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Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2001 DIGILAW 265 (HP)

C. D. KATOCH v. STATE OF H. P.

2001-10-01

LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA

body2001
JUDGMENT Lokeshwar Singh Panta, J.—These six Criminal Revision Petitions are directed against the common order dated July 15, 2000 recorded by Special Judge, Chamba Division, Chamba, whereby charges against both the petitioners and other persons under Sections 420, 424, 109, 167, 218, 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and Sections 41, 42, 32 and 33 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 were ordered to be framed. 2. The facts giving rise for the presentation of these Revision Petitions are that three cases came to be registered against 16 accused persons, namely, (i) Parkash Chand Anand (Forest lessee), (ii) M.S.L. Vaidya (the then Chief Conservator of Forest), (iii) H.C. Sharma (the then Principal Chief Conservator of Forests), (iv) R.A. Singh Conservator of Forest, (v) CD. Katoch (the then Chief Conservator of Forests), (vi) Teh Singh Jasrotia (Retired Divisional Manager), (vii) Purshotam Dutt Mishra (Superintendent in the office of Conservator), (viii) Gurditta Mai Abrol (Assistant in the office of Divisional Forest Officer), (ix) Atma Ram (Assistant Conservator of Forests), (x) Devi Lal (Forest Guard), (xi) Jodh Singh (Retired Block Officer), (xii) Vakil Ram (Forest Guard), (xiii) Sansari Lal, (xiv) Tek Chand (Block Officer), (xv) Rattan Chand (Forest Guard) and (xvi) Ram Prakash (Forest Guard), on a written report of Chief Conservator of Forests, Himathal Pradesh submitted to the Superintendent of Police, Enforcement (North Zone), Dharamshala inter alia stating that Lot Nos. 17/80-82, 21/80-82 and 6/81-83 were sold to P.C. Anand (Forest Lessee) in upper Ravi Division and M/s. Friends and Co. during open auction at Bhadroia in February, 1980 for Rs. 33,50,000, Rs. 22,50,000 and Rs. 11,01,000, respectively. The lease period was also specified for completion of the felling and conversion of large number of Deodar, Kail, Fir/spruce trees. The forest lessee under the agreement was under obligation to pay the royalty and other dues by specified date. The extracted wood was removed in four ghalls (floating the timber by river) out of which, timber in two ghalls was removed by him with permission of the Divisional Forest Officer and the third and fourth ghalls were removed by the lessee unauthorisedly The lessees did not make payment of the entire price of the trees purchased by him in auction and had been getting extension of the period of transporting the timber on one pretext or the other. During investigation of First Information Reports registered by the Enforcement Department of the State, it was found that the lessee and the other officials of the Forest Department in connivance with each other forged the record of the department and intentionally caused wrongful gain of lakhs of rupees to the lessee and wrongful loss to the State of Himachal Pradesh. On completion of the investigation police submitted three separate charge-sheets against the above mentioned accused persons which are numbered as Corruption Case No. 1/98, Corruption Case No. 2/98 and Corruption Case No. 3/ 98 on the file of the learned Special Judge, Chamba. 3. The learned Special Judge heard the arguments of the Public Prosecutor and the learned Counsel for the accused persons before recording the order. On consideration of the entire material on record and the submissions of the learned Counsel for the parties, the learned Special Judge by order dated 15.7.2000 discharged M.S.L. Vaidya and R.A. Singh for the offences mentioned herein-in-above. CD. Katoch, Tej Singh Jasrotia, Purshotam Dutt Mishra, Gurditta Mai Abrol, Atma Ram, Devi Lal, Jodh Singh, Vakil Ram and Sansari Lal were ordered to be charge-sheeted under Sections 420, 424, 109, 167, 218, 120-B IPC and 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and Sections 41, 42, 32 and 33 of the Indian Forest Act, whereas PC. Anand (Forest lessee) was also ordered to be charged for the above said offences except an offence under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. H.C. Sharma, Tek Chand, Rattan Chand and Ram Parkash, accused persons, were stated to have since expired and therefore proceedings against them were ordered to be dropped. 4. Out of the charged accused persons, only CD. Katoch and Atma Ram have filed these six Revision Petitions under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure challenging the impugned order of charge passed by the Special Judge, Chamba Division. It appears that the State did not assail the order of discharge of M.S.K. Vaidya and R.A. Singh. The other charged accused persons have also not challenged the said order. 5. I have heard learned Counsel for both the petitioners and the learned Assistant Advocate General for the State. 6. It appears that the State did not assail the order of discharge of M.S.K. Vaidya and R.A. Singh. The other charged accused persons have also not challenged the said order. 5. I have heard learned Counsel for both the petitioners and the learned Assistant Advocate General for the State. 6. The learned Counsel for the petitioners vehemently urged that once the learned Special Judge discharged the other two accused persons on the same set of allegations and evidence collected by the police during the investigation of the case, there was no other material available on record with the learned Special Judge to order framing of the charges against the petitioners on the same set of material and, therefore, the order impugned in these petitions is grossly erroneous and perverse. They next contended that whatever action was taken by the petitioners more specifically by petitioner CD. Katoch who at the relevant time was the Chief Conservator of Forests in the Forest Division, the same was done by them under clauses 18 and 19 of the agreement and the extension for transporting the extracted timber was granted by the State Government from time to time to the forest lessee and as such the petitioners are not at all involved in the commission of the offences levelled against them. Learned Counsel also contended that the prosecution has not been able to collect the material to prove that both the petitioners in connivance with the forest lessee caused any wrongful loss to the State and wrongful gains to themselves and they were absolutely not connected with the issuance of the marking of trees or felling orders of the trees auctioned by the Forest Department nor they had issued any export permit or dealt with the papers of the Forest lessee who took the above said three lots in open auction. Mr. Lalit Sharma, learned Counsel for the petitioner CD. Katoch also contended that petitioner immediately after the expiry of the period prescribed for the payment of royalty and sale price by the Forest lessee issued notice to him and asked the Range Officer to seize and confiscate the timber which was later on transported by the Forest lessee, namely, P.C. Anand when the State Government extended the period for doing the needful and in such circumstances, the petitioner has not committed any offence for which charge has been framed against him. 7. 7. Learned Counsel have placed reliance upon certain judgments in support of their submissions. In Anil Kumar Bose v. State of Bihar and Raghunath Prasad v. State of Bihar, AIR 1974 SC 1560, it has been held that for the purposes of holding the accused guilty under Section 420, the evidence adduced must establish beyond reasonable doubt, mens rea on their part. 8. In State of Karnataka v. L. Munisivarny and others, AIR 1977 SC 1489, their Lordships said : "It is clear from Section 227 of the new Code that the Sessions Court has the power to discharge an accused if after perusing the record and hearing the parties he comes to the conclusion, for reasons to be recorded, that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The object of the provision which requires the Sessions Judge to record its reasons is to enable the superior Court to examine the correctness of the reasons for which the Sessions Judge has held that there is or is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The High Court, therefore, is entitled to go into the reasons given by the Sessions Judge in support of his order and t9 determine for itself whether the order is justified by the facts and circumstances of the case. In the exercise of the wholesome power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice requires that the proceedings ought to be quashed." 9. In State of U.P. v. Purshottam, AIR 1991 SC 1015, it was noticed that the case was registered against the respondent more than 30 years back and thereafter, it took 17 years to frame the charges. Even the judgment of the High Court was delivered about 13 years back. The Supreme Court said that the fact remained that prosecution was pending in that case over three decades and even the trial had not as yet commenced. It would be travesty of justice if the prosecution to continue was permitted and in those circumstances the criminal prosecution against the accused persons was quashed. 10. The Supreme Court said that the fact remained that prosecution was pending in that case over three decades and even the trial had not as yet commenced. It would be travesty of justice if the prosecution to continue was permitted and in those circumstances the criminal prosecution against the accused persons was quashed. 10. In Satish Mehra v. Delhi Administration and another, (1996) 9 SCC 766, it has been said that when the Judge is fairly certain that there is no prospect of the case ending in conviction the valuable time of the Court should not be wasted for holding a trial only for the purpose of formally completing the procedure to pronounce the conclusion on a future date. Most of the Sessions Courts in India are under heavy pressure of work load. If the Sessions Judge is almost certain that the trial would only be an exercise in futility or a sheer waste of time it is advisable to truncate or snip the proceedings at the stage of Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 11. In State of M.R v. Mohan Lal Soni, (2000) 6 SCC 338, it has been held that if the evidence which the prosecution proposes to prove the guilt of the accused, even if fully accepted before it is challenged by cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the particular offence then the charge can be quashed. 12. In Kanti Bhadra Shah and another v. State of W.B., (2000) 1 SCC 722, it has been said by their Lordships that no reasons are required to be recorded when charges are to be framed against an accused. Reasons are to be recorded only when the accused is to be discharged. 13. In State of M.P. v S.B. Johari and others, (2000) 2 SCC 57, it has been reiterated that Court has only to see whether prima facie there was sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. It cannot appreciate the evidence to reach at a conclusion in the matter. 13. In State of M.P. v S.B. Johari and others, (2000) 2 SCC 57, it has been reiterated that Court has only to see whether prima facie there was sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. It cannot appreciate the evidence to reach at a conclusion in the matter. On the facts of the said case their Lordships held that the High Court in revision erred in quashing the charge framed against accused by trial Court by appreciating the material produced by the prosecution and on that basis deciding that accused was not guilty and in the facts and circumstances, the impugned orders passed by the High Court were quashed and set aside. 14. In State of Delhi v. Gyan Devi and others, (2000) 8 SCC 239, it has been again reiterated that the High Courts power to quash the charge should not be exercised except for strong reasons to hold that in the interest of justice and in order to avoid the abuse of the process of the Court the charge framed against the accused needs to be quashed and moreover the exercise of the said power should be confined to exceptional cases and rare occasions. 15. In M.N. Damani v. S.K. Sinha and others, (2001) 5 SCC 156, their Lordships have held as under :— For deciding whether the criminal proceedings should be allowed to continue or the same should be quashed, two aspects are to be satisfied: (1) whether the uncontroverted allegations, as made in the complaint, prima facie establish the offence, and (2) whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. On a plain reading of the order of the Magistrate issuing summons to the respondents, keeping in view the allegations made in the complaint and swron statement of the appellant, it appears that a prima facie case is made out at that stage. There are no special features in the case to say that it is not expedient and not in the interest of justice to permit the prosecution to continue. The Single Judge of the High Court failed to apply this test. The High Court could not say at that stage that there was no reasonable prospect of conviction resulting in the case after a trial. The Single Judge of the High Court failed to apply this test. The High Court could not say at that stage that there was no reasonable prospect of conviction resulting in the case after a trial. Assuming that the imputations made could be covered by exception 9 of Section 499IPC, several questions still remain to be examined-whether such imputations were made in good faith, in what circumstances, with what intention, etc. All these can be examined on the basis of evidence in the trial. Having regard to the facts of the case it must therefore, be held that the High Court committed a manifest error in quashing the criminal proceedings exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C" 16. In State by Central Bureau of Investigation v. S. Bangarappa, (2000) 1 Supreme Court Cases 369, their Lordships again reiterated thus: (Paragraph 21 SCC p. 377) "21. Time and again this Court has pointed out that at the stage of framing charge the court should not enter upon a process of evaluating the evidence by deciding its worth or credibility. The limited exercise during that stage is to find out whether the materials offered by the prosecution to be adduced as evidence are sufficient for the court to proceed further (vide State of M.P. v. Dr. Krishna Chandra Saksena)." 17. In the present case, the learned Special Judge on examination of the details of the complaint made by the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests, on the basis of which cases are registered against the petitioners and other accused persons by the Enforcement Department after collecting huge material on record produced with the charge sheet, recorded the impugned order after prima facie satisfying himself that the petitioners and other accused persons deserve to be proceeded against for the commission of the offences alleged against them. No special reasons are required to be given by the learned Special Judge for framing the charges and the impugned orders have contained reasons for discharging the two accused persons, namely, M.S.L. Vaidya and R.A. Singh. The pleas and other defences available to the petitioners and other accused persons can be taken by them before the learned Special Judge during trial and at this stage of framing charges, the evidence collected by the prosecution cannot be meticulously examined. The pleas and other defences available to the petitioners and other accused persons can be taken by them before the learned Special Judge during trial and at this stage of framing charges, the evidence collected by the prosecution cannot be meticulously examined. The ratio of the judgments relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioners will be of no help to advance .their defences at this stage. As settled by the Supreme Court in the above cited judgments and other catena of judgments, the power of this Court to quash the charge sheet at the initial stage is very limited. Without touching the merits of the cases registered against the petitioners and other accused persons, I find no infirmity, perversity or illegality in the order impugned in these petitions by the petitioners. If the learned Special Judge has discharged two accused persons, it will not be a sole ground for the petitioners to challenge the impugned order when the learned Special Judge satisfied himself that there is prima facie material on record placed by the prosecution to order framing of the charges against the petitioners and other accused persons. 18. None of the contentions of the learned Counsel for the petitioners can be accepted at this stage. 19. For the above said reasons, I find no merit in these revision petitions and the same are accordingly, dismissed. The record of the learned Special Judge shall be remitted by the Registry office forthwith. The learned Special Judge shall proceed with the trial in accordance with law and to dispose of it as expeditiously as possible. The miscellaneous applications shall also stand disposed of. Stay, if any, is vacated. Revision dismissed. -