Judgment :- M. Ramachandran, J. The challenge in this set of Original Petitions is made against recovery proceedings initiated against the petitioners at the instance of the Kerala State Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd. (Corporation), first respondent. 2. One Abdulla Kunhi is the petitioner in OJPL No. 223/2000, filed on 3/1/2000. The revenue recovery proceedings by way of Ext. P3 stand stayed, but this Court bad given liberty to the respondents to proceed against the properties, of his deceased father. 3. Reference had been made in the O.P. to the business activities of the petitioner's deceased father, Mohammed Kunhi. He was running a proprietary concern, engaged in transporting business, in the name "Yen Yen Yes Transports*. He had been one of the transporting contractors to the Corporation in respect of levy sugar, to be lifted from Mills outside the State to destinations within the State of Kerala. Petitioner held a general Power of Attorney of his father, and had office at Kalamassery. Ext. P1 is the notarised power of attorney; Ext. P2 is produced as the invitation offender, for the block months of July to September, 1999. It is admitted that the offer stood accepted. 4. Thereafter, there is reference, to Ext. P3 revenue recovery notice issued to him, at the instance of the Corporation. It is submitted that he is not answerable to any of the claims, since he is only an attorney, acting under Ext. P1 and was not aware of the nature of the transactions that had taken place after the death of his father, and there was no notice about the liability adjudged, which according to Ext. P3 come to Rs. 1,30,39,169/-, and therefore the said proceedings were illegal if not misconceived. His stand could best be appreciated from the averments in paragraph 4 of the O.P. extracted herein below: "Pursuant to Ext. P2 tender was submitted and the work was awarded to the petitioner's father being the lowest tenderer. Subsequently the petitioner's father became ill and he expired on 22.8.99. It appears that in the absence of the father the brokers and employees engaged for the purpose of transporting sugar from the factories based on the work order issued by the 1st respondent were not earnest and the work was not executed promptly. Subsequently the petitioner's father became ill and he expired on 22.8.99. It appears that in the absence of the father the brokers and employees engaged for the purpose of transporting sugar from the factories based on the work order issued by the 1st respondent were not earnest and the work was not executed promptly. The petitioner has now received a notice under S.7 of the Revenue Recovery Act demanding Rs.1303W6W- due to the Civil Supplies Corporation for the period from 1999-2000. There is bo reason to issue the above notice to the petitioner as he has not entered into any contract with the 1st respondent and no amount is due from him". 5. Apparently, taking note of the interim orders passed in the Original Petition, Corporation had taken steps to proceed against the deceased contractor's assets, and recovery proceedings Binder the Revenue Recovery Act had been initiated against the legal representatives. O.P No. 12616 of 2000 has been filed by Abdulla Kunhi himself complaining that in spite of stay orders, already in force, a repeated demand for an identical sum had been issued as Ext. P3. This was filed on 25.4.2000. Another son of Mohammed Kunhi, Mr. Abdul Rahiman, has filed O.P. No. 13020/2000 on 28.4.2000 challenging the recovery proceedings initiated against him. He had contended that he had been employed abroad, was not aware of the business dealings of his father, that the properties in which he was residing with Ms family at Kasaragod though belonged to his father, had been earmarked to him, and that the movable items there all were his personal belongings, and recovery proceedings were therefore uncalled for. 6. He bad also averred that excepting the apparels worn, his father had no movable properties, but bad substantial immovable properties. He had also undertaken not to sell or remove any movable properties from his residence. The above passages read as following: "petitioner hereby undertakes that he will not sell or remove any of the movables from the house until the disputes and claims are settled finally. Petitioner intends to file a suit for settlement of accounts, with the 1st respondent. The deceased M.Mohammed Kunhi has valuable immovable properties worth more than Rs. Two crores and it is open to toe respondents to attach and sell and recover if the law allows if. Petitioner intends to file a suit for settlement of accounts, with the 1st respondent. The deceased M.Mohammed Kunhi has valuable immovable properties worth more than Rs. Two crores and it is open to toe respondents to attach and sell and recover if the law allows if. His legal contentions were that no notice had been issued to his father before his death, assessing; liability and none were issued to him also, and hence, the steps contemplated were not sustainable in law. Yet another Writ Petition had been filed by Sri. Abdulla Kunhi on 2.5.2000 as O.P No. 13127 of 2000 which had questioned the authority for proceedings with revenue recovery by Exts. PS and P6, in respect of the properties which were exclusively owned by him situated at Thrikkakara. The grounds taken up was that he was not a defaulter, and could not be answerable for the debts of his deceased father. 7. The petitioners in the other connected Writ Petition viz., O.P. No. 13822 of 2000, which was filed on 5.5.2000 (admitted on 16.5.2000) are (1) Beefathima, wife of Mohammed Kumhiand the son of the couple Abdulla Kunhi (Petitioner in O.P. No. 223 of 2000 O.P. No. I2616/2000 and O.P.. No. 13127/2000, already referred to), Recovery proceedings as had been challenged in the previous Original Petitions are challenged on almost identical grounds. It is claimed that Sri. Mohammed Kunhi was not a defaulter either as principal or surety, and there was no demand made. The breach of contract alleged was refuted, and obviously the attempt was to salvage the properties which belonged to late Mohammed Kunhi, now in their hands. 8. Thus the position available is that recovery proceedings are subjected to challenge by Abdulla Kunhi, individually and jointly with his brother and mother, and in one of the cases there is independent attack made by one of his brother. The other legal representatives are not known to have approached this Court. 9. As against the above, counter affidavits in almost all cases have been filed by the Corporation. The development after the first Original Petition in the series is an attempt made to rely on a letter obtained as signed by Abdulla Kunhi, seeking permission of the Corporation for replenishment of the sugar dated 28.3.2000. The letter reads as follows: "Sir. It is marked as Ext. R2(v). The development after the first Original Petition in the series is an attempt made to rely on a letter obtained as signed by Abdulla Kunhi, seeking permission of the Corporation for replenishment of the sugar dated 28.3.2000. The letter reads as follows: "Sir. It is marked as Ext. R2(v). The Corporation in the affidavits had stoutly controverted the claims of the petitioners in every one of the Original Petitions. It was stated that they were authorised by the notification to initiate recovery proceedings under the> Revenue Recovery Act. The tender conditions admitted of their rights to realise the amounts in case of non-delivery at double the rates and hence the proceedings were valid. I may extract relevant portion of clause 7 of Ext. P2 (in O.P. No. 223/2000) to the following effect, to appreciate their stand: "He should take delivery of the stock from the sugar mills on behalf of the corporation on proper authorisation letter from the corporation. The contractor is responsible for delivery of the same quantity (No. of bags and weight) and quality of sugar lifted from sugar mills to destination depot(s). Any loss or damage or shortage or change of quality in transit to the stock of sugar will be realised from the contractor. The recovery will be made at the rate of double the cost of sugar." The contention raised justifying the conduct could be found from paragraphs 7 to 10 of the counter affidavit of the Managing Director of the Corporation dated 20.3,2000 as following: 7. Immediately within about a month after executing the tender, it is now revealed that the father of the petitioner fell ill fatally and expired on 28,8.99 as admitted by the petitioner. During the above period, without disclosing that his father was bedridden and subsequently died on 28.8.99, the petitioner cheated the Corporation to the tune of Rs. 1,30,39,169/- and misappropriated public money entrusted to him in trust and belief. The petitioner had received D.D. for release of sugar even after the death of his father on 28. 8.99. The petitioner has done it fraudulently with intention to defraud the Corporation to gain wrongfully by unlawful means. He cheated the Corporation and amassed wealth by misappropriating the Government money. 8. Of the total quantity of 2020 MT of levy sugar allotted to him, the petitioner has delivered only 1468.9635 MTs. The last delivery was made by him on 1.10.1999. The petitioner has done it fraudulently with intention to defraud the Corporation to gain wrongfully by unlawful means. He cheated the Corporation and amassed wealth by misappropriating the Government money. 8. Of the total quantity of 2020 MT of levy sugar allotted to him, the petitioner has delivered only 1468.9635 MTs. The last delivery was made by him on 1.10.1999. The balance quantity of 551.0365 MTs. lifted from the sugar mills has been misappropriated by him causing huge loss to the Corporation to the tune of Rs. 1,30,39,169/- calculated at the penal rate as per the tender conditions. 9. The Corporation made several attempts to ensure the delivery of the balance quantity of levy sugar but failed to get any response from the petitioner. 10. The petitioner lifted 1000 MTs. of sugar from BID Parry in July 1999, but delivered only 886.982 MTs. In September 1999 he lifted 380 MTs. from Mysore Sugar Company, but delivered only 192.9865 MTs. From the above, it is clear that the petitioner has misappropriated 551.0365 MTs. of levy sugar valued at Rs. 1,30,39,169/- at penal rate and thus misappropriated Government money. The petitioners action has caused dislocation and difficulties in distribution of levy sugar in the State." Thus, in view of the submissions that have been made by the respective parties, so as to enter a finding, it has become absolutely essential that I go into the merits of the contentions and express my view at least in respect of certain overt acts and conduct of the parties. 10. It is strange and surprising that such a naive and simple contention, as quoted above, by way of defence has come from a mighty Corporation, who are engaged in transactions involving crores of rupees. Sri. K. Jagadischandran Nair, Advocate pointed out that it was elementary that Revenue Recovery Proceedings could- be thought of being initiated against a person only after satisfying essential preconditions. The first one was that there should have been assessment of the dues, as a certain amount. Secondly, there should have been proper notice. And thirdly, the most important circumstance was that the demand could have been made only against a defaulter. He submitted that none of the preconditions were satisfied, and therefore the proceedings were defective and unenforceable. 11. The first one was that there should have been assessment of the dues, as a certain amount. Secondly, there should have been proper notice. And thirdly, the most important circumstance was that the demand could have been made only against a defaulter. He submitted that none of the preconditions were satisfied, and therefore the proceedings were defective and unenforceable. 11. The Corporation was not able to point out that there was any assessment' consequent to the default either from Mohammed Kunhi or any of his legal representatives with notice. There were continuous transporting work for over a span of three months in the period under consideration. It was not pin pointed as to at what point the lapse stood committed and which all items were not delivered/short delivered or who were the persons responsible. Secondly, it was not shown in what mariner the petitioners became automatically defaulters. None of them had entered into any contract with the Corporation and the method of directly proceeding against them in person defies logic, if not common sense. Owing to the nature and continuity and complexity of the operations, and the pattern that had come to set in, even if there was no element of lethargy„ the duties and obligations of the contracting parties were not easy to be worked out. Though the Corporation had to a great extent made stipulations in the contract stringent conditions that lifting particulars of sugar should be furnished daily over phone, to be confined by post, and incorporated also a forfeiture clause as also procedure for submission of final bills (see clauses 19 and 22 of Ext. P2 in O.P. No. 223/2000) it is not shown that any of such details were being furnished or instructions followed. But as quoted from the counter affidavit earlier, it is stated that the petitioner, Abdulla Kunhi had lifted sugar in July, 1999 and other months, but short delivered the items and hence responsibility lay on him. This is forgetting the basic circumstance that Abdulla Kunhi was a power of attorney holder, and he was acting only on behalf of the principal, viz., the contractor. He had also not admitted of any short delivery, and the averments in the O.P. is a total denial. The question is whether the Revenue Recovery notice dated 30.12.1999 could be enforced against him. 12. He had also not admitted of any short delivery, and the averments in the O.P. is a total denial. The question is whether the Revenue Recovery notice dated 30.12.1999 could be enforced against him. 12. Under S.71 of the Revenue Recovery Act, Government has power by notification in the Gazette to declare that provisions of the Act shall be applicable to recovery of amounts due from any person or class to any specified institution. The Corporation is a notified Institution. But the preconditions of the statute cannot be stretched to any further extent. A defaulter is a person under S.2(e) of the Act from whom there is leviable an arrear of public revenue due on land, and includes a person who is responsible as surety for the payment of any such arrear. S.5 authorises such arrears together with interest, if any, to be recovered by attachment and sale of the defaulter's movable or immovable property, or by appointment of an agent for management, or by arresting the defaulter. Notices under S.7 is the most important precondition to be observed. The demand shall contain among other details, the amount of arrear of public revenue, for which the attachment is made, the date on which the arrear fell due and such other particulars as may be prescribed. The notice has to be served on the defaulter. In the case of non-payment, the demand constitute the authority for making the attachment. 13. Ext. P3 notice, or the other recovery notices produced in the connected cases, I have to point out, do not satisfy the preconditions. Abdulla Kunhi was acting on and behalf of his deceased father, and normally it is not possible for the Corporation to mulct him with liability for the short falls of the contractor. He is practically immune from responsibility, though as attempted to be established by the Corporation, he might have been the body and soul behind the contract for the execution of the work. He enjoyed the freedom, as was admissible to an agent Perhaps, if a power of attorney holder, in such circumstance, was also to be bound by stipulations in the contract as a surety, it may have been possible for the Corporation to claim that he had responsibility for the execution of the contract as undertaken. But the contract is insufficient to bind him as wished by the Corporation. 14. But the contract is insufficient to bind him as wished by the Corporation. 14. In the aforesaid circumstance, the claim of the petitioner that Ext. P3 has been issued ignoring the legal petition is well founded. This is of course the first hurdle for the Corporation. Even if it was possible for them to point out that Abdulla Kunhi as de facto contractor had any responsibility or liability then also the short cut method of resorting to revenue recovery was ill advised not to say ill conceived. The Revenue Recovery Act, by the nature of the enactment, does not operate to cast fresh liability on any person. It is in fact intended as a method of recovery of amounts from persons who are otherwise bound to make payments because of the impact of other enactments contracts or sum determined as payable by binding adjudication. There has been no adjudication of any liability on Abdulla Kunhi, before Ext. P3 had been issued. Of course, a notice is seen to have been issued and one of his brothers has made a non committing reply. This did not have any legal basis for follow up action. The charging provision of Ext. P2, viz., clause 7 of course is employed for contending for a position that in case of non delivery, the contractor is to be held responsible and double the cost of such stock will be received (recovered?) from him. But this alone will not be sufficient to clothe the Corporation a right for initiating recovery of a sum at their discretion and violation. If that is permitted, it will be against the fundamental principle of fairness. Before Ext. P3, Abdulla Kunhi has not been advised of the nature of the shortages, the date of occurrence, quantum short delivered, reason for demanding at the rates of maximum of penalty, and the date of the ruling price taken as yardstick for the demand. The figures are arbitrarily put up, and neither the Revenue Recovery Act, nor the terms of contract give such powers for demanding unilaterally determined compensation and the counter affidavit also does not fill up the lacuna. 15. Even in a suit for damages, clinching evidence should be presented for the benefit of an award in respect of damages. Reference may be made in this context to the decision cited by the petitioner viz., B.P. Singh v. BA. 15. Even in a suit for damages, clinching evidence should be presented for the benefit of an award in respect of damages. Reference may be made in this context to the decision cited by the petitioner viz., B.P. Singh v. BA. Singh (AIR 1929 PC 179) Lord Atkin, adverting to S.74 of the Contract Act, held that "The plaintiff must prove the damages they have suffered", since the effect of the section is to disentitle the plaintiffs to recover simpliciter the sum fixed in contract whether penalty or liquidated damages. The principle has also found a place in the decision in Fateh Chand v. Balakrishnan Dass (AIR 1963 SC 1405) when it was pointed out that jurisdiction of Court is not determined by the accidental circumstances of the party in default, by a plaintiff or defendant in a suit. If this is the strictness that is attached to a properly constituted suit, the executive decision on haphazard terms of a contract for recovery of penalty is far weaker and of any worthwhile consequence. 16. Finding this difficulty, learned senior counsel Mr. M.N. Sukumaran Nayar put up an argument that at least the quantum of defaulted amount could be recovered, and the Corporation could proceed with the claims in respect of penalty in appropriate proceedings. As a matter of fact, apart from penalty covered by clause 7, other items of levy are also spoken to by the contract in the case of delayed deliveries. The automatic result therefore will be that the recovery notices now under challenge have to be quashed as the amount comes reduced by one half. Sri. K.K. Raveendranath, senior counsel appearing for the Government, however pointed out that the basic clause No. 7 is sufficiently worded to include the penalty element as well, while making a demand. But I find it difficult to agree with the submission. This is principally for the reason that the counter affidavit of the Managing Director dated 3.6.2000 (in O.P. No.13822/2000) reads as follows: "33. Steps taken by the Corporation to recovery Rs. 1,30,39,169 from the estate of the deceased Sri. Mohamed Kunhi and of the petitioner by recourse to revenue recovery is towards the cost of 551.0365 MTs. of sugar misappropriated by the petitioner by selling it in the black market and not for the damages sustained by the Corporation. Realisation of the damages for delay in delivery etc. 1,30,39,169 from the estate of the deceased Sri. Mohamed Kunhi and of the petitioner by recourse to revenue recovery is towards the cost of 551.0365 MTs. of sugar misappropriated by the petitioner by selling it in the black market and not for the damages sustained by the Corporation. Realisation of the damages for delay in delivery etc. and recovery of the cost of sugar misappropriated are different issues. For realisation of the damages, Corporation may take other legal remedies." In these circumstances, it is practically impossible to uphold the recovery notices issued to the petitioners. 17. For the reason that the petitioners are not defaulters as envisaged under the Revenue Recovery Act, and since there is no predetermined amount, or any admitted amount by the petitioners, the proceedings are unsustainable. The reliefs prayed for in O.P.No. 223/2000 and O.P. No. 13020/2000 (filed by M. Abdul Rahiman) are therefore liable to be granted. I quash the recovery notices produced in the above Original Petitions. 18. The Corporation contends at this stage that at least in the other three Original Petitions a substantial difference has come into being. Abdulla Kunhi is the petitioner in the two Original Petitions. O.P. No. 12616/2000 is filed challenging the recovery which was initiated by way of follow up action of the interim orders passed in O.P. 223/2000, and similar notices were issued to all the legal representatives. O.P. No. 13127 of 2000 is filed by him when it was found that his self acquired properties were sought to be attached. The third petition, viz., O.P. 13822/2000 is filed by him along with his mother. The renewed vigor is shown by the Corporation because of a document which came into existence on 28.3.2000 (Ext. R2 (v)), extracted in paragraph 9 already. 19. Sri. Abdulla Kunhi, when the said document was produced along with the counter affidavit was taking pains to disown it in all possible ways. He stated that it was obtained by coercion, in the presence of police officials, and he had no authority from any of the legal representatives for signing the same. According to him, it also did not constitute an admission. In the counter affidavit of the Corporation dated 20.3.2000 in OP. No. 223/2000 it is stated in paragraph 8 that the balance quantity of sugar short delivered and misappropriated by him (Abdulla Kunhi) is 551.0365 W. The reference in Ext. According to him, it also did not constitute an admission. In the counter affidavit of the Corporation dated 20.3.2000 in OP. No. 223/2000 it is stated in paragraph 8 that the balance quantity of sugar short delivered and misappropriated by him (Abdulla Kunhi) is 551.0365 W. The reference in Ext. R2(v) of about 550 MT may be traceable to this statement. But I cannot for a moment accept that even this is an unqualified admission. Abut 550 tones is not 551.0365 tons. The price of the sugar is not agreed. There is permission sought for replacement by a legal representative. It cannot bind anybody else, in any case. It cannot also be used as the admitted liability for the purpose of initiating revenue recovery either. I do not decide in these proceedings however as to whether this letter could be used for any other purpose, in any other proceedings. 20. In the above circumstances, the petitioners are well founded when they submit that the Revenue Recovery proceedings in the above three cases also are not valid and sustainable. They are, therefore, set aside. The position of Corporation has not improved by any appreciable extent as is attempted to be projected. 21. But this cannot be the end of the proceedings, in view of the materials that have been placed. What is involved in public money, and a matter of supreme public interest. Mishandling of the affairs not only affect the Corporation but also the common man. It is also stoutly contended that the legal representatives in any case will be answerable for the loss that is alleged to have suffered by the Corporation. Mr. Abdulla Kunhi and rest of the petitioners owe to explain as to their conduct of overt actions and suppressions after the expiry of Mohammed Kunhi on 22.8.1999. It is pathetic to see the Corporation groping in the dark after it has received a stunning blow. A public sector enterprise like the Corporation should have mustered all its resources to see that the loss was minimised, and all loop holes whereunder unscrupulous persons would escape were plugged tight. It is in these circumstances that further observations have become necessary, After the interim order in O.P. No. 223/2000 giving liberty to the Corporation to proceed against the assets of Mohammed Kunhi, at least the Corporate heads should have been put together. It is in these circumstances that further observations have become necessary, After the interim order in O.P. No. 223/2000 giving liberty to the Corporation to proceed against the assets of Mohammed Kunhi, at least the Corporate heads should have been put together. The high sounding expressions as found in the affidavit of the Corporation dated 4.5.2000 in O.P. 13127/2000 that petitioner who defaulted and misappropriated Government money in crores shall not be allowed to escape from the clutches of law through loop holes etc., in ultimate analysis is empty war cries and appears to be pathetic. What has been done as follow up is to issue notices to the legal representatives in the most clumsy and grotesque manner possible. Ext. R2(u) issued on 14.3.2000 read as following: "KERALA STATE CIVIL SUPPLIES CORPORAT10N LTD. NOTICE Maveli Bhavan, Gandhi Nagar, Cochin-682 020 14.3.2000. No.M.S.24988/ 99 Sub: -Kerala State Civil Supplies Corporation - Transportation of sugar - Misappropriation of sugar - Demand Notice to the legal heirs of late Sri. Mohammed Kunhi - reg. ref:- letter No. B6.6781/2000/K.Dis.dt.18.2.2000 of the District Collector, Kasaragode. As amount of Rs. 1,30,39,169/- (rupees one crore thirty lakhs thirty nine thousand one hundred sixty nine only) is due to Kerala State Civil Supplies Corporation from Late Sri. Mohammed Kunhi, Proprietor of M/s. Yen Yen Yes Transports, Transporting Contractors, 3/425, Near Municipal Office, South Kalamassery, towards the cost of 351.0365 MTs of sugar found misappropriated by him. The District Collector, Kasaragode, vide reference cited has informed that you arc the legal heir of late Sri. Mohammed Kunhi Rehmath Manzil, Mangad, Uduma Village, Hosdurg Taluk. Therefore, you are requested to remit the said amount in Kerala State Civil Supplies Corporation by way of Demand Draft drawn in favour of the Managing Director, within 7 (seven days from the date of receipt of this notice, failing which R.R. Steps will be initiated against you without any further notice. Sd/ For Managing Director." At the time of issuance of this letter, it was known to the Corporation that Mohammed Kunhi had passed away. And the table given in page 7 of the affidavit shows that between 23.9.1999 and 30.9.1999, a quantity of 187 tons have been token delivery by the lorry belonging to the firm/ son. But nevertheless Ext. Sd/ For Managing Director." At the time of issuance of this letter, it was known to the Corporation that Mohammed Kunhi had passed away. And the table given in page 7 of the affidavit shows that between 23.9.1999 and 30.9.1999, a quantity of 187 tons have been token delivery by the lorry belonging to the firm/ son. But nevertheless Ext. R2(u) very wisely says that 551.0365 MT sugar was misappropriated by Mohammed Kunhi; a person who had proceeded to unknown destinations by 22.8.1999 never to come back. 22. Documentary evidence have been produced in the Original Petitions to show that Abdulla Kunhi was the brain behind all the transactions. He had never disclosed the factum of death of his father, and Corporation has bona fide come to the conclusion that deliberately he had been proceeding with his game plans to bleed the Corporation, Though he is trying to escape responsibility on the alibi mat he is after all only a power of attorney holder, and is not answerable to the misdeeds of the principal, the circumstances do show that it may not be possible for him to shirk reasonability. The Corporation has to assess the cases of non-delivery on a broad division viz., those instances which happened before 22.8.1999, the date of death of the contractor, and the ones which took place after his death. A split up if advised also will have to be made as between the loads in transit on the date of death. For non-delivery, before 22.8.1999, the estate of Mohammed Kunhi, which is stated by his son as worm over Rs: 2 crores will of course be answerable. 23. Examining the argument that whether Abdulla Kunhi and rest of the estate of Mohammed Kunhi, will be liable in respect of the items of non-delivery, after his death, I may now scan through thw governing legal position. He was the contractor to the Corporation, and was represented by the power of attorney, his son. S.2 of the Powers of Attorney Act is as given below: "2. He was the contractor to the Corporation, and was represented by the power of attorney, his son. S.2 of the Powers of Attorney Act is as given below: "2. Execution under power-of-attorney -The donee of a power-of-attorney may, if he thinks fit, execute or do any instrument or thing in and with his own name and signature, and own seal, where sealing is required, by the authority of the donor of the power, and every installment and thing so executed and done, shall be as effectual in law as if it had been executed or done by the donee of the power in the name and with the signature and seal, of the donor thereof" It is clear that the donee may, if he thinks fit, execute or do anything by the authority of donor, and it be as effectual in law, as done by the donor. In spite of the authorisation, the donee cannot be compelled to act; he is given freedom to act only if he thinks fit. The difficulty for the Corporation in this case has arisen because of the death of the donor. In such a contingency the relevant provision is S.3. It is extracted below: "3. Payment of attorney under power, without notice of death, etc., good* Any person making or doing any payment or act in good faith, in pursuance of a power-of-attorney, shall not be liable in respect of the payment or act by reason that, before the payment or act, the donor of the power had died o become of unsound mind or insolvent, or had revoked the power, if the fact of death, unsoundness of mind, insolvency or revocation was not at the time of the payment or act, known to the person making or doing the same. but this section shall not affect any right against the payee of any person interested in any money so paid; and that person shall have the like remedy against the payee as he would have had against the payer, if the payment had not been made by him." 24. Mr. Jagadisa Chandran Nair reads it as a provision which protects the interest of the power of attorney holder alone. A payment made by him without the knowledge of the factum of the death of the donor, will not make the payment invalid, and to the extent he is protected. But Sri. Mr. Jagadisa Chandran Nair reads it as a provision which protects the interest of the power of attorney holder alone. A payment made by him without the knowledge of the factum of the death of the donor, will not make the payment invalid, and to the extent he is protected. But Sri. Sukumaran Nair sees many more situations and circumstances packed in the said section. The word used is not donee, but any person. This is a definite and conscious departure made from S.2, and any person includes donee, and others, who might be parties to the contract. The only condition should be that it is in pursuance of a power of attorney. The said expressions cannot be limited to the circumstance where it is master minded by the donee alone, as contended by the petitioners. If that was so, it would have been more specific and made personal, and the word used would have been not person, but donee. Significantly it is not also payment alone, but includes any act done. The sum total of the provision as it appears to me is to protect all persons who had acted bona fide in pursuance of the covenant, unknowing about the death of the donor. And more often the donee will be knowing about the demise of donor, earlier than the general public. When Abdulla Kunhi acted and signed documents, representing the proprietary firm and the proprietor as its power of attorney holder, after 22.8.99 he was not the person who was entitled to protection. He had no case that he was unaware of the death of his father, and therefore the Corporation was entitled to all protection conceivable on the strength of the statutory safeguards. The title of the paragraph may not have shown justice to the provisions which followed in the section. While interpreting the scope and purport of a section, the title can have only a directive role. There is no doubt in my mind that the section not only cover the situation concerning the payments by attorney under power, but encompasses other situations, say for instance, the interests of innocent third parties who were drawn to transactions by the power of attorney holder as well. There is no doubt in my mind that the section not only cover the situation concerning the payments by attorney under power, but encompasses other situations, say for instance, the interests of innocent third parties who were drawn to transactions by the power of attorney holder as well. The title of the section only refers to one aspect, but the word etc., at the end is pregnant with meaning and takes care of situations of ejusdem generis, as suggested above. The resultant position is that even though he acts as a power of attorney holder, the estate becomes liable for the transactions which took place after 22.8.1999 also. The legal representatives, in any case, are answerable for the transactions before 22.8.1999, and their liability after that date also continues in the aforesaid circumstances. 25. Appreciating the difficult position in which the Corporation unwillingly has been placed, the learned senior counsel urged that Mr. Abdulla Kunhi had from the very first instance was party to suppressions, and every attempt had been made to mislead this Court. It was alleged that he had disowned his signatures whenever found inconvenient, he had suppressed material details and was playing the role of an innocent victim, and had been putting conflicting contentions and throwing aspersion on officers, when confronted with real difficulty. The counsel has of course a point, since the pleadings in several instances are haphazard, there are instances of subtle suggestions which may lead the enquiry of tangent. Mr. Sukumaran Nair submits that when he disputes facts, and is pleading that this Court will have no jurisdiction to decide the issues automatically he is suggesting that the Writ Petition cannot be entertained. A person who approaches this Court without clean hands is definitely not entitled to any relief, while the extra ordinary jurisdiction is exercised, I am also distressed to find that Abdulla Kunhi has put signature in the affidavits, dissimilar to his admitted signature. (Refer signature in notarised Ext.P1 in O.P. No. 223/2000 and the reply affidavit filed dated 14.6.2000 in the above case). But dismissal of his case may not be warranted for more reasons than one. Firstly the impugned orders are absolutely unsustainable, and unenforceable for the reasons already stated. Even a criminal is entitled to protection of law and has to be protected from arbitrary State action. Secondly, when Sri. But dismissal of his case may not be warranted for more reasons than one. Firstly the impugned orders are absolutely unsustainable, and unenforceable for the reasons already stated. Even a criminal is entitled to protection of law and has to be protected from arbitrary State action. Secondly, when Sri. Abdul Rahiman, his brother, in O.P. No. 13020/2000 and T.A. Beefathima, first petitioner in O.P. No 13822/2000, have challenged the recovery proceedings, and when there is no allegation that they are parties to any misrepresentation, they are to be granted the reliefs as admissible in law. In that case, Sri. Abdulla Kunhi cannot be discriminated also, whatever be the opinion the Corporation may have against him. 26. Notwithstanding, I am constrained to issue further directions, as it is expected of a Court to evaluate the positions of parties in a matter that has been placed before it for consideration. Petitioner in O.P. 13020/2000, as indicated earlier, has stated that he will not alienate his movable properties. He has also admitted that his deceased father was having immovable properties worth crores. Abdulla Kunhi also on behalf of his mother has subscribed to the following undertaking in his affidavit dated 7.6.2000 (paragraph 16): "I am agreeable to any lawful settlement of all the claims by any competent Tribunal or Court. I submit that I want the law to be strictly applied and I want justice. The first respondent will not lose any amount lawfully due as I also have more than enough assets to meet any lawful demands." There is also reference to a suit for settlement of accounts filed by him. It will therefore be in the fitness of things that the petitioners do not take any steps or associate as parties to distribute or alienate the properties of deceased Mohammed Kunhi, in any manner whatsoever, till such time the disputes are finalised. It is so directed. As the recovery notices are set aside for technical reasons, the Corporation's rights are to stand unaffected for safeguarding their rights in appropriate manner as admissible in law. Petitioner in O.P. No. 13822 of 2000 should also not alienate their properties in view-of the affidavits that has been filed in the Writ Petition. The Original Petitions are disposed of as above. Parties will bear their respective costs.