JUDGMENT : P.K. Mohanty, J. - This is an application u/s 482, Code Criminal procedure Challenging the notice u/s 386(e) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 2. The short facts of the case is that the Petitioner on the date of occurrence i.e. on 31.05.1985 was working as the Sub-Divisional Police Officer at Khurda. He along with other Officers had gone on official duty and while coming back in the jeep they had to stop as an auto rickshaw was parked on the road and three persons were standing near the auto rickshaw. Since it was late night, the A.S.I. of Police got down and enquired Regarding the cause and seized the auto rickshaw: Suddenly one Dusmanta Das challenged the A.S.I. and brought one spring knife and raised the same to attack him. Dusmata was heavily drunk. The Circle Inspector of Police and the Petitioner immediately got down from the jeep and came to the rescue of the A.S.I. The Circle Inspector gave a blow by means of his smalliathi as a result of which the knife had broken and fell down on the ground and Dusmanta also fell down on the ground since he was heavily drunk. The other two associates and the auto driver ran away from the spot. The auto had no number plate, however Dusmanta was apprehended and brought to the police station in a drunken state. He is also sustained minor injuries due to the fall. An F.I.R. was lodged and he was sent for medical examination and ultimately charge sheet was filed against Dusmanta u/s 307, I.P.C. 3. Accused Dusmanta Das was tried for having committed an offence u/s 307, I.P.C. in S.T. No. 38/181 of 1992. He was convicted thereunder and sentenced to undergo R.I. for three years and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-. It is stated that the prosecution had examined eight witnesses. P.W. 1 was the Circle Inspector of police, P.W. 2 was the doctor who examined Dusmanta on the same night and opined that he was drunk and had two injuries, possibly by fall and the other injury was opined to be due to coming contact with rough substance. P.W. 5 was an eye witness, P.W. 6 was the Petitioner and P.W. 7 was the A.S.I. who was the informant in the case. P.W. 5 was an eye witness, P.W. 6 was the Petitioner and P.W. 7 was the A.S.I. who was the informant in the case. The matter was carried in appeal and the learned appellate Court allowed the appeal, set aside the order of conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court and acquitted the accused from the charges. 4. However, while acquitting the Appellant of the charges the learned appellate Court in paragraph 13. 1 of the judgment observed as follows: Now reverting back to the scenario of this case. I am of the opinion that the three police officers, namely P. Ws. 1, 6 and 7. owe an explanation as to how the Appellant accused sustained injuries on his person. They cannot be allowed to go scot-free without such an explanation. I, therefore, call upon those three police officers in exercise of my powers conferred under Clause (e) of Section 386 Code of Criminal Procedure to satisfactorily explain the circumstances, under which the Appellant-accused sustained injuries on his person and only after consideration of their explanation, the next course of justice, i.e. if they would be prosecuted for such an abominable act would be decided. Notice on this point be issued to P. Ws. 1, 6 and 7. The accused appellant also be noticed to place his version of the case so far as the injuries on him are concerned. 5. Pursuant to the observation the notice of show cause has been issued u/s 386 (e) Code of Criminal Procedure to show cause as to why the Petitioner shall not be prosecuted for committing assault on the accused Dusmanta Das on 31.5.1985 at the place of occurrence in furtherance of their common intention with the other two police officers and hence the present petition challenging the said show cause notice. 6. The main thrust of argument of Sri S.K. Pasha, learned Counsel for the Petitioner is that consequential or incidental orders within the purview of provision of Section 386 (e) Code of Criminal Procedure' must fall within the category that the order which follows as a matter of course being necessary complements to the main order which is ancillary in character require the appellate Court's inherent jurisdiction or interference, but none of the conditions being available, the notice is misconceived in law and liable to be quashed. It is submitted that an order for an enquiry as to how the accused got injuries is beyond the scope and ambit of Section 386 (e) Code of Criminal Procedure and as such, the issuance of notice by the appellate Court is misconceived in law. It is further submitted that the Criminal procedure Code prescribes the period of limitation with regard to taking of cognizance of offence u/s 468 of the Code, but in the present case the accused had sustained two simple injuries and if at all any Officer had inflicted the injuries, cognizance could be taken u/s 323 I.P.C. or at best u/s 324 I.P.C. beyond the period of limitation. The occurrence being of the year 1985 no cognizance could be taken after a lapse of 15 years and as such, the enquiry contemplated by the learned appellate Court is a futile exercise. It is submitted that even factually also it will be apparent from records that in the F.I.R. mention was made that Dusmanta had fallen down while he was in a drunken state being given a blow to his knife by the lathi of P.W. 1. He has sustained injuries due to fall and was referred to the doctor for examination in the same night, He was examined by the doctor who had opined that he sustained two simple injuries one of which is possible by fall and another by coming in contact with rough substance. He was produced before the learned Magistrate on 1.2.1985 and had not alleged any ill treatment or that he was injured by any police Officer. No complaint has been filed by Dusmanta. In his 313 Code of Criminal Procedure statement also he had not stated that the Petitioner has assaulted him, inasmuch as the explanation offered u/s 313, Code of Criminal Procedure does not relate to the incident which occurred at 11.30 P.M. of 31.1.1985 and as such; on merit also such a show cause issued by the learned Additional Sessions Judge is misconceived in law and is without jurisdiction. 7. The present Criminal Misc. Case was dismissed as against opp. party No. 1, accused in the Criminal case out of which the Criminal Appeal arose by order dated 4.7.1987, the peremptory order dated 5.5.1997 having not been complied with. However, by order dated 28.7.2000 in misc. 7. The present Criminal Misc. Case was dismissed as against opp. party No. 1, accused in the Criminal case out of which the Criminal Appeal arose by order dated 4.7.1987, the peremptory order dated 5.5.1997 having not been complied with. However, by order dated 28.7.2000 in misc. Case No. 1302 of 2000 a memo was filed to the effect that opp. party No. 1 having died two years back, his name may be expunged. The Court directed that no further notice is called for opp. party No. 1 having died. Section 386 (e), Code of Criminal Procedure may be quoted hereunder: 386. Powers of the Appellate Court-After perusing such record and hearing the Appellant or his pleader, if he appear and the Public Prosecutor, if he appears, and in case of an appeal u/s 377 of Section 378, the accused, if it considers that there is no sufficient ground for interfering, dismiss the appeal, or may (a) xx xx xx xx (e) or make any amendment or any consequential or incidental order that may be just or proper: 8. On a bare reading of the aforesaid provision it is abundently clear that an order under this clause must be anciliary to the main case or must be consequential or incidental thereto. An incidental order is one which is likely to follow as a result of the main order. The incidental or consequential order are those which follows as a matter of course and are compliments to the main order without which the order would be incomplete and ineffective, like the orders as to refund of fines in case of acquittal and orders of disposal of property. Clause (e) of Section 386 Code of Criminal Procedure does not invest an appellate court to make an order which the Court below ought or might have done. Law does not provide that an appellate Court while passing an order of acquittal without anything on record to show that the accused was assaulted or received injuries may be due to negligence or laches of the Arresting Officer they are to be brought to hook and proceeded against under this Section. The records did not show nor the Appellant complained before the appellate Court that in course of investigation the accused was assaulted and injured by the Investigating Officer or that he was prejudiced. The records did not show nor the Appellant complained before the appellate Court that in course of investigation the accused was assaulted and injured by the Investigating Officer or that he was prejudiced. There is also nothing on record when he accused was produced before the learned Magistrate, that he made any complaint with regard to the injuries or ill-treatment by the Police Officers. No application for initiating criminal proceeding against the Officer had been filed nor in the statement of the accused u/s 313 Code of Criminal Procedure a mention has been made that he was assaulted and injured. In such factual backdrop of the case, the impugned order passed by, the learned lower appellate Court asking the Petitioner to show cause and explain the injuries in the person of the accused, is misconceived in law and liable to be set aside. A reference may be made to a recent decision of the Apex Court In Commandant 20 BNITB Police v. Sanjaya Binjoa; AIR 1858 SC 220 wherein the Apex Court while considering the powers of the Court under Clause (e) of Section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has observed that the consequential or incidental orders contemplated under Clause (e) of Section 386 of the Code are orders which follow as a matter of course being necessary complements to the main orders without which the latter would be incomplete and ineffective, such as issuance of directions for refund of fine realised from accused ultimately acquitted or on the reversal of acquittal any direction as to punishment, fine or compensation payable u/s 250 of the Code and the like. In the present case the impugned order cannot be construed or complementary to the order of acquittal and as such cannot be sustained in law. 9. In the impugned order while asking the Petitioner to show cause the accused who was acquitted by it, was asked to place his version of the case so far as the injury on him are concerned. Since the accused is already dead, question of explaining the injuries would not arise and as such, the proceeding for explaining the injuries on the person of the accused would be a futile exercise. 10. In any view of the matter, the order for issuance of show cause and the impugned show cause notice cannot be sustained and accordingly, I quash the same. 11. The Criminal Misc. 10. In any view of the matter, the order for issuance of show cause and the impugned show cause notice cannot be sustained and accordingly, I quash the same. 11. The Criminal Misc. Case is accordingly allowed. Final Result : Dismissed