, the second respondent herein, has no power and jurisdiction to review the decision and order of the Board inasmuch as, the disciplinary proceeding initiated against the petitioner earlier on the same subject matter and charges was closed under a Board's decision mentioned above and in pursuance of the related Board's order dated 12.1.95 as in Annexure 8 to the writ petition by inflicting penalty and punishment upon the petitioner on certain conditions as mentioned above, but, the Chairman reviewed the matter once again and issued the impugned orders of 20.11.97 and 28.1.98 as in Annexures Al and A2 without jurisdiction and, as such, the impugned orders are liable to be quashed. 3. At the hearing, Mr. 3. At the hearing, Mr. SR Sen, learned senior counsel for the respondents Board contended, that there were some other cases of misappropriation of the Board's money by the Cashiers and the Bill Clerks and the matter came to the notice of the Board and accordingly, the Board, by its resolution dated 3.11.97 and 30.1.98 decided that all such cases of misappropriation of Board's money shall be reviewed by the Management in accordance with the MeSEB Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulation, 1996 and accordingly, the case of the petitioner was also reviewed by the Chairman by issuing the related two impugned order as required under Regulation 27 (b) of the said Regulation, 1996 and reasonable opportunity of filing show cause statement was given to the petitioner and, thereafter, the petitioner has filed representation which was duly considered by the Chairman and the Chairman decided that the ends of justice would be met if penalty of dismissal from service is imposed on the petitioner and accordingly, the impugned dismissal order was issued. 4. According to Mr. SR Sen, under Regulation 27 of 1996, the reviewing authority is competent to review the disciplinary cases where penalty has been imposed and he can reduce or enhance the penalty after observing the procedure laid down therein and, as such, it cannot be taken as reopening of the case afresh and the reviewing authority has got the power to deal with the case in the same manner as if it was an appeal under this Regulation. 5. Now, this Court is to see and examine as to whether the action of the respondents concerned is fair or not in passing the impugned orders as in Annexures 1 and 2 to the writ petition and, whether the writ petitioner has enforceable legal rights in the instant case or not. 6. Regulation 27 (1) (d) of the Regulations 1996 empower any authority superior to the appellate authority may at any time, either on its own motion or otherwise call for the records of any inquiry and revise any order made under this Regulation and may pass such other order as it may deem fit, and that Regulation 28 of it provides the provisions for review of the orders passed by the Board. In the instant case, a bare reading of the impugned order of 20.11.97 as in Annexure 1 to the writ petition shows, that the Chairman was of the view that he instant case is a fit case for dismissal of the petitioner from service under Regulation 9 (B) (e) of the Regulation, 1996 and accordingly, petitioner has been given an opportunity for making a representation in writing as to why the major penalty of dismissal as required under Regulation 9 (B) (e) should not be imposed against her and. further, perusal of the subsequent action, i.e. another impugned order dated 28.1.98 highlights that the Chairman imposed the penalty of dismissal from service upon the petitioner by invoking Regulation 10 (viii) of the Regulation, 1960 by holding that the petitioner has been found guilty of misconduct, theft and dishonesty, causing loss to the Board's property and willful insubordination in violation of Regulation 10 (b), 10 (c) and 10 (a) of the Regulations 1960. At this stage, an issue/question arises as to whether these two impugned orders as in Annexures 1 and 2 are consistent to each other and, whether these two can be treated as tenable in the eye of law or not. The answer is 'No'. In my considered view, the Chairman of the Board exercised jurisdiction, rather invoked the provisions of the related Regulation 10 of the Regulation, 1960 mentioned above which is non-est/was not in force at the relevant time of passing of the impugned order of 20.1.98 as in Annexure 2 to the petition and on this aspect, the action of the respondent No. 2/Chairman of the Board is not fair. Apart from it, it may be highlighted that the order of dismissal was issued after the earlier impugned order of 20.11.97 was issued by the Chairman concerned by invoking the new Regulation of 1996 and, accordingly, the action of the Chairman is not just and proper. It is also not disputed that these impugned orders were issued by the second respondent/Chairman after the same subject matter namely the related disciplinary proceeding was finally decided and closed by imposing penalty upon the writ petitioner as highlighted above in pursuance of a related Board's order/decision dated 12.1.95 as in Annexure 8 to the writ petition which cannot be reviewed or recalled by the second respondent/Chairman. According to me, the second respondent/Chairman set as an appellate authority of the respondent Board which is not permissible under the Jaw. Moreover, no one ought to be punished twice for the same offence, in other words, no one should be vexed twice for the same subject matter. At this stage, I hereby recall a legal maxim : nemo debet bis punire pro uno delicto. Secondly, I hereby refer to another maxim as the same is also relevant in the instant case, nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis. This means, a new law ought to be prospective not retrospective in its operation. 7. The submission of Mr. SR Sen, learned senior counsel, that he Board by its resolution dated 3.11.97 and 30.1.98 decided that all such cases of misappropriation of Board's money shall be reviewed by the Management in accordance with the Regulations 1996, which, according to me, the same has no relevancy with the case of the present petitioner as the disciplinary proceeding, in other words, the subject matter it was closed in the year 1995 under the related orders dated 12.1.95 and 4.3.95 in Annexures 8 and 9 to the writ petition. Apart from it, show cause notice was issued upon the petitioner and the case of the petitioner was reviewed by the Chairman under Regulation 27 (B) of the Regulations 1996 as per affidavit-in-opposition of the respondent/Board, but the impugned dismissal order speaks that dismissal of the petitioner from service was made by the Chairman by invoking Regulation 10 of the Regulations 1960. Hence, these reasoning assigned by the respondents in the instant case is not free from doubt and in such doubtful cases, there is a strong case for use of common sense as Mr. Lucas (Jurist) claimed that a non-common sense decision ° is no more certain than one based on common sense. While writing and appreciating Lord Denning, Mr. Lucas said, "Denning brought common sense to the interpretation of law". In an article in The Times on 17 September, 1980 Mr. Lucas of Merton College, Oxford further said : "Although some think that the law should always be clear, in practice it is not, and we have recourse to judges for authoritative interpretations. The only question is whether in interpreting what is unclear the law should be guided by common sense and give weight considerations of expediency, justice and morality. Lucas of Merton College, Oxford further said : "Although some think that the law should always be clear, in practice it is not, and we have recourse to judges for authoritative interpretations. The only question is whether in interpreting what is unclear the law should be guided by common sense and give weight considerations of expediency, justice and morality. Lord Denning thinks it should. Others think not. Mr. Lucas argued that a non-common sense decision is no more certain than one based on common sense. For the layman the law would be more predictable if based on common sense. Since laws apply to laymen there is a good argument for the development of the law to be influenced by common sense as well as legal reasoning. In a doubtful case there is a strong case for the use of common sense as it makes the law easier to predict and worthier of respect. A perceptive paragraph appeared in the Sunday Mirror on 16 October, 1966; "It is not that Lord Denning is excessively liberal. It is merely that he always seems to decide a case the way you or I would .....But an odd man out who has the gift of bending it (the law) in the right direction, is something for which we can be truly grateful." 8. Administrative and executive action should be fair and just always and the same should be rational or reasonable. This is the settled law of the land and test of it is generally done by the Courts by following the principles of Wednesbury Test. A relevant case law or in other words, a related decision of the Apex Court can be referred in the instant case, i.e. a case between Om Kumar & others vs. Union of India, reported in 2000 AIR SCW 4361 wherein, the Apex Court held thus: "In India whereas administrative action is challenged under Article 14 as being discriminatory, equals are treated unequally or unequals are treated equally, the question is for the constitutional Courts as primary reviewing Courts to consider correctness of the level of discrimination applied and whether it is excessive and whether it has a nexus with the objective intended to be achieved by the Administrator. Here the Court deals with the merits of the balancing action of the Administrator and is, in essence, applying 'proportionality' and is a primary reviewing authority. Here the Court deals with the merits of the balancing action of the Administrator and is, in essence, applying 'proportionality' and is a primary reviewing authority. But where, an administrative action is challenged as 'arbitrary' under Article 14 on the basis of Royappa (as in cases where punishment in disciplinary cases are challenged), the question will be whether the administrative order is 'rational' or 'reasonable' and the test then is the Wednesbury Test. The Courts would then be confined only to a secondary role and will only have to see whether the Administrator has done well in his primary rote whether he has acted illegally or has omitted relevant factors from consideration or has taken irrelevant factor into consideration or whether his view is one which no reasonable person could have taken. If his action does not satisfy these rules, it is to be treated as arbitrary. (In GB Mahajan vs. Jalgaon Municipal Council, (1991)3 SCC 91 page 111; ( AIR 1991 SC 1153 at page 1165). Venkatachaliah, J (as he then was) pointed out that 'reasonableness of the Administrator under Article 14 in the context of Administrative Law has to be judged from the standpoint of Wednesbury Rules. In Tata Cellular vs. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651 at pp 679-680: (1994 AIR SCW 3344 and at pp 3369-70: AIR 19% SC 11); Indian Express Newspaper vs. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 641 at p 691: (AIR 1986 SC 515 at pp 542-43); Supreme Court Employees Welfare Association vs. Union of India, (1989) 4 SCC 187 at p 241: ( AIR 1990 SC 334 at p 368:1990 Lab 1C 324 at p 358) and UP Financial Corporation vs. Gem Cap (India) Pvt Ltd, (1993) 2 SCC 299 at p 307: (1993 AIR SCW 1189 at p 1195: AIR 1993 SC 1435 at p 1439), while judging whether the administrative action is 'arbitrary' under Article 14 (i.e. otherwise than being discriminatory) this Court has confined itself to a Wednesbury review always. Thus, when administrative action is attacked as discriminatory under Article 14, the principle of primary review is for the Courts by applying proportionality. However, where administrative action is questioned as 'arbitrary' under Article 14, the principle of secondary review based on Wednesbury principles applies." 9. Thus, when administrative action is attacked as discriminatory under Article 14, the principle of primary review is for the Courts by applying proportionality. However, where administrative action is questioned as 'arbitrary' under Article 14, the principle of secondary review based on Wednesbury principles applies." 9. Applying these established principles of law mentioned above and also on perusal of the available materials on record, I am of the view that the action of the respondents concerned in passing the impugned orders is not just and fair and apart from it, the same is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 10. For the reasons, observations and discussions made above, I am of the view that he impugned orders including the order of dismissal of the writ petitioner from service vide, impugned orders dated 20 11 97 and 20.1.98 as in Annexures 1 and 2 to the writ petition, are not tenable in the eye of law as the same is arbitrary, discriminatory and not reasonable, rather illegal and, accordingly these are quashed. 11. In the result, petition is allowed but no order as to costs.