JUDGMENT M.R. Verma, J.:- The present suit has been instituted by the plaintiff for recovery of Rs. 10, 15,324/- as damages, for the loss suffered by it as a consequence of stay orders obtained by the defendants in civil suit No. 147 of 1994 from this Court. 2. Caw of the plaintiff as made out in the plaint is that it is a land corporate incorporated under Section 5 of the Indian Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. B.N. Bansal, Superintending Engineer, is duly authorised and empowered to sue on behalf of the plaintiff. Gram Panchayat, Dehan, vide its resolution No. 5 dated 12.7.1991 consented to part with the land for construction of 132 KV Sub Station, a general public utility project, which was sanctioned by the plaintiff to improve and strengthen the electricity supply system in Palampur and surrounding areas. A notification under Section 29 of the Indian Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 was issued notifying the proposed setting up of the substation on the land comprising khata No.l34min, Khatauni No. 209 min, khasra No. 15/1, measuring 0-99-15 hectares and khatauni No.243 min khasra Nos. 632/7/1 and 74/1/1 measuring 0-98-82 hectares situate in Bag Bhula, Mauja Dehan. Distt. Kangra which was transferred in the name of the plaintiff from various departments, but no objection was received from any quarter regarding setting up of the project as proposed. After obtaining the requisite permission from the Ministry of Environment and Forests, the plaintiff started construction of the project at the estimated cost of Rs.583.222. The defendants who are highly litigant persons and self proclaimed leaders with a view to gain cheap notoriety and to show the leadership, forcibly stopped the construction work and also instigated other persons of the area and then instituted a civil suit in this Court and obtained stay order on 28.10.1994 and delayed the proceeding for vacation of the stay order. The suit was then transferred to the Court of the District Judge, Kangra who vacated the stay order on 22.5.1995. Defendants then filed FAO No.776/1195 in this Court which was dismissed on 23.6.1995. The suit instituted by the defendants was vexatious and malafide and the stay order was obtained in the garb of public interest litigation when none existed. Thus, the work of the setting up of the project was held up from 22.10.1994 to 22.5.1995. Defendants then filed FAO No.776/1195 in this Court which was dismissed on 23.6.1995. The suit instituted by the defendants was vexatious and malafide and the stay order was obtained in the garb of public interest litigation when none existed. Thus, the work of the setting up of the project was held up from 22.10.1994 to 22.5.1995. The machinery men and equipment of the plaintiff remained ideal and the amount spent on the project remained blocked with the result that the plaintiff suffered a loss of over Rs. 20 lakhs. It is claimed that the act of the defendants in stopping the construction work was malafide and the loss suffered by the plaintiff as a consequence of their acts deserves to be compensated. Hence the present suit restricting the claim for damages to Rs.l0.15,000/-only. 3. The defendants contested the suit. In the written statement, they took the preliminary objections that the plaint is liable to be rejected as it does not disclose any cause of action because proceedings initiated by the defendants by way of civil suit were bonafide as well as for the purpose of a public cause, the suit deserves to be dismissed because at the time of institution of the suit, the plaintiff was not the lessee of the concerned land; the suit is not maintainable as the defendants were prosecuting the suit for a reasonable causes the stay orders were passed by this court after hearing both the parties; the plaintiff is precluded and stopped from filing the present suit for want of having raised any plea with respect to the damages in the earlier suit; the defendants were prosecuting their suit for reasonable cause and the suit is nothing but a pressure tactics. On merits, plaintiffs claim has been denied and it has been averred that Gram Panchayat, Dehan, had no authority to pass any resolution parting with the land in dispute. The notification allegedly issued did not mention the land in dispute, therefore, there was no question of filing any objections. In fact the suit land as per the jamabandi for the year 1992-93 is recorded in the possession of the Forest Department subject to rights of the right holders (reserve pool) and the defendants being right holders had right to protect their rights and it was to protect their rights that they had instituted the suit. In fact the suit land as per the jamabandi for the year 1992-93 is recorded in the possession of the Forest Department subject to rights of the right holders (reserve pool) and the defendants being right holders had right to protect their rights and it was to protect their rights that they had instituted the suit. In that suit, the State of H.P. in its written statement, had admitted that on a part of khasra No.74, there was a High School and that there was no existing lease in favour of the plaintiff. It has also been denied that the defendants forcibly stopped the construction work and instigated other residents of the area. It is claimed that the stay was granted by this Court after being satisfied of the existence of a prima facie case in favour of the defendants. It has also denied that the suit instituted by the defendants was vexatious or malafide. On the contrary, the defendants claim to have a right to approach the Court for seeking redressal of their grievances and it was after hearing both the parties and perusing the documents placed on record that this Court granted the stay order. The averments in the plaint that the machinery, men and equipment of the plaintiff remained idle are dined. It is further averred that the dispute related to a small portion of land, therefore, the plaintiffs could continue its work except on such portion of the land. The sustaining of the damages by the plaintiff has been denied. 4. Plaintiff filed replication wherein the grounds of defence as taken in the written statement were denied and the averments as made in the plaint were reaffirmed. 5. On the pleading of the parties, the following issues were framed: 1. Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action to file the suit, if so, its effect? OPD. 2. Whether the defendants by their acts and conduct and deeds forcibly stopped the construction and malafidely delayed the project, if so, its effect? OPP. 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to claim any damage especially when the plaintiff, in the written statement filed in the earlier suit had not claimed any damages? OPD. 4. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is not maintainable as alleged? OPD. 5. Whether the plaintiff is estopped from filing the present suit? OPD. 6. OPP. 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to claim any damage especially when the plaintiff, in the written statement filed in the earlier suit had not claimed any damages? OPD. 4. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is not maintainable as alleged? OPD. 5. Whether the plaintiff is estopped from filing the present suit? OPD. 6. Whether the defendants had initiated the earlier proceeding to protect their rights and the same was for a reasonable and public cause and without malice on the part of the defendants? OPD. 7. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages suffered by it, if so, to what extent and from whom? OPP. 8. Relief. 6. Parties led evidence. 7. Arguments were heard. 8. My findings on the aforesaid issue are as follows: Issue No. 1 9. The facts as averred in the plaint and as briefly set out in para 2 of this judgment apparently disclose a cause of action in favour of the plaintiff. No arguments were addressed on behalf of the defendants to show as to why the plaintiff has no cause of action to institute the suit. This issue is, therefore, decided against the defendants. Issue No.2 10. This issue being interconnected with issue No.6 will be taken up for discussion and decision along with the latter at a later stage. Issue No.3 11. There is no dispute that in the written statement filed by the plaintiff in the suit earlier instituted by the defendants, damages had not been claimed. However, it was not obligatory for the plaintiff to claim any damages in the said written statement. Ordinarily, cause of action to the plaintiff to sue for damages incurred as a consequence of grant of a stay /injunction by a court of law at the instance of a party will accrue only when the matter relating to grant of such stay/injunction would be finally decided. Thus, the fact that plaintiff had not claimed any damages in the written statement filed by it in the earlier suit of the defendants does not debar the plaintiff from claiming damages by instituting the present suit. Therefore, this issue is held against the defendants. Issue No. 4 12. At the time of arguments, it was not pointed out for the defendants as to why the suit is not maintainable. As per the averments made in the plaint, the suit is maintainable. Therefore, this issue is held against the defendants. Issue No. 4 12. At the time of arguments, it was not pointed out for the defendants as to why the suit is not maintainable. As per the averments made in the plaint, the suit is maintainable. Therefore, this issue is decided against the defendants. Issue No.5 13. At the time of arguments, it has not been pointed out as to by which act and conduct the plaintiff is estopped from instituting the present suit. I have gone through the statements of the DWs and the documents relied upon by the defendants and do not find any act or conduct on the part of the plaintiff which may constitute estoppel against it. It is, therefore, held that the defendants have failed to prove that the plaintiff is estopped from filing the present suit. This issue is accordingly decided against the defendants. Issue No.2 and 6 14. It may be pointed out at the very outset that the plaintiff though has averred in para 8 of the plaint that the defendants forcibly stopped construction work and also instigated the other residents of the area but the damages as claimed in the suit are not for such stoppage and instigation. In fact the claim is laid on the ground that the defendants instituted a civil suit wherein they obtained stay order by virtue of which the installation work of the project in question was held up from 22.10.1994 to 22.5.1995, as averred in para 8 of the plaint. Even in para 9 of the plaint, this claim has been reiterated by averring that the defendants had illegally created obstruction by filing one or the other civil suit thereby rendering the manpower idle during the period 28.10.1994 to 22.5.1995 whereby the plaintiff suffered a loss of over Rs.20 lakhs, though the claim in the suit has been restructed to Rs. 10,15,000/-. Thus, the real questions in controversy are whether the defendants instituted the civil suit No. 142 of 1994 in this court against the plaintiff and obtained a stay therein with malafide intention and without any reasonable or probable cause, and whether the manpower of the plaintiff was rendered idle during the period 28.10.1994 to 22.5.1995 due to the stay order thereby causing loss to the plaintiff to the tune of Rs.20 lakhs or any other amount. 15. 15. There is no dispute that the defendants instituted civil suit No. 142 of 1995 against the plaintiff, the State of H.P. and another in this Court thereby claiming the reliefs of (i) declaration that the land comprising khasra Nos. 632/7 and 74 situate in mauza Bag Buhla/Dehan Pargna Naval, Tehsil Palampur, District, Kangra is being used for the benefit of the village community, including playground of the school and is not liable to vest in the State and (ii) defendants Electricity Board (plaintiff herein) and the third defendant be permanently restrained from interfering with the exclusive equipment of the suit land for school playground and holding an annual fair. The relief had been claimed on the grounds that the suit land is owned by the State, and is recorded in the possession of Forest Department subject to the rights of the right holders (Reserved pool ), in the relevant revenue records. The defendants claimed to be the right holders being owners of land in the mauza and also claimed that land in suit is used as a playground of the school and a site to hold a fair annually. The State H.P. leased the land khasra No. 15 which is contiguous to the suit land, to the plaintiff herein. However, the said plaintiff and its workmen etc. started encroaching the suit land. At the material time, the revenue entries as per the latest copy of jamandi Ex.Dw-1/E and one copy of jamandi for the earlier period of the land was recorded as claimed by the defendants and was classified as Jungle Mehfooja Gair Mehdooda". The suit was contested and the claim of the defendants was denied. However, two situations then prevailing viz (i) that the suit land at that time was not leased by the State to the plaintiff and (ii) that on a part of khasra No.74 (a part of the subject matter in the earlier suit by the defendants) was used as a school play ground and to hold an annual fair. The entries in the revenue record as at the relevant time also show that the possession of forest department over the subject matter of the earlier suit was subject to Bartan of the Bartandarans (land owners of the village). The entries in the revenue record as at the relevant time also show that the possession of forest department over the subject matter of the earlier suit was subject to Bartan of the Bartandarans (land owners of the village). It is also not in dispute that before the institution of the suit by the defendants, the plaintiff through its contractor had started excavation work on a part of the Hand in suit though a part thereof was admittedly leased to the plaintiff by the State after the institution of the suit. It is admitted by the parties that the stay order was granted by this Court on 28.10.1994 on an application under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 CPC filed in the above suit and it remained operative till 22.5.1995. The controversy between the parties is that according to the plaintiff, the suit instituted by the defendants was malafide and vexatious and was instituted to gain cheap notoriety and to show the leadership whereas according to the defendants, by instituting the suit, they were bonafide protecting their rights, without any malice and had a reasonable cause to lay the suit. 16. It was contended by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that the suit was malafide because earlier one writ and a suit seeking relief of injunction in respect of the property stood dismissed as withdrawn/not prosecuted. However, there is no evidence on the record to show that the said writ petition and suit were instituted at the behest or with the consent of the defendants or that before the institution of said writ petition and/or the suit. They are admittedly not parties - in person in the said writ petition and the suit which were not dismissed on merits and because of withdrawal/non- prosecution. Therefore, for want of requisite knowledge of institution of said writ petition and suit on the part of defendants and also in view of the fate of the petition and suit met, the act of the defendants in instituting the suit cannot be said to be actuated by malice. 17. It is not in dispute that on 28.10.1994 when the ad interim stay was granted by the Court, the plaintiff was duly represented and one of its officials was also present in the Court. Grant of ad interim stay thus was not procured at the back of the plaintiff. 17. It is not in dispute that on 28.10.1994 when the ad interim stay was granted by the Court, the plaintiff was duly represented and one of its officials was also present in the Court. Grant of ad interim stay thus was not procured at the back of the plaintiff. It is presumed that as and when a stay is granted by a Court of law, it is after due application of mind to the material placed on record. The grant of stay by the Court on 28.10.1994 implies that the Court was satisfied of existence of a prima facie case to grant the stay, more so when made in the presence of the learned counsel representing the parties including the plaintiff. When the matter was listed before the Court on 2.11.1994, the case had to be adjourned because the plaintiff had failed to file reply to the application seeking temporary injunction within the time allowed and the ad interim stay already granted till 2.11.1994 had to be extended till 7.11.1994 admittedly without any opposition to such extension. It is not on record as to when the reply was filed by the plaintiff to the said application. However, because of enhancement of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Judges in the State of Himachal Pradesh, the suit on the request of the learned counsel for he parties, was transferred to the files of the learned District Judge, Kangra, who, vide his order dated 22.5.1995 dismissed the application of the defendants for the stay. It may be pointed out here that during the period 28.10.1994 when ad interim injunction was granted for a limited period and was later extended up to 7.11.1994, till 22.5.1995 when the application for stay was finally dismissed, the defendants had admittedly not applied for vacation, alteration or modification of the ad interim stay. Had the ad interim stay resulted in such colossus loss as now attempted to be made out, in the ordinary course, the plaintiff would have applied for vacation, alteration or modification of the stay. Plaintiffs failure not to do so will necessarily raise an inference adverse to it. 18. A.R. Sharma (PW-4) who was assigned the job of construction of the project as stated by him, has admitted the land, subject matter of the suit, instituted by the defendant was "Bartan" and the residents had the Bartandari rights over it. 19. Plaintiffs failure not to do so will necessarily raise an inference adverse to it. 18. A.R. Sharma (PW-4) who was assigned the job of construction of the project as stated by him, has admitted the land, subject matter of the suit, instituted by the defendant was "Bartan" and the residents had the Bartandari rights over it. 19. In view of the above discussion, particularly the admitted position regarding revenue entries, want of knowledge on the part of the defendants about previous petition and suit and the admission of plaintiff in the written statement in the earlier suit that a part of the suit land therein was used as school playground and for holding a fair, it cannot be said that the suit instituted by defendants was malafide, vexatious and without any reasonable cause. 20. If was contended by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that want of any reasonable cause to institute the suit and the malice actuating such institution are implicit in the dismissal of the application under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 of the Code and final dismissal of the suit in default. 21. The contention though attractive but is without any substance. The application of the defendants for temporary injunction in the earlier suit was dismissed by the learned District Judge vide order Ex.PW-1/5 mainly on the following grounds: (i) that in fact the defendants in that suit had challenged the vesting of the suit land therein in the State under the provisions of Section 3 of the H.P. Village Common Land (Vesting and Utilisation) Act but there was no pleading to support such challenge. (ii) that out of the suit land, khasra Nos.632/7/1 and 74/1 had been leased to the plaintiff herein by the owner State and (iii)that the proposed project was for the benefit of public, discretionary relief of injunction could not be granted to the defendants. 22. The ground (i) supra is a technical ground and has not much to do with the merits. There is no dispute that land khasra No.632/7/land 74/1 forming part of the subject matter of the suit was leased by the State to the plaintiff after the institution of the suit by the defendants and grant of ad interim stay. Thus, this ground of dismissal of the application for temporary injunction came into being after the grant of ad interim stay. Thus, this ground of dismissal of the application for temporary injunction came into being after the grant of ad interim stay. Therefore, being a subsequent event, it cannot be said on its basis that there was no reasonable cause to the defendants to institute the suit, Ground (iii)was only the exercise of its discretion by the Court in the larger interest of the public. It may also be pointed out that existence of Hartandari rights of the villagers over the land in question at the material time is admitted by PW-4. The learned District Judge, in his order Ex.PW- 1/5 before assigning his reasons for dismissal of the application, had noticed a few very important facts averred by the plaintiff in its reply which read as follows: It was further averred that the site of the fair has been separated and developed by defendant No.2. Similarly the playground has been developed. 23. The above admission in the reply about separating of the site of fair and school playground and development thereof after such separation clearly show that a school playground and right of holding a fair did exist over the land subject matter of the suit instituted by the defendants. The defendants had sued for protection of the school playground and the right of holding the fair and that too before a part of the land was leased to the plaintiff by the State. Once a part of the suit land was leased to the plaintiff by the State, and the plaintiff separated the playground and place of fair from their area of operation, the claim of the defendants stood vindicated. In such situation, if they did not take any further interest in the prosecution of the suit that will not lead to an inference adverse to them. In these circumstances, it is clear that the defendants had a reasonable cause to institute the suit and the institution of the suit by them cannot be said to have been actuated by malice. 24. In view of the above discussion and conclusions, issue Nos.2 and 6 are decided against the plaintiff and in favour of the defendants. Issue No. 7 25. 24. In view of the above discussion and conclusions, issue Nos.2 and 6 are decided against the plaintiff and in favour of the defendants. Issue No. 7 25. There is no reliable and cogent evidence to prove that because of the grant of the ad interim stay directing the parties to maintain status quo qua the suit land, the plaintiff suffered loss of Rs.20 lakhs or Rs.l 0,15,000/- as claimed in the suiton the ground that ts manpower was rendered idle during the period 28.10.1994 to 22.5.1995. In this regard, PW-1 has stated that as a result of the litigation initiated by the defendants and others, the equipments and labour were rendered useless and the progress of the work was calculated under his supervision which is Ex.PW-1/23. A perusal of Ex.PW-1/23 consists of main extract of cost for damages, Annexure A to it containing detail of salary of Sub Divisional staff from 28.10.1994 to 20.5.1995. Annexure B, details of arrears of dearness allowance of the said staff from 11/94 to 5/95. As per the main abstract, grand total of the loss suffered has been worked out in the sum of Rs.l0.77,521/-.The total of salary vide Annexure A of Ex.PW/1/23 has been shown as Rs.7.55.707/- . The total of arrears of dearness allowance vide Annexure B has been shown as Rs.4.658/-. The total of pay and arrears vide Annexure C has been shown as Rs.5,09.918/- and the expenditure incurred on journey vide Annexure D has been shown in the sum of Rs.30,947/-. However, there is no evidence at all as to the details of the staff which was detailed for duty at the project site. The persons shown as the payees vide Annexure A admittedly are regular staff of the plaintiff and are not labourers. This staff includes two Assistant Engineers, 10 Junior Engineers, 8 T. mates and also includes supervisors, carpenter, linemen, patwari, peons and clerks. Neither in the plaint nor in the evidence it has been clarified as to what work on the disputed land was going on at the relevant time. Further, there is no evidence to show that such a huge staff was required for such work which was to be carried out on the suit land at the material time. There is no dispute that the construction work was being done by a contractor, namely Vijay Kumar (PW-5). Further, there is no evidence to show that such a huge staff was required for such work which was to be carried out on the suit land at the material time. There is no dispute that the construction work was being done by a contractor, namely Vijay Kumar (PW-5). He has stated that because of the interference in his working, his labourers were rendered idle. In case work was being carried out by the contractor, such a huge staff was not required for supervision of the work being done by the contractor. For want of any cogent and reliable evidence, it cannot he said that all the officials of the plaintiff mentioned in Annexure A were at work at the site in dispute. It is admitted case of the plaintiff that the project was not a local project consisting of some work to be done only on the land in suit but the work to be done for completion of the project was spread over.from Bassi to Dehan, admittedly 32 kms apart from each other. In this long distance, the towers were to be raised and wires were to be laid. There was no stay regarding this part of the work. The work itself was in start from Bassi towards the land subject matter of the suit instituted by the defendants. A such station was to be instailed/constructed on the land leased by the State to the plaintiff which considered of khasra No. 15/1 measuring 0-99-15 hectares and was not the subject matter of the dispute in the suit and parts of khasra Nos. 74 and 672/7 which was the subject matter of the suit. A residential colony was also to be set up at the site leased to the plaintiff. The stay was not operative regarding the work to be carried out on khasra No. 15/1. Evidently, the situation was such that the entire work was not stalled by the ad interim stay nor the staff meant for supervision and carrying out the entire work spread over in between two villages 32 kms apart could have come to a halt by the stay which directed maintaining of status quo only qua two khasra numbers in village Dehan. The services of the staff could admittedly be utilised elsewhere but the explanation for not doing so is uncertain situation. 26. The services of the staff could admittedly be utilised elsewhere but the explanation for not doing so is uncertain situation. 26. A.K. Sharma (PW-4) in his statement has stated that the department suffered a loss to the tune of Rs.10 laksh approximately due to the act and conduct of the defendants and others i.e. Amriek Chand etc. If the total loss suffered by the plaintiff because of the act and conduct of the defendants and others i.e. Ameriek Chand etc. is only Rs.10 lakhs as stated by PW-4, the claim of the plaintiffs that because of the conduct of the defendants in instituting the suit, it suffered a loss of over Rs.20 lakhs, is apparently incorrect. Even this loss of Rs.10 lakhs as stated by PW-4 has not been suffered entirely because of the act of the defendants i.e. instituting the suit and obtaining a stay order therein. It includes the loss suffered because of the act and conduct of others including Amriek Chand and the mob which collected at the site in the month of April 1994 and excavated the trenches already prepared. This loss, as per the averments in the plaint is not subject matter of the suit because the claim has been restricted only to the loss sustained by the plaintiff because of its staff having been rendered workless during the period the ad interim injunction was operative. Thus, the plaintiff has not led any cogent and reliable evidence to prove as to what loss it had suffered as a consequence of the stay orders. 27. As already pointed out, the ad interim stay initially granted and order extending such stay were passed by this Court when the parties were duly represented and these orders were not exparte orders. Thus, these orders had the judicial sanction and were not unilateral acts on the part of the defendants. Therefore, the plaintiff could succeed only if it had proved that the defendants instituted the suit without any reasonable cause and with malice. This view is fully supported by the ratio in Bhupendra Nath Chatterjee & Ors. v. Sm. Trinayan Devi AIR (31) 1944 Cal. 289 and Ram Narayan Agrawalla v. Bholanath Das & Anr AIR 1978 Cal. 259. 28. Therefore, the plaintiff could succeed only if it had proved that the defendants instituted the suit without any reasonable cause and with malice. This view is fully supported by the ratio in Bhupendra Nath Chatterjee & Ors. v. Sm. Trinayan Devi AIR (31) 1944 Cal. 289 and Ram Narayan Agrawalla v. Bholanath Das & Anr AIR 1978 Cal. 259. 28. In Bhupendra Naths case (supra), the Calcutta High Court held as under: "The question is, whether in a case like the one before us, when a party aggrieved by an injunction obtained against him by another, brings a suit for damages against the latter is it enough for him to show that the injunction was obtained on insufficient grounds as is demonstrated by the subsequent result of the suit; or is it necessary as Mr. Ghose contends, that he should go further and prove that there was no reasonable and probable cause upon which the application for injunction could be founded and that the defendant was actuated by malice? In our opinion, the contention of Mr. Ghose is correct and as the essence of such action is the malicious abuse of the processes of the Court it is not sufficient to show that the injunction was obtained on insufficient grounds; it must be proved also that the defendant knew them to be insufficient and acted from an improver motive. The position would be different indeed if the order of the court was void for want of jurisdiction or the act could be regarded as the act of the defendant himself or of a miniterial officer of the Court. In such circumstances, if there was actual interference with the property of the plaintiff an action of trespass would undoubtedly lie. But as one of the circumstances mentioned above exists in the present case it was incumbent in our opinion upon the plaintiff to prove malice and want of reasonable or probable cause before she could be given damages against the defendants. this is view which is based upon the principles of English law referred to above is fully borne out by a large number of decisions of this as well as of other High Courts in India. 29. this is view which is based upon the principles of English law referred to above is fully borne out by a large number of decisions of this as well as of other High Courts in India. 29. In Ram Narayans case (supra) the same High Court reiterate as under: The result is that the lower appellate court was correct in basing its decision on the later Division Bench decision of this Court reported in ILR (1944) 2 Cal 358: (AIR 1944 Cal 289), and in holding that in an action for damages it was incumbent on the plaintiff to prove malice as also that the defendant acted without reasonable and probable cause and having failed to prove that as a fact the lower appellate court quite rightly dismissed the plaintiffs claim in the suit by rejecting the cross objection filed by the plaintiff who was respondent before the lower court and allowing the appeal preferred by the defendants. 30. In view of the above discussion, the plaintiff is not entitled to the damages as claimed. This issue is accordingly decided against the plaintiff. Issue No.8 (Relief) 31. In view of the findings given on issue Nos. 2,6 and 7 above, the suit merits dismissal and is accordingly dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case parties are left to bear their own costs.