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2001 DIGILAW 252 (MAD)

P. K. M. S. Jailani Beevi v. J. Madan Lal

2001-02-26

K.SAMPATH

body2001
Judgment : 1. The landlady is the revision petitioner. It arises out of proceedings under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for eviction of the respondent from the property belonging to her on the ground of owner's occupation or in the alternative for additional accommodation. 2. Thefacts leading to the civil revision petition are as under: The property an extent of 1200 sq.ft. in premises No.58, ground floor, Pondy Bazaar, T. Nagar, Chennai 17, belongs to the revision petitioner. The respondent became a tenant in the year 1984 on a monthly rent of Rs.900 and in course of time it was increased and at the time of filing the eviction petition it was Rs.2000 per month. The petitioner's husband and her two sons are carrying on business in footwear and leather goods at No.35, Ranganathan Street, T.Nagar, Chennai 17, in a rented shop on a monthly rent of Rs.650 under one Ramani lyer. The area of the shop is only 80 sq.ft. By reason of the joining of the sons with the father, the accommodation has become inadequate and insufficient. The petitioner's husband and their sons decided to enlarge the business by shifting from the rented premises in Ranganathan Street to the petition premises where the respondent is carrying on business in textiles. The petitioner and her family are residing in the first floor and the petition property is in the ground floor and the shifting would enable the members to concentrate on the business more. Under these circumstances, the eviction of the respondent is sought. Balance of convenience is in favour of the petitioner and no hardship will be caused to the respondent on account of the petitioner's bonafide requirements. Neither the petitioner nor her husband owns any non-residential building in Chennai. The requirement is bonafide. The petition was filed in April, 1993. 3. The respondent resisted the eviction petition contending inter alia. as follows: The allegation that the petitioner is the owner of the premises, subject matter of the proceedings, is not true. The petitioner's husband and her two sons are carrying on business in a rented shop, is denied as also the extent. Equally, the allegation that the business area has become small and Insufficient, and therefore the petitioner's husband and sons wanted to enlarge the business to suit the needs of changed circumstances, is not true. The petitioner's husband and her two sons are carrying on business in a rented shop, is denied as also the extent. Equally, the allegation that the business area has become small and Insufficient, and therefore the petitioner's husband and sons wanted to enlarge the business to suit the needs of changed circumstances, is not true. The petition has been filed with ulterior motive since the respondent did not agree to pay enhanced rent. The respondent has invested huge sums of money in the business and has improved the business on a large scale. He has also spent large sums for interior decoration in the shop. The surrounding locality of the petition premises is Pondy Bazaar and the area is full of showrooms. The claim of the petitioner that her husband is carrying on business in footwear and leather goods and wishes to shift the same, is not bonafide. Since the petitioner is not the real owner, the petition under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) is not maintainable. 4. On the above pleadings, the matter went for enquiry. The learned Rent Controller dismissed the petition on the ground that the petition as one falling under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act, was not maintainable and eviction should have been sought for on the ground that the petition was falling under Section 10 (3)(c) of the Act. The petitioner filed RCA No.284 of 1995. She also filed M.P.No.63 of 1998 to amend the pleadings by adding Sec.l0(3)(c) along with Sec. 10(3) (a) (iii ) of the Act. The Miscellaneous Petition was allowed. As against this the respondent filed CRP No. 1153 of 1998, which was dismissed on 21.9.1998 by R. Balasubramanian, J. while dismissing the revision petition, the learned Judge observed as follows: "On a consideration of the facts available in this case, I am of the opinion that the amendment will definitely avoid multiplicity of proceedings and it is not going to prejudice the tenant in any way. Though a statement was made before this Court on behalf of the landlord by his learned counsel that the landlord is not going to seek for any consequential amendment in the pleadings or let in evidence, yet I am of the opinion that if the tenant wants an opportunity to meet the case of the landlord under Section l0(3)(c) of the Act, if he had not already applied his mind to that requirement and adduced evidence, then it is always open to the Appellate Authority to provide the necessary opportunity to him in a manner known to law in this regard." 5. The appeal was heard by the learned Appellate Authority. After arguments had been heard and orders reserved, the revision petitioner took out applications in M.P.Nos.98 to 100 of 1999 to reopen the case, to permit her to adduce additional evidence by marking certain summoned documents from the Commercial Tax Department and to summon the Commercial Tax Officer of the area concerned to tender evidence on the produced documents. The applications were dismissed. She did not and could not let in any further evidence. The respondent/tenant also did not let in any further evidence. The Appellate Authority held that the revision petitioner/her family members owned other shops in Ranganathan Street itself, that the documentary and oral evidence on the side of the petitioner showed that the business of the petitioner's husband had not improved, that the respondent had spent huge amounts and improved the appearance of the property, that the hardship caused to the respondent would outweigh the advantage to the revision petitioner, that the reason for seeking eviction was not bonafide. So holding, the learned Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal. As against that, the present civil revision petition has been filed. 6. Mr. N.Krishna Mitra, learned counsel for the petitioner, made the following submissions: The learned Appellate Authority clearly misread the evidence of P.Ws.l and 2 while referring to an alleged admission by them as owning eight shops while in fact there was no such admission by either of them. As against that, the present civil revision petition has been filed. 6. Mr. N.Krishna Mitra, learned counsel for the petitioner, made the following submissions: The learned Appellate Authority clearly misread the evidence of P.Ws.l and 2 while referring to an alleged admission by them as owning eight shops while in fact there was no such admission by either of them. The Appellate Authority clearly erred that it was not the case of the respondent that the petitioner/her family members owned other non-residential premises in the city of Chennai, that on the basis of the ratio of the decisions of this Court in (1) V. Radhakrishanan v. S.N. Loganatha Mudaliar, 1998 (3) CTC 108 and (2) Hameed Ibrahim v. Bagirathan, 1999 (1) CTC 396 the Appellate Authority ought to have held that the requirement was bona fide that the petition premises was required for the business of the petitioner's husband and her sons. The Appellate Authority ought to have held on the pleading that the petitioner had proved the bona fides relating to shifting of the business from the rented premises and there was no contra pleading or evidence let in by the respondent. 7. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner also relied on certain other judgments to show that this Court can exercise the power under Section 25 of the Act in a case like this. Those judgments would be referred to in the course of the order. 8. Mr. N.S.Varadachari, learned counsel for the respondent, submitted that the Appellate Authority has, on the oral and documentary evidence, found that the requirement of the petitioner/her family members, is not bona fide, that the respondent had spent huge sums in improving the business and interior decoration of the premises, that the hardship caused to the respondent would outweigh the advantage to the petitioner. The learned counsel also relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Jermons v. Aliammal, 1999 (3) CTC 697: 1999 (7) SCC 382 : AIR 1999 SC 3041 and submitted that this Court sitting in revision cannot re-appreciate the evidence and the proper course in case it disagreed with the decision of the Appellate Authority would be to remand the case to the Rent Controller for giving opportunity to the parties to file further pleadings and adduce such further evidence relevant to the issue as they desired. 9. 9. Admittedly, the revision petitioner's husband alongwith his sons is running a chappal and leathergoods shop in a rented premises in Ranganathan Street. The space available is 80 sq.ft. Their business is not doing very well. The sons have joined the father in the business. The petition premises has an area of 1200 sq.ft. It is 15 times the area now occupied by the petitioner's husband for doing the business. The petitioner and her family are occupying the upstairs portion of the petition premises. The contention on the side of the petitioner is that her husband and sons want to expand their business. The finding by the Appellate Authority that the petitioner/her family members owned eight other shops is not based on any oral or documentary evidence. Except for general denial in the respondent's counter, there is no specific case put forward in the counter that the petitioner/her family members owned other non-residential premises in the city of chennai, to any of which places the petitioner's husband and sons can shift the business. The appellate authority has clearly misread the evidence. The apparent suggestion in the cross-examination of P.Ws.l and 2 is to show that in Ranganathan Street area there are other shoemarts and Pondy Bazaar is predominantly an area occupied by textile shops. The Appellate Authority has wholly misconstrued the evidence when he observed that the petitioner/her family members owned eight other shops in the city of Chennai. What P.Ws.l and 2 had said was that there were eight other chappal shops in Ranganathan Street area. The Appellate Authority has drawn out of context. This wrong reading of the evidence had apparently clouded his further approach to the question. There is absolutely nothing wrong, in fostering a hope, even assuming that the business of the petitioner's husband in Ranganathan Street area has not been thriving, that if it is shifted to the petition premises, the business can improve. They are having an additional advantage to oversee the business at close quarters as their residence is in the first floor of the petition mentioned premises. 10. It has already been noticed that the revision petitioner applied for amendment of the petition for eviction by inclusion of an alternative Section, namely, 10(3)(c). They are having an additional advantage to oversee the business at close quarters as their residence is in the first floor of the petition mentioned premises. 10. It has already been noticed that the revision petitioner applied for amendment of the petition for eviction by inclusion of an alternative Section, namely, 10(3)(c). According to the learned counsel for the revision petitioner and in my view his stand appears to be justified that sufficient pleadings and oral and documentary evidence were already available on record and a mere technical flaw was sought to be rectified by seeking the inclusion of the alternative section. R. Balsubramaninan, J. while dismissing the revision has also referred to it and it has also been extracted above and the learned Judge gave an opportunity to the respondent to let in evidence if he wanted to meet the case of the landlord under S.l0(3)(c) of the Act. This opportunity had not been availed of by the respondent before the Appellate Authority. As pointed out by the Supreme Court, in Jermons's case, 1999 (3) CTC 697 : 1999 (7) SCC 382 : AIR 1999 SC 3041 (already referred to), "..there is a fundamental difference between a case of raising additional ground based on the pleadings and the material available on record and a case of taking a new plea not borne out by the pleadings. In the former case no amendment of pleadings is required whereas in the latter it is necessary to amend the pleadings. The Court/Rent Controller in its discretion with a view to do complete justice between the parties, may allow a party either to raise additional ground or take a new plea, as the case may be; if the circumstances so justify like a plea based on subsequent events. Whereas in the former situation, the case can be disposed (of) on the material on record but in the latter case the pleadings will have to be amended and for that reason the parties have to be given reasonable opportunity to file further pleadings and adduce necessary evidence.' In the case before the Supreme Court, the High Court allowed the C.M.P. to raise additional ground in the revision. The original application was for eviction under Section 10(3)(a) and the application for amendment of eviction petition was allowed permitting to raise further ground under clause (c). The original application was for eviction under Section 10(3)(a) and the application for amendment of eviction petition was allowed permitting to raise further ground under clause (c). The Supreme Court observed that the appropriate course in such a case would be to remand the case to the Rent Controller for giving opportunity to the opposite party to file further pleadings and adduce such evidence relevant to the issue as it desired. It is needless to say that the authority considering an application for eviction of a tenant under clause (c) of Sec.10(3) is to record a finding under proviso to Sec. 10(3) to the effect that the hardship which may be caused to the tenant by granting eviction will outweigh the advantage to the landlord. For purposes of clause (c) it has to be found whether the landlord is occupying only a part of the building, whether residential or nonresidential, and whether the tenant is occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building and the facts relevant to the consideration with regard to comparative hardship to the landlord and tenant, and such facts are brought to be on record because they are not subject matter of consideration in an application filed under sub-section (3)(a). The Supreme Court has itself held in that case that for granting relief to the tenant under clause (a) the aspect of hardship of the tenant is alien but under clause (c) the Controller is enjoined to reject the application of the landlord for eviction if he is satisfied that the hardship which may be caused to the tenant by directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the portion of the building in possession of the tenant, will outweigh the advantage to the landlord. 11. In my considered view the present application by the revision petitioner is maintainable under Sec.10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act itself. The first floor in the occupation of the petitioner and her family is admittedly a residential portion. The shop in Ranganathan Street is a rented one. The petitioner/her family members are not in possession of any other non-residential building of their own. They are doing business. There is nothing wrong in a person wanting to improve the business. A clear case has been made out for eviction under Sec.10(3)(a)(iii). The shop in Ranganathan Street is a rented one. The petitioner/her family members are not in possession of any other non-residential building of their own. They are doing business. There is nothing wrong in a person wanting to improve the business. A clear case has been made out for eviction under Sec.10(3)(a)(iii). Even otherwise, the respondent has not pleaded that there is no other place available in the locality in Pondy Bazaar where he could shift his business. Except saying that the requirement is not bonafide and further saying that he had invested huge sums of money in the business and spent large sums for interior decoration of the shop. The respondent has not substantiated the same by acceptable evidence. The petitioner's case for additional accommodation under Section 10(3)(c) is also clearly made out. It has been held by the Supreme Court in V. Radhakrishnan v. S.N.Loganatha Mudaliar, 1998 (3) CTC 108 that the owner can seek eviction of tenant for benefit of member of his/her family notwithstanding that such owner is himself/herself occupying a building of his own for carrying on business so long as such member of the family for whose benefit eviction is sought does not occupy any premises of his own in city or town. In Hameed Ibrahim v. V.S. Bagirrathan, 1999 (1) CTC 396 it has been held that a petition for eviction for occupation of landlord's son of non residential building is maintainable. In that case it was also contended by the tenant that the petition filed under Section l0(3)(a)(iii) of the Act was not maintainable and the petition ought to have been under Section 10(3)(c). It was held that there was enough evidence available to order eviction under Section 10(3)(c). It was held that mere quoting of wrong provision of law did not disentitle landlord from getting relief if materials otherwise available on record enabled him to get relief. In Munusamy v. S.S. Nathan, 1995 (2) L.W. 364 it has been held that the Court has to confine its job in identifying the bonafide claim of landlord on his own evidence and not necessarily that of the family members for whose benefit eviction is sought. In Munusamy v. S.S. Nathan, 1995 (2) L.W. 364 it has been held that the Court has to confine its job in identifying the bonafide claim of landlord on his own evidence and not necessarily that of the family members for whose benefit eviction is sought. In R.Rajendran v. E.M. Kuthurathullah, 1999 (2) CTC 606 it has been held that the question of bona fide requirement to be decided on the basis of all circumstances available and when there is clear and cogent evidence regarding bona fide requirement and that the petitioner did not own any other building of his own in city or town, the petition has to succeed. This is a case where the appellate authority had not applied the proper test in deciding the matter. There are manifest errors in the order of the appellate authority. In Bashruddin v. P. Somasundaram, 2000 (I) CTC 723 . I have held that the High Court can look into evidence in revision to decide whether authorities below had approached the question from proper angle. When the Appellate Authority omits to consider materials placed before it, and assumes certain things which are non existent and ignores the various precedents on the issues before it. this Court is entitled to interfere under Section 25 of the Act. 12. This is a clear case whore there should be interference under Section 25 of the Act. It is not necessary to remit the matter to the Rent Controller as I have found that the case under Section 10 (3)(a)(iii) has been clearly made out. 13. Before parting with the case, I want to advert to one other aspect of the case. In the pleadings the respondent had disputed the title of the petitioner to the property. The claim in the petition that the petitioner is the owner of the property is disputed in para 3 of the counter. If things had stopped with that, we can explain the same by saying that it is a case of routine denial. But in para 8 it is stated that the petitioner is not the real owner of the property and therefore the petition under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) is not maintainable. It is now settled law that denial of title need not precede the eviction proceedings. But in para 8 it is stated that the petitioner is not the real owner of the property and therefore the petition under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) is not maintainable. It is now settled law that denial of title need not precede the eviction proceedings. If in the course of proceedings there is a denial of title that would suffice to order eviction on the ground of denial of title being bona fide. I do not wish to say anything further in the matter as this aspect was not pursued by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 14. In view of the discussion above, the petitioner is entitled to succeed. The civil revision petition will stand allowed. The original petition for eviction in RCOP.No.987 of 1993 will stand ordered. The respondent is given three months time to quit and deliver vacant possession of the premises. No costs. C.R.P.No.1257 of 1999 and C.M.P.No.1629 of 2001 K.Sampath, J. 15. After I had reserved orders, dictated the same, and posted the case for Judgment, Mr. R. Nandakumar. Advocate, mentioned that he had been given change of Vakalat by the counsel for the respondent and requested for the matter being posted for being mentioned as the respondent wanted to urge some more points. The counsel for the petitioner had no objection. Accordingly, the case was posted along with an application under Order 41, Rule 27, C.P.C. filed by the respondent, for further hearing.C.M.P.No. 1629/2001: 16. A set of six documents are sought to be received as additional evidence on the side of the petitioner herein/respondent in the main civil revision petition. The documents are:- (1) Rental Agreement, dated 21.2.1984, (2) the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Registration Certificate, dt.14.6.1984, (3) Settlement of Accounts with earlier tenant (two documents) dated 10.3.1984, (4) Audit Reports numbering from 1995 to 2000 indicating the Profit and Loss Accounts of the business, (5) Communication dated 1.10.1996 appointing the respondent as selling Agent for M/s. Garden Silk Mills Ltd., and (6) the Certificate dt.22.1.2001, issued by Garden Silk Mills Limited. 17. Besides referring to the merits of the case of the respective parties, it. 17. Besides referring to the merits of the case of the respective parties, it. is stated that the petitioner's showroom is the number one showroom doing good business at all India level, for Garden sarees that the said showroom has got a sister company called Vareli Textiles, that the petitioner is the authorised dealer in respect of the said Mills, that the business turnover is about one crore, that seeking eviction of this kind of number one showroom in India as against the requirement of a retail foot wear business carried on just 80 sq.ft. area is nothing but an unequal and disproportionate demand that the documents sought to be filed reflect the factual details about the petitioner being the number one showroom in the whole country, and the documents are necessary to evaluate the bonafide nature in respect of on going lis between the parties, and that this Court itself has held in the cases reported in S. Guruswamy Nadar and three others v. Andal Ammal (died) and another, 2000 (1) CTC 492 and Dr. P.S.Salahuddin v. C. Shameemunnissa, 2000 (2) CTC 600 that even at the revision stage the High Court can receive additional documents for the purpose of finding out the truth or otherwise of the case of the parties, that the rental deed and the other documents relating to Settlement of Accounts with the earlier tenant would show that the tenancy got renewed by the consent of the parties and the rent also got increased on various occasions and that the previous tenant while handing over vacant possession to the petitioner herein received a compensation of Rs. 1,15,000 by means of a Pay Order in respect of furniture left behind by him at the shop and the same was followed by the further payment of Rs.35,000 and the cash was paid by the petitioner herein on 12.1.1984. 18. A detailed counter has been filed by the respondent/revision petitioner to the miscellaneous petition for reception of additional evidence. 1,15,000 by means of a Pay Order in respect of furniture left behind by him at the shop and the same was followed by the further payment of Rs.35,000 and the cash was paid by the petitioner herein on 12.1.1984. 18. A detailed counter has been filed by the respondent/revision petitioner to the miscellaneous petition for reception of additional evidence. It is stated that the averments in the affidavit in support of the application for reception of additional evidence have been made mischievously as if there had been lack of opportunity to put forth the case of the petitioner herein/respondent, that during the full-fledged hearing the tenant had not let in any evidence or document inspite of specific opportunity given in the order in the civil revision petition, namely, C.R.P.No.1153 of 1998, dated 21.9.1998, that the present attempt to have additional documents marked is only a ruse to protract the proceedings, that the affidavit of the petitioner herein/respondent concedes another business two doors away, namely, at No. 60, Pondy Bazaar, in the name of Vareli Textiles, that the documents now sought to be produced were all available in the custody of the petitioner herein/respondent and no explanation whatsoever was forthcoming for not marking in that appeal before the Appellate Authority and no explanation had been given as to why the petitioner herein/respondent did not let in evidence inspite of the opportunity specifically given in the order in the civil revision petition and that in the absence of pleading, no document could be received. 19. In the reply affidavit it is stated that permission to adduce additional evidence at the appeal stage was given only to the landlady and not to the tenant/petitioner herein. The reply also further states that the bona fide requirement of the landlady has to be viewed not in any narrow sense of mere attempt of the landlady to fulfil the requirements of the section. There must be a further requirement showing the bona fide intentions. And in the instant case the volume of the business by the son of the landlady cannot be equated with that of the business carried on by the petitioner. There must be a further requirement showing the bona fide intentions. And in the instant case the volume of the business by the son of the landlady cannot be equated with that of the business carried on by the petitioner. It is further stated in the reply that for the current year till January, 2001, the petitioner's business has reached Rs.70.00.000 already and by the end of the financial year 2000-2001, it would be more than Rs.l crore and only for the purpose of substantiating this stand, permission for production of additional documents is sought. In the counter to the application it is stated falsely by the revision petitioner that the respondent is having another business, two doors away, namely, at No.60, Pondy Bazaar under the name and style of Vareli Textiles and this is factually incorrect and the petitioner herein does not have any business under the name and style of Vareli Textiles. 20. I heard elaborate arguments. The learned counsel for the respondent/petitioner herein strenuously contended by relying on certain decisions rendered by me and also other decisions that the documents had to be received as additional evidence. According to the learned counsel prayer under Section l0(3)(a)(iii) of the Act cannot coexist with Section l0(3)(c) of the Act and the revision petitioner has not satisfied the requirement of Section l0(3)(c) of the Act. No doubt, in appropriate cases it is open to the parties to apply for reception of additional evidence. But that will depend on the facts and circumstances of the individual cases and there cannot be a hard and fast rule with regard to reception of additional evidence. In the order of R. Balasubramanian, J. in C.R.P.No.1153 of 1998 in no uncertain terms it was stated that the revision petitioner opted to seek amendment with regard to the provision of law by inclusion of Section10(3)(c) along with Section10(3)(a)(iii) and did. not want to amend the pleadings or to lead any further evidence. But in the same order it was specifically stated that the petitioner/tenant could adduce any further evidence if so advised. 21. not want to amend the pleadings or to lead any further evidence. But in the same order it was specifically stated that the petitioner/tenant could adduce any further evidence if so advised. 21. Though in the affidavit, in support of the application for reception of additional evidence, it is properly set out that the earlier revision was filed by the tenant, however, in the reply affidavit it is stated as if it was only the present revision petitioner who filed the said revision petition and leave was granted to her to amend and also lead further evidence. Opportunity was given to the petitioner herein and the same was not availed or and it is rather incongruous that after the arguments had been heard and orders reserved the present miscellaneous petition with conflicting details came to be filed. In Raja Mohammed v. Murugesan, 2000 (1) CTC 386 I have held that if a case is made out by the party for reception of additional evidence, the same could be received even in revision petition. In that case what was sought to be filed as additional evidence was the revision petitioner's own pleadings in the proceedings between the same parties, in respect of the same property, previously and which came up to this Court by way of revision and there was a vital admission by the revision petitioner that he had received some amount as advance to the property and the same was not disputed by him. It was in those circumstances the application for reception of additional evidence was allowed. While deciding that case, I have referred to other decisions by this Court touching the reception of additional evidence. One other decision of mind on this aspect is Dr. P.S.Salahuddin v. C. Shameemunnissa, 2000 (2) CTC 600 . 22. I really do not find any justification for entertaining the present petition for reception of additional evidence in the instant case particularly when an opportunity had been given to load evidence before the Appellate Authority in the earlier civil revision petition. Even otherwise 1 fail to see as to how these documents, now produced, advance the case of the petitioner herein. The first of the documents is the agreement between the parties. The second is the Sales Tax Registration Certificate. The third is a set of documents relating to Settlement of Accounts with the previous tenant. Even otherwise 1 fail to see as to how these documents, now produced, advance the case of the petitioner herein. The first of the documents is the agreement between the parties. The second is the Sales Tax Registration Certificate. The third is a set of documents relating to Settlement of Accounts with the previous tenant. In the pleading and also in the evidence there was an admission that the petitioner herein became a tenant in the year 1984 at a particular rate of rent per month and that the same was being periodically increased. 23. So far as the Settlement of Accounts with the earlier tenant is concerned, para 11 of the affidavit, in support of the reception of additional evidence, mentions about the amounts paid by the petitioner herein to the previous tenant for purchase of furniture left behind by him in the petition mentioned premises. I fail to see how the amounts thus paid could be stated to be compensation paid by the petitioner herein to the previous tenant. I further fail to see how this, in any way, improves the case of the petitioner herein. 24. So far as the rest of the documents are concerned, they show the enormous turnover in the business of the petitioner herein. Those documents do not in anyway help the case of the petitioner/respondent. No case is made out for reception of additional evidence. The Miscellaneous petition will stand dismissed. 25. The learned counsel for the petitioner/respondent cited a number of decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court for the position that interference under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, is clearly circumscribed. The decisions relied on by the petitioner/respondent are listed below: 1. Phiroze Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant, AIR 1974 SC 1059 ; 2. Mattulal v. Radhe Lal, AIR 1974 SC 1596 ; 3.Children's Choice v. Adiseshiah, 1982 (1) MLJ 411 ; 4.Hameedia Hardware Stores v. Mohan Lal Sowcar, AIR 1988 SC 1060 ; 5. Gajendra Sha v. Govindarajan, 1996 (1) CTC 492 ; 6. Hotel De-Broadway, Etc. v. M/s Snow White Industrial Corporation, 1997 (1) CTC 193 : 1997 (1) L.W. 421 ; 7. Mohammed imalchand, 1998 (II) MLJ 619 ; 8. The South India Corporation Agencies Ltd. v. Chandrakanth C. Bandani, 1998 (1) CTC 674 ; 9. Jothi Ammal v. Kulandai Vadivel, 1999 (II) MLJ 35; 10. Hotel De-Broadway, Etc. v. M/s Snow White Industrial Corporation, 1997 (1) CTC 193 : 1997 (1) L.W. 421 ; 7. Mohammed imalchand, 1998 (II) MLJ 619 ; 8. The South India Corporation Agencies Ltd. v. Chandrakanth C. Bandani, 1998 (1) CTC 674 ; 9. Jothi Ammal v. Kulandai Vadivel, 1999 (II) MLJ 35; 10. Munawar Jan Begum v. Subramaniam, 2000 (1) MLJ 19 . Dealing with the revisionary powers under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates control Act (57 of 1947). the Supreme Court in Phiroze Bamanji Desai v. C.M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059 has held that the High Court cannot reassess the value of the evidence and interfere with the finding of fact merely because it thinks that the appreciation of the evidence by the lower court is wrong and the court should have reached a different conclusion of fact from what it did. Only if the lower Court had applied a wrong test on a misconstruction of the word 'requires' the finding recorded by it would have been vitiated by an error of law. In Mattulal v. Rade Lal, AIR 1974 SC 1596 the Supreme Court held that the finding reached by the First Appellate Court on an appreciation of evidence that the landlord does not bona fide require the premises in question for the purpose of starting business as a dealer in iron and steel materials is a finding of fact and not a finding of mixed law and fact and it cannot be interfered with by the High court in second appeal unless it is shown that in reaching it a mistake of law is committed by the Appellate Authority or it ia based on no evidence or is such as no reasonable man can reach. In Children's Choice v. Adiseshana, 1982 (1) MLJ 411 , T.N.Singaravelu, J. has pointed that if the bona fides of the landlords had been proved, the relative hardship of the parties in the event of eviction should also be considered before ordering eviction under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. It has been held in Hammedia Hardware Stores v. Mohan Lal Sowcar, AIR 1988 SC 1060 that the landlord should establish that he bona fide requires premises, in addition to proving other ingredients referred to in Sec.10(3)(a) (iii) for getting an order of eviction. It has been held in Hammedia Hardware Stores v. Mohan Lal Sowcar, AIR 1988 SC 1060 that the landlord should establish that he bona fide requires premises, in addition to proving other ingredients referred to in Sec.10(3)(a) (iii) for getting an order of eviction. In Gajendra Sha v. Govindarajan, 1996 (1) CTC 492 S.M. Abdul Wahab, J. (as the learned Judge then was) considered the requirement of the petition building by the landlord for the purpose of carrying on his own business under Section 10(3)(a)(iii), the tenant disputing the claim of the landlord as lacking in bona fides. Factually it was found that it was highly impossible to apprehend that such a flourishing business would be shifted to a narrow lane, especially when there was no threat of eviction and the accommodation was much more than what the landlord was going to get in the petition building. The learned Judge found that the petition was lacking in bona fides. In Hotel De-Broadway Etc. v. M/s.Snow White Industrial Corporation, Etc, 1997 (1) CTC 193 : 1997 (1) LW 421 it has been held by K.Govindarajan, J. that mere inconvenience of tenant cannot deprive landlord of his bona fide right to have additional accommodation. The concurrent findings about bona fides of landlord cannot be disturbed merely on the plea of the tenant as to difficulty of finding alternative accommodation in the area and it is not a relevant ground for rejecting the claim of the landlord. The mere fact that the tenant cannot get alternative accommodation alone cannot be the basis to reject landlord's claim. It is not the object of S. 10(3)(c) to weigh the hardship to tenant as against advantage of landlord on the delicate scales of giving benefit of a slight tilt in favour of the tenant. In Mohammed imalchand, 1998 (II) MLJ 619 the same learned Judge has held that eviction petition by the landlord as kartha of joint family seeking premises for his brother's requirement is not maintainable under Section 10(3)(a)(iii). In Mohammed imalchand, 1998 (II) MLJ 619 the same learned Judge has held that eviction petition by the landlord as kartha of joint family seeking premises for his brother's requirement is not maintainable under Section 10(3)(a)(iii). It was also held that the requirement was not bona fide.In The South India Corporation Agencies v. Chandrakanth C.Badani, 1998 (1) CTC 674 the same learned Judge has held that unless there is perversity in the matter of appreciation of evidence by authorities revisional court will not interfere with concurrent findings.In Jothi Ammal v. Kulandai Vadivel, 1999 (II) MLJ 35 the learned Judge has considered the scope of applicability of Sec.10(3) (c).In Munawar Jan Begum v. Subramaniam, 2000 (1) MLJ 19 has held that unless perversity is writ large on the face of the judgments rendered by the lower authorities, it is not desirable for the revisional court to interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower authorities. 26. None of the cases relied on by the learned counsel would apply to the facts of the present case. I have already given the reasons for interfering under Section 25 of the Act and setting aside the dismissal order by the authorities below is warranted on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. There is no case made out for taking a view different from the one already taken by me.