JUDGMENT V. Gopala Gowda, J.—This is the Plaintiff's Second Appeal challenging the correctness of the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court in Regular Appeal No. 93 of 1989, dated 25th June 1991 in confirming the Judgment and Decree dated 11.7.1989 passed in O.S. No. 41 of 1986 on the file of the Munsiff and J.M.F.C., Sullia, Dakshina Kannada. 2. The brief facts of the case necessary for the purpose of answering the substantial question of law framed by this Court at the time of admission of this appeal on 10.10.1991 are stated as hereunder. 3. The ranks of the parties in this Appeal are described as Plaintiff and deceased Defendant for the sake of convenience. The Plaintiff filed the original suit against the deceased Defendant in O.S. No. 41 of 1986 in the Court of Munsiff and J.M.F.C., Sullia for grant of judgment and decree for specific performance of contract by the deceased Defendant to execute the sale deed in respect of the suit schedule property in his favour. The trial Court after appreciation of evidence on record dismissed the suit for the reasons recorded in its judgment and decree dated 11th July, 1989. Aggrieved of the said judgment and decree the Plaintiff/appellant filed first Appeal under Section 96(1) Code of Civil Procedure before the First Appellate Court, the Civil Judge and Additional C.J.M. Puttur, Dakshina Kannada District. The same was registered in Regular Appeal No. 93 of 1989, on the basis of the rival contentions urged by the parties the First Appellate Court formulated two points for its consideration at paragraph 10, and the same have been answered in the impugned judgment and decree at paragraphs 12 to 19, answering the Point No. 2 in the negative against the appellant/Plaintiff and dismissed the Appeal affirming the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court. The correctness of the said judgment and decree is challenged in this Second Appeal contending that there is a substantial question of law has arisen in this Appeal and therefore he has prayed this Court to exercise its power and jurisdiction. The correctness of the said judgment and decree is challenged in this Second Appeal contending that there is a substantial question of law has arisen in this Appeal and therefore he has prayed this Court to exercise its power and jurisdiction. This Court has formulated the following substantial question of law: Whether the Lower Appellate Court having answered all issues in favour of Plaintiff was right in dismissing the suit only on the ground that he was not ready and willing to perform his part of contract, which it is represented is not factually correct? 4. The Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Plaintiff was asked to address arguments in support of the substantial question of law framed by this Court. The Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the L Rs, of the deceased Defendant/Respondent was directed to address arguments to show that the substantial question of law framed by this Court does not arise in this Appeal and therefore this Court should not exercise its power and jurisdiction. 5. The Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Plaintiff/Appellant Mr. Sripathy sought to substantiate the case of the Plaintiff to show that the substantial question of law as framed by this Court has arisen in this case inviting the attention of this Court, the pleadings at paragraph 3 of the plaint and the evidence of the PW-1 and further he has made his efforts that the First Appellate Court having come to the conclusion and answered the issues in favour of the Plaintiff/appellant regarding the execution of the Agreement of Sale in respect of the property in question, on the question of readiness and willingness on the part of the Plaintiff, though he has pleaded the pleading as required under Section 16(c) of the Special Relief Act of 1961 read with Form Nos. 47 and 48 Code of Civil Procedure, the First Appellate Court was not justified in recording a finding against the Plaintiff while answering the Point No. 2 in the impugned Judgment holding that the Plaintiff has not proved that there is sufficient pleading to show that he has all along been ready and willing to perform his part of contract, which finding is an erroneous one and the approach of the First Appellate Court in construing and interpreting the pleading at paragraph 3 of the plaint and the material evidence on record placed by the Plaintiff/appellant in support of his case has not been properly appreciated and the learned Appellate Judge has mis-construed the provision of Section 16(c) of the Act 1961 and not appreciated the evidence properly and therefore it is contended that finding recorded in the impugned Judgment is erroneous and therefore the substantial question of law as framed by this Court has arisen in this case and it is correctly framed by this Court at the time of admission of this Appeal and therefore he has prayed this Court for answering the same in his favour in exercise of its power. In support of his submission he has placed reliance upon the judgment reported in Syed Dastagir Vs. T.R. Gopalakrishnasetty, AIR 1999 SC 3029 at paragraphs 9 and 10 for the proposition of law namely that the Courts cannot draw any inference in abstract or to give such hyper-technical interpretation of pleadings of the provisions of the Act and the pleadings to defeat the claim of specific performance of contract of a person who seeks such Decree, which defeats the very objective for which purpose the said Act was enacted and for the further proposition of law that Section 16(c) of the Act does not require any specific phraseology, but only that the Plaintiff must aver that he has performed or has always been ready and is willing to perform his part of the contract. So the compliance of "readiness and willingness" has to be in spirit and substance and not in letter and form. Therefore learned Counsel Mr. So the compliance of "readiness and willingness" has to be in spirit and substance and not in letter and form. Therefore learned Counsel Mr. Sripathy submits that the First Appellate Court has committed an illegality in answering the Point No. 2 in the impugned judgment and decree against the appellant holding that he has failed to establish the fact that he has all along been ready and willing to perform his part of contract as required in law. Therefore the learned Counsel submits that the First Appellate's Courts approach in examining and considering the First Appeal is purely hyper-technical in nature and therefore the learned Counsel submits that the non-consideration of the pleading and the material evidence on record by the learned Judge of the First Appellate Court is strictly not in conformity with Section 16(c) as the view taken by the First Appellate Court is hypertechnical in nature and therefore the findings recorded by it while answering the Point No. 2 framed by it in the Appeal, is erroneous, hence he has requested this Court to answer the substantial question of law formulated by this Court in favour of the Plaintiff/Appellant and set aside the impugned judgment and decree and grant the reliefs as prayed in the Original Suit filed by the Plaintiff/Appellant. 6. Mr. Nataraj appearing on behalf of the LRs of the deceased Defendant has sought to justify the impugned judgment and decree in support of the findings, and the reasons assigned by the First Appellate Court with regard to the Point No. 2 in the impugned Judgment regarding the Plaintiff's readiness and willingness to perform his part of contract. The Learned Counsel in support of his submission to show that the question of law formulated by this Court does not arise for consideration in this case, he has placed reliance upon the Judgment of the Apex Court which is reported in Ouseph Varghese Vs. Joseph Aley and Others, (1969) 2 SCC 539 at paragraph 9 and also placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Abdul Khader Rowther Vs. P.K. Sara Bai and others, AIR 1990 SC 682 , paragraph 11 in which judgment the earlier judgment of the Supreme Court referred to supra is referred and followed and further he has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court reported in N.P. Thirugnanam (D) by L.Rs., Vs. Dr. P.K. Sara Bai and others, AIR 1990 SC 682 , paragraph 11 in which judgment the earlier judgment of the Supreme Court referred to supra is referred and followed and further he has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court reported in N.P. Thirugnanam (D) by L.Rs., Vs. Dr. R. Jagan Mohan Rao and others, AIR 1996 SC 116 for the proposition that the Plaintiff who plead his readiness and willingness to perform his part of contract as required under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act of 1961 should be proved for the purpose of exercising discretionary power of the Court under Section 20 of the Act for granting the judgment and decree in favour of the Plaintiff. 7. The learned Counsel has also placed strong reliance on the another judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Gurlingappa and others Vs. Assistant Commissioner and Land Acquisition Officer, Gulbarg, AIR 1997 SC 1750 with regard to the delay in approaching the Court for the reliefs beyond the terms stipulated in the Agreement of Sale, he has placed strong reliance upon the above said Judgment as there is delay in filing the suits, therefore this Court shall not exercise its discretionary power conferred upon it under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act of 1961, even if this Court were to come to the conclusion that the Plaintiff has established that the substantial question of law referred to above arise for consideration of this Court. 8. After hearing the learned Counsel for the parties, I have carefully examined the impugned judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court with regard to the Point No. 2 framed by it in the impugned Judgment for the reason that this Court is not required to examine the findings recorded at Point No. 1 by the learned Civil Judge reversing the findings of the trial Court for the reason that the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Legal Representatives of the deceased Defendant has neither filed cross objections nor addressed arguments in this appeal contending that the said findings are erroneous in law as permissible for him under Order 41, Rule 33 Code of Civil Procedure . In this view of the matter, this Court is required to answer the substantial question of law formulated with reference to the rival contentions urged by the learned Counsel, which are referred to above. In this view of the matter, this Court is required to answer the substantial question of law formulated with reference to the rival contentions urged by the learned Counsel, which are referred to above. For this purpose I have carefully examined the findings and reasons recorded by the First Appellate Court in answering the Point No. 2 framed by it in the impugned Judgment. At paragraphs 13 and 14 of the impugned Judgment the learned Judge of the First Appellate Court has considered the pleading and material evidence on record with reference to the authorities cited and relied upon at the Bar on behalf of each side of the parties and recorded a categorical finding holding that the Appellant/Plaintiff has failed to plead and prove the fact that he has all along been ready and willing to perform his part of contract as per Ex.P-1 Agreement of Sale of the schedule property. The First Appellate Court with reference to the pleading and the evidence on record and considering Judgments of the Supreme Court, this Court and Madras High Court and also considering the provisions under Section 16(c) and Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act and he has recorded the finding of fact holding that the Plaintiff has not pleaded that he has all along been ready and willing to perform his part of contract for getting the sale deed executed in his favour from the deceased Defendant in pursuant to Agreement of Sale at Ex.P-1 in respect of the suit schedule property. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has made serious effort to show to this Court that findings recorded by the learned Appellate Judge in the impugned Judgment are erroneous, as he has not considered the pleading, the evidence with reference to paragraph 3 of the plaint and the evidence of PW1 on record. I have gone through the same carefully after going through the pleading and the evidence on record in this regard for the purpose of finding out whether the contention urged on behalf of the appellant is tenable or not with reference to the findings and the reasons assigned by the First Appellate Court. After going through the same I am of the considered view that the First Appellate Court has properly interpreted the provision of Section 16(c) of the Act of 1961 with reference to Form Nos. After going through the same I am of the considered view that the First Appellate Court has properly interpreted the provision of Section 16(c) of the Act of 1961 with reference to Form Nos. 47 and 48 Code of Civil Procedure on the basis of the available pleading and material evidence on record and the decisions cited at the Bar in support of the contentions on behalf of the Plaintiff/appellant has been carefully and properly considered and answered the point against the Plaintiff/appellant. Therefore the contention urged by the learned Counsel on behalf of the Plaintiff that the findings, the reasons assigned and the conclusions arrived at by the Learned Judge at paragraphs 16 and 17 of the impugned Judgment while answering the Point No. 2 are not tenable in law for the reason that the First Appellate Court was perfectly justified in answering the same against the Plaintiff/appellant. The reliance placed upon the judgment of the Supreme Court by the learned Counsel for the Plaintiff in the case of Syed Dastagir Vs. T.R. Gopalakrishnasetty, AIR 1999 SC 3029 , and the Division Bench of the Court reported in 1988 (3) of Karnataka Law Journal between U.R. Narasimha Murthy v. Madhava Tenkillaya, page 478 in support of his contention that the Court should not construe the pleading and the evidence hyper-technically and in pedantic manner the form and the substance of the pleading and the evidence could be considered for the purpose of granting the relief in exercise of its power under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act. I have carefully applied my mind to the cases referred to supra to find out whether the law laid down in the said cases are applicable to the facts of the present case. After careful examination of the aforesaid cases, I am the considered view that the said decisions are misplaced as the same are not helpful to the facts of the present case. In both the cases referred to supra upon which much reliance is placed by the learned Counsel on behalf of the Plaintiff there is a finding of fact on the basis of the pleading and the evidence that the Plaintiffs in those cases have shown that they have all along been ready and willing to perform their part of contract. In both the cases referred to supra upon which much reliance is placed by the learned Counsel on behalf of the Plaintiff there is a finding of fact on the basis of the pleading and the evidence that the Plaintiffs in those cases have shown that they have all along been ready and willing to perform their part of contract. Therefore the ratio laid down in the aforesaid cases are not applicable to the present case and they are misplaced. 9. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Legal Representatives of the deceased Defendant Mr. Nataraj has correctly placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Ouseph Varghese Vs. Joseph Aley and Others, (1969) 2 SCC 539 and other Judgments referred in the earlier paragraph No. 5 of this judgment wherein the Apex Court in the abovesaid cases after considering the provision of Section 16(c) and Form Nos. 47 and 48 Code of Civil Procedure, has succinctly laid down the law, holding that in a suit for Specific Performance of Contract the Plaintiff should allege that he has been ready and willing to perform his part of contract. In the absence of such an allegation and the evidence on record the suit is not maintainable. In view of the clear law laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases and having regard to the findings recorded by the First Appellate Court on Point No. 2 in the impugned Judgment, the learned Judge on proper appreciation of pleading and material evidence on record has rightly held that the appellant/Plaintiff has not either pleaded or proved that he has all along been ready and willing to perform his part of contract as per Ex.P-1, therefore the law laid down in the aforesaid cases of the Supreme Court upon which reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent with all force applicable to the facts of this case. In view of the clear pronouncement of law by the Apex Court in the cases, cited supra the substantial question of law formulated by this Court in this Appeal does not arise for consideration of this Court. Therefore this Court has to answer the same against the Plaintiff/appellant. 10. In view of the clear pronouncement of law by the Apex Court in the cases, cited supra the substantial question of law formulated by this Court in this Appeal does not arise for consideration of this Court. Therefore this Court has to answer the same against the Plaintiff/appellant. 10. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Legal Representatives of the deceased Defendant has also rightly placed reliance upon the Judgment of the Supreme Court in K.S. Vidyanadam and Others Vs. Vairavan, AIR 1997 SC 1751 , at paragraph 13 that the Apex Court has considered the inaction on the part of the Plaintiff in that case for 21/2 years in instituting the original suit is in clear violation of the term of Agreement of sale of the property in question, as the Plaintiff was required him to pay the balance amount towards the sale consideration and the learned Judge has rightly observed in this case that there is a delay of 2 years on the part of the Plaintiff, in approaching the trial Court which would not be proper for the Court to exercise its discretionary power under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act for granting the relief as prayed in the original suit. The observation made in the case cited supra are also applicable to the present case for the reason that the appellant/Plaintiff has instituted Original Suit after lapse of 2 years, expiry of the time stipulated in the Agreement of sale at Ex.P-1. For the reasons stated supra, the Appeal must fail. Accordingly appeal is dismissed.