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2001 DIGILAW 267 (JK)

Senior Divisional Manager & Anr. v. Dharam Singh

2001-11-07

H.K.SEMA, S.K.GUPTA

body2001
PER S.K. GUPTA, J: 1. We have heard Mr. Sunil Malhotra, learned counsel for the appellants as well as Mr. K.L. Pandita, advocate on caveat, for respondent. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, we propose to dispose of this appeal (CMA No. 106-A/2001) at the preliminary stage. 2. This is an appeal against the order dated: 19-09-2001 of the Jammu and Kashmir State Consumers Protection Commission (State Commission�), by which the State Commission awarded a sum of Rs. 1,30,000/- in favour of the respondent, on account of extensive damage caused to the building due to heavy rains and floods, along with interest at the rate of 9% payable from three months after the date of survey report. 3. Before we proceed to examine the question raised in appeal by the appellants, it is expedient to take note of the material facts. A three storey residential house along with household goods were got insured by the complainant with the National Insurance Company for a sum of Rs. six lacs and paid a premium of Rs. 643/-, the risk covered by the Insurance Policy included the risk of the flood. During the subsistence of the Insurance Policy, the house of respondent-complainant was damaged due to rains and floods when FIR came to be lodged with the Police Station, Kistwar. The Insurance Company was also informed about the loss occasioned to the house of the complainant insured with the Insurance Company. Subash Saraf, Surveyor was detailed by the Appellants-Insurance Company to estimate the loss. The Surveyor assessed and estimated the loss to a sum of Rs. 1.30 lacs. Refusal of the Appellants to indemnify the complainant in respect of extensive damage caused to the building insured with the Company led the respondent to commence a complaint with the State Commission. The stand of the Appellants before the State Commission was that the claim of the respondent-complainant is covered by the exclusion clause of the Insurance Policy and the claim is not, thus, payable. The State Commission after hearing the parties and perusing the record allowed the claim of the complainant and directed the payment of the amount of loss assessed by the Surveyor with interest at the rate of 9%. 4. Aggrieved by the order of the State Commission dated: 19-09-2001, the Appellants impugned its correctness before us in this appeal. 5. Mr. The State Commission after hearing the parties and perusing the record allowed the claim of the complainant and directed the payment of the amount of loss assessed by the Surveyor with interest at the rate of 9%. 4. Aggrieved by the order of the State Commission dated: 19-09-2001, the Appellants impugned its correctness before us in this appeal. 5. Mr. Sunil Malhotra, advocate appearing for the appellants, in reiterating the stand taken before the State Commission strenuously urged that the damage is not covered under the terms and conditions of the Insurance Policy. That neither the building nor any part thereof has collapsed. Only the building has developed minor cracks and the claim is not payable under Clause 10 of the exclusion clause of the Insurance Contract. He, however, admitted the Insurance Policy, the house and the household goods insured with the Appellants and also included the risk of floods. It is also not disputed that the premium has also been paid and the Insurance Policy subsisted at the time of the damage to the house of the respondent by rains and floods. Mr. Sunil Malhotra further admitted that Surveyor, Subash Saraf, was appointed by the Company to assess the loss. The loss was assessed by this Surveyor to the extent of Rs. 1.30 lacs and his report further recited that the damages covered by the Insurance Policy. To appreciated the debate addressed by Mr. Sunil Malhotra, it is meaningful to reproduce the relevant extracts from the Surveyors report, which reads as under:- After the migration of the insured along with his family members, the residential house belonging to insured remained vacant and unattended to and same was considerably damaged due to floods of 9/95. The area was hitted with torrential rains, hail storm and heavy floods. The flood water had remained in the house for considerable time with the result slippage has taken place and the foundation of house got loosed and both outer and inner partition walls developed cracks horizontal and vertical, thereby loosing the stability of the house and it was due to remaining of flood water in and around the house, the purloins rafters and truss work got loosen/broken. It was due to the floods of 9/95 the insured™s house was damaged and same is well covered under the policy terms and conditions�. 6. It was due to the floods of 9/95 the insured™s house was damaged and same is well covered under the policy terms and conditions�. 6. The Correctness and authenticity of the survey report submitted by the Surveyor appointed by the Appellant™s Company has not been disputed by Mr. Sunil Malhotra, learned Advocate appearing for the appellants. The object of appointing Surveyor is to determine loss and to assess compensation payable. These functions cannot be separated. Rather, they are correlated. Repelling the contention of the appellant™s counsel, Mr. K.L. Pandita, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, contended that the Insurance Company unilaterally repudiated the claim of the respondent in the Policy and declined to indemnify the complainant. Though the Surveyor appointed by the Insurance Company had recommended the loss assessed by him to be well covered under the Policys terms and conditions. This repudiation made by the Insurance Company, in our opinion, was not made in good faith on valid and justifiable grounds. As regards the exclusion clause of the Insurance Contract emphasised by Mr. Sunil Malhotra, appellant™s counsel, with full force, it may be pointed out that exclusion clause defending the Appellants-Insurance Company™s obligation may be interpreted taking into account the main purpose rule�. Such rule would limit the application of widely worded exclusion clause. In the context of this rule, following observations were made by Lord Halsbury in Giyan Vs. Margetson & Co (1893) AC 351: It seems to me that in construing this document, which is a contract of carriage between the parties, one must in the first instance look at the whole instrument and not at one part of it only. Looking at the whole instrument and seeking what one must regard as its main purpose, one must reject words, indeed whole provision, if they are inconsistent with what one assumes to be the main purpose of the contract.� 7. The Apex Court, too, had the occasion to deal with the matter of leading down the exclusion clause in Skandia Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Kokilaben Chandravadan and referred to by the State Commission in the impugned order. Relying on the aforesaid decision and the principle laid down by the Apex Court, the effort must be not to allow the exclusion clause to snipe successfully at the main purpose, but to relieve the distress and misery of the victims. Ltd. Vs. Kokilaben Chandravadan and referred to by the State Commission in the impugned order. Relying on the aforesaid decision and the principle laid down by the Apex Court, the effort must be not to allow the exclusion clause to snipe successfully at the main purpose, but to relieve the distress and misery of the victims. The Insurance Company, in such circumstances, cannot be allowed to escape liability by taking refuge of the exclusion clause in view of the report of the Surveyor appointed by the Appellant-Insurance Company about the extensive damage caused to the building due to floods to the extent of Rs.1.30 lacs assessed and recommended the same well covered under the terms and conditions of the Policy. 8. In the premises of aforesaid, we do not find any merit in this appeal. There is no such infirmity, either in fact or law, in the impugned order of the State Commission to justify inference of this Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. We, therefore, dismiss this appeal. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.