Vidya Sugar v. Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Kurukshetra
2001-02-27
AMAR BIR SINGH GILL, V.S.AGGARWAL
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JUDGMENT V.S. Aggarwal, J. - Vidya Sagar petitioner has invoked Article 226 of the Constitution of India and seeks quashing of the order dated 21.8.2000 and the judgment dated 6.9.2000 passed by respondent No. 1 (Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division) Kurukshetra whereby election of the petitioner as Sarpanch of village Khairi had been set aside and respondent No. 2 has been declared elected as Sarpanch of the village. 2. The relevant facts alleged are that election for the office of Sarpanch of the village referred to above was held on 12.3.2000. The petitioner as well as respondents No. 2 and 3 contested the election. After the counting of the votes, the petitioner and respondent No. 2 were found to have secured 403 votes each. 8 votes had been rejected. It is contended that the Presiding Officer and the Supervisor wanted to declare the result by draw of lots to which the petitioner objected. In his absence and in the presence of respondent No. 2 draw of lots was held. The petitioner was declared to have been elected and respondent No. 2 had signed the declaration. Respondent No. 2 filed Election Petition under Section 176 of the Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 challenging the election of the petitioner. Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division) Kurukshetra, ordered the recounting of votes on 21.8.2000 and after recounting had set aside the election of the petitioner. 3. It is asserted that the orders so passed are illegal and contrary to law because no recounting of votes could be ordered. The election petition was lacking in material facts and particulars. No serial numbers of ballot papers were mentioned in the election petition nor any booth number was mentioned as to in which booth the ballot papers were wrongly counted in favour of the petitioner and as to in which booth number three invalid votes were put in the bundle of the petitioner. It was also asserted that respondent No. 2 had not moved any application before the Presiding Officer for recounting of votes. Under Rule 69 of the Haryana Panchayati Raj Election Rules, 1994, such a recount can be asked at the time of declaration of the result. At that time, respondent No. 2 or his agents were present.
It was also asserted that respondent No. 2 had not moved any application before the Presiding Officer for recounting of votes. Under Rule 69 of the Haryana Panchayati Raj Election Rules, 1994, such a recount can be asked at the time of declaration of the result. At that time, respondent No. 2 or his agents were present. Furthermore, it is asserted that the learned Tribunal had not correctly and rightly done the recounting because the total votes found at the time of initial counting were 964 while the record prepared shows 950 votes. 4. Needless to state that the petition as such had been contested primarily by respondent No. 2. It is asserted that when petitioner appeared before respondent No. 1, he had admitted on oath that he has no objection in recounting of the votes. The writ petition was further stated to be not maintainable because of the provisions of Section 176(4)(b) of the Panchayat Raj Act, as applicable to Haryana, which provides for recounting of valid votes. It is also the defence that the petitioner did not challenge the order dated 21.8.2000. It is denied that there is any mistake in the counting as such and it is asserted instead that under the facts it was rightly directed that there should be a recount because there were proper pleadings. 5. The learned Counsel for the petitioner in the first instance highlighted the fact that when counting was being done, there was no objection taken nor any request was made for recounting of votes. In the absence of the same, it was urged that respondent No. 2 was not justified in ordering recount. In support of his arguments, reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Satyanarain Dudhani v. Uday Kumar Singh and others, AIR 1993 SC 367 and Smt. Ram Rati v. Saroj Devi and others, AIR 1997 SC 3072. 6.
In support of his arguments, reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Satyanarain Dudhani v. Uday Kumar Singh and others, AIR 1993 SC 367 and Smt. Ram Rati v. Saroj Devi and others, AIR 1997 SC 3072. 6. In order to appreciate the said contention, it would be appropriate to refer to sub-section (4) to Section 176 of the Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (for short "the Act") which reads as under :- "(4)(a) If on the holding such inquiry the civil court finds that a candidate has, for the purpose of election committed a corrupt practice within the meaning of sub-section (5), he shall set aside the election and declare the candidate disqualified for the purpose of election and fresh election may be held. (b) If, in any case to which clause (a) does not apply, the validity of an election is in dispute between two or more candidates, the court shall after a scrutiny and computation of the votes recorded in favour of each candidate, declare the candidate who is found to have the largest number of valid votes in his favour, to have been duly elected : Provided that after such computation, if any, equality of votes is found to exist between any candidate and the addition of one vote will entitle any of the candidates to be declared elected, one additional vote shall be added to the total number of valid votes found to have been received in the favour of such candidate or candidate, as the case may be, elected by lot drawn in the presence of Judge in such manner as he may determine." 7. Co-related with the same is Rule 69 of the Haryana Panchayati Raj Election Rules, 1994 (for short "the Rules") which are being reproduced hereinafter for the sake of facility :- "69. Recount of votes. - (1) After the completion of the counting the Returning Officer (Panchayat) or such other officer authorised by him shall record in the result sheet in Forms mentioned in sub-rule (2) of Rule 66 the total number of votes polled for each candidate and announce the same.
Recount of votes. - (1) After the completion of the counting the Returning Officer (Panchayat) or such other officer authorised by him shall record in the result sheet in Forms mentioned in sub-rule (2) of Rule 66 the total number of votes polled for each candidate and announce the same. (2) After such announcement has been made a candidate or, in his absence counting agent may apply in writing to the Returning Officer (Panchayat) or the other officer authorised by him, for recount of all or any of the ballot papers already counted stating the grounds on which he demands such recount. (3) On such an application being made the Returning Officer (Panchayat) or the officer authorised by him shall decide the matter and may allow the application in whole or in part or may reject it in toto if it appears to him to be frivolous or unreasonable. (4) Every decision of the Returning Officer (Panchayat) or such other officer authorised by him, under sub-rule (3) shall be in writing and contain the reasons therefor. (5) If the Returning Officer (Panchayat) or the officer authorised by him, decides under sub-rule (3) to allow an application either in whole or in part, he shall - (a) count the ballot papers again in accordance with his decision; (b) amend the result sheet to the extent necessary after such recount; and (c) announce the amendment so made by him. (6) After the total number of votes polled for each candidate has been announced under sub-rule (1) or sub-rule (5) the Returning Officer (Panchayat) or the officer authorised by him, shall complete and sign the result sheet and no application for recount shall be entertained thereafter : Provided that no step under this sub-rule shall be taken on the completion of the counting until the candidates and [counting] agents present at the completion thereof have been given a reasonable opportunity to exercise the right conferred by sub-rule (2)." 8. A bare reading of both the relevant provisions show that under the Rules a recount is prescribed after the completion of the counting to the Returning Officer (Panchayat). Such an officer may allow the application and can even reject if it is frivolous and unreasonable. But the substantive provision is contained in sub-section (4) to Section 176 of the Act.
A bare reading of both the relevant provisions show that under the Rules a recount is prescribed after the completion of the counting to the Returning Officer (Panchayat). Such an officer may allow the application and can even reject if it is frivolous and unreasonable. But the substantive provision is contained in sub-section (4) to Section 176 of the Act. If the allegations are pertaining to corrupt practices, procedure is prescribed and election can be set aside if certain assertions in accordance with law are proved. But under Section 176(4)(b) of the Act, where the provisions of Section 176(4)(a) are not applicable and the validity of the election is in dispute, the Court after scrutiny and computation of the votes can pass appropriate orders. This is independent of Rule 69 of the Rules referred to above. 9. A Full Bench of this court in the case of Radha Kishan v. Election Tribunal-cum-Sub-Judge, Hissar, 1999(3) Punjab Law Reporter 1 has considered the relevant provisions. Specific note was taken of the expression "shall" occurring in section 17(4)(b) of the Act and thereupon the Full Bench concluded as under :- "The use of the word "shall" in our view is not without a purpose. The legislative purpose behind the provisions of sub-section (4)(b) is to provide an expeditious disposal and relief to the candidate whose case falls within the limited scope of the grounds spelled out in the Section itself. To us it appears that the cases falling within the limited ambit and scope of Section 176(4)(b) and not falling under sub-clause (a) of the same sub-section, it may not be necessary for the Court to hold a regular inquiry as postulated under the provisions of sub-section 4(a) of the Act. The validity of the election is to be in dispute but only between two or more candidates. Upon being prima facie satisfied, it may be somewhat obligatory upon the Court of competent jurisdiction to order scrutiny and computation of votes recorded in favour of each candidate (and) upon passing such an order, the candidate who is found to have recorded the largest number of valid votes in his favour would be duly elected. The restricted and narrow scope of the cases falling under this category and application of these provisions thereto clearly indicate with definite clarity (sic) by the legislature in the language of these provisions.
The restricted and narrow scope of the cases falling under this category and application of these provisions thereto clearly indicate with definite clarity (sic) by the legislature in the language of these provisions. The opening words of the provisions of sub-section (4)(b) indicate the exclusion of cases falling under clause 4(a) and take within its ambit the cases of a very limited and only ground for computation and scrutiny of votes. If the complete procedure of holding an enquiry by filing the pleadings leading to onus based evidence, examination of number of witnesses and then hearing of lengthy arguments is to be adopted before appropriate orders are passed, it would frustrate the very object of this sub-section. Expeditious disposal of election matters so as to enable a successful candidate to utilise his complete tenure in terms of the statute would be the basic legislative object behind such provisions. This object alone can further the cause of the statute. Fine line of distinction between the expression "shall" and where shall be terminated as "may" must be clearly understood to avoid unnecessary impediments in disposal of such election petitions. It also could not be contended that mere presentation of an application would compel the court to pass an order of recounting founded on computation and scrutiny of votes polled in favour of one candidates or the other automatically." The said findings of the Full Bench of this Court provide the answer to the argument so much thought of by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. 10. So far as the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Satyanarain Dudhani (supra) and Smt. Ram Rati (supra) are concerned, we have no hesitation in concluding that they have little application on the facts of the present case. The case of Satyanarain Dudhani (supra) pertains to Representation of the People Act, while the case of Smt. Ram Rati pertains to M.P. Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam. There is no provision brought to our notice similar to Section 176(4)(b) of the Act which gives independent power to respondent No. 1 for recount. Therefore, the said contention must fail and is rejected. 11. Confronted with that position, it had been argued that the recount had been ordered without there being proper pleadings and no, prima facie, case even had been drawn.
Therefore, the said contention must fail and is rejected. 11. Confronted with that position, it had been argued that the recount had been ordered without there being proper pleadings and no, prima facie, case even had been drawn. Our attention was drawn to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of P.K.K. Shamsudeen v. K.A.M. Mappillai Mohindeen and others, AIR 1989 SC 640. In the cited case, the Supreme Court held as under :- "Thus the settled position of law is that the justification for an order for examination of ballot papers and recount of votes is not to be derived from hind sight and by the result of the recount of votes. On the contrary, the justification for an order of recount of votes should be provided by the material placed by an election petitioner on the threshold before an order for recount of votes is actually made. The reason for this salutary rule is that the preservation of the secrecy of the ballot is a sacrosanct principle which cannot be lightly or hastily broken unless there is prima facie genuine need for it. The right of a defeated candidate to assail the validity of an election result and seek recounting of votes has to be subject to the basic principles that the secrecy of the ballot is sacrosanct in a democracy and hence unless the affected candidate is able to allege and substantiate in a acceptable measure by means of evidence that a prima facie case of a high degree of probability existed for the recount of votes being ordered by the Election Tribunal in the interests of justice, a Tribunal or Court should not order the recount of votes." Respondent No. 2 in this regard had pleaded as under:- "That the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 were fully colluded with the respondent No. 1. Three invalid votes were put in the bundles of respondent No. 1 by the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 and one vote thumb marked by the voter for his identification and was wrongly counted in favour of respondent No. 1 instead of cancelled. There were two booths in village Khairi and counting had been done at each polling booth by the respective Presiding Officer i.e. respondent Nos. 4 and 5. Respondent No. 1 had managed in connivance with the respondent Nos.
There were two booths in village Khairi and counting had been done at each polling booth by the respective Presiding Officer i.e. respondent Nos. 4 and 5. Respondent No. 1 had managed in connivance with the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 and their team to throw away two valid votes from the ballot boxes which would have definitely been polled in favour of the petitioner. The total number of polled votes did not tally with the votes taken out from ballot boxes. When the petitioner and his agent raised the objections and petitioner and his agent requested the Presiding Officer for recounting the valid and rejected votes and also to show the rejected vote to them for their satisfaction and also decide the above said objections i.e. double votes and dead votes, but the said Presiding Officer has refused to hear the petitioner and he left the place under police escort and reached Ladwa and a result had been declared by the P.O./R.O. on the basis of wrong counting already done under the great pressure from the higher authority and politician in an illegal manner. Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 and their team also wrongly gave benefit of cancelled votes to the respondent No. 1. The petitioner (was) having a largest number of valid votes in his favour than that of the respondent No. 1. The R.O./P.O. had committed illegality and irregularity during the course of counting in connivance with respondent No. 1. Therefore, the recounting and scrutiny of votes and computation of record and votes by the learned Court is very much necessary for justification in this case. If the re-counting is done in this case then no prejudice to the opposite party would be caused and rather a clear picture would emerge before this Honble Court." It is abundantly clear from the pleadings referred to above that though the pleadings were not very articulate, but the necessary basis for recount had been drawn, however, they were precise. In this view of the matter, the contention of the learned Counsel cannot prevail nor can he take the advantage of the Full Bench decision of this Court rendered in Radha Kishans case (supra). 12. In fact, on totality of the facts and circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that at any rate this court should not interfere. The reasons are not far to fetch.
12. In fact, on totality of the facts and circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that at any rate this court should not interfere. The reasons are not far to fetch. In extra-ordinary writ jurisdiction whenever it comes to the notice of the Court that the order in question does not require interference, certainly the court will withdraw its hand. The order for recount had been passed on 21.8.2000. The petitioner did not care to challenge that order at the relevant time. He allowed recount and thereafter when he found that he lost, he (had) has chosen to file the present writ petition. We are conscious of the principle that a person who does not challenge the interim order can challenge the same while filing the appeal against the final order. But it will not apply in the case of the petitioner who took a calculated risk and allowed recount to proceed. It is too late in the day for him now to turn around and start challenge the order earlier passed. Therefore, in any event, there is no occasion for any interference. For these reasons, the writ petition being without merit must fail and is dismissed with no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.