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2001 DIGILAW 271 (PAT)

Jamuna Prasad Keshari @ Jamuna Prasad And Others v. Ashok Kumar Jain

2001-03-23

S.N.PATHAK

body2001
Judgment S.N.Pathak, J. 1. This second appeal has been preferred by the defendants of Title Suit No. 302 of 1974. The aforesaid title suit was filed by the plaintiff-respondent and the trial Court decreed the suit. The defendants filed the first appeal which was dismissed and then this second appeal. The trial Court passed the judgment on 10th August, 1976 and the appellate Court passed its judgment on 8th May 1986. 2. The case of the plaintiff-respondents in the Court below was that Holding No. 304, having S.P. No. 3042 in Mohalla Rakabganj of Tekari Town, having an area of 6 decimals was orally purchased by the grand father of the plaintiffs in the year 1928 for Rs. 28. The vendor was Gauri Charan Lal, son of the recorded tenant. This purchase was made by Champalal in the Farzi name of his Bhagina Bala Bux. Bala Bux was mutated in the municipal records. However, Champalal owned and possessed holding No. 305 and, therefore, he amalgamated the holding Nos. 304 and 305 and opened urinal, Nail etc. on holding No. 304 and opened exit on holding No. 304. Rest of the land of holding No. 304 was left open for the purpose of constructing shops. Champalal continued in his possession and in the year 1938, he got his name mutated in place of Bala-Bux. The receipts for both the holdings were jointly issued by the Municipality and Champalal paid rent for both the holdings together. Moreover, in course of time, holding No. 304 became Parti and so no rent was paid and since both the holdings were mutated in favour of Champalal, receipts for both the holdings were issued jointly. However, in the year 1967(10-1-1967), Chaturbhuj Prased, one of the sons of Gauri Lal created a sham sale-deed in favour of defendant Nos. 2 and 3 and then the defendants started interfering with the possession of,the plaintiffs and so this led to a proceeding under Secs. 144 and 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This proceeding was decided against the plaintiff and, hence, the suit was filed for declaration of title and recovery of possession. 3. The case of the defendant-respondent was that the plaintiffs oral purchase was invalid because in the plaint, he set up a case of oral purchase accompanied by memorandum of sale whereas in the proceeding under Sec. 145, Cr. This proceeding was decided against the plaintiff and, hence, the suit was filed for declaration of title and recovery of possession. 3. The case of the defendant-respondent was that the plaintiffs oral purchase was invalid because in the plaint, he set up a case of oral purchase accompanied by memorandum of sale whereas in the proceeding under Sec. 145, Cr. P.C. he referred to a Khista Kebala. Moreover, the municipal record could not confer title upon the plaintiff or plaintiffs ancestor and so the plaintiffs had failed to prove their title. The proceeding in the proceeding under Sec. 145 Cr. P.C. was rightly decided and simply Gaurilal was not the sole owner of the property in the year 1928 because his elder brother was alive and, therefore, any question of oral sale by him did not arise and, hence, he could not confer any title upon the plaintiffs ancestor. 4. The trial Court, however, on the basis of the evidence on behalf of both the parties, held that it was not proved that in year 1928, Gaurilal was survived by his elder brother. So the trial Court disbelieved the case of the defendant-appellant that Gaurilal was not the sole owner of the suit property in the year 1928. The trial Court further held that the entries in the municipal record was evidenced by Assessment Register of the Municipality and receipts filed by the plaintiff-respondents. All these documents were exhibited in the lower Court. The case of the defendant in this connection to the effect that one of the relatives of Champalal Biswas was the Chairman of the the Municipality at the relevant time and so he got his name mutated, was also disbelieved by the trial Court upon the evidence adduced by the parties. So the trial Court held that the entries into the Municipal record in the name of Champalal did not suffer from any taintness or manipulation. The trial Court also held that the plaintiffs had thus, adduced sufficient oral evidence of so many witness to prove his possession right from the days of oral purchase up to the year 1967, when they were allegedly dispossessed or their possession was disturbed after the purchase by the descendants from Chaturbhuj Prasad. 5. The trial Court also held that the plaintiffs had thus, adduced sufficient oral evidence of so many witness to prove his possession right from the days of oral purchase up to the year 1967, when they were allegedly dispossessed or their possession was disturbed after the purchase by the descendants from Chaturbhuj Prasad. 5. The appellate Court also confirmed the judgment of the trial Court of the trial Court and relied on the evidence on behalf of plaintiff-respondents, as adduced in the lower Court. The case of the plaintiff-respondents depended on the oral sale. Of course, the pleading relating to the memorandum of sale or the Khista Kebala, as referred to in Ext-E and Ext-F, in the proceeding before the Magistrate, refers to some kind of discrepancies; but it is a matter of common knowledge that rustic people may refer to any reduction of the matter of sale on a paper to be a Khista Kebala, but that in itself does not belie the story of sale. The pleading in this connection cannot be disbelieved simply on the basis of jugglery of words. An oral sale has to be accompanied by the delivery of possession and at least one witness was examined by the plaintiff-respondent in the Court below. The consistent case and evidence of the plaintiff-respondent as documented by the entitles in the municipal record-referred to the possession of the plaintiff-respondent right from the year of sale up to the year 1967, when he was allegedly dispossessed by the defendant-appellant emboldened by his sale-deed. So, even if the sale of the plaintiff-respondent was not valid on account of non-prosecution of memorandum of sale or Khista Kebala which, perhaps required registration, the continuous possession of the plaintiff-would amount to perfection of his title, unless it was challenged by the rightful owner. In this connection, it was the defendant No. 5, Chaturbhuj Prasad who was the right person. Defendant No. 5 was the son of Gaurilal who failed to file any W.S. in the lower Court supporting the claim of the defendant-appellant regarding his purchase and validity of his sale-deed, it was submitted before me by the respondents lawyer that the sale-deed of the defendants did not contain any warranty that on the failure of the vendees title and possession, the vendor shall be liable to pay back the consideration money. Normally, sale-deeds do contain such warranty. Normally, sale-deeds do contain such warranty. The absence of such a warranty in the sale-deed of the defendant, was, of course, a peculiar circumstance in the instant suit and so it appears that Chaturbhuj Lal was not sure of title which he transferred to the defendants. In the instant appeal the sole legal question which was formulated for its decision was whether non-registered sale-deed will have precedence over the registered deed and, perhaps, in the order-sheet dated 18th July, 1988, by which this appeal was admitted, reference to deed of gift is a clerical error because it is none of the case of the parties that the registered deed of gift was created. Of course, an oral sale cannot prevail over the registered deed of sale. There can be no dispute regarding this legal principle; but the moot question in the instant case was whether the defendants acquired valid title by their registered sale-deed of the year 1967, if already by oral sale, the plaintiffs ancestor had acquired title over the suit land. Both the lower Courts held on the facts on record that the plaintiffs ancestor had acquired the suit land, by oral purchase and the vendee and then the plaintiff was coming in possession of the suit land, until the defendants obtained the sale-deed in the year 1967. So the finding regarding possession by both the lower Courts was concurrent and so it was conclusive and final. Therefore, I am of the opinion that the plaintiff-respondent had perfected his title at least by continued possession over the suit land through his ancestor. So the vendor of the defendant was left with no title to transfer any to the defendant and, hence, the sale-deed of the defendant was, of course, invalid and absence of warranty on the same may also refer to its fictitious character. In the circumstances of the case, therefore, there was no alternative before the lower Courts to hold that the plaintiff was entitled to seek the relief which he had sought for. 6. In the result, I am of the opinion that this appeal has got no merit and it is accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to cost of this appeal.