Judgment S.N.Pathak, J. 1. This second appeal has been preferred against the judgment and decree dated 30th May, 1996 passed by Sri K.B. Verma, 5th Additional District Judge, Purnea in Title Appeal No. 9 of 1984 whereby the appellate Court confirmed the judgment and decree dated 11th February, 1984 passed by sub-ordinate Judge, Araria in Title Suit No. 229 of 1960. The defendant No. 1 of that suit is the appellant here. 2. The case of the plaintiff respondents in the lower Court was that some of the suit lands, as described in the Schedule of the plaint, were acquired by their ancestor Arjilal Panjiyar in the year 1997 by a registered sale-deed. After the death of the original purchaser, his heirs (plaintiffs) came in possession of the suit land and remained in possession. However, during the course of revisional survey, final Khatiyan was prepared in the name of ancestor of defendants, namely, Arjilal Biswas. This cast a cloud on the title of the plaintiff and hence, they filed a suit for declaration of title and for confirmation of possession as also for declaration that the survey entry was wrong. The defendants contested the suit and contended, inter alia, that Arjilal Biswas, the ancestor of the defendants, purchased the suit land orally in the year 1943 for Rs. 95.00 and five years after the purchase, Arjilal Biswas excavated a pond on a portion of the suit land and the planted certain trees and, on the death of Arjilal Biswas, the defendants came in possession and had perfected their title by adverse possession and so the suit was barred by law of limitation as also under the Specific Relief Act. 3. The trial Court as also the appellate Court considered the entire gamut of evidence, documentary and oral, and came to the conclusion that the defendant-appellant had failed to prove their right and title over the suit land by adverse possession and they had also failed to prove their title by virtue of oral purchase. So, the suit was decreed with all the reliefs sought for by the plaintiff-respondents 4. Admittedly, the suit land was acquired by the ancestor of plaintiffs in the year 1997 by registered sale-deed and the sale-deed was filed in the lower Court (Ext. 1). This exhibit shows that it was registered on 14th November, 1927 and the consideration money is perhaps Rs, 110.00 . Admittedly, the suit land was acquired by the ancestor of plaintiffs in the year 1997 by registered sale-deed and the sale-deed was filed in the lower Court (Ext. 1). This exhibit shows that it was registered on 14th November, 1927 and the consideration money is perhaps Rs, 110.00 . There are various plots mentioned in the sale-deed; some of which are suit lands in dispute between the parties. So the plaintiffs title over the suit land is a well admitted fact and this cannot be in dispute because the defendants ancestor also admittedly took a plea of oral purchase from Arjilal Panjiyar (plaintiffs ancestor). So the defendants to succeed in their claim had to prove the oral purchase, as pleaded by them. In this connection, D.W. 1 was examined to support the fact of oral purchase but this D.W. was disbelieved by the trial Court because he failed to give the year and the date of oral purchase. This finding of the triai Court was affirmed by the first appellate Court and I am also of the opinion that this finding of the two lower Courts is not vitiated by any non-consideration or improper appreciation of the evidence. It is also relevant to mention that in the sale-deed (Ext. 1), the consideration money is Rs. 110.00 and the plea of the defendants is for purchasing the suit lands, besides other lands contained in the sale-deed for Rs. 95.00 . The sale-deed of the plaintiff was dated 14th November, 1927 and the defendants oral purchase is referred to the year 1942. So, the price of the land cannot be less than Rs. 100.00 in the year 1943 by any stretch of imagination. In this view of the matter also, the story of oral purchase does not appear to be convincing and I have already stated above that the evidence in this connection by the defendant-appellants was highly deficient. 5. In view of the aforesaid finding, the defendants had to prove their title on the basis of the plea of adverse possession. Both the lower Courts considered this aspect of the case and upon the evidence on record, came to the conclusion that the defendant-appellant had miserably failed to prove adverse possession. This second appeal was admitted, though it should not have been admitted because findings of fact by the two lower Courts were concurrent and, therefore, final. Both the lower Courts considered this aspect of the case and upon the evidence on record, came to the conclusion that the defendant-appellant had miserably failed to prove adverse possession. This second appeal was admitted, though it should not have been admitted because findings of fact by the two lower Courts were concurrent and, therefore, final. The law formulated for decision of this appeal was to the effect, "whether the question of adverse possession, as claimed by the defendants has correctly been decided or not". In this connection, it was pointed out by the appellants lawyer that both the lower Courts misinterpreted and misappreciated the evidence on the record and, hence, there was miscarriage of justice. However, I am of the opinion that simply because both the Courts below formed a particular opinion of the evidence on record which did not suit the case of the defendant-appellant and simply because it was not palatable to the defendants lawyer that will not be a ground for interference with the finding of the lower Court in this second appeal. Unless and until the same are perverse. So, I shall hareinbelow discuss the evidence on the point of adverse possession and give my opinion whatever the lower Courts erred in repudiating the claim of adverse possession of the defendant-appellants. 6. Admittedly, the defendant-appellant was not in possession of any documentary evidence, so far as possession is concerned, except the revisional survey Khatiyan (Ext-B & B/1) and the two receipts Ext-A and A/1. These receipts were issued during the pendency of the suit. If the story of oral purchase by the defendants were true, they should have been armed with receipts issued by the ex-landlord as also mutation papers in their favour. It was also expected that their names should have figured in the return filed by the ex-landlord and their names should have been entered in the demand Register of the State of Bihar. The defendants had failed to advance any plea regarding these papers and they had also failed to produce the documents in this connection. As against this, Parchas of the suit lands were prepared in the name of Nagwati Devi, wife of Arjilal Panjiyar, the ancestor of the plaintiffs (Ext-3 series). The Parchas are issued during the survey operation after Khanapuri. The defendants had failed to advance any plea regarding these papers and they had also failed to produce the documents in this connection. As against this, Parchas of the suit lands were prepared in the name of Nagwati Devi, wife of Arjilal Panjiyar, the ancestor of the plaintiffs (Ext-3 series). The Parchas are issued during the survey operation after Khanapuri. So till Khanapuri was completed, the mother of the plaintiff was found to be in possession of the suit land, as per the Parchas. The plaintiffs were armed with several Jamindari and State receipts regarding the suit land (Ext-2 series). So the documentary evidence tilted heavily in favour of plaintiff-respondent, so far as possession was concerned. 7. So far as the oral evidence is concerned, the plaintiffs had examined certain witnesses and the defendants had also examined certain witness. The oral evidence of both the parties was oath against oath, and therefore, no conclusive finding could be given on the basis of oral evidence. However, the onus to prove adverse possession was upon the defendants because under the changed law or limitation, when the judgment was passed by the trial Court, it was the defendants onus to prove adverse possession. It is here that the appellants lawyer laid his emphasis and argued that both the lower Courts committed error in arriving at a conclusion against the defendants case and in this connection, I find that the defendants had examined six witnesses in all. D.W. 6 was the plaintiff-defendant Raghunandan Prasad Biswas himself. Both the lower Courts did not rely upon his evidence because he was party himself and so his evidence was bound to be tainted. P.W. 1 was on the point of oral purchase and he was disbelieved because he failed to give the year and date in his cross-examination. Now, so far as possession of the defendants over the suit land was concerned, D.Ws. 2, 3 and 5 were other witnesses. The manner of coming in possession over the suit land, as pleaded and as deposed to by the D.Ws. was to the effect that Arjilal Biswas (the defendants ancestor) had excavated a pond on a portion of the suit land and certain trees were planted by the defendants ancestor. The lower Courts disbelieved the evidence of excavation of the pond on the ground that some of the D.Ws. was to the effect that Arjilal Biswas (the defendants ancestor) had excavated a pond on a portion of the suit land and certain trees were planted by the defendants ancestor. The lower Courts disbelieved the evidence of excavation of the pond on the ground that some of the D.Ws. were interested witnesses and they had earlier also deposed in favour of defendants. The lower Courts also disbelieved their evidence because they failed to give the name of the labourers in excavating the pond. I find that, of course, these D.Ws. have failed to give the name of the labourers. However, no labourer was examined to support the fact of excavating the pond. The appellants lawyer before me submitted that the lower Courts held that since the defendants had failed to prove the excavation of the pond by the defendants ancestor, it was to be presumed that the pond was excavated by the plaintiffs ancestor, even though there was no pleading to this effect. In the opinion of appellants lawyer, this finding of the lower Courts was highly erroneous and against the weight of evidence. In this connection, I am of the opinion that the claim of the plaintiffs possession and the defendants possession had to be decided on evidence and so it is the basic claim of possession which was to be pleaded and details of manner of possession need not necessarily be pleaded. Moreover, when both the parties lead evidence on the same point, the question of onus becomes an academic question and hence, it becomes irrelevant also. The oral evidence on behalf of plaintiff did not refer to the excavation of the pond by the ancestor of plaintiff. However, when onus in this connection of proving adverse possession was heavily upon the defendant-appellant, their evidence gained greater significance and unless they proved it, they were not entitled to secure bar of the suit by adverse possession, I have already said above that there was deficient evidence on behalf of defendants regarding excavation of pond. It is not difficult for procuring certain witnesses to make general and sweeping statement that such and such person was in possession of a particular piece of land and such and such person had constructed the pond. But, it is difficult to prove the statement in chief made by such witnesses, when they are faced with searching questions in the cross-examination. But, it is difficult to prove the statement in chief made by such witnesses, when they are faced with searching questions in the cross-examination. I have already stated above that the evidence of the defendant-appellant regarding construction of pond was deficient. Another manner of possession over the suit land was by planting certain trees. Ali the D.Ws. examined on behalf of the defendant, including D.W. 6, said that one mango tree, one neem tree and one kathal tree were planted by the defendants on the suit land. The trial Court in this connection, considered the statement of defendant Raghunandan Biswas (Ext-4), in title suit No. 657 of 1974 where he had said that he had planted five mango trees upon the disputed land. There was omission regarding planting of neem tree or kathal tree. So the trial Court held that the evidence of D.W. 6 and other witnesses regarding planting of tree was unreliable. I fail to understand as to how this finding of the trial Court, confirmed by the appellate Court, was erroneous or perverse. Not only that, contradiction regarding planting of trees is more apparent from the statement of Raghunandan Biswas in Ext-4 because he had said there that five mango trees were planted by him whereas all his D.Ws. including himself, said in their deposition that one mango tree was planted (defendants had earlier said in Ext-4 that he had planted five mango trees). The manner of exercising possession over other portion of the suit land was so vague and non-specific that the evidence was bound to be disbelieved and any sweeping and general statement was, of course, not to be given much credence because there was already evidence on behalf of plaintiff-respondent supporting their claim of possession. 8. As a result of aforesaid discussion, on the evidence, on the record and upon consideration of the judgments of the lower Courts, I do not think that the lower Courts judgments suffer from any non-consideration of evidence, nor from any perversity of findings or interpretation of the evidence. 9. In the result, this appeal is dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to cost of this appeal.